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Chapter 1
14 
1.1.More and Better Jobs! 
 
In a world in which the majority of the people spend most of their lifetime working, 
the labour market can rightfully be considered as one of the core features of today’s 
society. The income of workers as well as the utility that is derived from the act of 
working influence society’s welfare. Given this central role of the labour market in 
determining the welfare of citizens it is no wonder that governments aim for 
influencing the labour market process.  
 
Government interventions aimed at influencing labour market outcomes have been 
around for centuries and have been conducted by all levels of government, be it local, 
regional or national. In more recent years, policy measures in the area of the labour 
market have even transcended the boundaries of the nation state. The European 
Union, ever since its inception in the nineteen fifties, has influenced and facilitated 
the labour market process by policies ranging from the promotion of the free 
movement of workers and the laying down of work standards to spending from EU 
funds and the setting up of systems for the coordination of national policies. It is these 
EU policy efforts, their interplay and the way they influence the labour market that 
are the subject of analysis in this study. More specifically, this study asks the 
following research question: 
 
“What are the economic objectives of the European Union employment policies and 
how effective are EU policies in this regard?”  
 
1.2 Outline of the book 
 
This study will deal with the research question set out above by subsequently 
discussing the economic objectives of employment policy, the development over time 
of the different EU instruments of employment policy, the focus and impact of these 
instruments, and a number of institutional elements that influence the manner in 
which the EU instruments are able to contribute to the achievement of the various 
economic objectives. The final chapter then draws this study to a close by drawing 
conclusions and looking ahead, “rethinking” EU employment policy and coming up 
with proposals for improvement. 
 
Chapter 2 will address the question of which objectives governments may have for 
employment policy from an economic point of view. The chapter will be based on a 
standard growth accounting equation, in which GDP per capita growth is determined 
by growth in labour utilisation and labour productivity. This equation will be further 
developed to unravel the various aspects that influence the manner in which GDP per 
capita develops. In the end, this will lead to five objectives governments can pursue in 
setting employment policy, all of which are linked in a number of different ways to 
increasing GDP per capita growth, namely increasing incentives for work, improving 
the functioning and flexibility of markets, improving the human capital stock, 
 
improving framework conditions and short-term stabilisation policy. 
  
Chapter 3 addresses the question of what type of employment policy instruments have 
been developed in the EU. Describing the development of EU employment policy 
instruments, this chapter will relate these instruments to the economic objectives for 
government policy of chapter 2. Here it will become apparent that the development of 
EU employment policy has led to four different instruments of policy-making, namely 
employment policy coordination, internal market legislation, social employment 
policy and EU funds spending.  
 
Chapter 4 will take a closer look at the links between the economic objectives and the 
EU employment policy instruments and the role that the instruments actually play in 
influencing real world developments. In general, this chapter will analyse the link 
between the economic objectives of chapter 2 and the various EU employment policy 
instruments. However, the fit will be shown to be far from perfect, something which 
will become especially apparent when taking into account social aspects of 
employment policy. Analysis of the manner in which EU employment policy 
instruments have contributed to achieving the economic objectives will subsequently 
show a large heterogeneity between the EU Member States in both starting positions 
and development of the various economic output and policy variables. Also, when 
examining effects of the instruments large differences between the various 
instruments in terms of their contribution to the objectives will be identified.  
 
Chapter 5 will go deeper into this functioning of the EU employment policy 
instruments, analysing three different institutional aspects that can influence the 
manner in which the EU employment policy instruments are able to contribute to 
achieving the economic objectives, including the distribution of power in the 
supranational legal order, democratic legitimacy and accountability, and coherence 
and practical application. Analysis in this chapter will show that these aspects help 
explain the success (or lack thereof) of the various instruments.  
 
The general conclusions that can be drawn from the analyses offered throughout this 
study provide a mixed picture. On the one hand, as far as the aims of the various 
instruments are concerned, they are largely in line with the policy prescriptions from 
the economic framework. On the other hand, overall, EU employment policy is a 
complex system with large overlaps and vague terminology, which impact is 
uncertain. These findings combined, will form the basis to “rethink” EU employment 
policy, which is done in the final chapter.  
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Chapter 2
18 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The general economic rationale behind government employment policy is based on 
the concept of labour as one of society’s scarce productive resources. The economic 
concept of employment policy used here is therefore rooted in the assumption that the 
goal of government policy is to set a framework to ensure the most efficient and 
productive use of this production factor. This is an important assumption to highlight, 
since it means that this chapter will focus on ways the government can use 
employment policy to ensure the most efficient use of labour as a productive factor, 
thereby increasing economic growth. GDP per capita growth will be used as indicator 
of economic growth, since this is the most commonly used measure1 for material 
living standards and is readily available for a large number of countries on a timely 
basis. However, there are also some downsides to using this measure. GDP per capita 
e.g. does not capture some aspects that may be important for assessing overall well-
being, including the value of leisure or inequality of income2, and empirical 
measurement of key production activities  e.g. in the provision of health and 
education services can be further improved upon. All this means that focussing solely 
on GDP per capita as an indicator of how well-off people are, can give misleading 
indications, something which will have to be kept in mind3.   
 
Starting from the basis of GDP per capita, employment policy in essence can be 
aimed at two different aspects of labour as a productive factor. The standard 
macroeconomic growth accounting equation that will be used as a basis to 
differentiate between the two is the following:  
 
Equation 1: 
 
 
 
The left-hand side of the equation gives GDP per capita. The right-hand side of the 
equation is divided in two parts, which each stand for a distinct aspect of labour 
usage. The first part is the hours worked per capita, or labour utilisation. The second 
part is GDP per hour worked, or labour productivity. The formula therefore describes 
that GDP per capita is equal to the number of hours each person on average works 
times how productive the average person is per hour worked. 
                                                   
1 See European Commission, ‘GDP and beyond, measuring progress in a changing world’, 
COM(2009)433. 
2 See also e.g. OECD, Going for growth (2008) or European Commission, ‘GDP and beyond, 
measuring progress in a changing world’, COM(2009)433. For an extensive discussion on the pros and 
cons of GDP per capita as indicator of wellbeing see R. Boarini, A. Johansson and M. Mira d'Ercole, 
‘Alternative Measures of Well-Being’ (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no 476, 2006). 
3 On this see also Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, "Report by the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress" (2009) 

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Even though the two different aspects are closely interlinked they will first be 
discussed separately. Section 2.2 focuses on the labour utilisation element of the 
equation, section 2.3 will discuss labour productivity and section 2.4 will discuss the 
linkages between the two, giving the full picture of the labour market from a supply 
side point of view. Section 2.5 will add to this by discussing the elements of demand 
and business cycles. Section 2.6 will conclude, summarizing the various policy 
objectives that governments can pursue in the area of employment policy.    
 
2.2 Labour utilisation, or: how much do how many people work? 
 
This section deals with the first part of the growth accounting equation, labour 
utilisation. Before diving into the basic micro economic foundations behind this 
variable the different elements need to be made more explicit. The number of hours 
worked per capita, in equation 1, can be subdivided as follows: 
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Subsequently, the number of employed persons as part of the population  can be 
broken down as follows: 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The general economic rationale behind government employment policy is based on 
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goal of government policy is to set a framework to ensure the most efficient and 
productive use of this production factor. This is an important assumption to highlight, 
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education services can be further improved upon. All this means that focussing solely 
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Equation 1: 
 
 
 
The left-hand side of the equation gives GDP per capita. The right-hand side of the 
equation is divided in two parts, which each stand for a distinct aspect of labour 
usage. The first part is the hours worked per capita, or labour utilisation. The second 
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that GDP per capita is equal to the number of hours each person on average works 
times how productive the average person is per hour worked. 
                                                   
1 See European Commission, ‘GDP and beyond, measuring progress in a changing world’, 
COM(2009)433. 
2 See also e.g. OECD, Going for growth (2008) or European Commission, ‘GDP and beyond, 
measuring progress in a changing world’, COM(2009)433. For an extensive discussion on the pros and 
cons of GDP per capita as indicator of wellbeing see R. Boarini, A. Johansson and M. Mira d'Ercole, 
‘Alternative Measures of Well-Being’ (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no 476, 2006). 
3 On this see also Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, "Report by the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress" (2009) 
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Increasing  (i.e. the number of hours worked per capita) is achieved by 
increasing: 
1. The working age population as part of the total population 
2. The share of the working age population that participates in the labour market 
3. The number of hours worked per employed person 
4. The share of the participating working age population that is actually employed. 
 
To ultimately get to the economic objectives of government employment policy some 
more general micro economic notions need to be discussed first. The basic 
microeconomic concepts4 presented in this chapter are based on a theory of (free) 
choice and on the concept of “incentives”, the general notions of which can be 
explained by the following graph.  
 
Graph 1  
           
 
The graph illustrates a single person’s decision to allocate the hours he has in a day to 
different utility generating activities. For simplicity’s sake the graph gives just two 
choices. The person either works or he spends his time on “leisure activities”. In this 
simple framework leisure activities consist of all non-work activities (including 
sleep). The straight line in the graph depicts the person’s “budget constraint”: there 
are only 24 hours in a day. The U curve depicts the person’s indifference curve for a 
given utility (in this case “100”). For any combination of hours worked and hours 
spend on leisure that lies on the curve the utility (or welfare) the person obtains is the 
same. The person is therefore “indifferent” between the various options. The fact that 
the curve is convex to the origin is an illustration of diminishing returns to scale. In 
                                                   
4 Based on McConnell, Brue and MacPherson, Contemporary labor economics (7th edition, McGraw-
Hill, 2008). 
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short, this means that an individual becomes increasingly reluctant to give up an hour 
of leisure when leisure time becomes increasingly scarce. In this graph, there is only 
one U curve presented. However, one could draw an infinite number of identically 
shaped curves, each reflecting a different level of utility. The further away from the 
origin the higher the utility reflected by the curve. A person would therefore prefer to 
be on a curve as far away from the origin as possible. 
 
When the assumption is added that hours worked generates utility for the person in 
question because they generate income the adapted graph below can give a number of 
interesting insights.  
 
Graph 2 
         
 
The Y-axis now stands for real income (or real wage times hours worked). In the 
original situation, real income is Ya and number of hours spend on leisure is Xa.  
 
The adapted graph can give some insight into what happens when the wage rate rises. 
First of all, the maximum amount of income that can be generated rises from Y1 to 
Y2. This means that the budget constraint becomes steeper. This in turn means that a 
higher level of utility can now be obtained. The highest possible utility that can be 
obtained with the new budget constraint occurs at point B, with the person obtaining a 
higher income Yb and spending fewer hours on leisure activities. 
 
There are two different and opposing forces at work that lead to this outcome. The 
first one is what is called “the income effect”. The income effect consists of the 
change in hours spend on leisure activities and income that would have occurred if the 
person would have been able to obtain the level of utility at B, but without a change in 
the wage rate (or the change from A to C in the graph). This pure income effect 
increases the number of hours spend on leisure. The counteracting effect is what is 
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the wage rate (or the change from A to C in the graph). This pure income effect 
increases the number of hours spend on leisure. The counteracting effect is what is 
27022 Duin.indd   21 12-10-13   17:42
Chapter 2
22 
called the “substitution effect” (or the shift from C to B). This reflects the fact that the 
increased wage rate makes it more expensive to “buy” an hour of leisure.   
 
In this example the substitution effect is greater than the income effect. However, this 
is not necessarily always the case. The outcome depends both on the budget constraint 
and the shape and position of the indifference curves. Repeating the exercise above 
with an ever increasing wage rate and therefore a steeper and steeper budget 
constraint will show that eventually there is a turning point. From that point on, the 
income effect will dominate the substitution effect with an increase in the wage rate 
effectively lowering the number of hours worked. Graphically this looks as follows: 
 
Graph 3 
         
Point A represents a person in the position depicted in graph 2 experiencing an 
increase in wage rate. Point B is the turning point. A person at point C will decrease 
his hours worked when confronted with a further wage increase. 
 
When expanding this framework to the macro level the manner in which labour 
supply reacts to a change in wage rate becomes uncertain. Depending on the 
preferences of the persons in the specific group and the size of the wage interval the 
shape of the total labour supply curve can be either backward bending or a diagonally 
upward moving line. For the remainder of this study it will be assumed that for 
realistic real wage rates the aggregation of the individual labour supply curves give a 
straight upward moving labour supply curve. This assumption is largely confirmed 
by reality. Empirical studies on the elasticities of labour supply to wages give widely 
varying results. Studies generally support the existence of a positive elasticity, and 
therewith an upward sloping supply curve. There are, however, important differences 
between subgroups to be identified here. For instance, the elasticity for males is 
 
generally estimated as being much lower than that of females, especially second 
earners. Furthermore, the elasticity around the participation versus no participation 
threshold (or extensive margin) is greater than the elasticity in increasing hours 
worked (or intensive margin) 5. These differences will therefore always have to be 
kept in mind.  
 
The macroeconomic model used here will assume that higher wages attract people 
away from leisure activities, thereby increasing work hours. This leads to the 
following upward sloping labour supply curve. 
 
Graph 4 
         
Where the analysis of labour supply is built on a workers decision to allocate his 
hours, analysis of labour demand is built on the behaviour of firms and their business 
decisions, since firms demand labour as input for their production processes6. This 
means that labour demand is a “derived demand”. The amount of labour demanded is 
derived from the amount of products firms sell on a market and the relative costs and 
productivity of the different production inputs (labour, capital etc.). The amount of 
products a firm sells on a market in turn depends on the demand for its products and 
the firm’s profit maximisation decision, with firms setting their production at the 
point where marginal return equals marginal costs of production. This setup in fact 
gives a two stage game, where a firm’s demand for labour depends on the costs of its 
production factors and the firm’s supply of goods, which in turn depends on the costs 
of its production process, including labour. This decision can be simplified by 
                                                   
5 For a comprehensive overview see Evers, de Mooij and van Vuuren, ‘What explains the variation in 
estimates of labour supply elasticities?’ (CESinfo working paper, no 1633, 2005). 
6 It should be kept in mind that this is a simplification of reality. Government as an employer is, for 
instance, not dealt with separately here. Furthermore, self-employed persons would in this framework 
simultaneously be supplying and demanding labour.   
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assuming that there are only two production factors (capital and labour) and that the 
initial amount of goods supplied by a firm (Q) is an exogenously given outcome of 
the goods market, say Q = 50, which gives the following graph:  
 
Graph 5 
         
The Q = 50 curve (or isoquant) gives all different combinations of capital and labour 
that will lead to a production of Q = 50 and illustrates the fact that both experience 
diminishing returns to scale. The C = 100 line (or isocost) gives all combinations of 
capital and labour with a total cost of 100. In this example both labour and capital cost 
10 per unit. Point A gives the most efficient production input combination of capital 
and labour to produce Q = 50. Every other point on the Q = 50 line will lie on a 
higher, and therefore in this setting more expensive, isocost curve.  
 
This simple framework provides a reference to observe what happens in different 
situations affecting the amount or price of labour in the market. Assume that the price 
of labour rises, which gives the following graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6 
 
         
Starting point is at point A, like in the previous graph, with 6 units of labour being 
used (or demanded) by the firm. The increase in the price of labour leads to a pivoting 
of the isocost curve, since labour becomes relatively more expensive than capital. 
Again there are two effects. The first one is a substitution effect. This term in this case 
is illustrated by the pivoting of the isocost curve, while assuming that production 
remains at Q = 50 (the red line in the graph). Point B becomes the most efficient 
production input mix, with 5 instead of 6 units of labour being demanded7. 
 
The second effect is the income effect. Since the marginal costs of production 
become higher, the marginal rate of return at q=50 is no longer sufficient to counter 
the marginal costs. Profit is no longer maximised and the firm will decrease its 
production. This effect in the graph is illustrated by the green line. The new 
production point will be point C with Q= 40 being produced with 4 instead of 6 units 
of labour being used (or demanded). It is interesting to note in this context that, 
contrary to the discussion on labour supply, for labour demand both the income and 
the substitution effect work in the same direction, which does not lead to the same 
uncertainty as regards the shape of the labour demand curve that exists for labour 
supply. When aggregated, the labour demand curve will be downward sloping as 
portrayed in graph 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
7 Note that this assumes that both the amount of capital and labour can be altered automatically and 
instantaneously.  
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7 Note that this assumes that both the amount of capital and labour can be altered automatically and 
instantaneously.  
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Graph 7 
         
Similar to the labour supply framework discussed earlier, this simple framework is 
based on a number of assumptions which significantly influence the underlying logic 
and conclusions that can be drawn. As a starting point, however, it provides all the 
tools needed to delve deeper into the different elements of the growth accounting 
equation and subsequent government policy implications.  
 
2.2.1 The working age population as part of the total population 
 
The working age population as part of the total population is for a large part a matter 
of defining the term “working age”. What is considered to be working age can in 
essence be considered a political choice based on fundamental human values and 
cultural preferences8. In this study the standard EU/Eurostat definition for working 
age will be used, which is the population between the ages of 15 and 649. Taking the 
Eurostat definition as starting point, changes in the working age population follow 
changes in general demographic set up of the total population. Defining “flow 
variables” in this account are the net population growth rate and the net migration 
rate. For example, a (temporary) increase in the birth rate will increase the working 
age population as part of the total population. Eventually, however, this effect will 
subside and reverse simply because this wave of people turns 65.  The same holds for 
a (temporary) increase in migration from other countries (assuming that they will also 
remain members of the host country’s population after they turn 65).   
 
2.2.2 The share of the working age population that participates in the labour market  
 
To adequately deal with the aspect of “participating in the labour market” the concept 
                                                   
8 See e.g. International Labour Organisation, Key indicators of the labour market (7nd edition, 2011). 
9 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, last accessed 2 January 2013. 
 
of “participating” first needs to be defined. Again, the standard Eurostat definition 
will be used. A participating (or “economically active”), member of the working age 
population is either employed or unemployed but actively seeking for a job. To be 
even more precise:  
 
“- At work 
Persons stating they are 'currently' working for pay or profit in a job or business 
for at least one hour, or not currently working but with a job or business from 
which they are temporarily absent. Persons 'at work' comprise therefore 'paid 
employees', 'self-employed (together with employers)', persons in 'training under 
special scheme related to employment' or in 'paid apprenticeship'. Persons 
'working unpaid in family enterprise' are also included. 
 
- Unemployed 
Persons that are currently not working (i.e. 0 hours) and are available to start work 
within the next two weeks AND  
(a) that have already found a job to start in the future or are awaiting the outcome 
of an application or interview, or  
(b) that are actively seeking a job (i.e. contacted a public employment office for 
finding work, applied directly to an employer, studied or replied to advertisements, 
contacted a private employment or vocational guidance agency, asked friends or 
contacts or have taken steps to start an own business), or  
(c) that are seeking a job and have received a job offer during the past 4 weeks.”10 
 
Increasing the number of people that participate in the labour market therefore means 
increasing the number of people in the working age population that fall in the two 
categories above, or in other words, decreasing the number of people of working age 
that do not fall under this definition.  
 
There are several types of people that do not rank as a participating member of the 
working age population, with each type having its own characteristics and reasons for 
not participating. Based on a life cycle approach to the labour market, the following 
chart from Broersma, van Dijk and van Wissen (2004)11 distinguishes between the 
various types. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
10 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu last accessed 2 January 2013 
11 Broersma, van Dijk and van Wissen, ‘Making the Unused Labour force work: assessing the facts for 
the Netherlands’ (CBS working paper, no 04008, 2004) 31. 
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Graph 7 
         
Similar to the labour supply framework discussed earlier, this simple framework is 
based on a number of assumptions which significantly influence the underlying logic 
and conclusions that can be drawn. As a starting point, however, it provides all the 
tools needed to delve deeper into the different elements of the growth accounting 
equation and subsequent government policy implications.  
 
2.2.1 The working age population as part of the total population 
 
The working age population as part of the total population is for a large part a matter 
of defining the term “working age”. What is considered to be working age can in 
essence be considered a political choice based on fundamental human values and 
cultural preferences8. In this study the standard EU/Eurostat definition for working 
age will be used, which is the population between the ages of 15 and 649. Taking the 
Eurostat definition as starting point, changes in the working age population follow 
changes in general demographic set up of the total population. Defining “flow 
variables” in this account are the net population growth rate and the net migration 
rate. For example, a (temporary) increase in the birth rate will increase the working 
age population as part of the total population. Eventually, however, this effect will 
subside and reverse simply because this wave of people turns 65.  The same holds for 
a (temporary) increase in migration from other countries (assuming that they will also 
remain members of the host country’s population after they turn 65).   
 
2.2.2 The share of the working age population that participates in the labour market  
 
To adequately deal with the aspect of “participating in the labour market” the concept 
                                                   
8 See e.g. International Labour Organisation, Key indicators of the labour market (7nd edition, 2011). 
9 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, last accessed 2 January 2013. 
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10 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu last accessed 2 January 2013 
11 Broersma, van Dijk and van Wissen, ‘Making the Unused Labour force work: assessing the facts for 
the Netherlands’ (CBS working paper, no 04008, 2004) 31. 
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Chart 1 
 
 
On the left in the middle education is posted as a reason for not participating. This 
mainly stands for the large amount of young people that are of working age (which  
starts at 15) but do not work or look for work, because they are currently enjoying 
education. As mirror image, on the right in the middle it says early retirement. This 
stands for the people that still belong to the working age population (i.e. are younger 
than 65) but have already retired from employment. 
 
Between these two categories lie the people of working age that do not participate in 
the labour market, either because they 
 
1. choose to perform household/care tasks  
2. do not work for medical reasons  
3. do not work for other reasons 
 
The different categories can be incorporated in the general economic framework 
developed in the previous section in a number of different ways. The actual 
participating labour force is found in combining the labour supply and labour demand 
curves previously derived, or graphically at point A in graph 8 with participating 
labour force L1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8 
        
Recalling graph 1 on labour supply the labour supply decision is dependent on a 
person’s preferences between income generating activities (work) and other activities 
(leisure). A person will only participate in the labour market if the utility generated is 
higher than the utility generated when not participating. In other words, there is a 
threshold beneath which a person will not participate in the labour market which can 
be shown using the following graph. 
 
Graph 9 
 
 
The difference in this graph compared to the earlier ones lies in the existence of 
outside income (or Y1 in the graph). This gives a budget constraint curve with a 
different shape than usual (the C2 line in the graph). In the situation pictured in the 
graph this outside income ensures that the person spends all his hours on leisure 
activities. This is because at point A he can reach the highest utility isoquant. Besides 
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the additional income there are several other factors that contribute to this outcome. 
First of all, the person has a relatively flat budget curve AY, which means that the 
person would have a relatively low wage rate if he chooses to work. Furthermore, the 
utility curve is rather steep, which means that the person attaches a relatively high 
utility to hours spend on leisure activities. Increasing the wage rate (steeper budget 
curve) or decreasing the outside income can lead to a person crossing the participation 
threshold.  
 
The concept of outside income can have a whole variety of different sources and 
apply to a number of the different groups mentioned above. The outside income can 
be any type of welfare provisioned (e.g. general social security or disability allowance 
for the unemployed for medical reasons). It can even represent the earnings of having 
a spouse working. However, even with such a wide variety of interpretations this 
simple framework cannot incorporate all the different elements of the participation 
decision. The category “not participating for medical reasons”, for instance, 
incorporates a core number of people which are physically not capable of working. In 
other words, it is not a matter of choice, as they simply cannot participate. The 
category “not participating for reasons of education” incorporates a time element as 
well as a productivity element which can not be dealt with in this simple model, since 
it only gives the work leisure decision for a given moment in time. In reality, this 
decision is not just based on maximising utility at this particular moment, but should 
be considered in the form of maximising utility throughout a person’s life-time. For 
education this means that people forego direct utility for the sake of obtaining a higher 
utility in the future by increasing productivity. This last point will be further discussed 
under labour productivity12.   
 
Furthermore, a more general critique of the simple model worked with so far is that it 
does not incorporate transaction costs. Most relevant here is the “looking for a job” 
phase. This is part of the definition of participating labour force but cannot be 
incorporated in this model, since it only models the choice between working and not 
working, assuming that a person, if he wants to, can work immediately and for as 
many hours as he would like. Reality in this regard is more complex. People incur 
costs looking for a job, and might remain unemployed despite search efforts. A simple 
way to incorporate this uncertainty in the model is by changing real income into 
expected real income. Search costs would be deducted from real income, and the 
remainder would be multiplied by the chance of actually getting and keeping a job. 
This would lead to lower expected real income, and a flatter budget curve, like in the 
following graph: 
 
 
 
                                                   
12 See section 2.3.1. 
 
Graph 10 
         
Even then, however, this model has a number of drawbacks. For instance, it does not 
allow for a clear distinction between different types of variables influencing the 
expected real gains of participating, and can therefore only intuitively help in 
explaining the consequences for the participation threshold. There is another type of 
model, called a “search model”, which gives further insights in this regard. Since this 
model incorporates not only the participation decision but also (and is even mainly 
aimed at) the employment/unemployment division this will be dealt with later on13. 
 
2.2.3 The number of hours worked per employed person 
 
The individual decision on how many hours a person works can be derived using 
roughly the same framework used in deriving a person’s decision whether or not to 
participate in the labour market. The difference is that in this case the participation 
threshold is met, and the person decides to spend some of his time working. In fact, a 
lot of the dynamics within the decision on how much hours to work have already been 
discussed. To recall, the following graph can be revisited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
13 See section 2.2.4. 
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13 See section 2.2.4. 
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Graph 11 
         
In the original situation at point A, a person works 24-Xa hours a day and earns Ya. A 
wage increase leads to higher utility, and since the substitution effect is greater than 
the income effect the person spends more hours a day working (24-Xb), earning Yb.  
 
Even though this is a simple framework it can give some important insight into the 
different elements influencing the decision on how many hours a person opts to 
work14. The first one is the wage rate. A higher wage rate leads to more hours 
worked15. A higher wage rate in this regard can be interpreted very broadly. Since 
people care about disposable income, lower income taxes on the existing wage rate 
have the same effect as increasing the wage rate. Decreasing the costs people incur 
when deciding to work an extra hour also has the same effect (reducing the cost of 
childcare is an often mentioned example here16). Government-imposed limitations on 
maximum hours worked are another aspect which can influence the outcome.  
 
2.2.4 The share of the participating working age population that is actually employed. 
 
Unemployment when placed in the framework developed up to now is fairly 
straightforward to illustrate by looking at the following graph. 
 
 
 
                                                   
14 Large parts of the following are also applicable to the participation decision. 
15 Assuming that the substitution effect outdoes the income effect, as we have seen a reasonable 
assumption when looking at the whole economy with realistic wage rates. 
16 Studies that empirically examine the impact of child care costs on hours of work find that mothers’ 
hours of work tend to fall in response to an increase in the cost of formal child care with the response 
typically larger for mothers with younger children. See OECD, Employment Outlook (2010) for an 
overview. 
 
Graph 12 
 
         
The combination of wage W1 with labour supply L1 gives the general equilibrium for 
units of labour demanded and supplied. The economy is at its “natural rate of 
unemployment”, with the amount of labour supplied L1 being described as the 
economy having achieved full employment17. The phrase natural rate of 
unemployment seems a bit odd since in at this point there actually is no 
unemployment. In the model of perfect information and no transaction costs the 
difference between LS3 and L1 is the non participating labour force which does not 
fall under the Eurostat definition of unemployed. Actual, involuntary, unemployment 
can be created in this model by deviating from equilibrium and not immediately 
returning to it. This could be the case, e.g., when a government introduces a minimum 
wage rate that is higher than the equilibrium level, say W2. The supply of labour will 
be LS2, demand will be LD2 and unemployment will be the difference between the 
two, reflecting people that are willing to work, but cannot find a job.  
 
Policy conclusions in this simple framework are straightforward: there is no 
unemployment in equilibrium, so let the market do its work. No government 
intervention is needed, in fact it can be counterproductive. However, problems here 
lie in the fact that the assumptions of this model and the underlying logic have proven 
not to fit reality very well, and changing some of these assumptions leads to different 
conclusions. 
 
The first important assumption is the non-transaction costs environment. The model 
used so far assumes that workers and firms automatically and instantly find each other 
to create jobs and that there is a perfect match between the employers’ desires and the 
                                                   
17 See, for instance, Burda and Wyplosz, Macro economics, a European text (4th edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
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17 See, for instance, Burda and Wyplosz, Macro economics, a European text (4th edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
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employees’ characteristics. However, in reality, there are costs incurred in every stage 
of the creation, finding and switching of a job for both employers and employees. The 
existence of these costs implies that even in equilibrium a number of people will be 
involuntarily unemployed. The existence of this type of unemployment in the standard 
model used so far is either called frictional (short-term) or structural (long-term) 
unemployment, depending on the cause and duration of the mismatch. In graphical 
form this can be expressed as follows. 
 
Graph 13 
 
 
Beyond assuming the existence of these types of unemployment the model set out so 
far is not equipped to discuss unemployment. Therefore a different route needs to be 
taken to dive into the more specific causes of types of unemployment. For this a 
search model will be used18, which is based on the stylized fact that the labour market 
in the real world seems unable to clear. At the same moment in time, there are always 
a number of people involuntarily unemployed as well as a number of job vacancies 
that are not fulfilled. At least part of the problem here lies in the no transaction costs 
assumption. There are several reasons why this assumption is not realistic. The 
existence of heterogeneities, search frictions and information imperfections makes it 
necessary for both firms and workers to spend time and resources on finding a 
productive job match. Heterogeneity in this regard means that not all persons 
supplying their labour are identical and that not all jobs offered are identical. Search 
frictions stand for aspects as distance from worker to jobs and is also linked to 
imperfect information on e.g. the exact jobs (or workers) available on the market. The 
search model of the labour market is based on these frictions and their consequences 
                                                   
18 This section is largely based on Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd edition, MIT press 
ltd, 2000). 
 
for the labour market equilibrium19.  
 
The central equation of the search model is a so called “matching function”. In its 
standard form it gives the number of new jobs formed at any moment in time as part 
of the participating labour force (or number of successful matches mL) as a positive 
function F of the number of workers looking for jobs (or number of unmatched 
workers uL) and the number of firms looking for workers (or the number of vacant 
jobs as a fraction of the participating labour force vL): 
 
Equation 5 
 
  
 
The probability that in any given moment in time a vacancy is filled is  
 
 or . This rate is assumed a function of the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment only20. The probability of a vacancy being fulfilled increases with the 
number of unemployed job seekers relative to the number of vacancies on the market. 
Exactly the opposite reasoning can be followed when looking at the probability that a 
job seeker finds a job. Probability here is  or  , meaning that the 
probability of a job seeker finding a job increases with the number of vacancies 
relative to the number of job seekers on the market. In other words, both the 
probability of a firm finding a worker and the probability of a worker finding a job are 
dependent on the relative “tightness” of the market, or the ratio of vacancies versus 
job seekers, but with opposing signs. This ratio, called θ, plays a central role in this 
model.  
 
The mere assumption that all workers have a positive probability that they will not 
find a job is not enough to create a positive unemployment rate in equilibrium. 
Workers can still just try and try again until eventually all find jobs. What is needed to 
create unemployment, next to a job creation rate, is a job destruction rate. Job 
destruction is assumed to be caused by shocks that arrive to occupied jobs at a certain 
rate or probability λ. The shock changes the value of production, which means that the 
job loses its profitability and will therefore cease to exist. This could be a negative 
demand (or taste) shock or a negative productivity (or technology) shock. In the 
                                                   
19 This type of search matching models when properly derived and used quite quickly becomes 
mathematically challenging. For simplicity’s sake, most of the formulas and formal derivation will be 
left out. For an extensive overview of the development of these types of models see Pissarides, 
Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd edition, MIT press ltd, 2000). 
20 This is due to the (assumed) homogeneity of equation, or the existence of constant returns to scale: 
See Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd edition, MIT press ltd, 2000) ch 1. 
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employees’ characteristics. However, in reality, there are costs incurred in every stage 
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model discussed here this rate is considered exogenously determined. 
 
Equating the job destruction and job creation rate as set out above determines the 
equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment. Graphically this can be represented in 
vacancy unemployment space by the following graph also known as the Beveridge 
curve21. 
 
Graph 14 
 
The driving force behind the equilibrium unemployment rate is job creation22. Job 
creation in turn is dependent on the ratio of vacancies to workers looking for a job 
(market tightness) and therefore on the demand for and supply of labour.  
 
Concerning the demand for labour, the decision of how many workers a firm wishes 
to employ has its roots in the profit maximisation decision. Firms will keep on hiring 
workers until the marginal revenue of the extra worker is equal to the marginal costs 
incurred. In a one production factor one period world this means that the job output or 
extra productivity is equal to the extra wage costs incurred (or p – w = 0). This can be 
elaborated upon by introducing two additional aspects: transaction or search costs and 
a time element.  
 
The existence of search costs assumes that a firm does not automatically find a 
worker, but needs to spend resources to find one. These resources depend on the 
productivity of the worker (the more productive, the higher the search costs)23. Also 
                                                   
21 Originally derived from Beveridge, Full employment in a free society (Allen and Unwin, 1944), who 
discussed the relationship between the demand for workers as captured by vacancies and the rate of 
unemployment.  
22 For an example of a search theoretic model with endogenous job destruction rate see Rogerson, 
Shimer and Wright, ‘Search theoretic models of the labor market, a survey’ (Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol XLIII, 2005) 959–988. 
23 In a long-run equilibrium this assumption is a natural one to make, since the costs of a firm have to 
 
 
there is a positive chance that in a given period of time the vacancy will not be filled, 
and a positive and exogenous chance that a fulfilled job will cease to exist (λ). The 
time element entails that the profit maximisation procedure maximizes the present 
discounted value of all expected profits from job. With some simplifying 
assumptions24 and mathematical derivation this leads to the following equation.  
 
Equation 6 
 
 
 
A firm will keep on creating vacancies until this equation is met. The extra element as 
compared to the simple equation p-w=0 is the . This stands for the expected 
capitalised value of the firms hiring costs, and as such are the extra costs a firm incurs 
in the creation of a job. Note that the hiring costs increase with r (which stands for the 
real interest rate and is a reflection of the time element) and λ (which stands for the 
likelihood a job will cease to exist in a moment in time), times pc (which stands for 
the search costs c proportionate to job output or productivity p) and 1/q(θ). This last 
element stands for the expected duration of a vacancy, with q(θ) standing for the rate 
at which vacant jobs become filled25. The higher the rate at which vacancies are 
fulfilled the more vacancies will be created. Equation 6 replaces the downward 
sloping labour demand curve used in the neo classical model so far, and can be 
depicted in wage – labour tightness space as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rise along side productivity to ensure the existence of a steady state. The assumption may however be 
less easy to justify over the business cycle, see also Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd 
edition, MIT press ltd, 2000). 
24 Including perfect capital market, infinite horizon and no dynamic change in parameters. 
25 Due to the underlying mathematical derivation, the q(θ) notation might seem unfamiliar. This is 
created by rewriting the process that changes the state of vacant jobs, which is Poisson with rate 
, separating out the v/u ratio (θ). q(θ) then stands for F . For more information on 
the formal derivation see Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd edition, MIT press ltd, 
2000) ch 1. 
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rise along side productivity to ensure the existence of a steady state. The assumption may however be 
less easy to justify over the business cycle, see also Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd 
edition, MIT press ltd, 2000). 
24 Including perfect capital market, infinite horizon and no dynamic change in parameters. 
25 Due to the underlying mathematical derivation, the q(θ) notation might seem unfamiliar. This is 
created by rewriting the process that changes the state of vacant jobs, which is Poisson with rate 
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2000) ch 1. 
0
)(
)(





q
pcr
wp
)(
)(


q
pcr 
vL
vLuLF ),(





 1,
v
u
27022 Duin.indd   37 12-10-13   17:42
Chapter 2
38 
Graph 15 
 
To determine labour supply in this model what needs to be taken into account is that a 
worker has a different income when he is unemployed/searching for a job than when 
he is employed. The income of a person unemployed/searching for a job depends 
upon possible outside income (called z) and the probability that a person finds a job 
times the expected increase in income. This last element is depicted by the rate at 
which unemployed workers move into employment, or θq(θ)26. This gives the 
following equation 
 
Equation 7 
 
rU = z + θq(θ)(W-U) 
 
The expected real income for an employed person is dependent on the wage minus the 
chance a person loses his job (λ) and the difference between the working and 
searching income (W-U), which leads to the following equation. 
 
Equation 8 
 
rW = w - λ(W-U) 
 
Permanent discounted income in both situations is therefore dependent on income (w 
for employed, z for unemployed) and the transition rate between unemployed – 
                                                   
26 As earlier with q(θ), θq(θ) might also seem unfamiliar. This is derived in exactly the same manner as 
q(θ), with the difference that  is used as the starting point. For more information on the 
formal derivation see Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd edition, MIT press ltd, 2000) 
ch 1. 
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employed (θq(θ)(W-U)) and vice versa (λ(W-U)). When solving the two equations it 
follows that a worker will prefer the status of employed as long as wage w is higher 
than outside income z. In the remainder of this section it will be assumed that this 
holds and that a worker will therefore always prefer working to being 
unemployed/searching for a job. 
 
With labour demand and labour supply determined, there is one more aspect of this 
model that needs to be developed before coming to its equilibrium dynamics, and that 
is the aspect of wage determination. Contrary to the standard micro model dealt with 
so far, the search model assumes that due to market imperfections there are rents to be 
earned, even in equilibrium. How these rents are divided between the worker and the 
firm is the last essential element needed, since this determines the wage rate in this 
model. Quickly revisiting and somewhat extending earlier paragraphs, the expected 
return for a firm of a filled job satisfies the following equation: 
 
Equation 9 
  
rJ = p-w-λJ 
 
The expected return equals the extra productivity minus the wage rate minus the 
(exogenous) chance a job will cease to exist. The returns for a worker are: 
 
Equation 10 
 
rW = w - λ(W-U) 
 
The firms gains J from a successful match27, and the workers gain W-U. Together 
these two make up the total rents or surplus. This surplus can be divided between 
workers and firms in a number of ways. A standard assumption in matching theory is 
that the division is decided through Nash bargaining28. Nash bargaining leads to a 
wage rate that maximises the weighted product of both firm and worker rents as 
depicted in the following equation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 The value of a vacancy V is assumed to be 0 or equal to the expected search costs, a safe assumption 
in a world with free entry and exit and no costs in opening a vacancy. If V would have some sort of 
positive value, this would have to be deducted from J, the same way the gains a worker incurs when 
searching for a job U are deducted from W. 
28 See Shimer, Labor markets and business cycles (Princeton University Press, 2009) with reference to 
Nash, ‘Two person cooperative games’ (Econometrica 21(1), 1953). 
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Equation 1129 
 
W-U= β (J+W-U) 
 
β in these equations is a number between 0 and 1 and stands for the respective 
bargaining weights of workers and firms, or in other words, labour’s share of the total 
rent that an occupied job creates.  In symmetric situations, with equal bargaining 
power β = ½ .  This last equation can be rewritten in a number of ways to form the 
central wage determining equation of this model. The most convenient one for further 
analysis is the following: 
 
Equation 12 
 
w = (1-β)z + βp(1+cθ) 
 
Wages depend on outside income z (which has a smaller impact when bargaining 
power rises), productivity, a firm’s hiring costs and market tightness30. The worker is 
rewarded for saving the firm extra hiring costs the moment a job is formed according 
to his bargaining power. Market tightness is related to bargaining power as well: with 
more vacancies relative to workers searching for a job the share of surplus allocated to 
the worker increases.  
 
In wage – labour tightness space this curve slopes upward:  
 
Graph 16 
 
                                                   
29 This is the first order maximization condition of  .  
30 Note that pcθ equals the average hiring costs for each unemployed worker (remember θ = vacancies 
divided by number of unemployed). 
    1)max(arg JUWw
 
To get to an equilibrium wage the alternative labour supply and labour demand 
curves, or graphs 15 and 16, still need to be combined, which is done in the following 
graph.  
 
Graph 17 
 
Equilibrium is at point A with corresponding wage rate w1 and labour market 
tightness θ1. To figure out the equilibrium unemployment level, a further step is 
needed, which is the inclusion of the equilibrium labour market tightness equilibrium. 
The Beveridge curve shows the relationship between vacancies and unemployment, 
while the ratio of vacancies to number of unemployed v/u is the definition of the 
labour market tightness parameter θ. The labour market tightness equilibrium can 
therefore be incorporated into the Beveridge curve by means of a diagonally upward 
sloping line with slope θ, called the “job creation curve”. This gives the last step 
towards the calculation of the equilibrium unemployment rate shown in graph 18. 
Equilibrium is reached at point B, with equilibrium vacancy rate v* and equilibrium 
or natural unemployment rate u*. 
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Graph 18 
    
Looking at the different elements of these graphs and their underlying equations a 
number of interesting conclusions can be drawn. For instance, take the effect of an 
increase in negotiating power of the workers, which can be due to an increase in the 
level of unionisation. This shifts the labour supply curve in graph 17 up, increasing 
wages, but decreasing market tightness. Workers claim a higher wage, which causes 
firms to create fewer jobs. This causes the job creation curve in graph 18 to turn 
clockwise, increasing unemployment31. Empirical studies have provided support for 
this prediction, though the manner in which unionisation actually causes upward 
pressure on wages has been shown to depend on union power in wage bargains, union 
coverage and the degree of coordination of wage bargains. Strong trade unions with 
large coverage have the ability to push wages above market-clearing levels, at the cost 
of lower employment. However, in practice, union influence on wage formation can 
vary depending on the structure of collective bargaining. Decentralised wage 
bargaining at the firm level can be regarded as employment-friendly, preventing 
excessive wage claims since this would lead to a loss of market shares to competitors 
with detrimental effects on employment. On the other hand, very centralised or 
coordinated bargaining systems are more likely to lead to wage moderation, because 
they induce unions to internalise the detrimental effects – e.g. on employment – that 
excessive wage pressure may have at the macroeconomic level. These considerations 
suggest that the relationship between employment and the degree of corporatism may 
be “hump-shaped”32. While certain studies have found support for the “hump-shaped” 
                                                   
31 The same reasoning goes for an increase in the amount of outside income z. 
32 Also known as the Calmfors-Driffil hypothesis, see Calmfors and Driffil, ‘Bargaining Structure, 
Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance’ (Economic Policy, vol. 3, no. 6, 1988).  Furthermore, 
while co-ordination can reduce overall wage pressure, which tends to lower equilibrium 
unemployment, through the decreased flexibility it may raise the rate of idiosyncratic job shifts which, 
in the presence of an endogenous job destruction rate, will tend to shift the Beveridge Curve to the right 
 
 
hypothesis33, the empirical literature remains inconclusive overall.34 
  
Another interesting aspect that can be analysed using this framework is the effect of 
the existence of employment protection legislation (EPL), which can be incorporated 
into this model in the form of a “firing tax” T35. This firing tax shifts the labour 
demand curve in graph 17 to the left, decreasing wages as well as market tightness. 
This leads to a clockwise turning of the job creation curve. The lower return of a job 
leads to fewer vacancies and unemployment increases. This fits empirical results on 
this issue, although the simple framework presented here is not nuanced enough to 
give the full picture. Specifically, the effects of EPL on the job destruction rate cannot 
be taken into account, because in the model this is determined exogenously. If EPL 
decreases the job destruction rate, the Beveridge curve would shift to the left, further 
decreasing vacancies, but making the effect on unemployment ambiguous. Empirical 
results seem to confirm this presumption36. Overall, the main conclusion from 
empirical research on this issue is hat that the effects of a higher EPL on 
unemployment are negative but small, while EPL reduces the flows in and out of 
employment and increases unemployment duration37. 
    
2.2.5 Interlinkages 
 
As the previous sections have shown, both the participation element (in persons and 
hours worked) and the employment/unemployment divide in the economy are 
influenced by several variables. What has not been examined so far is the 
interrelationship between the two elements. This section will elaborate on this issue, 
using an extended version of the search model.  
 
The search model used in the previous sections relied on the assumptions of both a 
fixed number of people actively participating in the labour market and a fixed number 
of hours worked per person when employed. In this section both assumptions will be 
abandoned. First, the participation decision will be incorporated into the framework of 
the search model. There are a number of variables that have an impact on the decision 
to participate in the labour market which can be divided into two categories: variables 
that influence the expected return of participating and variables that influence the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and have an offsetting effect. 
33 Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, ‘Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms: 
Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experiences’ (Swedish Economic Policy Review, vol 5, 1998). 
34 See Flanagan, ‘Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International 
Perspective’ (Journal of Economic Literature, vol 37, no 3, 1999) for a survey. See also Bassanini and 
Duval, ‘Employment patterns in OECD countries, reassessing the role of policies and institutions’ 
(OECD Economics department working papers, no 486, 2006).    
35 Making e.g. equation 12 rJ = p-w-λ(J+F). 
36 See e.g. Nickell et al., ‘The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment and Wages in the OECD from the 
1960s to the 1990s’ (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001). 
37 For an overview see Bartelsman, Gautier and de Wind, ‘Employment protection, technology choice 
and worker allocation’, (IZA discussion paper, no 4895, 2010). 
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and have an offsetting effect. 
33 Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, ‘Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms: 
Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experiences’ (Swedish Economic Policy Review, vol 5, 1998). 
34 See Flanagan, ‘Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International 
Perspective’ (Journal of Economic Literature, vol 37, no 3, 1999) for a survey. See also Bassanini and 
Duval, ‘Employment patterns in OECD countries, reassessing the role of policies and institutions’ 
(OECD Economics department working papers, no 486, 2006).    
35 Making e.g. equation 12 rJ = p-w-λ(J+F). 
36 See e.g. Nickell et al., ‘The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment and Wages in the OECD from the 
1960s to the 1990s’ (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001). 
37 For an overview see Bartelsman, Gautier and de Wind, ‘Employment protection, technology choice 
and worker allocation’, (IZA discussion paper, no 4895, 2010). 
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expected costs of participating. Incorporating this into the framework of the search 
model gives the following equation.  
 
Equation 13 
 
 
 
With rU being the present discounted value of entering the labour force and lo being 
the value of leisure when not participating. This last variable differs between people 
depending on the position of their respective utility curves. rU is still determined by 
equation 7, for convenience repeated below, with income depending upon outside 
income z and the likelihood that a person finds a job times the expected increase in 
income.  
 
Equation 14 
 
rU = z + θq(θ)(W-U) 
 
Using the equilibrium dynamics as captured by graph 18 and its underlying equations 
equation 13 can be rewritten as the following equation defining the size of the 
participating labour force38  
 
Equation 15 
 
 
 
This means that the higher the share of labour in the wage bargain ( ), the hiring 
costs/productivity (pc) and the labour market tightness ( ), the greater the chance 
that a random person will participate in the labour market, and therefore the greater 
the participating labour force PWP as a part of the working age population WP. 
Intuition here is rather straightforward, with all elements either meaning that there is 
more money to be made or that there is a greater chance to find a job. This equation 
gives the basis to further analyse the relationship between the different stages of 
employment. These interrelationships will be discussed by way of two typical 
hypotheses, namely the discouraged worker effect and the added worker effect.  
 
According to the hypothesis of the discouraged worker effect, the experience of 
unsuccessful job search increases the propensity to withdraw from the labour market. 
Or in other words: when people try and try again to get a job and fail they will 
                                                   
38 For mathematical derivation see Pissarides, Equilibrium unemployment theory (2nd edition, MIT 
press ltd, 2000) ch 7. 
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become discouraged and stop searching all together. In the model this effect can be 
observed in a decrease in labour market tightness .To recall, a decrease in labour 
market tightness means a relatively large amount of workers compared to vacancies in 
the market. With a low  the expected returns of participating drop, decreasing 
incentive to participate39. This decreased incentive leads to a lower participation rate 
compared to the population of working age40. 
 
According to the hypothesis of the added worker effect, once a member of a 
household becomes unemployed this will have a positive effect on the decision of 
other members of the household to participate. In the model this effect can be 
analysed by looking at variable lo. If this variable is taken to constitute household 
wealth instead of an individual’s wealth one can see how this fits. If a household 
constitutes of two persons, one employed and one non-participating, and the 
employed person becomes unemployed household wealth drops. With a lower lo, 
there is a higher possibility that the non-participating member of the household will 
start to participate41.   
 
These elements are not mutually exclusive, and empirical work suggests that both 
effects actually exist42. Which effect dominates has been shown to depend on the 
specific situation and country under examination, with the discouraged worker effect 
generally dominating in more severe economic downturns43. This implies that the 
participation rate behaves pro-cyclically, increasing at times when labour market 
tightness is high and decreasing in times when labour market tightness is low. The 
unemployment rate, in response, would be lower than expected at times of low market 
tightness because of people leaving the participating labour force (and vice versa), 
dampening fluctuations in the unemployment rate44.  
 
2.3 Labour productivity, or what is the added value of an hour worked? 
 
The previous section dealt with the labour utilisation element of promoting GDP per 
capita growth, or the question of how much how many people work. This section will 
focus on the other half of the equation, the labour productivity element, defined as 
or GDP per hour worked. This section will discuss various elements 
                                                   
39 See equation 14. 
40 See equation 15. 
41 See equation 13. 
42 See e.g. Stephens, ‘Worker displacement and the added worker effect’ (Journal of Labor Economics, 
2002) for evidence on the added worker effect and Benati, ‘Some empirical evidence on the 
discouraged worker effect’ (Economics Letters, vol 70, issue 3, 2001) on the discouraged worker 
effect.  
43 See e.g. OECD, Economic Outlook (vol 1, 2010). 
44 With a dominating added worker effect the opposite would be the case.   
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expected costs of participating. Incorporating this into the framework of the search 
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analysed by looking at variable lo. If this variable is taken to constitute household 
wealth instead of an individual’s wealth one can see how this fits. If a household 
constitutes of two persons, one employed and one non-participating, and the 
employed person becomes unemployed household wealth drops. With a lower lo, 
there is a higher possibility that the non-participating member of the household will 
start to participate41.   
 
These elements are not mutually exclusive, and empirical work suggests that both 
effects actually exist42. Which effect dominates has been shown to depend on the 
specific situation and country under examination, with the discouraged worker effect 
generally dominating in more severe economic downturns43. This implies that the 
participation rate behaves pro-cyclically, increasing at times when labour market 
tightness is high and decreasing in times when labour market tightness is low. The 
unemployment rate, in response, would be lower than expected at times of low market 
tightness because of people leaving the participating labour force (and vice versa), 
dampening fluctuations in the unemployment rate44.  
 
2.3 Labour productivity, or what is the added value of an hour worked? 
 
The previous section dealt with the labour utilisation element of promoting GDP per 
capita growth, or the question of how much how many people work. This section will 
focus on the other half of the equation, the labour productivity element, defined as 
or GDP per hour worked. This section will discuss various elements 
                                                   
39 See equation 14. 
40 See equation 15. 
41 See equation 13. 
42 See e.g. Stephens, ‘Worker displacement and the added worker effect’ (Journal of Labor Economics, 
2002) for evidence on the added worker effect and Benati, ‘Some empirical evidence on the 
discouraged worker effect’ (Economics Letters, vol 70, issue 3, 2001) on the discouraged worker 
effect.  
43 See e.g. OECD, Economic Outlook (vol 1, 2010). 
44 With a dominating added worker effect the opposite would be the case.   
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influencing labour productivity growth, using the following subdivision45.  
 
Equation 16 
 
  
 
Labour productivity growth or growth in GDP per hour worked is positively 
influenced by the growth of capital intensity per hour worked, human capital intensity 
per hour worked and the growth of total factor productivity. This last term is an error 
term catching the different elements influencing productivity growth which do not 
directly flow from the changes in capital and human capital inputs.  
 
This section will not discuss all elements which the economic literature has identified 
as influencing labour productivity growth. More specifically, the element of capital 
per hour worked and various elements that influence total factor productivity will be 
left out46. In this section focus will lie on the human capital intensity and those 
elements which fall under the total factor productivity growth heading with a direct 
link with employment policy, starting with discussing 
 
or human 
capital intensity as a determinant of labour productivity growth.  
 
2.3.1 Human Capital 
 
To understand the theoretical concept of human capital as a driver of productivity one 
needs to delve deeper into an aspect of the labour force only briefly discussed up to 
now; the heterogeneity of workers. The economic models set out so far embraced the 
concept of heterogeneity by e.g. allowing for differences in preferences and wage 
rates. The macro labour supply curve was derived by adding different individuals, 
thereby treating labour as a homogenous mass.  
 
The idea of homogeneity of labour has been challenged ever since the 18th century 
Scottish economist Adam Smith. He believed that economic activity was fuelled not 
by workers as a collective mass but by “the acquired and useful abilities of all the 
inhabitants or members of the society”. An individual had to pay a price to gain such 
talents and abilities, added Smith, but once attained they stood as “a capital fixed and 
                                                   
45 Based on a standard Solow/Swan model for economic growth, see Solow, ‘A contribution to the 
theory of economic growth’ (Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 70, no 1, 1956). 
46 Examples of issues that will not be discussed directly are the level of competition in product markets 
and the level of innovation, R&D and ICT investments as possible drivers for productivity growth. For 
a more comprehensive overview, see OECD, Sources of economic growth in OECD countries (2003). 
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realized, as it were, in his person”47. These ideas were the roots for the concept of 
human capital, which according to the current OECD definition is “productive wealth 
embodied in labour, skills and knowledge”, or the “quality” of labour48. 
Macroeconomic models of human capital and growth are mostly built around the 
hypothesis that knowledge and skills embodied in humans both directly raise 
productivity and increase an economy's ability to develop and to adopt new 
technologies. Both aspects have been thoroughly tested empirically and found 
robust49.  
 
To gain more insight into the possibilities for government to increase human capital 
accumulation the individual decision making process in this area has to be analysed. 
The micro economic theory on human capital was given a great impetus by the work 
of Gary Becker. In his book “Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
with Special Reference to Education”50, Becker analysed a person’s participation in 
education and training within the framework of investment theory. The nexus of this 
theory is that a person will decide to spend time participating in education and 
training activities when the expected benefits outweigh the expected cost. More 
specifically, an additional year of education and training is a good investment when 
the increased benefits both pay back the initial costs and yield a rate of return at least 
as high as alternative investments of one’s time and money51. Taking the example of 
the decision to enrol for college education of four years this can be pictured as 
follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
47 Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1st edition, W.Straham, 1776) 
as quoted by Keely, Human capital, how what you know shapes your life (OECD, 2007) 22. 
48 The definition of quality of labour used here is significantly different from the definition mostly used 
in the EU dialogue on employment issues. We will come back to this divergence of definitions in 
chapter 4. 
49 See, for instance, de La Fuente and Ciccone, Human Capital and Growth in a Global and 
Knowledge-based Economy (Report for the European Commission, 2003). 
50 Becker, Human capital; a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education  
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, 1964). 
51 See also Kaufmann and Hotchkiss, The economics of labour markets (7th edition, Thomson/South 
Western, 2006). The positive effect of education on wages has been thoroughly tested and confirmed 
empirically, see also de La Fuente, Angel and Antoni Ciccone, Human Capital and Growth in a Global 
and Knowledge-based Economy (Report for the European Commission, 2003). 
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realized, as it were, in his person”47. These ideas were the roots for the concept of 
human capital, which according to the current OECD definition is “productive wealth 
embodied in labour, skills and knowledge”, or the “quality” of labour48. 
Macroeconomic models of human capital and growth are mostly built around the 
hypothesis that knowledge and skills embodied in humans both directly raise 
productivity and increase an economy's ability to develop and to adopt new 
technologies. Both aspects have been thoroughly tested empirically and found 
robust49.  
 
To gain more insight into the possibilities for government to increase human capital 
accumulation the individual decision making process in this area has to be analysed. 
The micro economic theory on human capital was given a great impetus by the work 
of Gary Becker. In his book “Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
with Special Reference to Education”50, Becker analysed a person’s participation in 
education and training within the framework of investment theory. The nexus of this 
theory is that a person will decide to spend time participating in education and 
training activities when the expected benefits outweigh the expected cost. More 
specifically, an additional year of education and training is a good investment when 
the increased benefits both pay back the initial costs and yield a rate of return at least 
as high as alternative investments of one’s time and money51. Taking the example of 
the decision to enrol for college education of four years this can be pictured as 
follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
47 Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1st edition, W.Straham, 1776) 
as quoted by Keely, Human capital, how what you know shapes your life (OECD, 2007) 22. 
48 The definition of quality of labour used here is significantly different from the definition mostly used 
in the EU dialogue on employment issues. We will come back to this divergence of definitions in 
chapter 4. 
49 See, for instance, de La Fuente and Ciccone, Human Capital and Growth in a Global and 
Knowledge-based Economy (Report for the European Commission, 2003). 
50 Becker, Human capital; a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education  
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, 1964). 
51 See also Kaufmann and Hotchkiss, The economics of labour markets (7th edition, Thomson/South 
Western, 2006). The positive effect of education on wages has been thoroughly tested and confirmed 
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and Knowledge-based Economy (Report for the European Commission, 2003). 
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Graph 19 
 
 
The two different lines in the graph depict the alternative of enrolling for college (line 
A) and the alternative of starting to work at 18 instead (line B).  Earning and costs in 
this graph can both depict actual monetary values, but can also be interpreted more 
widely as utility gains and losses.  
 
Looking at the alternative of starting to work at 18 the total earnings over a person’s 
life-time are relatively simple, and depicted by the area under line B, or 2+4. 
Intuitively this makes sense: a person will start working for a relatively low salary, 
which will increase steadily during his life-time. When looking at the alternative of 
enrolling for college one can see that during the period 18-22 a person will incur extra 
costs worth 1 (e.g. college tuition fees) and 2 (wages lost by not working). When this 
person starts working, however, his wage will start on a higher level, with total life- 
time earnings amounting to areas 3 + 4. Since in both situations a person will 
eventually earn the amount of money depicted in area 4 the decision in essence boils 
down to the difference in size between the areas 1 and 2 combined and area 3. As long 
as area 3 is larger than areas 1 and 2, enrolling for a 4-year college education for the 
person concerned is worthwhile.  
 
To come to a more realistic picture, however, timing still needs to be taken into 
account. The costs in enrolling in college education are incurred immediately while 
the benefits only accrue in the future. The benefits and costs have to be compared in 
terms of their present value. A simple representation of calculating present value is 
given in the following equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 17 
 
 
 
With Y being the sum of money earned, i being the interest rate and n being the 
number of years in the feature. Note that this significantly decreases the worth of 
extra earnings from enrolling for college, since the benefits are relatively distant and 
therefore relatively heavily discounted. 
 
This simple model gives some important insights into an individual’s decision to 
increase his human capital. Consider, for instance, the difference in incentives 
between a younger and an older person. In graph 19, area 3 will be much larger for 
the younger person than for the older person, simply because he has more years to 
enjoy revenue from his investment. The younger person will therefore be much more 
inclined to postpone his decision to participate in the labour market in order to 
participate in education and training activities. Furthermore, the costs of education 1 
and 2 negatively impact a person’s decision to participate in education and training. 
When allowing for differences in quality of education, however, where higher costs 
lead to higher quality, this factor becomes uncertain, since the expected payoff 3 will 
probably also increase. 
 
There are a number of other aspects that can be put under the human capital umbrella, 
such as workers’ health, professional experience and social networks. Most relevant 
for this study is the aspect of workers’ health. Improved health of workers could 
enhance productivity as well as labour supply by improving framework conditions, 
e.g. by reducing the risk of injury of workers. Furthermore, the extra costs an 
employer has to make in case of an injury are reduced, improving competitiveness. 
There is, however, a trade off involved here. Increased worker health also comes with 
costs. For instance, employers have to make additional costs in meeting health and 
safety conditions and they see their administrative burdens increased and flexibility as 
far as possible business models are concerned reduced. Both aspects could decrease 
competitiveness and GDP per capita growth. This means that there is an optimal level 
of workers’ health that will be ensured in a situation of perfect information in a given 
company. This can be graphically portrayed as follows. 
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Graph 20 
 
 
With the MB curve representing marginal benefits of increasing worker health and 
safety and the MC curve representing the marginal costs of increasing worker health 
and safety. Point Q1 is the optimal level of health and safety provided. There are, 
however, reasons why this point will not be reached, most prominently being 
information imperfections, for instance, when workers and companies inaccurately 
assess the job hazards or risk of injury. In this case, the level of workers’ health and 
safety protection will be lower than optimal. Policy could then be aimed at both 
improving information availability and laying down legally binding minimum 
requirements for workers’ health and safety.  
   
2.3.2 Total Factor Productivity 
 
The element of total factor productivity influencing labour productivity in the growth 
accounting methodology is an error term, catching all the different effects not directly 
incorporated in the capital and human capital elements of the equation52.  The concept 
of total factor productivity in essence can be said to capture the increases in 
effectiveness of the use of the different factor inputs (capital, human capital and hours 
worked). This makes for a large number of different explanatory routes and matching 
                                                   
52 It is good to realise that statistically this also includes those instances where an element is not fully 
covered by the chosen indicator to represent it. The element of human capital is a good example here. 
An indicator often chosen to represent this factor is average years of schooling. As said earlier on, the 
theoretical concept of human capital is broader than just schooling and also includes aspects like health 
and social networks. Furthermore, human capital indirectly affects productivity by increasing an 
economy's ability to develop and to adopt new technologies. Since these aspects are not captured by the 
indicator they will fall in the error term of total factor productivity. 
 
economic theories. Establishing the various relationships this section will follow the 
work of Bartelsman53 in search of the different sources of total factor productivity 
growth. The various links in this regard can be portrayed as follows: 
 
Chart 2 
 
 
Source: Bartelsman (2010) 
 
Productivity per hour worked depends on firm choices and market selection 
mechanisms. The firm makes the decision how to combine the various production 
factors and put them to use to produce a product. Prominent among the elements 
affecting the effectiveness of the use of factor inputs are technological 
advances/innovation and the functioning of markets. Technological advances can 
create, e.g., more advanced production processes which increase the amount of output 
that can be derived from a given amount of input. Improving the functioning of 
markets in general allows the factor inputs to `travel` and be used in the manner and 
by the firms that use them most efficiently.  
 
The link with employment policy therewith lies in the ability for workers to use their 
abilities in the most productive manner. Employment policy can therefore be linked to 
improving the ability of workers to search for the most effective way to use their 
labour and their human capital. Increasing the flexibility of labour markets (both 
within and between firms), is a good example here. This increased flexibility as a 
policy prescription, however, is somewhat ambiguous, notably because of the link 
between the two aspects of labour productivity dealt with in this section. Taking the 
example of employment protection legislation, the reasoning in the previous section 
would lead to the conclusion that the mere existence of this type of legislation would 
have a negative effect on labour productivity growth, since employment protection 
                                                   
53 Bartelsman, ‘Searching for the sources of productivity, from macro to micro and back’, (Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 19(6), 2010). See also the work of van Ark, Timmer and Inklaar on the 
decomposition of causes for (total factor) productivity growth, e.g. Inklaar, Timmer and van Ark, 
‘Mind the gap! International comparisons of productivity in services and goods production’, (German 
Economic Review, vol. 8, issue 2, 2007)   
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The element of total factor productivity influencing labour productivity in the growth 
accounting methodology is an error term, catching all the different effects not directly 
incorporated in the capital and human capital elements of the equation52.  The concept 
of total factor productivity in essence can be said to capture the increases in 
effectiveness of the use of the different factor inputs (capital, human capital and hours 
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52 It is good to realise that statistically this also includes those instances where an element is not fully 
covered by the chosen indicator to represent it. The element of human capital is a good example here. 
An indicator often chosen to represent this factor is average years of schooling. As said earlier on, the 
theoretical concept of human capital is broader than just schooling and also includes aspects like health 
and social networks. Furthermore, human capital indirectly affects productivity by increasing an 
economy's ability to develop and to adopt new technologies. Since these aspects are not captured by the 
indicator they will fall in the error term of total factor productivity. 
 
economic theories. Establishing the various relationships this section will follow the 
work of Bartelsman53 in search of the different sources of total factor productivity 
growth. The various links in this regard can be portrayed as follows: 
 
Chart 2 
 
 
Source: Bartelsman (2010) 
 
Productivity per hour worked depends on firm choices and market selection 
mechanisms. The firm makes the decision how to combine the various production 
factors and put them to use to produce a product. Prominent among the elements 
affecting the effectiveness of the use of factor inputs are technological 
advances/innovation and the functioning of markets. Technological advances can 
create, e.g., more advanced production processes which increase the amount of output 
that can be derived from a given amount of input. Improving the functioning of 
markets in general allows the factor inputs to `travel` and be used in the manner and 
by the firms that use them most efficiently.  
 
The link with employment policy therewith lies in the ability for workers to use their 
abilities in the most productive manner. Employment policy can therefore be linked to 
improving the ability of workers to search for the most effective way to use their 
labour and their human capital. Increasing the flexibility of labour markets (both 
within and between firms), is a good example here. This increased flexibility as a 
policy prescription, however, is somewhat ambiguous, notably because of the link 
between the two aspects of labour productivity dealt with in this section. Taking the 
example of employment protection legislation, the reasoning in the previous section 
would lead to the conclusion that the mere existence of this type of legislation would 
have a negative effect on labour productivity growth, since employment protection 
                                                   
53 Bartelsman, ‘Searching for the sources of productivity, from macro to micro and back’, (Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 19(6), 2010). See also the work of van Ark, Timmer and Inklaar on the 
decomposition of causes for (total factor) productivity growth, e.g. Inklaar, Timmer and van Ark, 
‘Mind the gap! International comparisons of productivity in services and goods production’, (German 
Economic Review, vol. 8, issue 2, 2007)   
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legislation hinders the efficient allocation of labour to sectors where labour and 
human capital could be used in the most productive manner. However, the impact of 
this type of legislation becomes less clear cut if one realises that this impediment for 
firing employees prevents the disappearance of firm specific knowledge and 
productivity that would accompany dismissal. Moreover, such impediments may even 
encourage existing enterprises to raise worker productivity, e.g., through the provision 
of firm specific training to their employees in order to remain competitive and avoid 
paying redundancy costs as a result of output loss54. The two effects run counter to 
one another, leaving empirics to determine which one dominates. Bartelsman, Gautier 
and de Wind55, using a country industry panel dataset find a negative relationship 
between the level of employment protection legislation and the size of high-risk 
innovative productive sectors, with their model being able to explain a large portion 
of the slowdown in productivity in the EU relative to the US since 1995. In addition, 
Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn56, using annual cross-country aggregate data on the 
degree of regulations and industry level data on productivity from 1982 to 2003, 
examine the impact of employment protection legislation on productivity in the 
OECD. Their empirical results suggest that mandatory dismissal regulations have a 
depressing impact on productivity growth in industries where layoff restrictions are 
more likely to be binding. 
 
2.4 The link between labour utilisation and labour productivity  
 
Up to now, the two defining aspects of GDP per capita, labour utilisation  
and labour productivity , were discussed separately. However, there are a 
number of ways in which the two elements are linked, which also have important 
implications for government employment policy. In the previous sections several 
theoretical links between labour participation and productivity have already been dealt 
with. Both the standard neo classical model and the search model showed the results 
of an increase in worker productivity, through a rise in the wage rate, on an 
individual’s decision to enter the labour market. Within a reasonable range of wage 
rates the income effect is stronger than the substitution effect, and an increase in 
worker productivity increases a person’s propensity to enter the labour market, get a 
job and increase his or her hours worked. This would suggest a positive relationship 
between productivity and labour utilisation. When one introduces the possibility of 
inflexibility in quantities and prices, however, in the short-run an opposite effect 
could occur. With increased worker productivity there is simply less labour needed to 
                                                   
54 See European Commission, Employment in Europe report (2008). 
55 Bartelsman, Gautier and de Wind, ‘Employment protection, technology choice and worker 
allocation’ (IZA discussion paper, no 4895, 2010).  
56 Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn, ‘Job protection legislation and productivity growth in OECD 
countries’ (IZA discussion paper, no 3555, 2007). 
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produce the same amount of goods for the same price. These inflexibilities would 
make a share of existing labour (temporarily) redundant. Furthermore, the relationship 
between employment and productivity increase depends on the elasticities of demand 
in the goods and services markets. In markets where the price elasticity of demand for 
the goods and services produced is relatively low (<1) productivity increases can lead 
to decreasing employment when the rise in quantity of the product sold does not 
outweigh the drop in price associated with the productivity increase. The opposite 
holds true in markets where the price elasticity of demand for the goods and services 
produced is relatively high (>1). 
    
Theoretically the causal effect between labour utilisation and labour productivity can 
also run the other way around. In the short run, the standard labour demand curve in 
the neo classical model keeps the amount of capital fixed. Increasing labour supply 
would therefore decrease the amount of capital per worker, and thereby labour 
productivity57. In the long run, however, this would be predicted to be undone by 
increased investment and increases in the capital stock. Furthermore, both in the short 
and the long run an increase in labour utilisation or employment could affect labour 
productivity by influencing the composition of the labour force. An influx, for 
instance, of highly skilled labour into the labour force would increase the average 
labour productivity and vice versa.  
 
All these possible channels through which the two elements can influence each other 
make the exact sign of the macroeconomic effects as well as their duration and 
magnitude theoretically largely uncertain, therewith leaving the ultimate answer for 
empirical research. Even though results vary, recent results seem to indicate that there 
is a valid case to be made for the existence of a positive relationship between 
employment and productivity58.  
 
The remainder of this section will focus on two more specific issues regarding the 
relationship between productivity and labour utilisation, namely the role of wages as 
linking pin between the two elements and the specific relationship between 
unemployment and productivity.       
 
2.4.1 The role of wages in labour utilisation and labour productivity 
 
The linking pin in the relationship between productivity and labour utilisation lies in 
the setting of wage rates. This section will further develop two distinct theoretical 
issues and their practical consequences. The first one being the question of who 
benefits from increases in productivity, and whether the extent to which productivity 
                                                   
57 See also Dew-Becker and Gordon, ‘The role of labour market changes in the slowdown of European 
productivity growth’, (CEPR discussion paper, no 6722, 2008). 
58 See van der Horst, Rojas-Romagosa and Bettendorf, ‘Does employment affect productivity?’ (CPB 
discussion paper, no 119, 2009).  
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more likely to be binding. 
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number of ways in which the two elements are linked, which also have important 
implications for government employment policy. In the previous sections several 
theoretical links between labour participation and productivity have already been dealt 
with. Both the standard neo classical model and the search model showed the results 
of an increase in worker productivity, through a rise in the wage rate, on an 
individual’s decision to enter the labour market. Within a reasonable range of wage 
rates the income effect is stronger than the substitution effect, and an increase in 
worker productivity increases a person’s propensity to enter the labour market, get a 
job and increase his or her hours worked. This would suggest a positive relationship 
between productivity and labour utilisation. When one introduces the possibility of 
inflexibility in quantities and prices, however, in the short-run an opposite effect 
could occur. With increased worker productivity there is simply less labour needed to 
                                                   
54 See European Commission, Employment in Europe report (2008). 
55 Bartelsman, Gautier and de Wind, ‘Employment protection, technology choice and worker 
allocation’ (IZA discussion paper, no 4895, 2010).  
56 Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn, ‘Job protection legislation and productivity growth in OECD 
countries’ (IZA discussion paper, no 3555, 2007). 
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produce the same amount of goods for the same price. These inflexibilities would 
make a share of existing labour (temporarily) redundant. Furthermore, the relationship 
between employment and productivity increase depends on the elasticities of demand 
in the goods and services markets. In markets where the price elasticity of demand for 
the goods and services produced is relatively low (<1) productivity increases can lead 
to decreasing employment when the rise in quantity of the product sold does not 
outweigh the drop in price associated with the productivity increase. The opposite 
holds true in markets where the price elasticity of demand for the goods and services 
produced is relatively high (>1). 
    
Theoretically the causal effect between labour utilisation and labour productivity can 
also run the other way around. In the short run, the standard labour demand curve in 
the neo classical model keeps the amount of capital fixed. Increasing labour supply 
would therefore decrease the amount of capital per worker, and thereby labour 
productivity57. In the long run, however, this would be predicted to be undone by 
increased investment and increases in the capital stock. Furthermore, both in the short 
and the long run an increase in labour utilisation or employment could affect labour 
productivity by influencing the composition of the labour force. An influx, for 
instance, of highly skilled labour into the labour force would increase the average 
labour productivity and vice versa.  
 
All these possible channels through which the two elements can influence each other 
make the exact sign of the macroeconomic effects as well as their duration and 
magnitude theoretically largely uncertain, therewith leaving the ultimate answer for 
empirical research. Even though results vary, recent results seem to indicate that there 
is a valid case to be made for the existence of a positive relationship between 
employment and productivity58.  
 
The remainder of this section will focus on two more specific issues regarding the 
relationship between productivity and labour utilisation, namely the role of wages as 
linking pin between the two elements and the specific relationship between 
unemployment and productivity.       
 
2.4.1 The role of wages in labour utilisation and labour productivity 
 
The linking pin in the relationship between productivity and labour utilisation lies in 
the setting of wage rates. This section will further develop two distinct theoretical 
issues and their practical consequences. The first one being the question of who 
benefits from increases in productivity, and whether the extent to which productivity 
                                                   
57 See also Dew-Becker and Gordon, ‘The role of labour market changes in the slowdown of European 
productivity growth’, (CEPR discussion paper, no 6722, 2008). 
58 See van der Horst, Rojas-Romagosa and Bettendorf, ‘Does employment affect productivity?’ (CPB 
discussion paper, no 119, 2009).  
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increases are transferred into wage increases influences the labour utilisation element 
of the equation. The second question relates to the theoretical concept of efficiency 
wages. This question in short is whether next to an effect from productivity to wages 
there might also be an effect the other way around, from wages to productivity. 
 
Returning to the search model discussed earlier the effects of a rise in worker 
productivity can be illustrated by shifting the curves in the following graph.  
 
Graph 21 
 
A rise in worker productivity shifts the labour demand curve to the right, but at the 
same time causes the labour supply curve to move upward. Since the effect on labour 
demand is per definition greater than that on labour supply (caused by β being smaller 
than 1) both the wage rate and labour market tightness increases. This in turn rotates 
the job creation curve anticlockwise, decreasing the unemployment rate59. Note 
however, that if wage increases exceed productivity increases, the effect on labour 
supply becomes larger than that on labour demand, which leads to on increasing 
unemployment rate. 
 
The same reasoning can be applied for the participation decision, depicted earlier as 
the following equation 
 
 
                                                   
59 Note, however, that in this model the only reason why the market tightness increases and 
unemployment rate decreased is because of the existence of a fixed z (outside income), which also 
partly determines the wage rate. Because of this fixed z, wages do not fully absorb productivity 
increases. Making z fully flexible, for instance, in relation to the wage rate, would cause wages to fully 
absorb productivity increases therewith making the unemployment rate independent of changes in 
productivity. 
 
Equation 18 
 
 
 
With participation changes being independent from productivity changes when lo is 
made fully flexible in relation to the wage rate.  
 
The second theoretical question concerns the relationship between wages and 
productivity. Up till now it was assumed that a higher wage is paid because of higher 
productivity of the person concerned. This assumption has, however, proven not to be 
realistic in all instances. Studies on the relationship between the age structure of the 
labour force and productivity, for instance, have shown that the productivity picture 
looks more like an inverted U, meaning that productivity increases up to a certain age 
and then starts to decline60. When the highest point on the curve is reached differs 
between different professions, but on average it lies around the mid to late forties. 
Wages on the other hand tend to rise steadily until retirement61. 
 
Furthermore, “efficiency wage theories” predict that under some circumstances higher 
wages would actually induce higher productivity62. There are a number of reasons 
why such an effect would occur. Labour turnover can be one reason: employees 
earning a higher wage will be less inclined to switch jobs. When a firm incurs training 
costs for new workers, a profit maximising decision by the firm could include 
increasing wages above market clearing level. Information imperfections could also 
be a reason. With imperfect information about worker characteristics firms can 
increase the probability of attracting high productivity workers by increasing wages 
offered. The higher wage also works as a disciplining device, with workers having 
more to lose in case of termination of labour contracts and therewith a higher 
incentive to be productive. The underlying reasoning here is that a worker has an 
incentive to work at a level below his maximum productivity, since the extra “leisure” 
that is derived in that manner increases his utility enjoyed. More generally, worker 
productivity could also be influenced by their impression of being treated “fairly”63. 
                                                   
60 See, for instance, Evers and Wilthagen, ‘Arbeidsproductiviteit en arbeidsmarktdynamiek’  
(Organisatie voor strategisch arbeidsmarktonderzoek, 2006). 
61 This age related loss of productivity in literature as far as the individual himself is concerned has 
been mostly attributed to a combination of cognitive or physical decline and obsolete skills, but also for 
a large part works through the complex interaction with other workers and other factors of production 
which takes place within a certain economic environment constituted by the available technology, 
public infrastructure, characteristics of a given firm and sector and many other things beside. See also 
Werding, ‘Ageing and productivity growth: are there macro level cohort effects of human capital?’ 
(CESifo Working paper, no 2207, 2008). 
62 See e.g. Akerlof, 'Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange' (Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, XCVII, 1982) and Shapiro and Stiglitz, 'Equilibrium Unemployment as a 
Worker Discipline Device' (American Economic Review, LXXIV, 1984). 
63 Stiglitz, ‘Theories of wage rigidities’ (NBER working paper, no 1442, 1986).  
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increasing wages above market clearing level. Information imperfections could also 
be a reason. With imperfect information about worker characteristics firms can 
increase the probability of attracting high productivity workers by increasing wages 
offered. The higher wage also works as a disciplining device, with workers having 
more to lose in case of termination of labour contracts and therewith a higher 
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60 See, for instance, Evers and Wilthagen, ‘Arbeidsproductiviteit en arbeidsmarktdynamiek’  
(Organisatie voor strategisch arbeidsmarktonderzoek, 2006). 
61 This age related loss of productivity in literature as far as the individual himself is concerned has 
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public infrastructure, characteristics of a given firm and sector and many other things beside. See also 
Werding, ‘Ageing and productivity growth: are there macro level cohort effects of human capital?’ 
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62 See e.g. Akerlof, 'Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange' (Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, XCVII, 1982) and Shapiro and Stiglitz, 'Equilibrium Unemployment as a 
Worker Discipline Device' (American Economic Review, LXXIV, 1984). 
63 Stiglitz, ‘Theories of wage rigidities’ (NBER working paper, no 1442, 1986).  
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The outcome of efficiency wages would be a heterogeneous wage level for different 
workers and wages above market clearing level combined with downward wage 
rigidity. Since there is some evidence as to the existence of efficiency wage type 
arrangements in the economy64 this should be kept in mind as addition to earlier 
predictions and policy instruments. 
   
2.4.2 Unemployment and productivity  
 
In the models set out in the section on labour utilisation65 several labour market 
aspects that influence the level of unemployment in the economy were encountered. 
This section further investigates two of those aspects, and their link to productivity 
performance. These two elements are the existence of a government imposed 
minimum wage and the existence of unemployment benefits66. A government-
imposed minimum wage above the long-run equilibrium wage rate leads to 
involuntary unemployment. Extending the earlier analysis this can be graphically 
portrayed as follows:  
 
Graph 22 
         
The extension of the analysis is the identification of two distinct types of workers. 
The units of labour in the left graph are units of high-skilled labour. The units of 
labour in the right hand graph are units of low-skilled labour. The difference between 
the two is the amount of human capital incorporated. Since the amount of human 
capital present in the high-skilled workers increases their productivity the equilibrium 
wage rate is at w1, significantly higher than the equilibrium wage rate of w3 for the 
                                                   
64 See, for instance, Kugler, ‘Employee referrals and efficiency wages’ (Labour Economics 10, 2003). 
65 See section 2.2. 
66 See also OECD, Employment Outlook (2007). 
 
low-skilled worker. The result of the introduction of a government-set minimum wage 
w2 here still leads to involuntary unemployment, but with a distinct division between 
the two types of workers. Since the minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage 
rate of w1 for the high skilled workers, the minimum wage for this group of workers 
does not lead to unemployment. For low-skilled workers on the other hand 
involuntary unemployment is created, since companies are forced to pay the higher 
wage rate w2 instead of the equilibrium wage rate w3. 
 
The existence of a minimum wage rate could also increase productivity. First of all, 
the general composition of the employed labour force is influenced. The decreased 
demand for low-skilled workers actually increases the average skill level of the labour 
force, increasing productivity per hour worked. Second, the reduced demand for low- 
skilled labour increases incentives for low-skilled workers to invest in education and 
training to increase their skill level (or in the terms of the graphs, to become high- 
skilled workers). The aggregate effect of a minimum wage on GDP per capita 
therewith becomes uncertain67. In general, empirical studies find no significant effect 
of minimum wages on employment, labour allocation or productivity performance68. 
This suggests that they in general are low enough to avoid general negative impact, 
although in some instances a negative employment effect for specific vulnerable 
groups such as young people and low-productivity workers69 has been identified.  
 
Unemployment benefits can influence productivity through several channels. The first 
one is the composition effect of the employed labour force. Unemployment benefits 
increase the reservation wage z, and since the average wage rate for low-skilled 
workers is lower than that for high-skilled workers, this will lead to a proportionately 
larger share of low-skilled workers becoming unemployed. This in turn increases 
average labour productivity per hour worked. Furthermore, higher unemployment 
benefits increase incentives for workers to search for a good job, increasing the 
quality of matches. These higher quality matches should increase productivity since 
production factors are used more efficiently. On the other hand, an increase in search 
time for workers could also lead to a deterioration of human capital incorporated in 
the persons searching for a job, which in turn has a negative effect on productivity. 
The effect on both productivity and GDP per capita therefore becomes ambiguous. 
Empirical studies generally confirm these findings, with Bassanini and Duval finding 
that high and long-lasting unemployment benefits increase unemployment70. 
However, when benefits are combined with high expenditure on active labour market 
                                                   
67 Even more so since the extra influx of high skilled labour would shift the labour supply curve, 
lowering the wage rate towards or even beyond the government set minimum wage.  
68 See e.g. Bassanini et al., ‘Institutional Determinants of Worker Flows: A Cross-Country/Cross-
Industry Approach’ (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, no 107, 2010) and 
OECD, Employment Outlook (2010).  
69 See e.g. Rutkowski, The minimum wage; curse or cure? (World Bank, 2003). 
70 Bassanini and Duval, ‘Employment patterns in OECD countries, reassessing the role of policies and 
institutions’ (OECD Economics department working papers, no 486, 2006). 
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However, when benefits are combined with high expenditure on active labour market 
                                                   
67 Even more so since the extra influx of high skilled labour would shift the labour supply curve, 
lowering the wage rate towards or even beyond the government set minimum wage.  
68 See e.g. Bassanini et al., ‘Institutional Determinants of Worker Flows: A Cross-Country/Cross-
Industry Approach’ (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, no 107, 2010) and 
OECD, Employment Outlook (2010).  
69 See e.g. Rutkowski, The minimum wage; curse or cure? (World Bank, 2003). 
70 Bassanini and Duval, ‘Employment patterns in OECD countries, reassessing the role of policies and 
institutions’ (OECD Economics department working papers, no 486, 2006). 
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policies, shorter duration and strict activation requirements embedded in the system, 
this effect can be mitigated and even lead to positive productivity effects71. The 
positive productivity effect in turn is empirically shown to exist in a study by 
Acemoglu and Shimer. Using US data for high school graduates they show that 
economies with moderate unemployment benefits can have higher output and welfare 
than those without unemployment insurance72. 
 
2.5 Demand and Business cycles 
 
The models developed in the previous sections have given an extensive overview of 
the labour market from an economy’s supply side perspective. The demand side of the 
product market has not been fully taken into account up to now, nor has the existence 
of temporary or cyclical changes in employment been elaborated upon. To relate these 
aspects to analysis on supply and labour market aspects an economic tool called the 
called Phillips curve will be used. On the basis of economic data for the UK for nearly 
a century A.W. Phillips in 195873 found an inverse empirical relation between the 
level of inflation and the level of unemployment in an economy. As an underlying 
rationale he argued that nominal wage formation in period T was related to 
unemployment in period T-1, or simply put, in case of higher demand for labour in 
period T-1 (and therewith lower unemployment), workers would demand a higher 
wage for period T. This can be portrayed in the following simple equation 
 
Equation 19 
 
 
From this he deduced that there was a trade off between unemployment and inflation, 
which policy makers could exploit to choose between different combinations of 
inflation and unemployment. According to Phelps and Friedman, Phillips’ theory 
contained a serious flaw however. In particular, they argued in the late nineteen 
sixties74, that both firms and workers care about real wages and not nominal wages. 
Therefore it is the real wage that should rise in period T when there is excess demand 
for labour in period T-1, something which adds an inflation expectation element to the 
simple picture painted by Phillips. Inflation expectations were assumed to evolve over 
time as a result of actual past experience so that inflation expectations are determined 
by what happened during the last period. This can be represented as follows:  
 
                                                   
71 See, for instance, Nickell et al., ‘The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment and Wages in the OECD 
from the 1960s to the 1990s’ (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001). 
72 Acemoglu and Shimer, ‘Productivity Gains from Unemployment Insurance’ (European Economic 
Review 44, 2000). 
73 Phillips, ‘The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the 
United Kingdom 1861-1957’ (Economica 25, 1958).  
74 See, for instance, Friedman, ‘The Role of Monetary Policy’  (American Economic Review 58, 1968). 
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Equation 20 
 
 
The wage rate at period t is a function of the unemployment rate at t-1 and the 
expected inflation at period t. The latter is formed adaptively and is based on inflation 
in the previous period t-1. Phelps and Friedman argued that in the long run there are 
no systematic mistakes made in predicting inflation, which makes the long-run 
Phillips curve vertical75. This is portrayed in the following graph.  
 
Graph 23  
 
 
The convex curve depicts the standard Phillips curve as explained above. The vertical 
line is the long-run Phillips curve, which is vertical at the natural rate of 
unemployment. The equilibrium level of inflation that is consistent in the long run 
with the equilibrium level of unemployment is level П*.  
 
Friedman and Phelps’ adaptive expectations argument was rejected by Lucas and 
Sargent in the nineteen seventies76, since this does not allow for the idea that agents 
process all available information in an optimal manner. To include this idea they 
introduced rational expectations, which can be portrayed as follows.   
 
Equation 21 
 
                                                   
75 For derivation see McCallum, Monetary economics; theory and policy (MacMillan publishing 
Company, 1989) ch 9. 
76 See originally e.g. Lucas and Sargent, ‘After Keynesian Macroeconomics’, in Federal Bank of 
Boston, After the Phillips Curve (Conference Series, no 19, 1978). 
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Note that the essential difference with the previous equation is that inflation in period 
T now depends on expected inflation in period t + 1.   
 
However, in a world of fully flexible prices and wages and perfectly rational 
expectations even the short-term Phillips curve is vertical, which empirics had proven 
to not be the case. Lucas and Sargent explained the convex short run Phillips curve by 
misperceptions, with people not instantly identifying and reacting to changes in 
inflation. The New Keynesian version of the Phillips curve builds on this by focussing 
on rational forward looking expectations combined with nominal rigidities, or the 
“sticky prices and wages”  encountered earlier77, which means that firms and workers 
can not instantaneously change product prices and wages to accommodate changes in 
inflation perception.  
 
Graph 24 
 
Relating this rational expectations version of the Phillips curve to the business cycle, 
the various models translate to different views on the causes and policy response and 
the manner in which they are either supply or demand related. Real Business Cycle 
theory (RBC)78 in this regard argues that business cycles can be seen as a market 
clearing, equilibrium phenomenon. The only shocks that affect the economy are 
shocks affecting aggregate supply, for instance, an increase in productivity, shifting 
the long-run Phillips curve. The business cycle in this framework is created by two 
reactions to the shock. The first one is the accumulation of additional capital. The 
increased productivity makes it worthwhile for companies to increase the capital 
                                                   
77 For more information on the possible micro economic explanations for price and wage stickiness in a 
world of rational expectations see Heijdra and van der Ploeg, Modern Macro Economics (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
78 See originally e.g. Kydland and Prescott, ‘Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations’ (Econometrica, 
50, 1982). 
 
stock. Since the accumulation of capital is a gradual process, this increases production 
over time. With the productivity shock being temporary the following decline in 
productivity would decrease the capital stock, and decrease production. This leads to 
the properties of a business cycle. The second reason relates to labour supply. The 
productivity shock increases productivity per hour worked, which translates in higher 
wages and higher labour supply. The cycle is then created by the intertemporal choice 
between labour and leisure meaning a person will maximise utility over a life time, 
working in periods of high wages and enjoy leisure in times of lower wages. This 
process would reinforce the business cycle properties of the model. In this model it is 
not even desirable to smooth business cycles, since by definition both firms and 
workers are maximising utility levels.  
 
In New Keynesian models79, on the other hand, business cycles result due to lags in 
economic relationships as well as persistence of effects. These lags include slow 
responses of demand to income and of supply to demand. Prices and wages adjust 
gradually to changing demand and supply conditions and therefore cause actual 
adjustment in a Phillips curve setting like graph 24 to take place in of a “loop” around 
the long-run Phillips curve. With plausible lags on both the demand and supply side, 
this adjustment to shocks can broadly explain observed actual business cycles.   
 
Mirroring the models with actual empirical outcome both models under various 
assumptions could be made to reflect reality relatively well. RBC theory would 
predict both employment and productivity to rise in a period of boom and fall in a 
period of slowdown, something which is observed in practice80. The New Keynesian 
theory came to the same results using the concept of “labour hoarding”. Because 
dismissal costs are positive and human capital is often firm-specific, firms will avoid 
firing employees immediately in downturns, even though production is reduced. This 
leads to lower productivity. During the expansion phase labour is then gradually put 
to more productive use.   
 
In recent years somewhat of a convergence has occurred between these two different 
strands of theory81, incorporating rational expectations, the link between the short and 
long-term from the RBC framework (and therewith the possibility of intertemporal 
substitution of labour leisure), and the price and wage rigidities present in the New 
Keynesian approach (and in practice82). This means that government policy aimed at 
stabilisation is not necessarily ineffective, and that ideal stabilisation policies in 
                                                   
79 See originally e.g. Ball, Mankiw and Romer, ‘The New Keynesian Economics and the Output-
Inflation Trade-off’ (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol 19, no 1, 1988) 1-82. 
80 Burda and Wyplosz, Macro economics, a European text (Oxford University press, 2001). 
81 See e.g. Woodford, ‘Convergence in macro economics, elements of the new synthesis’ (American 
Economic Journal, vol 1, issue 1, 2009) and Blanchard and Gali, ‘Real wage rigidities and the new 
Keynesian model’  (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to vol 39, no 1, 2007). 
82 See e.g. Mankiw, ‘Real Business cycles, a new Keynesian perspective’ (Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vo1 3, no 3, 1989). 
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firing employees immediately in downturns, even though production is reduced. This 
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to more productive use.   
 
In recent years somewhat of a convergence has occurred between these two different 
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79 See originally e.g. Ball, Mankiw and Romer, ‘The New Keynesian Economics and the Output-
Inflation Trade-off’ (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol 19, no 1, 1988) 1-82. 
80 Burda and Wyplosz, Macro economics, a European text (Oxford University press, 2001). 
81 See e.g. Woodford, ‘Convergence in macro economics, elements of the new synthesis’ (American 
Economic Journal, vol 1, issue 1, 2009) and Blanchard and Gali, ‘Real wage rigidities and the new 
Keynesian model’  (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to vol 39, no 1, 2007). 
82 See e.g. Mankiw, ‘Real Business cycles, a new Keynesian perspective’ (Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vo1 3, no 3, 1989). 
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theory at least can be designed. Government could, in the short run, for instance, 
stimulate employment, or speed up the process of overcoming a negative employment 
shock83. Tools at hand include e.g. increasing government spending, lowering taxes 
or, on the monetary side, an increase in the money supply. Furthermore, next to short-
term stabilisation policy, measures taken can have a more structural effect on labour 
market characteristics. Central for this argument is the concept of “hysteresis”, which 
in the labour market means that short-term cyclical unemployment under some 
conditions can be transformed into structural unemployment. In an economic slump, 
when unemployment is above its initial structural level, wages will decrease but by 
less than predicted due to the fact that, when workers become unemployed their 
disconnection from work starts a process of degeneration of their skills and reduction 
in their motivation to search for a job (an effect quite similar to the discouraged 
worker effect discussed earlier). As a result, unemployment will settle at a new but 
higher rate than predicted by the model without hysteresis effects. Ball84 finds 
evidence for the existence of these hysteresis effects, as do Furceri and Mourougane 
85. The latter also find that strict employment protection legislation and product 
market regulation negatively influence both the extent of the initial shock and the 
adjustment pattern in the aftermath of a downturn86. However, in general, designing 
and implementing these measures is difficult since one cannot expect a simple answer 
about the effects of a given policy action. Whether the action is anticipated in advance 
or not, whether the change in policy is expected to be persistent or not, and what the 
policy authority announces about its policy intentions are, for instance, all relevant 
factors to be taken into account. 
 
2.6 Government policy objectives 
In analysing the various channels through which government policy influences labour 
market outcomes policy prescriptions have not always been clear cut, leaving 
empirics to decide which effect dominates. And even then results have not always 
been without debate. All in all, however, this chapter has left a number of possible 
channels through which government policy can increase both labour utilisation and 
labour productivity, which can be summarised under the following five objectives. 
1. Increasing incentives for work. 
This first channel for policy intervention is mostly based on the micro economic 
notions developed in the first part of the chapter and the work-leisure trade-off 
described. In increasing labour market participation government policy can 
influence this trade-off, making work more attractive. This applies to the decision 
                                                   
83 For a more comprehensive handling of these issues see e.g. Heijdra and van der Ploeg, Modern 
Macro Economics (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
84 Ball, ‘Hysteresis in unemployment, old and new evidence’ (NBER working paper, no 14818, 2009). 
85 Furceri, D. and A. Mourougane, ‘How Do Institutions Affect Structural Unemployment In Times Of 
Crises?’ (OECD, Economics Department Working Paper, no 730, 2009). 
86 See also European Commission, Employment in Europe (2010). 
 
to work or not to work, as well as to the decision to work additional hours. 
Concrete policy prescriptions in this area become more nuanced when taking into 
account the effect on productivity. Although a good case can be made for a 
positive relationship between participation and productivity, there are trade-offs 
here. Also, the elasticity of labour supply differs between subgroups, with 
elasticity for males being in general far lower than those for females (especially if 
they are second earners), and the elasticity around the participation threshold being 
greater than the elasticity in increasing hours worked. 
 
Government instruments identified in this chapter which can increase these 
incentives include decreasing tax rate on wages, reducing generosity of benefits, as 
well as reducing costs incurred when working more (like childcare). Trade-offs 
between participation and productivity figured most prominently in the area of 
benefit generosity, where higher benefits can encourage people to keep looking for 
higher productivity jobs. A possible solution here to obtain both positive 
participation and productivity effects would be a combination of relatively 
generous benefits and active labour market policies, shorter duration and strict 
activation requirements. 
 
2. Improving the functioning and flexibility of markets. 
The second avenue for policy intervention is mainly based on the search theory, as 
well as the general theory behind stimulating total factor productivity and (new) 
Keynesian macroeconomics. In short, the existence of search frictions and 
information imperfections have been shown to make it necessary for both firms 
and workers to spend time and resources on finding a productive job match. 
Furthermore, flexible markets increase possibilities for firms to take risks and 
production factors, including labour, to move to the most productive sectors, 
increasing productivity. Finally, general inflexibility in wages and wage growth in 
excess of labour productivity growth have been shown to increase unemployment 
and decrease participation, although some productivity enhancing effect of wages 
above market clearing level might ensue from the efficiency wage theorem in 
general and in the specific case of minimum wages. 
 
Government policy aimed at reducing frictions can decrease unemployment, 
increase participation and increase productivity. A prominent policy tool in this 
area is the existence of employment protection legislation. Although highly 
debated, the overall empirical conclusion on this issue is that effects on 
unemployment are negative but small, while EPL does reduce the flows in and out 
of employment and increases unemployment duration and the creation of insiders 
and outsiders in the labour market. Furthermore, countries with high EPL 
normally have a lower participation rate. Finally high EPL can have a depressing 
effect on productivity performance in general as well as on the emergence of high 
productivity sectors.  
 
27022 Duin.indd   62 12-10-13   17:42
2Economic objectives
63 
theory at least can be designed. Government could, in the short run, for instance, 
stimulate employment, or speed up the process of overcoming a negative employment 
shock83. Tools at hand include e.g. increasing government spending, lowering taxes 
or, on the monetary side, an increase in the money supply. Furthermore, next to short-
term stabilisation policy, measures taken can have a more structural effect on labour 
market characteristics. Central for this argument is the concept of “hysteresis”, which 
in the labour market means that short-term cyclical unemployment under some 
conditions can be transformed into structural unemployment. In an economic slump, 
when unemployment is above its initial structural level, wages will decrease but by 
less than predicted due to the fact that, when workers become unemployed their 
disconnection from work starts a process of degeneration of their skills and reduction 
in their motivation to search for a job (an effect quite similar to the discouraged 
worker effect discussed earlier). As a result, unemployment will settle at a new but 
higher rate than predicted by the model without hysteresis effects. Ball84 finds 
evidence for the existence of these hysteresis effects, as do Furceri and Mourougane 
85. The latter also find that strict employment protection legislation and product 
market regulation negatively influence both the extent of the initial shock and the 
adjustment pattern in the aftermath of a downturn86. However, in general, designing 
and implementing these measures is difficult since one cannot expect a simple answer 
about the effects of a given policy action. Whether the action is anticipated in advance 
or not, whether the change in policy is expected to be persistent or not, and what the 
policy authority announces about its policy intentions are, for instance, all relevant 
factors to be taken into account. 
 
2.6 Government policy objectives 
In analysing the various channels through which government policy influences labour 
market outcomes policy prescriptions have not always been clear cut, leaving 
empirics to decide which effect dominates. And even then results have not always 
been without debate. All in all, however, this chapter has left a number of possible 
channels through which government policy can increase both labour utilisation and 
labour productivity, which can be summarised under the following five objectives. 
1. Increasing incentives for work. 
This first channel for policy intervention is mostly based on the micro economic 
notions developed in the first part of the chapter and the work-leisure trade-off 
described. In increasing labour market participation government policy can 
influence this trade-off, making work more attractive. This applies to the decision 
                                                   
83 For a more comprehensive handling of these issues see e.g. Heijdra and van der Ploeg, Modern 
Macro Economics (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
84 Ball, ‘Hysteresis in unemployment, old and new evidence’ (NBER working paper, no 14818, 2009). 
85 Furceri, D. and A. Mourougane, ‘How Do Institutions Affect Structural Unemployment In Times Of 
Crises?’ (OECD, Economics Department Working Paper, no 730, 2009). 
86 See also European Commission, Employment in Europe (2010). 
 
to work or not to work, as well as to the decision to work additional hours. 
Concrete policy prescriptions in this area become more nuanced when taking into 
account the effect on productivity. Although a good case can be made for a 
positive relationship between participation and productivity, there are trade-offs 
here. Also, the elasticity of labour supply differs between subgroups, with 
elasticity for males being in general far lower than those for females (especially if 
they are second earners), and the elasticity around the participation threshold being 
greater than the elasticity in increasing hours worked. 
 
Government instruments identified in this chapter which can increase these 
incentives include decreasing tax rate on wages, reducing generosity of benefits, as 
well as reducing costs incurred when working more (like childcare). Trade-offs 
between participation and productivity figured most prominently in the area of 
benefit generosity, where higher benefits can encourage people to keep looking for 
higher productivity jobs. A possible solution here to obtain both positive 
participation and productivity effects would be a combination of relatively 
generous benefits and active labour market policies, shorter duration and strict 
activation requirements. 
 
2. Improving the functioning and flexibility of markets. 
The second avenue for policy intervention is mainly based on the search theory, as 
well as the general theory behind stimulating total factor productivity and (new) 
Keynesian macroeconomics. In short, the existence of search frictions and 
information imperfections have been shown to make it necessary for both firms 
and workers to spend time and resources on finding a productive job match. 
Furthermore, flexible markets increase possibilities for firms to take risks and 
production factors, including labour, to move to the most productive sectors, 
increasing productivity. Finally, general inflexibility in wages and wage growth in 
excess of labour productivity growth have been shown to increase unemployment 
and decrease participation, although some productivity enhancing effect of wages 
above market clearing level might ensue from the efficiency wage theorem in 
general and in the specific case of minimum wages. 
 
Government policy aimed at reducing frictions can decrease unemployment, 
increase participation and increase productivity. A prominent policy tool in this 
area is the existence of employment protection legislation. Although highly 
debated, the overall empirical conclusion on this issue is that effects on 
unemployment are negative but small, while EPL does reduce the flows in and out 
of employment and increases unemployment duration and the creation of insiders 
and outsiders in the labour market. Furthermore, countries with high EPL 
normally have a lower participation rate. Finally high EPL can have a depressing 
effect on productivity performance in general as well as on the emergence of high 
productivity sectors.  
 
27022 Duin.indd   63 12-10-13   17:42
Chapter 2
64 
3. Improving the human capital stock. 
The third avenue for policy intervention is mainly based on the theory of quality 
of work, more specifically human capital theory. Knowledge and skills both 
directly raise productivity and increase an economy's ability to develop and to 
adopt new technologies. Both aspects have been confirmed empirically. Incentives 
in this area have been found to differ greatly between various subgroups, with cost 
benefit analysis of enjoying education versus higher future income being central in 
determining them.   
 
Government policy in this area can be linked to increasing incentives (or removing 
disincentives) for education, with an emphasis on increasing the flexibility of 
human capital obtained. Since societal benefits have been found to be greater than 
personal benefits from education, there is an additional reason for government 
intervention. 
  
4.  Improving framework conditions.  
The fourth avenue for policy intervention can also be linked to the theory on 
quality of work dealing with worker health as well as discussion on minimum 
wage level. Improved health of workers can enhance worker productivity as well 
as labour supply by improving framework conditions, e.g. by reducing the risk of 
injury of workers. Furthermore, the extra costs an employer has to make in case of 
an injury are reduced, improving competitiveness. There is, however, a trade-off 
here. Increased worker health also comes with costs. For instance, employers have 
to make additional costs in meeting health and safety conditions: their 
administrative burdens increase while their flexibility as far as possible business 
models is concerned reduces. Both aspects can decrease competitiveness and GDP 
per capita growth.  
  
Government policy in this area can be aimed at both improving information 
available and introducing minimum health and safety regulations. Policy in the 
area of minimum wages has been specifically discussed, where a minimum wage 
rate could influence the general composition of the labour force, increasing 
incentives for low-skilled workers to invest in education and training to increase 
their skill level. The aggregate effect on GDP per capita therewith becomes 
uncertain and arguably subject to the same kind of optimisation question. 
 
5. Short-term stabilisation policy. 
The previous four objectives of government policy intervention focussed on 
structural aspects of the labour market. This last objective of policymaking in 
contrast is based on business cycles and temporary fluctuations in the labour 
market. This chapter has shown that government policy aimed at stabilisation is 
not necessarily ineffective, and that ideal stabilisation policies in theory at least 
can be designed. The discouraged worker and hysteris concepts discussed in this 
chapter provide additional reasons for governments to act. However, designing 
 
and implementing these measures is difficult since the policy effects are uncertain.  
 
Concerning specific government policy there is a large overlap with the more 
structural policy prescriptions above. Improving flexibility of markets and 
increased incentives to supply labour, for instance, will allow a faster recovery 
from economic downturn, decreasing the effects described above. Other measures 
such as expansionary fiscal policies and increasing incentives for labour hoarding 
could have positive effects as well, although a cost benefit analysis is very 
complicated, with actual effects very much depending on the specifics. 
With these five possible policy objectives identified, the next chapter will zoom in on 
the European Union and the development of EU labour market policy, from its 
inception in the nineteen fifties up to the present day. Against the backdrop of the five 
policy objectives, the following chapter will describe the areas in which EU 
employment policy has developed over time as well as the instruments that have been 
put in place to achieve its objectives. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has given a general overview of the different policy objectives 
governments can pursue in order to contribute to increasing GDP per capita growth. 
The government actor, however, has not been elaborated upon. In reality there are 
several governments, varying from local to supranational, all implementing policy 
measures that, to some extent, aim at or influence the five different objectives. This 
study will specifically focus on the role that the European Union plays in this area. 
Using the five objectives from the previous chapter as background for analysis, this 
chapter will give an overview of the development of EU employment policy over 
time, unveiling the motivation for the different steps that have been taken and that 
have led to EU employment policy as it stands today. In doing so, this chapter will be 
based on the development of table 1. The first column depicts the five different policy 
objectives that were identified in the previous chapter. The first row gives four 
different EU employment policy instruments: employment policy coordination, 
internal market legislation, social employment policy and EU funds spending.  
Table 1 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
 
    
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
 
    
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
  
 
   
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
     
 
3.2 The Treaty of Rome 
The roots of EU employment policy go back to the beginning of the process of 
 
European integration, over fifty years ago. The Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (TEEC)87, also sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Rome, 
of 1957 was clear about its task and the means to perform it. Article 2 states:  
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to 
promote throughout the community a harmonious development of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the 
states belonging to it.”  
Removing barriers to trade, and ultimately creating a common market, was seen as the 
main tool in reaching the TEEC’s central goal, namely “the constant improvement of 
the living and working conditions of their people” 88. The cause and effect relationship 
between creating a common market and improving the living and working conditions 
of the people was based on economic reasoning that was dominant at the time, and is 
best explained by a reference to the report of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Committee, chaired by Bertil Ohlin, published in 195689. The report gives an 
economic analysis of the social aspects of European integration and formed an 
important basis for the Spaak-report90 later that year, which in fact recommended the 
creation of a European Economic Community. 
The general philosophy underlying the ILO report is that free trade will automatically 
lead to higher productivity and higher economic growth. This in turn automatically 
has a positive effect on employment. Furthermore, unemployment was not a large 
problem at the time, and the general opinion was that existing unemployment could be 
contained by the increased freedom of movement that the common market would 
create. Concerning working conditions, Member States were already (striving to) 
adhere to relevant ILO standards in this area, and the general sentiment was that the 
internal market in this regard would lead to a race to the top, also because of the 
relatively strong position of labour unions at the time91. Lastly, the report did not 
consider wage differentials between Member States to be a problem since they were 
considered a reflection of differences in labour productivity.  
The EEC Treaty reflects this philosophy, first of all by not including employment as a 
separate objective in article 2 TEEC and secondly by the central role that was given to 
articles 48 to 51 TEEC on free movement of workers that form one of the pillars of 
the common market. There are, however, two other places in the Treaty were 
                                                   
87Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [1957], OJ C 340/173 (TEEC).  
88 TEEC, recitals 2 and 3. 
89 International Labour Office, Social aspects of European Economic co-operation (1956).  
90 Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration, Rapport de chefs de delegation aux ministres 
des affaires etrangeres (1956). 
91 Kenner, EU employment law, from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond (Hart Publishing, 2003) 2. 
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87Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [1957], OJ C 340/173 (TEEC).  
88 TEEC, recitals 2 and 3. 
89 International Labour Office, Social aspects of European Economic co-operation (1956).  
90 Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration, Rapport de chefs de delegation aux ministres 
des affaires etrangeres (1956). 
91 Kenner, EU employment law, from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond (Hart Publishing, 2003) 2. 
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employment is mentioned, namely Title III on social policy and Title II on economic 
policy.  
The subject of social policy as described in Title III of the EEC Treaty is related to 
employment as there is an explicit obligation in article 119 TEEC for Member States 
to ensure that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. Besides this specific 
provision, employment policies are left entirely to the Member States. Article 117 
TEEC on social provisions paints this picture clearly, stating that “Member States 
agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved 
standard of working for workers, so as to make possible their harmonization while the 
improvement is being maintained”. The common market92 is mentioned as the main 
source for the obtainment of these goals. In article 118 TEEC, the Commission is 
given the task to promote coordination between Member States in several 
employment related areas, but only gets the power to “make studies, deliver opinions 
and arrange consultations”. An exception to this approach is the European Social 
Fund (ESF), set out in chapter 2 of this Title. Article 123 TEEC93 constitutes the ESF, 
which is administered by the Commission and directly aimed at improving 
employment opportunities94. The reasoning on how to improve employment 
opportunities is very much in line with the overall reasoning as explained above. The 
fund was entrusted to the Commission to “render the employment of workers easier 
and to increase their geographical and occupational mobility”. In other words, 
employment policy to ensure the functioning of the Common market, which in turn 
would lead to positive employment effects. 
Title II on economic policy also makes a reference to employment in the provisions 
regarding the approximation of the economic policies of the Member States95. 
Specifically the obligation is created for Member States to:  
“pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of 
payments and to maintain confidence in its currency while taking care to ensure a 
high level of employment¸ and a stable level of prices”96      
It is obvious from the phrasing that within the approximation of the economic policies 
of the Member States emphasis lies on exchange rate policy and balance of payment 
                                                   
92 The term “common market” and “internal market” are used interchangeably in this study. “Common 
market” as used in the EEC Treaty embodied the concept of removing trade barriers between Member 
States. With the Single European Act in 1987, the broader concept of “internal market” was introduced 
in the Treaty, being an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured.  
93 There are more (equality between men and women, equivalence between paid holiday schemes) but 
these obligations are expressly laid in the hands of the Member States. See art 119 and 120 TEEC. 
94 Art 124 TEEC, see also Barents, Het verdrag van Amsterdam in werking (Kluwer, 1999) 175. 
95 The second way to promote the goal of “constant improvement of the living and working conditions 
of their people” as mentioned in art 2 TEEC. 
96 Art 104 TEEC. Emphasis added. 
 
equilibrium. High employment comes second only when these goals are met. In order 
to achieve these goals, Member States were to coordinate their economic policies97 by 
providing for cooperation between administrative departments and central banks98. 
The role of the Commission is limited to submitting recommendations on how to 
achieve this cooperation99. The general system with regard to the division of 
responsibilities is therefore much like the system applicable to the social provisions of 
article 117 TEEC. Member States remain responsible, which is made even clearer by 
article 145 TEEC, where coordination of economic policy is expressly laid in the 
hands of the Council.  
Summarizing these developments and their relationship to the different policy 
objectives gives the following table. A red X marks changing or emerging EU 
employment policy instruments: 
Table 2  
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
 
    
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
 
 
X 
   
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
 
    
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
  
 
   
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
     
The EEC Treaty showed a large confidence of its drafters in the economic reasoning 
behind the establishment of the Common market. Employment related areas were not 
seen as a big issue at the time since development in this field was assumed to be 
positive in response to the opening up of markets on the basis of the free movement 
articles. The employment policy at the European level that did exist (including the 
European Social Fund) was largely aimed at ensuring the optimal functioning of the 
                                                   
97 Art 6 and 105 TEEC. 
98 Art 105(1) TEEC. 
99 Art 105(2) TEEC. 
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97 Art 6 and 105 TEEC. 
98 Art 105(1) TEEC. 
99 Art 105(2) TEEC. 
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Common market and promoting the coordination of national policies, with the latter 
having a marginal Treaty base for any action at the European level. The promotion of 
coordination of national policies also comes back in the macroeconomic part of the 
Treaty, where the Commission has an equally marginal role in ensuring a high level 
of employment in Member States.  
3.3 The early days: changing perspective  
In the years directly following the creation of the European Economic Community the 
EEC Treaty was elaborated upon by a number of different acts of secondary 
legislation. These were mainly based on the free movement articles 48-51 and were 
therefore designed to increase labour mobility and to enhance the functioning of the 
common market. General principles on the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment, as well as the right of 
such workers to move freely within the Community in order to pursue activities as 
employed persons were, for instance, laid down in Regulation 1612/68100. More 
specifically, Regulation 1408/71101 coordinated the national social security legislation 
in order to protect the social security rights of persons moving within the European 
Union. This measure is based on articles 2, 7102 and article 51 TEEC. The latter article 
states that:  
“The council shall (…) adopt such measures in the field of social security as 
are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers.”  
Its objective is to eliminate barriers for the free movement of persons, which 
automatically comes with a form of “worker protection”. In the recitals this reasoning 
is made even clearer, with recital 9 stating:  
“Whereas the provisions for co-ordination of national social security 
legislations fall within the framework of freedom of movement for workers 
who are nationals of Member States and should, to this end, contribute 
towards the improvement of their standard of living and conditions of 
employment (…)”103  
 
                                                   
100 Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community [1968] OJ L257. 
101 Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 149 and 
its Regulation (EEC) 574/72 of the Council of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and 
their families moving within the Community [1972] OJ L 74. 
102 Anti discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
103 Emphasis added. 
 
However, TEEC policies with a binding impact on Member States’ legal systems 
were scarce until the nineteen seventies. In this period the creation of the first Social 
Action Program in 1974104 paved the way for the use of other, more general clauses of 
the EEC Treaty, such as article 100 TEEC105, as legal basis for employment policy. 
Article 100 TEEC states that: 
“The Council shall (…) issue Directives for the approximation of such 
provisions laid down by law (…) in Member States as directly affects the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market.” 
That this provision relating to the functioning of the internal market was deemed 
appropriate for Community action in the area of employment can be interpreted as a 
sign of the changing opinion on the economic effects that the establishment of the 
common market was having on the Member States. Even though the common market 
had led to greater prosperity, the Social Action program concludes that it had not 
solved employment problems in Member States, and had even led to increased 
problems in certain areas, mainly related to inequality in income and wealth 
distribution. Therefore more attention was paid to these social effects of economic 
integration. Following the Social Action Program106 some measures were 
implemented107, but the limited Treaty base for social employment action continued to 
hinder the development of further Community legislation, mainly because article 100 
could only be used if there was a direct relationship with the functioning of the 
internal market. As will be highlighted hereafter, this issue remained until the Single 
European Act came into effect in 1987. 
The European Social Fund in this period developed similar to the application of the 
social chapter108. Working within the strict confines of article 125 TEEC, in the 1960s 
the ESF provided grants reimbursing national governments for the retraining of 
almost a million workers and the resettlement of another 700,000109. The fund was 
financed up to 1969, when the Community budget became based on “own resources”, 
by direct contributions from the Member States. Even though ESF money was spent 
                                                   
104 See European Commission ‘Social action program’ COM(73)1600.  
105 See also, to a lesser extent, art 235 TEEC. 
106 For a detailed account see Kenner, EU employment policy, from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond 
(Hart Publishing, 2003). 
107 See, for instance, Directive 75/117/EEC of the Council of 10 February 1975 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women [1975] OJ L 045 and Directive 76/207/EEC of the Council of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39, Directive 
75/129/EEC of the Council of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies [1975] OJ L 048 and Directive 80/987/EEC of the Council of 
20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [1980] OJ L 283, all based on art 100 
TEEC. 
108 Title III chapter 1 TEEC on social provisions. 
109 Commission ‘European Social Fund, an overview of the programming period 1994-1999’ (1997)14. 
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their families moving within the Community [1972] OJ L 74. 
102 Anti discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
103 Emphasis added. 
 
However, TEEC policies with a binding impact on Member States’ legal systems 
were scarce until the nineteen seventies. In this period the creation of the first Social 
Action Program in 1974104 paved the way for the use of other, more general clauses of 
the EEC Treaty, such as article 100 TEEC105, as legal basis for employment policy. 
Article 100 TEEC states that: 
“The Council shall (…) issue Directives for the approximation of such 
provisions laid down by law (…) in Member States as directly affects the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market.” 
That this provision relating to the functioning of the internal market was deemed 
appropriate for Community action in the area of employment can be interpreted as a 
sign of the changing opinion on the economic effects that the establishment of the 
common market was having on the Member States. Even though the common market 
had led to greater prosperity, the Social Action program concludes that it had not 
solved employment problems in Member States, and had even led to increased 
problems in certain areas, mainly related to inequality in income and wealth 
distribution. Therefore more attention was paid to these social effects of economic 
integration. Following the Social Action Program106 some measures were 
implemented107, but the limited Treaty base for social employment action continued to 
hinder the development of further Community legislation, mainly because article 100 
could only be used if there was a direct relationship with the functioning of the 
internal market. As will be highlighted hereafter, this issue remained until the Single 
European Act came into effect in 1987. 
The European Social Fund in this period developed similar to the application of the 
social chapter108. Working within the strict confines of article 125 TEEC, in the 1960s 
the ESF provided grants reimbursing national governments for the retraining of 
almost a million workers and the resettlement of another 700,000109. The fund was 
financed up to 1969, when the Community budget became based on “own resources”, 
by direct contributions from the Member States. Even though ESF money was spent 
                                                   
104 See European Commission ‘Social action program’ COM(73)1600.  
105 See also, to a lesser extent, art 235 TEEC. 
106 For a detailed account see Kenner, EU employment policy, from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond 
(Hart Publishing, 2003). 
107 See, for instance, Directive 75/117/EEC of the Council of 10 February 1975 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women [1975] OJ L 045 and Directive 76/207/EEC of the Council of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39, Directive 
75/129/EEC of the Council of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies [1975] OJ L 048 and Directive 80/987/EEC of the Council of 
20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [1980] OJ L 283, all based on art 100 
TEEC. 
108 Title III chapter 1 TEEC on social provisions. 
109 Commission ‘European Social Fund, an overview of the programming period 1994-1999’ (1997)14. 
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by subject and not by country, the ESF did have a redistributive effect since the direct 
contributions differed per country. Italy, for example, paid relatively little but was a 
large beneficiary110.  
Article 126 TEEC included the possibility of a review that coincided with the end of 
the 12 year transitional period for completion of the Customs Union. The adjustments 
made in the beginning of the nineteen seventies to the ESF and its functioning reflect 
the same change in attitude towards the functioning of the common market. Next to a 
significant budget increase, Council decision 71/66/EEC111 enlarged the scope of ESF 
action. Focus became twofold. The first part was aimed at balancing supply and 
demand in the Community labour market and on specific categories of workers112 that 
were hurt by measures taken to complete the Common market. The second part 
focused on structural unemployment in the less developed regions. Both parts clearly 
reflect a less optimistic view on the results of the development of the Common market 
and the need for additional action at the EU level. Deteriorating labour markets in the 
1970s led to a further increase in the categories of workers eligible for ESF 
funding113. In addition, because of the increased attention for regional disparities, the 
maximum aid percentage was increased for some regions with high unemployment. 
This increased attention also led to the establishment in 1975 of a separate fund that 
specifically focused on regional development from a broader point of view than 
employment, the European Regional Development Fund114. 
Finally, looking at employment policy in macroeconomic policy coordination, both 
the prioritization and the limited competence discussed in the previous section remain 
clearly visible. Discussion in the area of monetary and economic cooperation in the 
1960s mainly focused on the stability of the exchange rate regime. Prioritization in 
this area was very much influenced by the economic debate at the time between the so 
called “monetarists” and the “economists”. The monetarists highlighted the need for 
institutional arrangements and commitments in the area of monetary policy. This 
would induce common policies and convergence in other areas of economic policy, 
which would in turn pave the way for a common currency. The economists on the 
other hand, argued that close coordination in all the different areas of economic policy 
                                                   
110 See Commission, ‘European Social Fund, 50 years of investing in people’ (2007) 10. This was also 
due to a protocol attached to the Treaty that envisaged use of the ESF for an Italian regional 
development program. 
111 Council Decision 71/66/EEC of 1 February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund [1971] 
OJ L 28. 
112 For instance, workers in the agricultural and textile industry, but also persons with disabilities, see 
Regulation 2396/71 of the Council of 8 November 1971 implementing the Council Decision of 1 
February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund [1971] OJ L 249. 
113 Examples are young people, especially first job seekers and migrant workers, see Regulation 
2893/77 of the Council of 20 December 1977 amending Regulation 2396/71 of the Council, 
implementing the Council Decision of 1 February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund 
[1977] OJ L 337. 
114 See Regulation 724/75 of the Council of 18 March 1975 establishing a European Regional 
Development Fund [1975] OJ L 73. 
 
(including employment policy) should be the starting point, and that a common 
monetary policy and currency should be the crowning achievement115.  
Discussion on economic policy in general and concerning employment in particular 
between the different Member States took place at civil servant level in different 
committees set up by the Council. The Conjunctural Policy Committee was 
installed116 in 1960, followed in 1964 by the installation of the Medium Term 
Economic Policy Committee117. The goal of the Conjunctural Committee was to 
participate in and facilitate the consultations between Member States and the 
Commission as mentioned in article 103 TEEC. The Medium Term Economic Policy 
Committee was to prepare a medium term economic policy program outlining in 
broad terms the economic policies which the Member States and the institutions of the 
Community intended to follow. This program covered a period of about 5 years and 
was very broad in scope. Regarding employment policy, increasing labour supply, 
labour mobility, and education were mentioned in very general wording as goals 
Member States should strive for118. Both committees were intended to improve the 
process of coordination of economic policy, but the Treaty base continued to put 
severe limits on its functioning. Meetings mainly functioned as a get together for high 
officials of the EEC countries and the Commission to get acquainted with each other’s 
problems and to understand the differences in philosophy and implementation of 
national policies and institutional arrangements119.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
After the completion of the Customs Union ahead in 1968, the need for achieving 
economic and monetary union became more apparent, even more so since it coincided 
with monetary crises and large exchange rate fluctuations. The advances towards 
integration at the time were thought to “have the result that general economic 
disequilibrium in the member countries will have direct and rapid repercussions on 
the global evolution of the Community”, with “a grave danger of disequilibria arising 
if economic policy cannot be harmonized effectively”120. Starting with the increased 
mandate of the Conjunctural committee in 1969121 and the Werner report on the 
                                                   
115 See Ungerer, A concise history of European monetary integration, from EPU to EMU (Quorum 
books, 1997) 84.  
116 Council Decision of 9 March 1960 on co-ordination of the conjunctural policies of the Member 
States [1960] OJ 31, based on art 103(2) TEEC. 
117 Council Decision of 15 April 1964 on the installation of a Medium term economic policy 
committee, [1964] OJ 64, based on art 105 TEEC. 
118 See Council Decision 67/264/EEC concerning the Medium-term economic policy program 1966-70 
[1967] OJ 79.   
119 See Ungerer, A concise history of European monetary integration, from EPU to EMU (Quorum 
books, 1997) 87/88. 
120 Werner, ‘Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and 
monetary union in the community’ [1970] OJ C 136, 8/9. 
121 Council Decision 69/227/EEC of 17 July 1969 on co-ordination of the short-term economic policies 
of the Member States [1969] OJ L 183, art 1 created the obligation for Member States for prior 
consultation with other Member States and the Commission when taking high impact short term 
economic measures. 
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by subject and not by country, the ESF did have a redistributive effect since the direct 
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and the need for additional action at the EU level. Deteriorating labour markets in the 
1970s led to a further increase in the categories of workers eligible for ESF 
funding113. In addition, because of the increased attention for regional disparities, the 
maximum aid percentage was increased for some regions with high unemployment. 
This increased attention also led to the establishment in 1975 of a separate fund that 
specifically focused on regional development from a broader point of view than 
employment, the European Regional Development Fund114. 
Finally, looking at employment policy in macroeconomic policy coordination, both 
the prioritization and the limited competence discussed in the previous section remain 
clearly visible. Discussion in the area of monetary and economic cooperation in the 
1960s mainly focused on the stability of the exchange rate regime. Prioritization in 
this area was very much influenced by the economic debate at the time between the so 
called “monetarists” and the “economists”. The monetarists highlighted the need for 
institutional arrangements and commitments in the area of monetary policy. This 
would induce common policies and convergence in other areas of economic policy, 
which would in turn pave the way for a common currency. The economists on the 
other hand, argued that close coordination in all the different areas of economic policy 
                                                   
110 See Commission, ‘European Social Fund, 50 years of investing in people’ (2007) 10. This was also 
due to a protocol attached to the Treaty that envisaged use of the ESF for an Italian regional 
development program. 
111 Council Decision 71/66/EEC of 1 February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund [1971] 
OJ L 28. 
112 For instance, workers in the agricultural and textile industry, but also persons with disabilities, see 
Regulation 2396/71 of the Council of 8 November 1971 implementing the Council Decision of 1 
February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund [1971] OJ L 249. 
113 Examples are young people, especially first job seekers and migrant workers, see Regulation 
2893/77 of the Council of 20 December 1977 amending Regulation 2396/71 of the Council, 
implementing the Council Decision of 1 February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund 
[1977] OJ L 337. 
114 See Regulation 724/75 of the Council of 18 March 1975 establishing a European Regional 
Development Fund [1975] OJ L 73. 
 
(including employment policy) should be the starting point, and that a common 
monetary policy and currency should be the crowning achievement115.  
Discussion on economic policy in general and concerning employment in particular 
between the different Member States took place at civil servant level in different 
committees set up by the Council. The Conjunctural Policy Committee was 
installed116 in 1960, followed in 1964 by the installation of the Medium Term 
Economic Policy Committee117. The goal of the Conjunctural Committee was to 
participate in and facilitate the consultations between Member States and the 
Commission as mentioned in article 103 TEEC. The Medium Term Economic Policy 
Committee was to prepare a medium term economic policy program outlining in 
broad terms the economic policies which the Member States and the institutions of the 
Community intended to follow. This program covered a period of about 5 years and 
was very broad in scope. Regarding employment policy, increasing labour supply, 
labour mobility, and education were mentioned in very general wording as goals 
Member States should strive for118. Both committees were intended to improve the 
process of coordination of economic policy, but the Treaty base continued to put 
severe limits on its functioning. Meetings mainly functioned as a get together for high 
officials of the EEC countries and the Commission to get acquainted with each other’s 
problems and to understand the differences in philosophy and implementation of 
national policies and institutional arrangements119.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
After the completion of the Customs Union ahead in 1968, the need for achieving 
economic and monetary union became more apparent, even more so since it coincided 
with monetary crises and large exchange rate fluctuations. The advances towards 
integration at the time were thought to “have the result that general economic 
disequilibrium in the member countries will have direct and rapid repercussions on 
the global evolution of the Community”, with “a grave danger of disequilibria arising 
if economic policy cannot be harmonized effectively”120. Starting with the increased 
mandate of the Conjunctural committee in 1969121 and the Werner report on the 
                                                   
115 See Ungerer, A concise history of European monetary integration, from EPU to EMU (Quorum 
books, 1997) 84.  
116 Council Decision of 9 March 1960 on co-ordination of the conjunctural policies of the Member 
States [1960] OJ 31, based on art 103(2) TEEC. 
117 Council Decision of 15 April 1964 on the installation of a Medium term economic policy 
committee, [1964] OJ 64, based on art 105 TEEC. 
118 See Council Decision 67/264/EEC concerning the Medium-term economic policy program 1966-70 
[1967] OJ 79.   
119 See Ungerer, A concise history of European monetary integration, from EPU to EMU (Quorum 
books, 1997) 87/88. 
120 Werner, ‘Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and 
monetary union in the community’ [1970] OJ C 136, 8/9. 
121 Council Decision 69/227/EEC of 17 July 1969 on co-ordination of the short-term economic policies 
of the Member States [1969] OJ L 183, art 1 created the obligation for Member States for prior 
consultation with other Member States and the Commission when taking high impact short term 
economic measures. 
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realization by stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community122 , 
economic policy coordination schemes were strengthened as a set up for economic 
and monetary union. Economic and Monetary Union was to be completed in three 
stages, eventually leading to full EMU by 1980, which would notably include a 
“centre of decision for economic policy”, something the Werner report identified as 
an indispensable part of the final set up123. Working towards this final aim and as part 
of the first phase, which would take three years with the second phase starting at the 
1st of January 1974, the various coordinating Committees were combined in one 
single Economic Policy Committee124. Furthermore, a decision125 and a Directive126 
were adopted in 1974 that introduced an extensive system of medium and short-term 
economic policy guidelines Member States had to follow in their national policies to 
ensure “stability, growth and full employment”. For employment the overarching 
goals were still increasing labour supply, labour mobility and education. The short-
term guidelines were EU wide as well as country specific, with detailed 
recommendations as to how national public policy should be brought in accordance 
with the overarching guidelines127.  
Even though this was a relatively strict and complicated regime, there was no 
enforcement mechanism included, which proved an Achilles' heel. Economic 
circumstances had worsened shortly after the publication of the Werner report, with 
the breakdown of the Bretton woods exchange rate system in 1971. It was attempted 
to regain stable exchange rates against the US dollar by the Smithsonian agreement in 
December 1971128, followed by more narrow exchange rate bands between the six 
EEC Member States and three that were about to join under the Basle agreement in 
April 1972129. However, different visions on how to deal with the economic downfall 
with sharp rises in oil prices in 1973, increased inflation and high unemployment led 
                                                   
122 Werner, ‘Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and 
monetary union in the community’ [1970] OJ C 136. 
123 Werner, ‘Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and 
monetary union in the community’ [1970] OJ C 136, 12. 
124 Council Decision 74/122/EEC of 18 February 1974 setting up an Economic Policy Committee 
[1974] OJ L 63.   
125 Council Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of 
convergence of the economic policies of the Member States of the European Economic Community 
[1974] OJ L 63, based on art 103 TEEC. 
126 Directive 74/121/EEC of the Council of 18 February 1974 on stability, growth and full employment 
in the Community [1974] OJ L 63 based on art 103 TEEC. 
127 Commission, ‘proposal for a Council Decision on the adjustment to the guidelines for economic 
policy for 1974’ COM (74) 689. 
128 The so called “tunnel” , see International Monetary Fund, ‘Communique of the group of ten 
ministerial meeting, December 18 1971’ (International Financial News survey, vol 23, 1971) 417. The 
group of ten referred to consisted of the US, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden, Canada and Switserland. 
129 The “snake in the tunnel”, see Basle Agreement of 10 April 1972, implemented on 24 April 1972, 
between the central banks of the Member States of the Community on the narrowing of the margins of 
fluctuation, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/documentation_chapter6.htm, last 
accessed 2 January 2013.  
 
to diverging Member States’ policies and non-compliance with both the economic and 
the monetary side of the system130. Stage two as envisioned in the Werner report was 
postponed and the Commission asked a group of experts chaired by Robert Marjolin 
to draw up a study on EMU 1980. The expert group declared the failure of the Werner 
plan, stating “unfavourable events, a lack of political will and insufficient 
understanding in the past of the meaning of an EMU and the conditions which must 
be fulfilled”131 as the main culprits. In a similar vein, the Economic Policy Committee 
and the Commission in its medium-term economic policy program 1976-1980  
concluded that a better functioning of policy coordination could to a certain extent be 
realized by more efficient use of the current system, but that the real response had to 
be political and institutional132. In the years after the start of the European Monetary 
System in 1979133 attempts were made for more efficient and stricter use of the 
coordination mechanisms134. As will be highlighted hereafter, however, the first real 
changes only occurred when the first steps towards a new attempt to establish EMU 
were made. 
Developments during this period of changing perspectives can be summarized in the 
following table. Again, a red X marks changing or emerging EU employment policy 
instruments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
130 Despite attempts for a coordinated response, see for instance Council Resolution of 17 December 
1973 on measures to be taken against rising prices and the maintenance of a high level of employment 
in the Community [1973] OJ C 116.  
131 Commission, “Report of the studygroup economic and monetary union 1980” (1975) 3. 
132 Commission, ‘Draft fourth medium-term economic policy program’ [1977] OJ C 012. 
133 See e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini, Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: the European Monetary 
System (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union (Oxford 
University Press, Fourth Edition, 2005). 
134 See, for instance, Commission, ‘Communication on improving economic policy coordination’ 
COM(80)101 final. 
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term guidelines were EU wide as well as country specific, with detailed 
recommendations as to how national public policy should be brought in accordance 
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enforcement mechanism included, which proved an Achilles' heel. Economic 
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the breakdown of the Bretton woods exchange rate system in 1971. It was attempted 
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123 Werner, ‘Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and 
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124 Council Decision 74/122/EEC of 18 February 1974 setting up an Economic Policy Committee 
[1974] OJ L 63.   
125 Council Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of 
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[1974] OJ L 63, based on art 103 TEEC. 
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policy for 1974’ COM (74) 689. 
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to diverging Member States’ policies and non-compliance with both the economic and 
the monetary side of the system130. Stage two as envisioned in the Werner report was 
postponed and the Commission asked a group of experts chaired by Robert Marjolin 
to draw up a study on EMU 1980. The expert group declared the failure of the Werner 
plan, stating “unfavourable events, a lack of political will and insufficient 
understanding in the past of the meaning of an EMU and the conditions which must 
be fulfilled”131 as the main culprits. In a similar vein, the Economic Policy Committee 
and the Commission in its medium-term economic policy program 1976-1980  
concluded that a better functioning of policy coordination could to a certain extent be 
realized by more efficient use of the current system, but that the real response had to 
be political and institutional132. In the years after the start of the European Monetary 
System in 1979133 attempts were made for more efficient and stricter use of the 
coordination mechanisms134. As will be highlighted hereafter, however, the first real 
changes only occurred when the first steps towards a new attempt to establish EMU 
were made. 
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130 Despite attempts for a coordinated response, see for instance Council Resolution of 17 December 
1973 on measures to be taken against rising prices and the maintenance of a high level of employment 
in the Community [1973] OJ C 116.  
131 Commission, “Report of the studygroup economic and monetary union 1980” (1975) 3. 
132 Commission, ‘Draft fourth medium-term economic policy program’ [1977] OJ C 012. 
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Table 3 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
X 
    
X 
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
X 
 
X 
   
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
X 
    
X 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
 
 
 
X 
   
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
X     
Two main tendencies can be observed. The first one is the change in perspective 
towards the functioning of the common market and its effects on employment. An 
increased awareness arose of the need for additional action to promote employment 
where the common market did not deliver or even had adverse effects. This 
significantly influenced how the various aspects of employment policy were used, 
with e.g. increased attention for the aspect of improving framework conditions in both 
the internal market and EU funds instruments. The second tendency that can be 
observed is the persistent lack of possibilities for action in the sphere of employment 
at the EU level. This becomes most apparent when looking at the social title of the 
EEC Treaty and the macroeconomic policy coordination. In the area of social policy, 
lack of formal competencies led to creative (but still restrictive) solutions, using the 
general article 100 TEEC in relation with the provisions from the social title. 
Concerning employment policy coordination efforts can be identified, but they 
eventually proved futile due to lack of power. 
3.4 The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty 
Even though all tariffs between Member States had been removed with the 
completion of the Customs Union in 1968, the Commission and Member States in the 
beginning of the 1980s became aware of the importance of non-tariff barriers like 
product standards as obstacles for free movement within the EEC. This was mainly 
because of the rise in volume and therefore significance of these types of barriers 
between Member States for protectionist reasons during the economic downfall in the 
1970s. After the publication of the Delors Commission White Paper on the 
 
completion of the internal market in 1985135 and the introduction, with the Single 
European Act in 1987136, of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) on measures proposed 
by the Commission aimed at the completion of the internal market in 1992137, the 
removal of the remaining barriers was vigorously pursued. Though mostly aimed at 
improvement of the free movement of goods, also in the area of employment 
significant steps were made. An important element here is the setting up of a general 
system for mutual recognition between Member States of a person’s professional 
qualifications, which consisted of three Directives from the late 1980s and the 
1990s138. For political reasons, mainly fear by some Member States for too much 
meddling in national social systems139, however, those areas of the internal market 
that dealt with the free movement of persons and the rights and interests of employed 
persons were legally excluded from QMV140. This meant that article 100 and the free 
movement articles 48-51 still remained the main source for internal market related 
employment policy.  
The Delors’ internal market program also introduced a clear social dimension, 
designed to balance the possible negative effects of further opening up of markets. 
Delors contended that some degree of equality in social standards was desirable as 
otherwise in an increasingly competitive environment those countries with lower 
standards would undercut those with higher standards141. Two aspects are of special 
interest to elaborate on. First of all, the introduction of article 118a TEEC in the social 
title of the Treaty, which widened Community competence with regard to 
employment issues considerably. With the adoption of this article the ability for the 
Community to introduce, using QMV and by means of Directives, minimum 
requirements in the area of “health and safety of workers”, was created. Even though 
health and safety Directives had been adopted in the past on the basis of article 100 
TEC142 this was a major step, as a link between employment measures and the 
internal market was no longer legally necessary. Also, unanimity in the Council was 
no longer required. With the adoption of the Community charter of basic social rights 
for workers in 1989, a legally non-binding declaration adopted by all Member States 
                                                   
135 Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’, COM(85)310 final. 
136 Single European Act [1987] OJ L169/1. 
137Then art 100a juncto 8a TEEC.  
138 Directive 89/48/EEC of the Council of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of 
higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least 
three years' duration [1988] OJ L 19, Directive 92/51/EEC of the Council of 18 June 1992 on a second 
general system for the recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 
89/48/EEC [1992] OJ L 209 and Directive 99/42/EEC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 
June 1999 establishing a mechanism for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional 
activities covered by the Directives on liberalisation and transitional measures and supplementing the 
General Systems for the recognition of qualifications [1999] OJ L 201.   
139 Kenner, EU Employment law from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond (Hart Publishing, 2003) 82. 
140 see 100a(2) EEC. 
141 See Swann, The Single European Market and beyond, a study of the wider implications of the Single 
European Act (Routledge, 1992) 220. 
142 See section 3.2. 
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Table 3 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
X 
    
X 
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
X 
 
X 
   
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
X 
    
X 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
 
 
 
X 
   
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
X     
Two main tendencies can be observed. The first one is the change in perspective 
towards the functioning of the common market and its effects on employment. An 
increased awareness arose of the need for additional action to promote employment 
where the common market did not deliver or even had adverse effects. This 
significantly influenced how the various aspects of employment policy were used, 
with e.g. increased attention for the aspect of improving framework conditions in both 
the internal market and EU funds instruments. The second tendency that can be 
observed is the persistent lack of possibilities for action in the sphere of employment 
at the EU level. This becomes most apparent when looking at the social title of the 
EEC Treaty and the macroeconomic policy coordination. In the area of social policy, 
lack of formal competencies led to creative (but still restrictive) solutions, using the 
general article 100 TEEC in relation with the provisions from the social title. 
Concerning employment policy coordination efforts can be identified, but they 
eventually proved futile due to lack of power. 
3.4 The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty 
Even though all tariffs between Member States had been removed with the 
completion of the Customs Union in 1968, the Commission and Member States in the 
beginning of the 1980s became aware of the importance of non-tariff barriers like 
product standards as obstacles for free movement within the EEC. This was mainly 
because of the rise in volume and therefore significance of these types of barriers 
between Member States for protectionist reasons during the economic downfall in the 
1970s. After the publication of the Delors Commission White Paper on the 
 
completion of the internal market in 1985135 and the introduction, with the Single 
European Act in 1987136, of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) on measures proposed 
by the Commission aimed at the completion of the internal market in 1992137, the 
removal of the remaining barriers was vigorously pursued. Though mostly aimed at 
improvement of the free movement of goods, also in the area of employment 
significant steps were made. An important element here is the setting up of a general 
system for mutual recognition between Member States of a person’s professional 
qualifications, which consisted of three Directives from the late 1980s and the 
1990s138. For political reasons, mainly fear by some Member States for too much 
meddling in national social systems139, however, those areas of the internal market 
that dealt with the free movement of persons and the rights and interests of employed 
persons were legally excluded from QMV140. This meant that article 100 and the free 
movement articles 48-51 still remained the main source for internal market related 
employment policy.  
The Delors’ internal market program also introduced a clear social dimension, 
designed to balance the possible negative effects of further opening up of markets. 
Delors contended that some degree of equality in social standards was desirable as 
otherwise in an increasingly competitive environment those countries with lower 
standards would undercut those with higher standards141. Two aspects are of special 
interest to elaborate on. First of all, the introduction of article 118a TEEC in the social 
title of the Treaty, which widened Community competence with regard to 
employment issues considerably. With the adoption of this article the ability for the 
Community to introduce, using QMV and by means of Directives, minimum 
requirements in the area of “health and safety of workers”, was created. Even though 
health and safety Directives had been adopted in the past on the basis of article 100 
TEC142 this was a major step, as a link between employment measures and the 
internal market was no longer legally necessary. Also, unanimity in the Council was 
no longer required. With the adoption of the Community charter of basic social rights 
for workers in 1989, a legally non-binding declaration adopted by all Member States 
                                                   
135 Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’, COM(85)310 final. 
136 Single European Act [1987] OJ L169/1. 
137Then art 100a juncto 8a TEEC.  
138 Directive 89/48/EEC of the Council of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of 
higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least 
three years' duration [1988] OJ L 19, Directive 92/51/EEC of the Council of 18 June 1992 on a second 
general system for the recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 
89/48/EEC [1992] OJ L 209 and Directive 99/42/EEC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 
June 1999 establishing a mechanism for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional 
activities covered by the Directives on liberalisation and transitional measures and supplementing the 
General Systems for the recognition of qualifications [1999] OJ L 201.   
139 Kenner, EU Employment law from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond (Hart Publishing, 2003) 82. 
140 see 100a(2) EEC. 
141 See Swann, The Single European Market and beyond, a study of the wider implications of the Single 
European Act (Routledge, 1992) 220. 
142 See section 3.2. 
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except the UK which laid down an extensive list of worker rights that both Member 
States and the Commission would strive to ensure within their own competences143, 
article 118a TEEC became widely used, with the Commission interpreting the term 
“health and safety of workers” in the broadest possible sense144.    
The second issue of interest is that the new attention for the social dimension of the 
internal market was reflected in a Commission proposal in 1991 on the posting of 
workers145. Based on the free movement articles, this proposal laid down a number of 
minimum requirements applicable to workers from other Member States temporarily 
posted to provide services in another Member State concerning e.g. the minimum 
wage146. After long discussions in Council and the European Parliament the proposal 
was adopted in 1996147.   
Following the Single European Act, the Treaty on European Union, also known as the 
                                                   
143 Including the right to freedom of movement, the right to adequate social protection and the right to 
freedom of association. 
144 Directive 93/104/EC of the Council of 8 February 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time [1993] OJ L 38, laying down a maximum weekly working time was, for 
instance, based on art 118a TEEC, even though this measure is only remotely connected to health and 
safety. Other important measures that were implemented are Directive 89/391/EEC of the Council of 
12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of 
workers at work [1989] OJ L183 and Directive 91/383/EEC of the Council of 25 June 1991 
supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of workers 
with a fixed- duration employment relationship or a temporary employment relationship [1991] OJ L 
206.  
145 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services’ COM(91)230. 
146  Art 2(1) of the Directive reads that  “Member States shall ensure that, whatever the law 
applicable to the employment relationship, the undertakings referred to in art 1(1) guarantee workers 
posted to their territory the terms and conditions of employment covering the following matters 
which, in the Member State where the work is carried out, are laid down: 
- by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or 
- by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8, insofar as they concern the activities referred to 
in the Annex: 
(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
(b) minimum paid annual holidays; 
(c) the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; 
(d) the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by temporary 
employment undertakings; 
(e) health, safety and hygiene at work; 
(f) protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of pregnant 
women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of young people; 
(g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-
discrimination.” 
147 Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L 18. 
 
Maastricht Treaty148, laid down even more clearly the then perceived balancing act 
between economic and social policy. The new article B TEU formulated the goal of 
the newly formed Union as “to promote economic and social progress which is 
balanced and sustainable…” Likewise, the new article 2 TEC included a high level of 
social protection  as goals of the European Community, and introduced “achieving a 
high level of employment” as a separate policy goal. 
The division between the UK and the other eleven Member States on social policy as 
a separate area of EU legislative competence persisted during negotiations leading up 
to the Maastricht Treaty. In the text that was finally accepted in 1991 the division was 
still clearly present. The social provisions in the Treaty itself were not significantly 
altered compared to the situation under the Single European Act and remained 
applicable to all Member States. In addition, however, a protocol, including an 
agreement on social policy was attached to the Treaty. The agreement, which did not 
apply to the UK, set out a whole range of new Community competences and legal 
bases149 and made for a significant strengthening of the process of “social dialogue” 
with the European social partners that had been installed with article 118B of the 
Single European Act150. A number of employment related areas, such as “pay”, were 
also explicitly excluded from the scope of the protocol, which limited the possibilities 
for Community action in this specific field151.     
The existence of two different legislative routes for employment related social policy 
made for a complicated system in the years after the coming into force of the Treaty 
on European Union in 1993. The Commission tried to use the “normal” legal bases 
within the Treaty itself as much as possible, and only resorted to the protocol when 
there was no hope for agreement152. Furthermore, a number of proposals that faced 
difficulties in the Council because of UK opposition were transformed to fit under the 
new protocol153.  
With the adoption of the Single European Act, the position of the ESF and the other 
Structural Funds was radically changed. Whereas before the ESF played a relatively 
                                                   
148 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191 (TEU). 
149 An adapted form of QMV voting was installed for measures relating to, for instance, working 
conditions, information and consultation of workers and the integration of persons excluded from the 
labour market. Unanimity was, for instance, required in the field of protection of workers whose 
employment contract was terminated. 
150 Before the SEA, dialogue with the social partners on employment issues had already been taking 
place in several advisory committees like the Advisory Committee on freedom of movement of 
workers and the Standing Committee on employment.  
151 See, for instance, Commission, ‘Opinion on an equitable wage’ COM(93)388. 
152 See Commission, ‘Communication concerning the application of the agreement on social policy’ 
COM(93)600. 
153 Which was, for instance, the case with Directive 94/45/EC of the Council of 22 September 1994 on 
the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 
[1994] OJ L 254, see Addison and Siebert, ‘Recent developments in social policy in the new European 
Union’ (Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol 48, no 1, 1994). 
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except the UK which laid down an extensive list of worker rights that both Member 
States and the Commission would strive to ensure within their own competences143, 
article 118a TEEC became widely used, with the Commission interpreting the term 
“health and safety of workers” in the broadest possible sense144.    
The second issue of interest is that the new attention for the social dimension of the 
internal market was reflected in a Commission proposal in 1991 on the posting of 
workers145. Based on the free movement articles, this proposal laid down a number of 
minimum requirements applicable to workers from other Member States temporarily 
posted to provide services in another Member State concerning e.g. the minimum 
wage146. After long discussions in Council and the European Parliament the proposal 
was adopted in 1996147.   
Following the Single European Act, the Treaty on European Union, also known as the 
                                                   
143 Including the right to freedom of movement, the right to adequate social protection and the right to 
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organisation of working time [1993] OJ L 38, laying down a maximum weekly working time was, for 
instance, based on art 118a TEEC, even though this measure is only remotely connected to health and 
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12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of 
workers at work [1989] OJ L183 and Directive 91/383/EEC of the Council of 25 June 1991 
supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of workers 
with a fixed- duration employment relationship or a temporary employment relationship [1991] OJ L 
206.  
145 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services’ COM(91)230. 
146  Art 2(1) of the Directive reads that  “Member States shall ensure that, whatever the law 
applicable to the employment relationship, the undertakings referred to in art 1(1) guarantee workers 
posted to their territory the terms and conditions of employment covering the following matters 
which, in the Member State where the work is carried out, are laid down: 
- by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or 
- by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8, insofar as they concern the activities referred to 
in the Annex: 
(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
(b) minimum paid annual holidays; 
(c) the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; 
(d) the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by temporary 
employment undertakings; 
(e) health, safety and hygiene at work; 
(f) protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of pregnant 
women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of young people; 
(g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-
discrimination.” 
147 Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L 18. 
 
Maastricht Treaty148, laid down even more clearly the then perceived balancing act 
between economic and social policy. The new article B TEU formulated the goal of 
the newly formed Union as “to promote economic and social progress which is 
balanced and sustainable…” Likewise, the new article 2 TEC included a high level of 
social protection  as goals of the European Community, and introduced “achieving a 
high level of employment” as a separate policy goal. 
The division between the UK and the other eleven Member States on social policy as 
a separate area of EU legislative competence persisted during negotiations leading up 
to the Maastricht Treaty. In the text that was finally accepted in 1991 the division was 
still clearly present. The social provisions in the Treaty itself were not significantly 
altered compared to the situation under the Single European Act and remained 
applicable to all Member States. In addition, however, a protocol, including an 
agreement on social policy was attached to the Treaty. The agreement, which did not 
apply to the UK, set out a whole range of new Community competences and legal 
bases149 and made for a significant strengthening of the process of “social dialogue” 
with the European social partners that had been installed with article 118B of the 
Single European Act150. A number of employment related areas, such as “pay”, were 
also explicitly excluded from the scope of the protocol, which limited the possibilities 
for Community action in this specific field151.     
The existence of two different legislative routes for employment related social policy 
made for a complicated system in the years after the coming into force of the Treaty 
on European Union in 1993. The Commission tried to use the “normal” legal bases 
within the Treaty itself as much as possible, and only resorted to the protocol when 
there was no hope for agreement152. Furthermore, a number of proposals that faced 
difficulties in the Council because of UK opposition were transformed to fit under the 
new protocol153.  
With the adoption of the Single European Act, the position of the ESF and the other 
Structural Funds was radically changed. Whereas before the ESF played a relatively 
                                                   
148 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191 (TEU). 
149 An adapted form of QMV voting was installed for measures relating to, for instance, working 
conditions, information and consultation of workers and the integration of persons excluded from the 
labour market. Unanimity was, for instance, required in the field of protection of workers whose 
employment contract was terminated. 
150 Before the SEA, dialogue with the social partners on employment issues had already been taking 
place in several advisory committees like the Advisory Committee on freedom of movement of 
workers and the Standing Committee on employment.  
151 See, for instance, Commission, ‘Opinion on an equitable wage’ COM(93)388. 
152 See Commission, ‘Communication concerning the application of the agreement on social policy’ 
COM(93)600. 
153 Which was, for instance, the case with Directive 94/45/EC of the Council of 22 September 1994 on 
the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 
[1994] OJ L 254, see Addison and Siebert, ‘Recent developments in social policy in the new European 
Union’ (Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol 48, no 1, 1994). 
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isolated role, now a system in which the ESF was integrated with that of the other 
Structural Funds aimed at achieving the common goal of “economic and social 
cohesion”154 was introduced. The most important “other” Structural Fund was the 
European Regional Development Fund, which had been given an explicit Treaty 
base155. Five different objectives were formulated for the Structural Funds156:  
regional development (objectives 1 and 2), agricultural reforms (objective 5) and 
employment (objectives 3 and 4). The ESF was to coordinate action with the other 
Structural Funds in objectives 1, 2 and 5157, with objectives 3 and 4, “combating long-
term unemployment” and “facilitating the occupational integration of young people”, 
remaining the sole responsibility of the ESF.  
Next to the change in content, the system of reimbursement of funds was replaced by 
a system of programming and partnership. Member States (in cooperation with 
regional authorities) had to submit programs up front in which they outlined action 
they were planning to take under the five objectives. After discussion with the 
Commission, Community Support Frameworks were set up, setting out priorities for 
Structural Fund assistance. EEC assistance still remained additional to the aid 
provided for by Member States themselves. Priorities for Community funding were 
established by means of guidelines158 and operations in backward (objective 1, 2 and 
5) regions were given priority. Almost 55% of the 20 billion ECU ESF budget under 
all objectives was, for instance, spent in these regions in the period 1989-1993159. 
With the Maastricht Treaty cohesion as a Community goal was further 
strengthened160. The budget for the Structural Funds was changed accordingly161, as 
were the specific provisions relating to the ESF162. Next to “rendering the 
employment of workers easier and increasing their geographical and occupational 
mobility” that had already been included in article 123 TEEC “facilitating [the 
                                                   
154 See art 130 B TEU. 
155 See art 130 C TEU. 
156 See Regulation (EEC) 2052/88 of the Council of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds 
and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the 
operations of the EIB and the other financial instruments [1988] OJ L185/9, art 1.  
157 In the regions that were covered by objectives 1, 2, and 5 a broader category of workers were 
eligible for ESF funding. See Regulation 4255/88 of the Council of 19 December 1988 laying down 
provisions for the implementing Regulation 2025/88 as regards the European Social Fund [1988] OJ L 
374. 
158 See, for instance, Commission, ‘Guidelines concerning European Social Fund intervention in 
respect of action against long-term unemployment and occupational integration of young people ESF 
intervention’ [1989] OJ C45/6.  
159 See Commission, ‘The European Social Fund, an overview of the programming period 1994-1999’ 
(1997). 
160 See Protocol attached to the Treaty on European Union on economic and social cohesion [1992] OJ 
C 191 and the strengthened art 130(b) TEC. 
161 Out of the rise to a total of 142 billion for the structural funds in the period up to 1999, 42 billion 
were for the ESF, see Commission, ‘The European Social Fund, an overview of the programming 
period 1994-1999’ (1997) 23. 
162 See for more extensive motivation Commission, “From the Single Act to Maastricht and beyond”, 
COM (92)2000.  
 
workers] adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems” was 
added. Objectives 3 and 4 were altered accordingly163. The “old” objectives 3 and 4 
were merged into one with the addition of “helping the socially excluded”. The 
facilitation of adaptation was laid down as the new objective 4. The categories of 
programs eligible for ESF funding in objectives 1, 2 and 5 regions was also 
increased164. Decision making proceedings were streamlined, systematic evaluation 
was provided for and greater flexibility in the attribution of the funds was 
introduced165. 
Concerning employment policy coordination, the setting of fixed exchange rates 
around the newly introduced ECU within the EMS in 1979 was not accompanied by a 
shift of power in the area of macroeconomic policy towards the EU level. Member 
States still had very different views as to how to deal with their macroeconomic 
policy in general and employment policy more specifically166. France, e.g., under 
president Mitterand in the early 1980s introduced the “leftist medicine” for the 
economic downfall by raising minimum wages, reducing the working week and 
increasing government expenditure, while Germany took a diametrically opposite 
stance, remaining committed to its low inflation policy167. The resulting inflation 
differentials led to frequent devaluations of the French franc. The resulting loss of 
French competitiveness did in fact eventually force France in 1983 to change its 
policy to fit that of the Germans (“franc fort”), but this “convergence of policy” was 
for the aforementioned national reasons only. 
With the institutional arrangements for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) set out 
under the Maastricht Treaty, the system of macroeconomic policy coordination 
changed substantially. As mentioned earlier, the Werner rapport of 1970 had been the 
first to describe the possible economic counterweight to monetary integration. It had 
envisioned setting up a European centre of decision for economic policy as a strong 
                                                   
163 See Regulation 2081/93 of the Council of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation 2052/88 on the tasks 
of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between 
themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments [1993] OJ L 193 and Regulation 2084/93 of the Council of 20 July 1993 amending 
Regulation 4255/88 as regards the European Social Fund [1993] OJ L 193. For a more detailed 
description of the development of the various funds see Evans, The EU Structural Funds (Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
164 Training schemes, education and research and development schemes became eligible as well. See 
website European Commission, DG Employment http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/index_nl.html 
Last accessed July 2012. 
165 See Regulation 2081/93 of the Council of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation 2052/88 on the tasks 
of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between 
themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments [1993] OJ L 193. 
166 See also Decision of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States 82/534/EEC meeting within the Council of 28 July 1982 adopting the fifth medium-term 
economic policy programme [1982] OJ L 236. 
167 See Baldwin and Wyplosz, The Economics of European Integration (2nd edition, McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2006). 
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isolated role, now a system in which the ESF was integrated with that of the other 
Structural Funds aimed at achieving the common goal of “economic and social 
cohesion”154 was introduced. The most important “other” Structural Fund was the 
European Regional Development Fund, which had been given an explicit Treaty 
base155. Five different objectives were formulated for the Structural Funds156:  
regional development (objectives 1 and 2), agricultural reforms (objective 5) and 
employment (objectives 3 and 4). The ESF was to coordinate action with the other 
Structural Funds in objectives 1, 2 and 5157, with objectives 3 and 4, “combating long-
term unemployment” and “facilitating the occupational integration of young people”, 
remaining the sole responsibility of the ESF.  
Next to the change in content, the system of reimbursement of funds was replaced by 
a system of programming and partnership. Member States (in cooperation with 
regional authorities) had to submit programs up front in which they outlined action 
they were planning to take under the five objectives. After discussion with the 
Commission, Community Support Frameworks were set up, setting out priorities for 
Structural Fund assistance. EEC assistance still remained additional to the aid 
provided for by Member States themselves. Priorities for Community funding were 
established by means of guidelines158 and operations in backward (objective 1, 2 and 
5) regions were given priority. Almost 55% of the 20 billion ECU ESF budget under 
all objectives was, for instance, spent in these regions in the period 1989-1993159. 
With the Maastricht Treaty cohesion as a Community goal was further 
strengthened160. The budget for the Structural Funds was changed accordingly161, as 
were the specific provisions relating to the ESF162. Next to “rendering the 
employment of workers easier and increasing their geographical and occupational 
mobility” that had already been included in article 123 TEEC “facilitating [the 
                                                   
154 See art 130 B TEU. 
155 See art 130 C TEU. 
156 See Regulation (EEC) 2052/88 of the Council of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds 
and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the 
operations of the EIB and the other financial instruments [1988] OJ L185/9, art 1.  
157 In the regions that were covered by objectives 1, 2, and 5 a broader category of workers were 
eligible for ESF funding. See Regulation 4255/88 of the Council of 19 December 1988 laying down 
provisions for the implementing Regulation 2025/88 as regards the European Social Fund [1988] OJ L 
374. 
158 See, for instance, Commission, ‘Guidelines concerning European Social Fund intervention in 
respect of action against long-term unemployment and occupational integration of young people ESF 
intervention’ [1989] OJ C45/6.  
159 See Commission, ‘The European Social Fund, an overview of the programming period 1994-1999’ 
(1997). 
160 See Protocol attached to the Treaty on European Union on economic and social cohesion [1992] OJ 
C 191 and the strengthened art 130(b) TEC. 
161 Out of the rise to a total of 142 billion for the structural funds in the period up to 1999, 42 billion 
were for the ESF, see Commission, ‘The European Social Fund, an overview of the programming 
period 1994-1999’ (1997) 23. 
162 See for more extensive motivation Commission, “From the Single Act to Maastricht and beyond”, 
COM (92)2000.  
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were merged into one with the addition of “helping the socially excluded”. The 
facilitation of adaptation was laid down as the new objective 4. The categories of 
programs eligible for ESF funding in objectives 1, 2 and 5 regions was also 
increased164. Decision making proceedings were streamlined, systematic evaluation 
was provided for and greater flexibility in the attribution of the funds was 
introduced165. 
Concerning employment policy coordination, the setting of fixed exchange rates 
around the newly introduced ECU within the EMS in 1979 was not accompanied by a 
shift of power in the area of macroeconomic policy towards the EU level. Member 
States still had very different views as to how to deal with their macroeconomic 
policy in general and employment policy more specifically166. France, e.g., under 
president Mitterand in the early 1980s introduced the “leftist medicine” for the 
economic downfall by raising minimum wages, reducing the working week and 
increasing government expenditure, while Germany took a diametrically opposite 
stance, remaining committed to its low inflation policy167. The resulting inflation 
differentials led to frequent devaluations of the French franc. The resulting loss of 
French competitiveness did in fact eventually force France in 1983 to change its 
policy to fit that of the Germans (“franc fort”), but this “convergence of policy” was 
for the aforementioned national reasons only. 
With the institutional arrangements for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) set out 
under the Maastricht Treaty, the system of macroeconomic policy coordination 
changed substantially. As mentioned earlier, the Werner rapport of 1970 had been the 
first to describe the possible economic counterweight to monetary integration. It had 
envisioned setting up a European centre of decision for economic policy as a strong 
                                                   
163 See Regulation 2081/93 of the Council of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation 2052/88 on the tasks 
of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between 
themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments [1993] OJ L 193 and Regulation 2084/93 of the Council of 20 July 1993 amending 
Regulation 4255/88 as regards the European Social Fund [1993] OJ L 193. For a more detailed 
description of the development of the various funds see Evans, The EU Structural Funds (Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
164 Training schemes, education and research and development schemes became eligible as well. See 
website European Commission, DG Employment http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/index_nl.html 
Last accessed July 2012. 
165 See Regulation 2081/93 of the Council of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation 2052/88 on the tasks 
of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between 
themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments [1993] OJ L 193. 
166 See also Decision of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States 82/534/EEC meeting within the Council of 28 July 1982 adopting the fifth medium-term 
economic policy programme [1982] OJ L 236. 
167 See Baldwin and Wyplosz, The Economics of European Integration (2nd edition, McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2006). 
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institution to balance the increased EU power in the monetary area, giving it power in 
structural areas like employment matters168. Already with the Delors Report in 1989 
on EMU169, however, this vision had been significantly watered down. The Delors 
Report proposed to change the poorly functioning policy coordination system that had 
been in place since 1974 with a system based as much as possible on voluntary 
cooperation, with strict adherence to the new “principle of subsidiarity”. The report 
states that “all policy functions which could be carried out at national (…) level 
without adverse repercussions on the cohesion and functioning of the economic and 
monetary union would remain within the competence of the member countries”170.   
Despite the fact that the French in their vision on EMU did propose a strong economic 
pillar next to the monetary one, with a central role for the Council and the European 
Council171, the Delors vision was for the most part taken over in the provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Title VI on economic policy sets out a new system of coordination 
of the economic policies of the Member States172. Two main structural differences 
arise when comparing this system with the system that was in place under the old 
Treaty provisions173. The first one is that a larger number of objectives for economic 
policy making is included. Instead of the limited list of objectives mentioned in the 
old article 104 TEEC, economic policy coordination was linked to achieving the goals 
of article 2 TEC174, the scope of which had been substantially widened. The second 
main difference is that the procedure for coordination of economic policy was laid 
down in the Treaty175. The Council (i.e. the ECOFIN), on the basis of a 
recommendation of the Commission and taking into account discussion in the 
European Council, adopts a recommendation setting out Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPG’s), of which the European Parliament is informed176. 
Implementation of the guidelines is monitored by the Commission and Council177, and 
the Council can, on a recommendation from the Commission, make recommendations 
                                                   
168 See Werner, ‘Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic 
and monetary union in the community’ [1970] OJ C 136. 
169 See Committee for the study of economic and monetary union, ‘Report on Economic and Monetary 
Union in the European Community’ (1989). 
170 Committee for the study of economic and monetary union, ‘Report on Economic and Monetary 
Union in the European Community’ (1989) 14. 
171 See Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht (Cartermill international, 1993) 247, see also van Riel and 
Metten, De keuzes van Maastricht (van Gorcum & Comp, 2000) 56-58. 
172 Art 103 TEC. 
173 The old system that comprised Council Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 February 1974 on the 
attainment of a high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the Member States of the 
European Economic Community [1974] OJ L 63 and Directive 74/121/EEC of the Council of 18 
February 1974 on stability, growth and full employment in the Community [1974] OJ L 63 had actually 
already been replaced in 1990 by Council Decision 90/141/EEC of 12 March 1990 on the attainment of 
progressive convergence of economic policies and performance during stage one of economic and 
monetary union [1997] OJ L 78, adjusting the system in the run up to stage 2 of EMU. 
174 Art 103 juncto 102a juncto 2 TEC. 
175 Art 103 TEC. 
176 Art 103(2) TEC. 
177 Art 103(3) TEC. 
 
to Member States178. Looking at this new procedure one could say that the criticism 
from the Marjolin report and the call for help by the Economic Policy Committee in 
its policy program in the late 1970s179 was at best only partly answered. The lack of 
transfer of competence and enforcement authority to the EU level remains apparent. 
Even though the role of the Commission has increased, the Council decides if and 
what action is taken in both the formulation and the surveillance phase. The European 
Parliament is included in the process, but is simply a bystander and the role of the 
Economic Policy Committee itself remained unchanged.  
In summary, developments during this period of large institutional changes can be 
portrayed in the following table. A red X again marks changing or emerging EU 
employment policy instruments, with a red arrow marking a change in the strictness 
of coordination arrangements. 
Table 4 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
(more binding) 
 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
 X 
    
X 
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
 X 
 
X 
   
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
 X 
    
X 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
  
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
 X 
    
EU competencies in the area of employment in this period were significantly altered 
and somewhat expanded. The functioning of the common market was given an 
enormous boost by the Single Market program, the increased attention for the social 
and cohesion aspects of integration led to an increase in EU competencies under the 
social title, adding an additional instrument aimed at improving framework 
conditions, and a more coherent working of the EU Structural Funds. Furthermore, a 
new, procedurally more binding, coordination of economic policy was introduced in 
                                                   
178 Art 103(4) TEC. 
179 See section 3.2. 
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to Member States178. Looking at this new procedure one could say that the criticism 
from the Marjolin report and the call for help by the Economic Policy Committee in 
its policy program in the late 1970s179 was at best only partly answered. The lack of 
transfer of competence and enforcement authority to the EU level remains apparent. 
Even though the role of the Commission has increased, the Council decides if and 
what action is taken in both the formulation and the surveillance phase. The European 
Parliament is included in the process, but is simply a bystander and the role of the 
Economic Policy Committee itself remained unchanged.  
In summary, developments during this period of large institutional changes can be 
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EU competencies in the area of employment in this period were significantly altered 
and somewhat expanded. The functioning of the common market was given an 
enormous boost by the Single Market program, the increased attention for the social 
and cohesion aspects of integration led to an increase in EU competencies under the 
social title, adding an additional instrument aimed at improving framework 
conditions, and a more coherent working of the EU Structural Funds. Furthermore, a 
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the Maastricht Treaty. The exclusion of the free movement of persons from QMV and 
the absence of sanctions or transfer of authority under the procedure for economic 
policy coordination, however, illustrate that Member States remained hesitant to give 
up any sovereignty in the area of employment policy.   
3.5 Towards and beyond the Treaty of Amsterdam: taking EU employment policy to 
the next level 
After the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union unemployment in the 
Union became a major issue. Union wide unemployment was at around 17 million 
people and over two thirds of the European population in 1993 saw unemployment as 
the most important problem in the European Union180. Together with the alarming 
drop in confidence in the European Union as a whole that surfaced in the Danish and 
French referenda on the Maastricht Treaty181, this drove employment to the top of the 
EU political policy agenda. The European Council took a leading role in handling this 
issue. Starting in Edinburgh in December 1992, followed by more detailed discussion 
in Copenhagen in June 1993, it formulated a strategy to “restore growth, 
competitiveness and employment” 182. The strategy focused both on the supply and on 
the demand side of the labour market and gave a number of measures to be taken at 
both the European and national level in order to reduce unemployment. For the short 
term, Member States were urged to bring forward their public expenditure on a 
number of structural issues, such as infrastructure, to boost demand and therewith 
employment. It also points at decreasing taxes on labour as a way to stimulate supply 
and therewith labour demand. However, because of the budgetary convergence 
criteria for EMU183, countries at the time had limited room for manoeuvring, 
something which the European Council also recognizes. As far as the European 
elements of the strategy are concerned, the European Council underlines the 
importance of a rapid implementation of the Communities’ structural policy program 
for the period 1994-1999. Further aspects of the internal market dimension of 
employment policy are also, though briefly, mentioned. In this regard it is stated that 
the internal market is an enormous asset to the EU, and that there are only a few last 
remaining issues to be dealt with before the internal market will be complete184. For 
the medium term, the Commission was invited to present a white paper on a medium 
term strategy for discussion at the Council, taking place in Brussels in December1993. 
This white paper was to be expressly linked to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
that were being prepared for the first time by the ECOFIN Council for December that 
                                                   
180 See van Riel and Metten, De keuzes van Maastricht (van Gorcum & Comp, 2000) 126 and Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ , last accessed 26 December 2012. 
181 In the French referendum a very small majority (51%) voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty. The 
Danish referendum even resulted in a “no” by 51%. 
182 See Presidency conclusions of the European Council of 21/22 June 1993. 
183 Most importantly for this issue the maximum yearly budget deficit of 3%, see art 109(j) juncto 104 
TEC and the protocol on excessive deficit procedure.  
184 Presidency conclusions of the European Council of 21/22 June 1993, 8. 
 
year.  
The Commission White Paper was published a week before the next European 
Council meeting in December 1993. As for the reason behind the White Paper the 
Commission states that “The one and only reason is unemployment185”. It sets out a 
comprehensive vision on the causes of unemployment within the EU and the way 
forward. The recommendations for structural change of policies within the Member 
States take up a large part of the document, with the Commission focusing on ways to 
reduce the level of structural unemployment in the Union. Central theme here is the 
inflexibility of the labour market186. Improving both internal flexibility, i.e. optimal 
use of human resources within firms, and external flexibility (“where supply meets 
demand”), increasing opportunities for lifelong learning and education, reducing the 
costs of low qualified work and commencing a thorough overhaul of employment 
policies are the main messages. Furthermore, the Commission puts emphasis on 
making the most of the newly established internal market and formulated hard policy 
goals to strive for, i.e., creating 15 million jobs before the end of the century187.   
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines that were established for the first time in 
December 1993188 focus on returning to a “non inflationary, strong and employment 
creating growth”, therewith decreasing the unemployment level. After briefly setting 
out the overall framework by mentioning the need for price and exchange rate 
stability and sound public finances a whole range of more detailed employment 
related objectives and specific structural measures are set out which the Member 
States are “invited” to explore to decrease their unemployment level. The measures 
follow the same logic as the Commission White Paper and include, for example, 
examining the adaptation of social security systems, improving educational systems, 
reintegrating the long-term unemployed, removing excess rigidities and improving 
labour mobility.   
With the Commission White Paper and the BEPGs as input the European Council in 
Brussels in December 1993 set out an action plan on the fight against 
unemployment189. Neither the hard policy goals, nor large EU investments were 
included190. Instead the action plan focused on creating a healthy, open, decentralized 
economy geared to solidarity by “significantly reducing” the number of 
                                                   
185 Commission, ‘White paper on Growth, competitiveness, employment the challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century’ COM (93)700, 9. 
186Something also emphasized by the OECD in those days  as a cause of unemployment. See, for 
instance, ‘The OECD jobs study, facts, analysis, strategies’ (1994). 
187 Commission, ‘White paper on Growth, competitiveness, employment the challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century’ COM (93)700, 11.  
188 Council Recommendation 94/7/EC of 22 December 1993 on the broad guidelines of the economic 
policies of the Member States and of the Community [1994] OJ L 7. 
189 See Presidency conclusions of the European Council in Brussels of 10 and 11 December 1993. 
190 For a more detailed description of this process see van Riel and Metten, De keuzes van Maastricht 
(van Gorcum & Comp, 2000). Also see Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy, genesis and 
development’ (European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 5, no 2, 1999) 117-137. 
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employment. It also points at decreasing taxes on labour as a way to stimulate supply 
and therewith labour demand. However, because of the budgetary convergence 
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something which the European Council also recognizes. As far as the European 
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States take up a large part of the document, with the Commission focusing on ways to 
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goals to strive for, i.e., creating 15 million jobs before the end of the century187.   
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creating growth”, therewith decreasing the unemployment level. After briefly setting 
out the overall framework by mentioning the need for price and exchange rate 
stability and sound public finances a whole range of more detailed employment 
related objectives and specific structural measures are set out which the Member 
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follow the same logic as the Commission White Paper and include, for example, 
examining the adaptation of social security systems, improving educational systems, 
reintegrating the long-term unemployed, removing excess rigidities and improving 
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With the Commission White Paper and the BEPGs as input the European Council in 
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unemployment189. Neither the hard policy goals, nor large EU investments were 
included190. Instead the action plan focused on creating a healthy, open, decentralized 
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unemployed191. A general framework for the policies to be pursued by Member States 
was set up, as were specific accompanying measures at the EU level and a monitoring 
procedure. The general framework set up by the European Council focuses on 
defining objectives Member States should strive for, leaving the Member States free 
to choose the appropriate means. Member States are invited to draw suggestions from 
the Commission White Paper192, with Member States’ policies to be periodically 
reviewed within the European Council in order to analyse the results and learn from 
experience how future action should be concluded. At the EU level the action plan 
consisted mainly of making full use of the internal market (i.e. by full incorporation of 
Community legislation in national law), and actively using the social dialogue that 
was installed with the protocol on social policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty.  
The monitoring procedure that was set up consisted of a yearly evaluation by the 
European Council, starting in December 1994 in Essen. The discussions were to be 
based on a summary report by the Commission, a report from the Council on the 
national policies taken in the area of employment, the annual report of the ECOFIN 
Council on the implementation of the BEPGs, the Commission’s report on the 
functioning of the internal market. The discussion during the Essen European Council 
ended in intensifying the monitoring procedure, with the Member States being urged 
to transpose the recommendations in their individual policies into a multiannual 
program having regard to the specific features of their economic and social situation. 
The Labour and Social Affairs Council, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
and the Commission were also asked to keep close track of employment trends, to 
monitor the relevant policies of the Member States and report annually to the 
European Council on further progress on the labour market, starting in 
December 1995. 
When relating the four instruments of EU employment policy identified above to the  
views set out by the European Council, one can come to a number of conclusions. 
Optimizing the functioning of the internal market was seen as an important source of 
job creation and the Structural Funds, especially the ESF under objectives 3 and 4, 
were seen as contributing to promoting employment193. The relationships between the 
                                                   
191 Presidency conclusions of the European Council in Brussels of 10 and 11 December 1993, 4 
192 Paying particular attention to the following measures: 
1. Improving education and training systems 
2. Improving flexibility both within enterprises and on the labour market  
3. Examination of economically sound formulas for the reorganization of work 
4. Targeted reductions in the indirect cost of labour, especially of less skilled work 
5. Better use of public funds by means of a more active policy of information motivation and 
guidance of job seekers. 
6. Specific measures concerning young people with low education  
7. Developing employment in connection with meeting requirements linked to the quality of life 
and protection of the environment. 
193 On the role and focusing of the ESF on employment creation also see Commission, 
‘Communication on the medium term social action program 1995-1997’ COM(95)134 and 
Commission, Communication on Community structural assistance and employment, COM (96) 109. 
 
other two parts of EU employment policy, social employment policy and the 
provisions on macroeconomic policy coordination, and the newly set up system at the 
European Council in Brussels, however, are not immediately obvious and therefore 
requires some further explanation.   
As to the social provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, the relationship with the 
Employment action plan is best explained by reference to the Green and White Papers 
on social policy published by the Commission in 1993 and 1994194. The white paper 
sets out the Commission approach to social policy development in the years up until 
the year 2000. Its relationship to the growth white paper, and to the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines is that “the pursuit of high social standards is a key element in the 
competitive formula” and that “the principles set out in the White paper need to be 
born in mind in the formulation of future Union social policy, as do the Union’s 
macroeconomic guidelines”195.   
In the green and white papers on social policy the implementation of the European 
Council action plan of 1993 takes centre stage. As the white paper states 
“employment is the key both for social and economic integration” and “jobs are the 
top priority”196. This focus had some consequences for the nature and level of social 
action proposed. As in the white paper on growth, emphasis in the white paper on 
social policy is put on active labour market policies for generating employment, 
rejecting passive instruments of social solidarity based on the redistribution of 
income.  Harmonisation of social policies is explicitly rejected as a goal of the Union. 
In accordance with the action plan emphasis is put on “mobilization and cooperation” 
and “fixing common objectives”, based on a level playing field of common minimum 
standards, accompanied at the EU level by information provision and the analysing of 
future trends.  
 
As has been highlighted in section 3.3, with the coming into force of the Treaty on 
European Union and the action program for the implementation of the social charter, a 
large number of initiatives introducing minimum standards in the field of social 
employment policy had been announced and (were being) adopted. The Commission 
states that with this solid base of European social legislation there is no need for a 
wide ranging program of new legislative proposals in the coming period197. The 
emphasis on soft forms of cooperation in the area of employment in general was 
                                                   
194 See Commission, ‘Green paper on European social policy, options for the Union” COM (93) 551. 
and Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM (1994) 
333. 
195 See Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM 
(1994)333, 2/3. 
196 Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM 
(1994)333, 4 and 9 
197 Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM 
(1994)333, 5. 
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unemployed191. A general framework for the policies to be pursued by Member States 
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193 On the role and focusing of the ESF on employment creation also see Commission, 
‘Communication on the medium term social action program 1995-1997’ COM(95)134 and 
Commission, Communication on Community structural assistance and employment, COM (96) 109. 
 
other two parts of EU employment policy, social employment policy and the 
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194 See Commission, ‘Green paper on European social policy, options for the Union” COM (93) 551. 
and Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM (1994) 
333. 
195 See Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM 
(1994)333, 2/3. 
196 Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM 
(1994)333, 4 and 9 
197 Commission, ‘White paper on European social policy, a way forward for the Union” COM 
(1994)333, 5. 
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therefore accompanied by a similar emphasis in the area of social policy 198. 
Noteworthy exceptions here, however, can be found in the area of equal treatment 
rights and minimum requirements for workers under various flexible types of 
contracts other than standard open-ended contracts, where EU social partners 
subsequently laid down framework agreements on part time work and fixed term 
work, while voicing the intention to come to such a framework on temporary agency 
work199.  
When examining the relationship between the provisions for economic policy 
coordination of the Member States and the action plan that was initiated by the 
European Council, the first thing that sticks out is the large overlap and similarity of 
approach. The procedure laid down in article 103 TEC was expressly linked to 
achieving the goals as set out in article 2 TEC. These goals included the attainment of 
a high level of employment and social protection. Furthermore, even under the “old” 
system of economic policy coordination employment policy had an important role in 
the medium and short-term guidelines. The legal situation therefore had not changed. 
Neither was the type of monitoring used a novelty: despite the lack of a base in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the monitoring procedure on employment by the European Council 
in Essen had roughly the same form as the procedure under article 103. The similarity 
of approach was of course no coincidence, the main political message being that 
employment mattered just as much as establishing EMU. With the restrict ions on 
public deficit and debt due to the convergence criteria that were part of the road to 
EMU being seen as one of the causes for the high unemployment level, this approach 
was perceived as necessary to “retain the confidence of the citizens”200.  
In a communication following up on the Essen Council, the Commission provided 
more clarity on the relationship between the two monitoring procedures and set out to 
reconcile the guidelines with the Essen priorities to help overcome the danger of a 
“two track approach”201. The basic thought was to develop an overall coherent 
approach in the context of article 103 TEC. To this end, the year was divided in two, 
with the broader procedure under article 103 TEC, starting with the Commission’s 
annual economic report, taking place in the first half, and the more focused Essen 
procedure, starting with the Commission’s annual employment and overview report, 
                                                   
198 On this subject see also Ashiagbor, The European Employment Strategy, labour market regulation 
and new governance  (Oxford monographs on labour law, 2006) 89. 
199 Directive 99/70/EC of the Council of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L 175 and Directive 97/81/EC of the 
Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time working concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L 14. The framework on temporary agency work was in 
fact concluded years later in 2008 by the European Parliament and the Council when the social partners 
had failed to reach agreement, see Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work [2008] OJ L 327. 
200 See also European Parliament, ‘Resolution on a coherent employment strategy for the European 
Union’ [1995] OJ C 249, 143. 
201 See Commission, ‘Follow up to the Essen European Council on Employment’ COM (95)74. 
 
taking place in the second half. In practice, this meant that the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, as before, contained both macroeconomic and structural policy 
recommendations. As to the structural policy recommendations for employment 
policy, reference was made to obtaining the priority goals set out in Essen. The 
second part of the year followed a similar procedure but then focused only on these 
structural employment measures, adding input by the Social affairs Council and the 
Standing Committee on employment.  
This cumbersome process was a good reflection of the political nature of the Essen 
process. Public confidence in the EU was waning, and with unemployment being 
conceived as the main problem facing Europe at the time there was a need to take 
explicit and visible action, thereby making it absolutely clear that reducing 
unemployment was a top priority of the EU. The European Council took on a central 
role on this issue, therewith assuring that the process obtained maximum media 
coverage. Or in other words, handling unemployment as being just another part of 
economic policy coordination would no longer do. 
The Essen process was implemented, and the progress and guidelines debated at the 
Madrid European Council in 1995 and the Dublin European Council in 1996. In 
between the Commission (under the new president Santer) published a confidence 
pact on action for employment in Europe. As the Commission states “the point of the 
pact is not to create new European Community powers, nor to increase its 
expenditure, nor to bring in new criteria for EMU”. It is to “launch a collective 
enterprise involving the public authorities and the social partners alike and defining 
their respective commitments in a coordinated comprehensive strategy” 202. The link 
between employment and the setting up of EMU is also apparent here, since one of 
the main reasons for this extra communication was to act as a “counterweight” to the 
Stability and Growth Pact203 on economic policy coordination that was being 
discussed at the time204. The conclusion of the confidence pact on employment 
creation is straightforward; “the unemployment statistics are terrible”.205 Participation 
of the social partners in the employment strategy is judged inadequate, and Member 
States are blamed for not taking into account the EU wide repercussions of their 
national multi-annual programs. The EU dimension of employment is emphasized 
with the Commission stating that “the Union must really treat employment as a matter 
of common interest” and calling for all actors to set clear objectives in specific 
timeframes”. Not surprisingly therefore the Commission argues for institutionalisation 
                                                   
202 See Commission, ‘Action for employment in Europe; a confidence pact’ COM (96)0485, 2. 
203 See also Regulation 1466/97 of the Council of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [1997] OJ L 209 and 
Regulation 1467/97 of the Council of 7 July 197 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure [1997] OJ L 209. 
204 See Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy, genesis and development’ (European Journal 
of Industrial Relations, vol 5, no 2, 1999) 117-137. See also Resolution of the Amsterdam European 
Council of 17 June 1997 on growth and employment.  
205 See Commission, ‘Action for employment in Europe; a confidence pact’ COM (96)0485, 27. 
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202 See Commission, ‘Action for employment in Europe; a confidence pact’ COM (96)0485, 2. 
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of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [1997] OJ L 209 and 
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205 See Commission, ‘Action for employment in Europe; a confidence pact’ COM (96)0485, 27. 
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of the Essen process in the upcoming Intergovernmental conference. 
In preparation of and during the intergovernmental conference for the Treaty of 
Amsterdam206 there was discussion whether or not the newly to be formed Treaty 
would provide for the institutionalisation of the Essen process207. The Commission, 
led by Swedish socialist Alan Larson, the newly appointed Director General for 
employment, was in favour, as was the European Parliament. As for the Member 
States, Sweden took a central role in favour of institutionalisation, whereas France, 
Germany and especially the UK were opposed. There were three main lines of 
arguments against the inclusion of an employment chapter in said Treaty. The first 
was the fear, especially on the French side, that a too ambitious approach at the EU 
level would come into conflict with the basic premise that the primary responsibility 
for employment policy lies with the Member States. The second reason was that with 
the introduction of a separate employment chapter the relevant importance of the 
employment goals in article 2 TEC would be strengthened. The provisions on 
Economic and Monetary Union are explicitly linked to this article, and the increased 
weight put on the employment goals could have an indirect effect on EMU. Especially 
the German government was very wary for any kind of possible interference with the 
establishment and stability of EMU. Finally, there was a more general concern that, 
given the primary national responsibilities in the area, including employment as a 
separate chapter would set expectations with the public for action and results that the 
EU would not be able to meet. These concerns were somewhat incorporated in the 
eventual drafting of the employment chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Moreover, a 
change to a more left wing government in the UK and then France that resulted from 
general elections in these countries took away the remaining opposition. The German 
objections as regards EMU were abolished when newly elected left wing French 
Prime Minister Jospin threatened to refuse signing the Stability and Growth Pact if an 
employment chapter was not included in the Treaty and a special meeting of the 
Council to address the “hot issues” of unemployment and job creation was not 
organized.  
Eventually therefore, the decision was taken to institutionalise the Essen process in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The promotion of a high level of employment that had 
already been part of article 2 TEC was also included in the new article 2 EU. “The 
promotion of coordination between employment policies of the Member States with a 
view to enhancing their effectiveness by developing a coordinated strategy for 
                                                   
206 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Economic Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C 340/01. 
207 For more detailed coverage of this process see de la Porte and Pochet, ‘A two fold assessment of 
employment policy coordination in the light of economic policy co-ordination’, in Foden and 
Magnusson, Five Years Experience of the Luxembourg Employment Strategy (European Trade Union 
Institute, 2003). See also van Riel and van der Meer, ‘The advocacy coalition for European 
employment policy – The European integration process after EMU’ in Hegmann and Neumarker, Die 
Europäische Union aus politökonomischer Perspektive (Metropolis, 2002). 
 
employment” was included in article 3 TEC as one of the activities of the 
Community. 
In addition, a new Title VIII on employment was included into the EC Treaty, right 
after the Title on economic and monetary policy, consisting of six provisions208. 
Article 125 TEC states the general goal of this new employment Title:  
“Member States and the Community shall, in accordance with this Title, work 
towards developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for 
promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets 
responsive to economic change with a view to achieving the objectives 
defined in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in article 2 of this 
Treaty.”  
Member States’ obligations in this regard are further specified in article 126 TEC, 
stating that they shall contribute to the article 125 TEC objectives in a way consistent 
with the BEPGs and that they shall regard promoting employment as a matter of 
common concern and coordinate their action in this respect within the Council, a 
process which is laid down in article 128 TEC. This article to a large extent codifies 
the Essen process of employment coordination, with the procedure installed being a 
virtual copy of the procedure for the BEPGs under (new) article 99 TEC209. 
Furthermore, the employment Title creates an additional legal base for the Council to 
take action in the area of employment, though harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States is explicitly excluded as a possibility210, while the 
obligation for the Council to create an Employment Committee with advisory status to 
promote coordination between Member States on employment and labour market 
policies is also formulated211. The tasks of the Committee is monitoring of the 
employment situation and employment policies in the Member States and the 
Community; to formulate opinions at the request of either the Council or the 
Commission or on its own initiative, and to contribute to the preparation of the 
                                                   
208 Art125-130 TEC. 
209 Except for the role of the European Parliament and the various committees in 128(2) EC, which gain 
a right of consultation  absent in the art 99 TEC procedure. 
210 Art 129 TEC. Instead, incentive measures may be adopted to encourage cooperation between 
Member States and to support their action in the field of employment through initiatives aimed at 
developing exchanges of information and best practices, providing comparative analysis and advice as 
well as promoting innovative approaches and evaluating experiences, in particular by recourse to pilot 
projects. In the first years of the strategy several of this article has been used several times to install 
such Employment Incentive Measures (EIM). See, for instance, Council Decision 98/171/EC of 23 
February 1998 on Community activities concerning analysis, research and cooperation in the field of 
employment and the labour market [1998] OJ L 63 and Decision 1145/2002/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on Community incentive measures in the field of 
employment [2002] OJ L 170. 
211 Art 130 TEC. The Council established the Committee by Council Decision 2000/98/EC of 24 
January 2000 establishing the Employment Committee. The Committee replaced the Employment and 
Labour Market Committee.  
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Council proceedings referred, i.e. the same role in employment policy as the 
Economic Policy Committee had in the area of economic policy.  
The special summit on employment that the French had insisted on during 
negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam took place in November 1997 in 
Luxembourg. The European Council in its conclusions wanted “to mark a new 
departure in the thinking and action upon which the Member States had been 
embarked since the Essen European Council meeting”212. The conclusions take 
roughly the same form as the Essen conclusions, with the European Council setting 
out her approach to the employment challenge at both the national and the community 
level. At the European level emphasis is placed on the continuation of a coordinated 
macroeconomic policy, underpinned by an efficient internal market. Further 
development of the internal market was to take place on the basis of the “action plan 
for the single market” that had been published by the commission in June that year 
with the ambition of completing the internal market by the 1st of January 1999213. In 
addition, the Council draws special attention and gives its approval to two sets of 
initiatives specifically geared to developing employment. The first initiative was an 
action program of the European Investment Bank, which made an additional 10 
billion ECU funding available to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
new technology and trans-European networks. The second concerned an initiative of 
the European Parliament providing for a 450 million ECU strengthening of budgetary 
resources earmarked for employment.  
Furthermore, the European Council decided to put the provisions of the new Title on 
employment in the Treaty of Amsterdam into effect immediately214. The Commission 
to this end had already published her first draft proposal for employment guidelines 
for 1998 in October 1997215. The guidelines as adopted by the Social Affairs Council 
in December 1997216 were divided into four pillars: 
1. Improving employability, aimed at improving access of the unemployed to the 
labour market by developing a preventive approach regarding long-term 
                                                   
212 Presidency conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting on employment, 
Luxembourg, November 1997, par 2.  
213 See Commission, ‘Communication to the European Council - Action plan for the single market’ 
CSE 97/1 final. The action plan set out a strategy based on four specific targets; making the rules more 
effective, dealing with key market distortions, removing sector specific obstacles to market integration 
and delivering a single market for the benefit of all citizens. This action plan was followed by a specific 
action plan for improving the free movement of workers. Its main focus was improving current 
secondary legislation and improving transparency of the labour market and visibility of the right of free 
movement, see Commission, ‘An action plan for free movement of workers’ COM(97)586. 
214 See Presidency conclusions of the extraordinary European council meeting on employment of 20 
and 21 November 1997. The intention had already been expressed in the Resolution on growth and 
employment annexed to the presidency conclusions of the Amsterdam summit of 16/17 June 1997. 
215 See Commission, ‘Proposal for Guidelines for Member States Employment Policies 1998’ COM 
(97) 497 final. 
216 Council resolution of 15 December 1997 on the 1998 employment guidelines [1998] OJ C30/1. 
 
unemployment and by implementing activation policies. 
2. Developing entrepreneurship aimed at making it easier to start and run a new 
business and to recruit people, reducing administrative constraints and making the 
tax structure more employment friendly. 
3. Encouraging adaptability both for business and their employees. 
4. Strengthening the policies for equal opportunities by tackling the gender gap and 
reconciling work and family life. 
Each heading consisted of several more detailed guidelines. Where the Commission 
proposal, similar to the Commission White Paper in 1993, contained a relatively large 
number of detailed quantitative targets (e.g. the creation of 12 million jobs in the first 
five years of the strategy), the guidelines in the Council text included only a few217, 
with flexible deadlines218, in some instances combined with benchmarking against the 
best performing Member States219.  
Member States handed in their first official National Action Plan (NAP) in the area of 
employment in the spring of 1998. No recommendations were made. Instead, the joint 
employment report220 issued by the Commission and Council had a positive focus, 
emphasising the strong commitment shown by Member States in their NAPs. 
Comparison between Member States progress is formulated in terms of “challenges” 
for the least performing221, with a lot of attention paid to the identification of good 
practices within the EU. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the need to develop more 
and better common indicators to evaluate performance, but also better integration with 
the BEPGs and the European Social Fund. 
                                                   
217 Instead of the quantitative goal set by the Commission the goal of achieving “a significant increase 
in the employment rate in Europe on a lasting basis” was installed.  
218 For example, in the area of tackling youth unemployment and preventing long-term unemployment 
a guideline was established that stated that “In order to influence the trend in youth and long-term 
unemployment the Member States will develop preventive and employability-oriented strategies, 
building on the early identification of individual needs; within a period to be determined by each 
Member State which may not exceed five years and which may be longer in Member States with 
particularly high unemployment, Member States will ensure that every unemployed young person is 
offered a new start before reaching six months of unemployment, in the form of training, retraining, 
work practice, a job or other employability measure”.  
219 For example, in the area “Transition from passive measures to active measures” it was stated that 
“Benefit and training systems - where that proves necessary - must be reviewed and adapted to ensure 
that they actively support employability and provide real incentives for the unemployed to seek and 
take up work or training opportunities. Each Member State will endeavor to increase significantly the 
number of persons benefiting from active measures to improve their employability. In order to increase 
the numbers of unemployed who are offered training or any similar measure, it will in particular fix a 
target, in the light of its starting situation, of gradually achieving the average of the three most 
successful Member States, and at least 20%.”  
220 See Commission, ‘draft joint employment report’ SEC(1998)1688, adopted by the Social affairs and 
ECOFIN Council on the 1st of December 1998. 
221 The report, for example, states at page 5 that “The challenge in terms of raising the employment rate 
is relatively greater in Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium.” 
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Council proceedings referred, i.e. the same role in employment policy as the 
Economic Policy Committee had in the area of economic policy.  
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212 Presidency conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting on employment, 
Luxembourg, November 1997, par 2.  
213 See Commission, ‘Communication to the European Council - Action plan for the single market’ 
CSE 97/1 final. The action plan set out a strategy based on four specific targets; making the rules more 
effective, dealing with key market distortions, removing sector specific obstacles to market integration 
and delivering a single market for the benefit of all citizens. This action plan was followed by a specific 
action plan for improving the free movement of workers. Its main focus was improving current 
secondary legislation and improving transparency of the labour market and visibility of the right of free 
movement, see Commission, ‘An action plan for free movement of workers’ COM(97)586. 
214 See Presidency conclusions of the extraordinary European council meeting on employment of 20 
and 21 November 1997. The intention had already been expressed in the Resolution on growth and 
employment annexed to the presidency conclusions of the Amsterdam summit of 16/17 June 1997. 
215 See Commission, ‘Proposal for Guidelines for Member States Employment Policies 1998’ COM 
(97) 497 final. 
216 Council resolution of 15 December 1997 on the 1998 employment guidelines [1998] OJ C30/1. 
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employment report220 issued by the Commission and Council had a positive focus, 
emphasising the strong commitment shown by Member States in their NAPs. 
Comparison between Member States progress is formulated in terms of “challenges” 
for the least performing221, with a lot of attention paid to the identification of good 
practices within the EU. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the need to develop more 
and better common indicators to evaluate performance, but also better integration with 
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The four pillar approach was maintained in the employment guidelines for 1999, with 
a few new specific guidelines added222. On the basis of the implementation of the 
1998 NAPs and the newly formulated 1999 NAPs, the joint employment report draws 
several conclusions as to Member States’ compliance with the commitments set out in 
the employment guidelines. The report concludes that employment performance of 
the EU as a whole is improving, but that progress varies across individual Member 
States. Major structural changes remain, with the employment rate still lagging 
significantly compared to the United States and Japan, long-term unemployment 
remaining a persistent and severe problem and low employment rates for older 
workers, youth and women. Member States are seen as responding to the challenges, 
but progress remains slow and comparability and governance is hindered by lack of 
common reliable indicators.223 
Following up on this joint employment report the Commission decided, for the first 
time, to issue Member State specific recommendations (55 to be precise). Even 
though this aggressive move from the Commission was met by a frosty response from 
several Member States, which were irritated by excessive “finger pointing”224, the 
recommendations were almost entirely taken over by the Council225. With the 
subsequent setting of the employment guidelines for 2000 in March that year the 
scene was set for the European Council in Lisbon. 
Next to the inclusion of a separate employment chapter, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
introduced changes in the area of social policy as well. The two-track approach to 
social policy mentioned earlier came to an end with the UK giving up its objections to 
the social protocol that had been agreed upon at Maastricht. The protocol was 
integrated in the main text of the social policy Title in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Even 
though the new Title XI of the Treaty of Amsterdam is mainly an integration of the 
protocol and the old Title VIII on social policy, some changes can be identified 
which, together with the integration of the employment Title, led to some confusion.  
Article 136 first paragraph, for instance, stating the aim of the newly integrated social 
                                                   
222 See, for example, the new guideline in the improving employability pillar: “Each Member State will 
review and, where appropriate, refocus its benefit and tax system and provide incentives for 
unemployed or inactive people to seek and take up work or measures to enhance their employability 
and for employers to create new jobs. In addition, it is important to develop, in the context of a policy 
for active ageing, measures such as maintaining working capacity, lifelong learning and other flexible 
working arrangements, so that older workers are also able to participate actively in working life”. 
223 Commission, ‘draft joint employment report’ SEC(1998)1688, chapters 1 and 2. 
224 See Kenner, EU employment law, from Rome to Amsterdam and beyond (Hart Publishing, 2003) 
479/480. 
225 See Council Recommendation 2000/164/EC of 14 February 2000 on the implementation of Member 
States' employment policies [2000] OJ L 052. Even though the Council states that ‘recommendations 
should be used sparingly, should concentrate on priority issues and should be based on sound and 
accurate analysis” and that “The Council acknowledges the significant efforts already undertaken by 
Member States with a view to implementing the Employment Guidelines; in the assessment of the 
impact of these policies, the multi-annual perspective of the Employment Guidelines should be taken 
into account.” 52 of the Commission’s 55 recommendations were adopted. 
 
Title, reads as follows: 
“The Community and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social 
rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 
18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of 
employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible 
their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained, proper social 
protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of 
human resources with a view to lasting high employment  and the combating of 
exclusion.”226 
The first thing that stands out is the referral to fundamental social rights of the 
European social charter and the Community Charter of the fundamental social rights 
of workers. Although not much more than a simple political declaration, this inclusion 
can be said to lead to the introduction of a normative framework of basic rights on the 
basis of which social policy should be conducted227. Moreover, there is a noticeable 
overlap between the goals of the social chapter and the newly introduced employment 
chapter. The relationship between the new employment chapter and the chapter on 
economic policy was recognized early on. The primacy of the economic policy 
coordination process was laid down in article 126(1) TEC, removing the (mainly 
German) fear of possible interference of the new employment Title with the 
constitution and functioning of EMU.  
A similar clarification, however, is not given with regard to the interrelationship 
between the employment chapter and the social chapter. The new article 136 TEC 
clearly poses the promotion of (high) employment as one of the goals of the social 
chapter and gives several competencies to the Community in the area of employment 
that touch upon the different subjects mentioned in the employment guidelines, 
including the possibility to facilitate coordination in a large number of areas228. All 
together there was a significant overlap between the two chapters, and the lack of 
clarification meant that a danger for different approaches to the same issue under the 
employment and social chapters was created.  
In the same way as giving the promotion of employment a more prominent role in the 
BEPGs would have been a way to solve the ambiguity between the economic and 
employment chapter, integrating the employment chapter and social chapters would 
have been a way to remove the danger of a two track approach. Next to political 
visibility issues discussed earlier, however, the clarification between the economic 
                                                   
226 Emphasis added. 
227 See Barents, Het verdrag van Amsterdam in werking (Kluwer, 1999) 198. 
228 See, for instance, the fourth pillar (equal opportunities) of the employment guidelines and art 141 
TEC in the social chapter or the adaptability pillar and a community legislation based on the health and 
safety of workers provision.  
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together there was a significant overlap between the two chapters, and the lack of 
clarification meant that a danger for different approaches to the same issue under the 
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In the same way as giving the promotion of employment a more prominent role in the 
BEPGs would have been a way to solve the ambiguity between the economic and 
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226 Emphasis added. 
227 See Barents, Het verdrag van Amsterdam in werking (Kluwer, 1999) 198. 
228 See, for instance, the fourth pillar (equal opportunities) of the employment guidelines and art 141 
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policy guidelines and the employment guidelines that still would have been necessary 
could have posed significant political trouble. Giving primacy to economic policy 
coordination over employment policy coordination with the latter being integrated in 
the social chapter would have been a way of stating that the economic dimension of 
integration has primacy over the social dimension, a statement not easily and 
willingly made.       
Even though the EC Treaty does not give a clear relationship between the social 
chapter and the employment chapter, this did not result in major problems in practice, 
mainly because of the change in philosophy behind EU social policy that had already 
started with the green and white papers on social policy of 1993 and 1994, as well as 
the link between the ESF and the Essen process mentioned earlier. This approach is 
confirmed by the Social Action Program 1998-2000229. Noticeably, the action 
program does exactly what the drafters of the Treaty did not do; it expressly integrates 
the employment Title as a part of social policy.  
Developments during this period of political turmoil can be summarized in the 
following table. A red X again marks changing or emerging EU employment policy 
instruments, with a red arrow marking a change the strictness of coordination 
arrangements. 
Table 5 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
(more binding) 
 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
 X 
   
X 
 
X 
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
 X 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
 X 
   
X 
 
X 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
 X 
    
X 
                                                   
229 See Commission ‘Social action programme 1998-2000’ COM(98)259. 
 
It is safe to say that the political spotlight that was put on employment issues and 
especially unemployment as a common European problem introduced several changes 
in the content and functioning of employment policy at the EU level. The fact that the 
road towards EMU coincided with this development significantly influenced the 
outcome as well. At the EU level, a neo-Keynesian spending approach to 
employment, as well as a large degree of centralisation was largely rejected in favour 
of a mainly national and labour supply-side oriented approach. However, short-term 
stabilisation policy in employment coordination and as far as the EU funds is 
concerned was partially introduced. The Essen process and the following specific 
employment policy coordination process as laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
further increased the procedurally binding nature of coordination in this specific 
period. However, the largely political nature remained apparent and where the Treaty 
of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth pact introduced sanctions in the area of 
budgetary coordination, a similar move was not made in the area of employment 
policy coordination. Furthermore, the manner of integration of a separate employment 
Title in the Treaty of Amsterdam gave cause to some confusion and overlap with the 
four strands of employment policy discussed earlier. Economic policy was given a 
superior position, internal market policy was complementary, but especially the 
relationship with EU social policy remained unclear. The Social Action Program 
1998-2000, which can be considered to include the first real steps towards social 
employment policy coordination, removed most ambiguities in this area.  
3.6 Employment in the Lisbon Strategy  
In March 2000, at the spring European Council in Lisbon, European leaders set a new 
strategic goal for the EU. By 2010 the Union was to become:  
“The most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion.” 230 
This new impetus for the economic development of the EU, while at the same time 
emphasising the social (and environmental) dimension, was perceived necessary since 
the Union at the time, in the words of its political leaders, was confronted with “a 
quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-
driven economy”, resulting in “changes affecting every aspect of people’s lives and 
therefore requiring a radical transformation of the European economy” 231.  
The overall strategy consisted of three different sub-goals232, and was designed 
(among other things) to enable the Union to regain the conditions for full, instead of 
                                                   
230 See European Council conclusions 23/24 March 2000, par 5. 
231 See European Council conclusions 23/24 March 2000, par 1. 
232 The three sub goals were 
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230 See European Council conclusions 23/24 March 2000, par 5. 
231 See European Council conclusions 23/24 March 2000, par 1. 
232 The three sub goals were 
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the familiar high level of, employment. The process of employment policy 
coordination, by then referred to as "the Luxembourg process", in this context was 
given credit for enabling Europe to substantially reduce unemployment, with 4 
million people since its inception233, while it was also stated that at the same time 15 
million Europeans were still out of work. The Luxembourg process was therefore to 
be given a new impetus by enriching the guidelines and giving them more concrete 
targets by establishing closer links with other relevant policy areas and by defining 
more effective procedures for involving the different actors234. 
Even though the Lisbon summit initialised very little in terms of “new” processes, 
there were some procedural novelties that followed. The Council called for (further) 
integration of current instruments and emphasised the central role of the BEPGs. The 
BEPGs were to focus increasingly on the medium- and long-term implications of 
structural policies and on reforms aimed at promoting economic growth potential, 
employment and social cohesion, as well as on the transition towards a knowledge-
based economy, something which in effect gave the BEPGs an umbrella function for 
the different aspects of the Lisbon strategy. The Luxembourg process fitted in as a 
tool to deal with employment matters in greater detail, and served as a role-model for 
setting up of Open Method of Coordination procedures in other areas like social 
inclusion235.  
Coordination of national policies in all Lisbon-related areas was tightened and more 
specifically linked to two working modes, namely that of public and peer pressure and 
that of policy learning on the basis of best practices. The aspect of peer pressure is 
based on the yearly process of country specific recommendations. New in this area 
                                                                                                                                                 
- preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the 
information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for 
competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market; 
- modernizing the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion; 
- sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favorable growth prospects by applying an 
appropriate macroeconomic policy mix.  
233 See Commission, ‘Joint Employment report’ COM(2000)1688 final. 
234 The European Council in this regard set out four priority areas for further action: 
Improving employability and reducing skills gaps, in particular by providing employment services with 
a Europe-wide data base on jobs and learning opportunities; promoting special programs to enable 
unemployed people to fill skill gaps; 
Giving higher priority to lifelong learning as a basic component of the European social model, 
including by encouraging agreements between the social partners on innovation and lifelong learning; 
by exploiting the complementarity between lifelong learning and adaptability through flexible 
management of working time and job rotation; 
Increasing employment in services, including personal services, where there were major shortages; 
private; 
Furthering all aspects of equal opportunities, including reducing occupational segregation, and making 
it easier to reconcile working life and family life, in particular by setting a new benchmark for 
improved childcare provision.  
235 Other processes of coordination that had been installed in the late nineteen nineties, and which were 
also integrated in the Lisbon strategy (think of the Cologne process of macroeconomic dialogue and the 
Cardiff process of structural reform in product and capital markets) will not be dealt with here.  
 
was that with the change of the central employment goal from achieving a high level 
of employment to achieving full employment also came the setting of concrete targets, 
something that was avoided in the past. The overall EU employment rate was to be 
raised from an average of 61% to as close as possible to 70% by 2010 and the number 
of women in employment from an average of 51% to more than 60% by 2010236. The 
increased public nature of both country specific recommendations and targets as well 
as the discussion of matters on a political level, most prominently in the European 
Council, was to induce pressure on national governments to make the right policy 
decisions. The aspect of policy learning is centred on the mutual provision of 
information and discussion of policy actions taken in Member States. This would lead 
to countries “learning” from each other, and taking over and adapting practices that 
had served well in other countries.   
Shortly after the Barcelona European Council of March 2002 had identified “active 
policies towards full employment; more and better jobs” as one of three priority areas 
within the Lisbon strategy that needed extra impetus237 the Commission published its 
five year review of the European Employment Strategy238. The exercise, which was 
jointly carried out by the Commission and Member States, identified several 
shortcomings in the functioning of the EES. Its conclusions, together with those of the 
independent study conducted by the “employment taskforce”, chaired by former 
Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, on key employment related policy challenges in the 
EU in 2003239 again led to a number of changes in the EES. First of all, emphasis is 
put on the need for the EES to focus more on the medium-term policy challenges 
created by the changing context of the EU, such as globalisation, enlargement and 
ageing. Three overarching goals are established in this regard, including raising 
employment and participation rates, improving quality at work and promoting 
productive jobs, and promoting an inclusive labour market. Taking these three goals 
as a starting position, the guidelines have been simplified. Changing and fine-tuning 
the existing guidelines on a yearly basis had led to an extensive and complex system, 
in which the hierarchy of priorities had become blurred and the four pillars mentioned 
earlier had lost part of their intrinsic coherence240. It was therefore decided that the 
guidelines should only be fully reviewed once every three years, with the guidelines 
                                                   
236 The Stockholm European Council of 23/24 March 2001 added the goal of achieving an employment 
rate of 50% for older workers (55-64) and set intermediate targets to be reached by 2005 (67% total, 
57% for women).  
237 See Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council of 15/16 March 2002.  
238 Commission, ‘Taking stock of five years of the European Employment Strategy’  COM(2002) 416. 
239 Employment Taskforce, ‘Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. Creating more employment in Europe’ (2003). 
240 The increased complexity shows clearly when comparing the 1998 with the 2002 guidelines. The 
first guidelines for 1998 consisted of 19 specific actions under the four pillars mentioned earlier. The 
2002 guidelines included 18 actions under the same four pillars, with most of these actions divided into 
a number of sub actions. In addition, six “horizontal objectives” had been added.  
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the familiar high level of, employment. The process of employment policy 
coordination, by then referred to as "the Luxembourg process", in this context was 
given credit for enabling Europe to substantially reduce unemployment, with 4 
million people since its inception233, while it was also stated that at the same time 15 
million Europeans were still out of work. The Luxembourg process was therefore to 
be given a new impetus by enriching the guidelines and giving them more concrete 
targets by establishing closer links with other relevant policy areas and by defining 
more effective procedures for involving the different actors234. 
Even though the Lisbon summit initialised very little in terms of “new” processes, 
there were some procedural novelties that followed. The Council called for (further) 
integration of current instruments and emphasised the central role of the BEPGs. The 
BEPGs were to focus increasingly on the medium- and long-term implications of 
structural policies and on reforms aimed at promoting economic growth potential, 
employment and social cohesion, as well as on the transition towards a knowledge-
based economy, something which in effect gave the BEPGs an umbrella function for 
the different aspects of the Lisbon strategy. The Luxembourg process fitted in as a 
tool to deal with employment matters in greater detail, and served as a role-model for 
setting up of Open Method of Coordination procedures in other areas like social 
inclusion235.  
Coordination of national policies in all Lisbon-related areas was tightened and more 
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that of policy learning on the basis of best practices. The aspect of peer pressure is 
based on the yearly process of country specific recommendations. New in this area 
                                                                                                                                                 
- preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the 
information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for 
competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market; 
- modernizing the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion; 
- sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favorable growth prospects by applying an 
appropriate macroeconomic policy mix.  
233 See Commission, ‘Joint Employment report’ COM(2000)1688 final. 
234 The European Council in this regard set out four priority areas for further action: 
Improving employability and reducing skills gaps, in particular by providing employment services with 
a Europe-wide data base on jobs and learning opportunities; promoting special programs to enable 
unemployed people to fill skill gaps; 
Giving higher priority to lifelong learning as a basic component of the European social model, 
including by encouraging agreements between the social partners on innovation and lifelong learning; 
by exploiting the complementarity between lifelong learning and adaptability through flexible 
management of working time and job rotation; 
Increasing employment in services, including personal services, where there were major shortages; 
private; 
Furthering all aspects of equal opportunities, including reducing occupational segregation, and making 
it easier to reconcile working life and family life, in particular by setting a new benchmark for 
improved childcare provision.  
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Cardiff process of structural reform in product and capital markets) will not be dealt with here.  
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in 2003 covering the period 2003-2005241. This working method was maintained until 
the end of the Lisbon strategy in 2010.  
As far as economic policy coordination is concerned, the central umbrella function 
given by the Lisbon Council to the BEPGs did not change much for the area handling 
employment. The 2000 BEPGs still mention the need for wage moderation in the 
context of macroeconomic stability and refer to the employment guidelines for 
structural measures to improve the employment situation in Member States. The shift 
of focus towards more medium-term policy challenges and the new three year cycle 
installed for the employment guidelines in 2002 was also implemented with regard to 
the BEPGs, further aligning the two processes.242 
The social cohesion goal of the Lisbon strategy finds a place in the BEPGs for 2000 
interpreted as “creating better framework conditions for high employment and low 
unemployment”243. This should not come as a surprise since it has already been 
highlighted that in the aftermath of the Growth and Jobs White Paper in 1993 the 
traditional harmonisation approach to EU social policy had been largely abandoned, 
in favour of a more flexible approach seeing social policy as an integrative part of EU 
competitiveness. The social policy agenda 2000-2005 elaborates on the position of 
social policy in the Lisbon strategy, and more specifically, on the role of social policy 
as a productive factor244. The employment chapter of the EC Treaty is still seen as an 
integral part of social policy. The overall focus lies on the promotion of quality, 
striving for more and better jobs, based on high skills, fair labour standards and decent 
levels of occupational health and safety. Improved quality in this regard also meant, 
for instance, a high level of social protection to underpin productivity and to facilitate 
adaptation to change. A whole range of (mainly non legislative) proposals for action 
are set out245.  
The coherence between the Luxembourg process and the EU Structural Funds, 
especially the European Social Fund, had also been identified as a challenge in the 
mid-term review of the Luxembourg process. The Treaty of Amsterdam had omitted 
to create a formal link between the provisions of the new employment chapter and the 
provisions on the European Social Fund. The Structural Fund Regulation for the 
period 2000-2006246, next to reducing and simplifying247 the system, had also, 
                                                   
241 See in this regard also Commission, ‘Strengthening the implementation of the European 
Employment Strategy’ COM(2004)239. 
242 For more info on the exact procedural changes see Commission, ‘Streamlining the annual economic 
and employment policy coordination cycles’ COM(2002)487. 
243 Council Recommendation of 19 June 2000 on the broad economic policy guidelines of the Member 
States and the Community [2000] OJ L 210, 6. 
244 See Commission, ‘Social policy agenda’ COM(2000)379, 5. 
245 Noteworthy exception here is the conclusion in this period of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time [2003] OJ L 299 modifying Directive 93/104/EC of the Council of 8 February 1993 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [1993] OJ L 38. 
246 See Regulation 1260/1999 of the Council of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
 
 
together with the Regulation on the ESF remedied this omission by stating that the 
Fund “shall support measures to prevent and combat unemployment and to develop 
human resources and social integration into the labour market in order to promote a 
high level of employment, equality between men and women, sustainable 
development, and economic and social cohesion” and that “In particular, the Fund 
shall contribute to the actions undertaken in pursuance of the European Employment 
Strategy and the Annual Guidelines on Employment”. 248  
 
The completion of the internal market was also included as part of the Lisbon 
strategy. The timing and the manner in which this was to be accomplished is set out in 
two successive internal market strategies in 1999 and 2002249. Improving the free 
movement of workers was an important part of the internal market strategy, where the 
goal was to ensure the European labour markets are open and accessible to all by 
2005250. Under the title “reinforcing and promoting the full use of the rights of 
citizens” the internal market strategy sets out a number of target actions, varying from 
information provision to the adaptation and simplification of legislation in areas, such 
as social security regulation and professional qualifications251. A yearly evaluation by 
the Commission is foreseen as input for the Spring European Council and therewith 
the Lisbon strategy. The announced adaptation and simplification of the Professional 
Qualifications Directive entered into force in 2005252. Beyond a few innovations, it 
mainly consolidated and simplified fifteen previous Directives, some of which dated 
back to the 1960s253. The adaptation and simplification in the area of social security 
                                                                                                                                                 
Structural Funds [1999] OJ L 161. 
247 Only three remained: 
1. promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is  
lagging behind 
2. supporting the economic and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties 
3. supporting the adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems of education, training and 
employment 
248 See Regulation (EC) 1784/1999 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 July 1999 on the 
European Social Fund [1999] OJ L 213, art 1. 
249 See Commission, ‘The strategy for Europe’s Internal Market’ COM(1999)624 and Commission 
‘Internal Market strategy, priorities 2003-2006’ COM(2003)238. 
250 See Commission, ‘New European Labour Markets, Open to All, with Access for All’ 
COM(2001)116.  
251 See Commission, ‘The strategy for Europe’s Internal Market’ COM(1999)624 and Commission 
‘Internal Market strategy, priorities 2003-2006’ COM(2003)238. 
252 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255.  
253 Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of 
higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least 
three years' duration [1988] OJ L 19, Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second 
general system for the recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 
89/48/EEC [1992] OJ L 209 and European Parliament and Council Directive 99/42/EEC of 7 June 
1999 establishing a mechanism for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional 
activities covered by the Directives on liberalisation and transitional measures and supplementing the 
General Systems for the recognition of qualifications [1999] OJ L 201. The 2005 Directive also 
simplifies and consolidates a large number of more specific Directives for the nineteen sixties, 
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entered into force in 2010254. The original basic principles remain unchanged, but the 
technical details, procedures and scope of application of the rules have evolved 
significantly. Furthermore, basic principles for citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States were 
introduced with Directive 2004/38/EC255, laying down specific situations for workers 
and self-employed.  
 
Next to these actions, a landmark development in improving the functioning of the 
internal market was the Commission’s proposal for a general Directive on services in 
the internal market. The aim of this Directive was to “establish a clear and balanced 
legal framework aiming to facilitate the conditions for establishment and cross-border 
service provision”256. The highly ambitious Commission proposal was published in 
early 2004257and immediately met resistance in the public opinion, since the proposal 
was feared to clear the way for social dumping and was believed to lead to a race to 
the bottom regarding workers’ rights258. This fear was fuelled by both the very wide 
scope of application on services as well as the famous “country of origin” principle 
that the Directive entailed. Pressure from the European Parliament led to a revised 
Commission proposal in 2006 in which the scope was limited and the country of 
origin principle was replaced with the general concept of free provision of services. 
The Directive was adopted at the end of 2006259, and entered into force in 2010260.    
The increased drive for consistency and simplification was followed up at the Lisbon 
strategy’s 2005 midterm review. In preparation, a high level group (again chaired by 
Wim Kok) was installed to evaluate Lisbon’s progress and to make recommendations 
for improvement. Its final report is highly critical and includes proposals for 
significant reforms. The report concludes that, even though some progress can be 
observed (especially in the area of employment), the EU is significantly behind on 
achieving its main strategic goals and will not achieve them unless a significant 
                                                                                                                                                 
seventies and eighties on professional qualifications in the areas of craft commerce and industry, health 
professionals and architects.   
254 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166 and Regulation 987/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L 284. 
255 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158. 
256Commission, ‘Internal Market strategy, priorities 2003-2006’ COM(2003)238. 
257 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on services in the Internal Market’ COM(2004)2. 
258 See e.g. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the services Directive’ (Common Market Law Review 45, 2008).  
259 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376. 
260 See also Timmerman, ‘Legislating amidst public controversy; the services Directive’ (Egmond royal 
institute for international relations, Egmond paper 32, 2009). 
 
change is made to the functioning of the process261.  
The report does not question the strategic goals or the timeline set to achieve them. 
Both are still seen as valid and essential for maintaining and improving the 
competitiveness of the EU economy. It is the inadequate implementation due to lack 
of focus and political will and commitment that is subject of criticism. The report 
therefore focuses on ways to increase national commitment and force Member States 
to take responsibility for implementation by increasing coherence and transparency262. 
Recommendations in the area of national commitment include the obligation to 
formulate national reform programs, setting out road maps, including milestones how 
each Member State plans to achieve the Lisbon targets, the installation in Member 
States of a political “Mr. (or Mrs.) Lisbon” responsible for the implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy and increased use of the principle of “naming and shaming”. The 
most important changes proposed concerning the content of the Lisbon strategy are a 
renewed, and narrower focus, namely “growth and jobs” and increasing the 
consistency between the BEPGs and the employment guidelines. With the exception 
of the increased naming and shaming, the Commission in its proposals for revision of 
the strategy 263, which in turn are largely followed by the following European 
Council264, took over the majority of the recommendations in the Kok report. An 
extension of the Kok report is the creation of a Community Lisbon action program265 
to match the national reform programs with the intention to create further clarity on 
the division of responsibilities between national and European level. Furthermore the 
BEPGs and employment guidelines are officially integrated in one document and 
increased consistency between expenditure under the EU Structural Funds and the 
Lisbon program is again emphasised. Noteworthy is also the Commission’s 
mentioning of possible consequences of the 2005 revision of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) in the area of macroeconomic policy. These changes led to a relation of 
rules in the preventive as well as the corrective arm of the SGP, with the possibility of 
exceptions to the rules for budgetary discipline if transgressions were caused by 
implementation of structural reforms and the Lisbon strategy in general266. This, 
according to the Commission, would create further possibilities for national Lisbon-
related structural reform, because these considerations could be taken into account 
                                                   
261 See report from the high level Group chaired by Wim Kok, ‘Facing the challenges; the Lisbon 
strategy for growth and employment’ (November 2004) 6/7. 
262 Furthermore, a number of recommendations are made to improve the involvement of different 
stakeholders, as well as that of the national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
263 Commission, ‘Working together for growth and jobs; a new start for the Lisbon strategy’ 
COM(2005)24. 
264 See Presidency conclusions of the European Spring Council, Brussels, 22/23 March 2005. 
265 See Commission, ‘Common actions for growth and employment, the Community Lisbon program’ 
COM(2005)330. 
266 See Council Regulation (EC) 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
[2005] OJ L 174 and Council Regulation (EC) 1056/2005 amending Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2005] OJ L 174. 
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entered into force in 2010254. The original basic principles remain unchanged, but the 
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Commission proposal in 2006 in which the scope was limited and the country of 
origin principle was replaced with the general concept of free provision of services. 
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257 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on services in the Internal Market’ COM(2004)2. 
258 See e.g. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the services Directive’ (Common Market Law Review 45, 2008).  
259 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376. 
260 See also Timmerman, ‘Legislating amidst public controversy; the services Directive’ (Egmond royal 
institute for international relations, Egmond paper 32, 2009). 
 
change is made to the functioning of the process261.  
The report does not question the strategic goals or the timeline set to achieve them. 
Both are still seen as valid and essential for maintaining and improving the 
competitiveness of the EU economy. It is the inadequate implementation due to lack 
of focus and political will and commitment that is subject of criticism. The report 
therefore focuses on ways to increase national commitment and force Member States 
to take responsibility for implementation by increasing coherence and transparency262. 
Recommendations in the area of national commitment include the obligation to 
formulate national reform programs, setting out road maps, including milestones how 
each Member State plans to achieve the Lisbon targets, the installation in Member 
States of a political “Mr. (or Mrs.) Lisbon” responsible for the implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy and increased use of the principle of “naming and shaming”. The 
most important changes proposed concerning the content of the Lisbon strategy are a 
renewed, and narrower focus, namely “growth and jobs” and increasing the 
consistency between the BEPGs and the employment guidelines. With the exception 
of the increased naming and shaming, the Commission in its proposals for revision of 
the strategy 263, which in turn are largely followed by the following European 
Council264, took over the majority of the recommendations in the Kok report. An 
extension of the Kok report is the creation of a Community Lisbon action program265 
to match the national reform programs with the intention to create further clarity on 
the division of responsibilities between national and European level. Furthermore the 
BEPGs and employment guidelines are officially integrated in one document and 
increased consistency between expenditure under the EU Structural Funds and the 
Lisbon program is again emphasised. Noteworthy is also the Commission’s 
mentioning of possible consequences of the 2005 revision of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) in the area of macroeconomic policy. These changes led to a relation of 
rules in the preventive as well as the corrective arm of the SGP, with the possibility of 
exceptions to the rules for budgetary discipline if transgressions were caused by 
implementation of structural reforms and the Lisbon strategy in general266. This, 
according to the Commission, would create further possibilities for national Lisbon-
related structural reform, because these considerations could be taken into account 
                                                   
261 See report from the high level Group chaired by Wim Kok, ‘Facing the challenges; the Lisbon 
strategy for growth and employment’ (November 2004) 6/7. 
262 Furthermore, a number of recommendations are made to improve the involvement of different 
stakeholders, as well as that of the national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
263 Commission, ‘Working together for growth and jobs; a new start for the Lisbon strategy’ 
COM(2005)24. 
264 See Presidency conclusions of the European Spring Council, Brussels, 22/23 March 2005. 
265 See Commission, ‘Common actions for growth and employment, the Community Lisbon program’ 
COM(2005)330. 
266 See Council Regulation (EC) 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
[2005] OJ L 174 and Council Regulation (EC) 1056/2005 amending Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2005] OJ L 174. 
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when assessing Member States’ stability and convergence programs267. In effect, the 
Commission statement indicates that the strict budgetary rules that had limited neo-
Keynesian employment creating expenditure in the 1990s are in fact not so strict 
anymore when it comes to the Lisbon strategy’s objectives268.  
When examining the first set of integrated guidelines (BEPGs and employment 
guidelines) for the period 2005-2008 it can be observed that the employment 
guidelines now account for eight out of a total of twenty-four guidelines269, with one 
overarching guideline namely that “Member States should implement employment 
policies aiming at achieving full employment, improving quality and productivity at 
work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion” 270. The efforts to increase the 
interlinkage and coherence between the BEPGs and the employment guidelines , 
besides being integrated in one document, are also reflected in the extensive reference 
that is made in the employment guidelines to the BEPGs and vice versa271.  
Whereas the overlap and need for consistency between the BEPGs and the 
employment guidelines took centre stage, the relationship between the social strand of 
employment policy and the EES as developed since the Growth and Jobs White Paper 
in 1993 remained unaltered. The new social agenda 2005-2010 lists a number of 
actions under two priority areas, “moving towards full employment” and “a more 
cohesive society”. The first priority fully overlaps with the EES. The second priority 
does so partially. Extensive reference is made to “other” Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) processes that, with the Luxembourg process as example, had 
been installed after Lisbon, namely those on social inclusion, pensions and healthcare.  
                                                   
267 See consolidated version of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 as amended by Regulation 
1055/2005 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, especially art 5 and 9. 
268 Commission, ‘Working together for growth and jobs; a new start for the Lisbon strategy’ 
COM(2005)24, 13. 
269 See Council Decision 2005/600/EC of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of 
the Member States [2005] OJ L 205. 
— Guideline No 18: Promote a lifecycle approach to work 
— Guideline No 19: Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, and make work pay 
for job-seekers, including disadvantaged people, and the inactive 
— Guideline No 20: Improve matching of labour market needs 
— Guideline No 21: Promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce labour market 
segmentation, having due regard to the role of the social partners 
— Guideline No 22: Ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage-setting 
mechanisms 
— Guideline No 23: Expand and improve investment in human capital 
— Guideline No 24: Adapt education and training systems in response to new competence 
requirements 
270 See Council Decision 2005/600/EC of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of 
the Member States [2005] OJ L 205, 2. 
271 See for instance the relationship between guideline 18 (promoting a life cycle approach to work) and 
BEPG nr 2 (to safeguard economic and fiscal sustainability) and, even more clearly, the relationship 
between guideline 22 (Ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage-setting 
mechanisms) and BEPG nr 4 (to ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic stability 
and growth). 
 
The position of these OMC processes was a curious one. Especially the social 
inclusion OMC process had a large overlap with the EES. Furthermore, the 
possibilities for community incentive measures in employment and social policy were 
integrated in the community program for employment and social solidarity 
(PROGRESS)272. At the same time, however, these OMC systems were not taken into 
account in the integration of guidelines with the restructuring of Lisbon, and kept 
separate from the integrated growth and jobs guidelines. This partly reflects the new 
focus of the Lisbon strategy, which was “growth and jobs” and not social policy per 
se, but it also shows the hesitance to integrate social and employment policy, and 
therewith economic policy. Exemplary in this case is a 2005 Commission 
communication on the future of the social OMC processes, emphasising the need for 
further alignment with the EES and the BEPGs in the context of the Lisbon restart, 
while at the same time forcefully stating that the “distinct nature and scope of the 
inclusion and pensions processes” were to remain intact273. A distinct nature which 
also incorporated a very limited use of peer pressure, with almost sole focus on policy 
learning and best practice as tools for coordination in this area.  
Next to the focus on coordination measures, the first years after the Lisbon relaunch 
also saw an increased attention for EU social employment policy legislation. The 
Commission communication on the implementation of the Lisbon strategy of 
December 2006274 had formulated a priority area in the area of employment as 
“Greater adaptability of labour markets based on flexicurity”. The focus on this 
subject was mainly due to the still limited progress in the area of adaptability (a 
problem already identified at the time of the EES midterm review in 2000), but new 
was the concept of “flexicurity”. Flexicurity was based on the Danish employment 
system, and was focused upon by the Austrian presidency at the time. It is based on 
the idea of worker security instead of job security, entailing measures to increase the 
flexibility of the labour market while at the same time ensuring effective social 
protection and lifelong learning. Through this it can be linked to all three of the main 
objectives of the EES, namely to attract and retain more people in employment, 
increase labour supply and modernise social protection systems; improve adaptability 
of workers and enterprises; increase investment in human capital through better 
education and skills. The concept of flexicurity was thoroughly debated among 
Member States and with the social partners275. Together with the results of an expert 
                                                   
272 TFEU See Council decision establishing a community program for employment and social 
solidarity, 1672/2006, art 9 based on art 129 and 137(2)a TFEU. The program created possibilities for 
funding of analysis, mutual learning and support for main actors in the areas of employment, social 
protection and inclusion, working conditions, antidiscrimination and diversity and gender equality. 
273 See Commission, “Working together, working better: A new framework for the open coordination 
of social protection and inclusion policies in the European Union’ COM(2005)706. 
274 Commission, ‘Implementing the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs; a year of delivery’ 
COM (2006)816. 
275 See, for instance, the EU press release of the stakeholder flexicurity conference of the 20th of April 
2007, ‘European partners join lively debate on flexicurity’ IP/07/519.  
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when assessing Member States’ stability and convergence programs267. In effect, the 
Commission statement indicates that the strict budgetary rules that had limited neo-
Keynesian employment creating expenditure in the 1990s are in fact not so strict 
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policies aiming at achieving full employment, improving quality and productivity at 
work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion” 270. The efforts to increase the 
interlinkage and coherence between the BEPGs and the employment guidelines , 
besides being integrated in one document, are also reflected in the extensive reference 
that is made in the employment guidelines to the BEPGs and vice versa271.  
Whereas the overlap and need for consistency between the BEPGs and the 
employment guidelines took centre stage, the relationship between the social strand of 
employment policy and the EES as developed since the Growth and Jobs White Paper 
in 1993 remained unaltered. The new social agenda 2005-2010 lists a number of 
actions under two priority areas, “moving towards full employment” and “a more 
cohesive society”. The first priority fully overlaps with the EES. The second priority 
does so partially. Extensive reference is made to “other” Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) processes that, with the Luxembourg process as example, had 
been installed after Lisbon, namely those on social inclusion, pensions and healthcare.  
                                                   
267 See consolidated version of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 as amended by Regulation 
1055/2005 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, especially art 5 and 9. 
268 Commission, ‘Working together for growth and jobs; a new start for the Lisbon strategy’ 
COM(2005)24, 13. 
269 See Council Decision 2005/600/EC of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of 
the Member States [2005] OJ L 205. 
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while at the same time forcefully stating that the “distinct nature and scope of the 
inclusion and pensions processes” were to remain intact273. A distinct nature which 
also incorporated a very limited use of peer pressure, with almost sole focus on policy 
learning and best practice as tools for coordination in this area.  
Next to the focus on coordination measures, the first years after the Lisbon relaunch 
also saw an increased attention for EU social employment policy legislation. The 
Commission communication on the implementation of the Lisbon strategy of 
December 2006274 had formulated a priority area in the area of employment as 
“Greater adaptability of labour markets based on flexicurity”. The focus on this 
subject was mainly due to the still limited progress in the area of adaptability (a 
problem already identified at the time of the EES midterm review in 2000), but new 
was the concept of “flexicurity”. Flexicurity was based on the Danish employment 
system, and was focused upon by the Austrian presidency at the time. It is based on 
the idea of worker security instead of job security, entailing measures to increase the 
flexibility of the labour market while at the same time ensuring effective social 
protection and lifelong learning. Through this it can be linked to all three of the main 
objectives of the EES, namely to attract and retain more people in employment, 
increase labour supply and modernise social protection systems; improve adaptability 
of workers and enterprises; increase investment in human capital through better 
education and skills. The concept of flexicurity was thoroughly debated among 
Member States and with the social partners275. Together with the results of an expert 
                                                   
272 TFEU See Council decision establishing a community program for employment and social 
solidarity, 1672/2006, art 9 based on art 129 and 137(2)a TFEU. The program created possibilities for 
funding of analysis, mutual learning and support for main actors in the areas of employment, social 
protection and inclusion, working conditions, antidiscrimination and diversity and gender equality. 
273 See Commission, “Working together, working better: A new framework for the open coordination 
of social protection and inclusion policies in the European Union’ COM(2005)706. 
274 Commission, ‘Implementing the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs; a year of delivery’ 
COM (2006)816. 
275 See, for instance, the EU press release of the stakeholder flexicurity conference of the 20th of April 
2007, ‘European partners join lively debate on flexicurity’ IP/07/519.  
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group that was to further investigate the subject276, this discussion led to a 2007 
Commission communication on flexicurity in which different pathways and common 
principles were set out277. At the same time, the adaptability part of the flexicurity 
concept spurred discussion in the area of labour law at both the national and the 
European level. A Commission Green Paper on “modernizing labour law to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century” was published in November 2006278. With the green 
paper a public consultation process was initiated to identify key challenges, engage 
Member States, social partners and other stakeholders in an open debate and stimulate 
discussion. There was a wide divergence of opinions on the issue. As regards EU 
employment law the divergence of views centred on two main issues279: the nature of 
EU action and the division of competences between the EU and Member States. Part 
of the respondents, consisting mostly of trade unions and social NGOs, but also some 
academics and Member States, question the dominant focus in the Lisbon strategy on 
labour law as an integral part of EU competitiveness280. Instead they prefer 
considering labour law reform in the framework of fundamental human rights281. 
Divergence also occurs in preference for division of competences, differing from a 
preference for reinstalling full national sovereignty to urging the Commission to use 
its right of initiative more proactively in the interests of “social Europe”, stating that 
emerging European labour markets can no longer be managed by relying on national 
rules in the social sphere. Both the Communication of flexicurity and the results of the 
Green Paper on labour law served as input for common principles on flexicurity 
which were later agreed by the EPSCO Council in December 2007282 that year and 
endorsed by the December European Council283.  
                                                   
276See final report of the European expert group on flexicurity, ‘Flexicurity pathways, turning hurdles 
into stepping stones’ (June 2007). 
277 See Commission, ‘Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through 
flexibility and security’ COM(2007)359. In addition in the more specific area of health and safety of 
workers the Commission in February 2007 published a new strategy for health and safety at work for 
the period 2007-2012 COM(2007)62. Legislation in this area is seen, just as labour law in general, as 
an integral part of increasing EU competitiveness. 
278 Commission, ‘Green paper on modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’  
COM(2006)708. The Commission had already announced this green paper in its social agenda 2005-
2010 mentioned earlier. 
279 See Commission, ‘Outcome of the public consultation on the Commission’s Green paper 
“Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’ COM(2007)627. 
280 This focus in fact had already been installed in the early 1990s with the growth and jobs white paper 
mentioned earlier.  
281 In particular the charter of fundamental rights of the EU as proclaimed in Nice by the President of 
the EP, Council and Commission on the 7th of December 2000. The charter was subsequently included 
in the Lisbon Treaty, where art 6.1 states that the “The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as 
adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.” 
While “The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as 
defined in the Treaties.” 
282 See Conclusions of the Employment and Social Affairs Council of 5/6 December 2007, ‘Towards 
common principles of flexicurity”. 
283 See Presidency conclusions of the European Council of 14 December 2007. 
 
The EU Structural Funds, and especially the ESF, also did not remain unaffected by 
the restructuring of the Lisbon strategy. The new Structural Funds Regulations for the 
period 2007-2013 not only maintained the explicit link between the ESF and the 
European Employment Strategy284, but, 60% of the total Structural Fund budget under 
the new objective 1 (convergence for least developed regions) and 75% under the new 
objective 2 (regional competitiveness and employment objective for regions not 
falling in objective 1) is explicitly linked to expenditure targeting the European 
Union’s priorities of promoting competitiveness and creating jobs, including meeting 
the objectives of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005 to 2008)285.  
 
One can portray the developments during this period in the following summarising 
table. A red X again marks changing or emerging EU employment policy instruments, 
with a red arrow marking a change the strictness of coordination arrangements. 
 
Table 6 
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policy 
coordination 
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(more binding) 
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market 
legislation 
 
Social employment policy 
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spending 
Legislation  Coordination 
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incentives for 
work 
 
 X 
   
 X 
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Improving the 
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Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
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Improving 
framework 
conditions  
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 X 
 
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
X 
    
                                                   
284 See Regulation 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
European Social Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, art 2.1. 
285 See Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, art 9.3. See also 
Commission Regulation 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006 setting out rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and of Regulation1080/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional Development Fund [2006] OJ L 
371/1. 
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group that was to further investigate the subject276, this discussion led to a 2007 
Commission communication on flexicurity in which different pathways and common 
principles were set out277. At the same time, the adaptability part of the flexicurity 
concept spurred discussion in the area of labour law at both the national and the 
European level. A Commission Green Paper on “modernizing labour law to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century” was published in November 2006278. With the green 
paper a public consultation process was initiated to identify key challenges, engage 
Member States, social partners and other stakeholders in an open debate and stimulate 
discussion. There was a wide divergence of opinions on the issue. As regards EU 
employment law the divergence of views centred on two main issues279: the nature of 
EU action and the division of competences between the EU and Member States. Part 
of the respondents, consisting mostly of trade unions and social NGOs, but also some 
academics and Member States, question the dominant focus in the Lisbon strategy on 
labour law as an integral part of EU competitiveness280. Instead they prefer 
considering labour law reform in the framework of fundamental human rights281. 
Divergence also occurs in preference for division of competences, differing from a 
preference for reinstalling full national sovereignty to urging the Commission to use 
its right of initiative more proactively in the interests of “social Europe”, stating that 
emerging European labour markets can no longer be managed by relying on national 
rules in the social sphere. Both the Communication of flexicurity and the results of the 
Green Paper on labour law served as input for common principles on flexicurity 
which were later agreed by the EPSCO Council in December 2007282 that year and 
endorsed by the December European Council283.  
                                                   
276See final report of the European expert group on flexicurity, ‘Flexicurity pathways, turning hurdles 
into stepping stones’ (June 2007). 
277 See Commission, ‘Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through 
flexibility and security’ COM(2007)359. In addition in the more specific area of health and safety of 
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an integral part of increasing EU competitiveness. 
278 Commission, ‘Green paper on modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’  
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284 See Regulation 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
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The main changes occurring during this period were linked to the installation of the 
Lisbon strategy. The emergence of concrete quantitative targets along with increased 
use of peer pressure and policy learning on a political level increased the manner in 
which employment policy coordination linked to the various objectives was binding 
to the Member States. The issue of short-term stabilisation policy formed an 
exception in this regard, as it did not fit well with the medium- to long-term focus of 
the strategy. Short-term stabilisation policy was also absent in the EU funds spending 
instrument during this period. Social employment policy coordination was 
procedurally intensified by the installation of the open method of coordination in the 
area of social protection and social inclusion.  
 
3.7 The Europe 2020 strategy and Europe in crisis  
 
The Lisbon strategy came to an end in 2010 amidst a severe economic and financial 
crisis. EU GDP had fallen by 4% in 2009, with unemployment approaching 10% and 
government debt levels having increased by 20 percentage points over two years. The 
Commission’s own evaluation of the Lisbon strategy is heavily influenced by this 
dismal economic situation286. The document comes to the conclusion that the ultimate 
effect of the strategy on growth and jobs is not straightforward to analyse, and focuses 
more on the effects the strategy has had on promoting structural reforms in Member 
States. Several weaknesses are identified. The lack of ownership of the strategy 
among stakeholders and the difference in reform efforts between countries and policy 
areas come back again, as do the still insufficient links between the strategy and more 
specific EU instruments such as the social agenda. The economic crisis furthermore 
had several effects on the nature of economic policy coordination. First, the 
Commission had revived and strengthened short-term stabilisation policy as a matter 
of common concern in its European Economic Recovery Plan published in November 
2008287 and approved by the European Council in December 2008288. In this 
communication the Commission proposes a two pillar approach to handling the crisis 
with “targeted, timely, temporary and coordinated action”, namely by boosting 
demand and stimulate confidence, where Member States and the EU would agree to 
an immediate budgetary impulse amounting to 200 billion euro, or 1.5% of GDP. This 
new-Keynesian demand stimulating policy of course had to respect the Stability and 
Growth Pact, but possibilities here had been widened significantly since its change in 
2005289. Moreover, direct short-term action to reinforce Europe's competitiveness in 
the long term are proposed. In this regard the Plan sets out a comprehensive 
programme to direct action to "smart" investment, for instance, in skills.  
 
                                                   
286 Commission, ‘Lisbon strategy evaluation document’ SEC(2010)114. 
287 Commission, ‘A European Economic Recovery Plan’ COM(2008)800. 
288 European Council conclusions December, Brussels, 11/12 December 2008. 
289 See section 3.5. 
 
Second, the crisis is also cause for some new reflections on the specific focus and 
nature of the Lisbon strategy. Specifically, the Commission identifies a lack of 
attention for competitiveness problems and macroeconomic imbalances. These in the 
view of the Commission were at the root of the economic crisis, and were not 
adequately addressed in the surveillance of Member States' economies carried out 
through the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy. Together with this 
criticism the Commission identifies a lack of attention for the specific nature of the 
euro area in the strategy. Given the fact that with a single currency economic 
adjustment and convergence has to come from adjustment in real economic variables 
the euro area should have been put under stricter surveillance. 
 
With the Lisbon strategy coming to an end in 2010, the Europe 2020 strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and jobs was presented as its successor and 
agreed upon at the June 2010 European Council. The Europe 2020 strategy aimed at 
achieving five EU level headline targets in 2020, three of which fall in the area of 
employment policy290.  
1. The participation target of 70% under the Lisbon strategy was replaced by a 
participation target of 75%, with a slightly different age group291.  
2. Increasing education level is added, with concrete targets of reducing school drop-
out rates below 10% at least 40% of 30-34 year-olds completing third level 
education. 
3. To decrease the number of people living in poverty or social exclusion by 20 
million, defined according to according to three indicators292.  
 
Programmes to achieve these objectives, or “flagships”, were to be set up in seven 
different areas293 where EU and national authorities would have to coordinate their 
efforts. Also, EU instruments like the internal market and the EU budget would have 
to be further aligned to achieving these objectives294. To increase commitment at the 
national level and increase possibilities for peer pressure, countries were to translate 
the EU wide targets into differentiated national targets.  
 
                                                   
290 The other two are  
- R&D/innovation; 3% of the EU’s GDP is to be invested in R&D/innovation 
- Climate change/energy; Green house gas emissions 20% lower than 1990 20% of energy from 
renewables and 20% increase in energy efficiency.  
291 Instead of 15-64 it is now aimed at people 20-64 to better  reflect the education status of people 
between 15-20. 
292 at-risk-of poverty; material deprivation; jobless household. 
293 1.Digital agenda for Europe, 2 Innovation Union, 3. Youth on the Move, 4. Resource efficient 
Europe, 5. An industrial policy for the globalisation era, 6. An agenda for new skills and jobs and 7. 
European platform against poverty.   
294 See Commission, ‘Europe 2020, A European Strategy for smart sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
COM(2010)2020.  
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The main changes occurring during this period were linked to the installation of the 
Lisbon strategy. The emergence of concrete quantitative targets along with increased 
use of peer pressure and policy learning on a political level increased the manner in 
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the strategy. Short-term stabilisation policy was also absent in the EU funds spending 
instrument during this period. Social employment policy coordination was 
procedurally intensified by the installation of the open method of coordination in the 
area of social protection and social inclusion.  
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2005289. Moreover, direct short-term action to reinforce Europe's competitiveness in 
the long term are proposed. In this regard the Plan sets out a comprehensive 
programme to direct action to "smart" investment, for instance, in skills.  
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Linked to this system is a new system of monitoring in the form of a European 
semester295. Placed at the beginning of the year, this new semester simultaneously 
incorporates the national monitoring and reporting under the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the performance of the Europe 2020 strategy. The Council would address 
country-specific recommendations to Member States, and the Commission, in the case 
of non-compliance, would issue policy warnings. The latter was a new power 
conferred to the Commission in the Treaty of Lisbon296 as an addition to what is now 
article 121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)297 on 
economic policy coordination, as was the fact that policy recommendations under 
article 121(4) TFEU would now be taken without the vote of the Member State 
involved being taken into account. Where the form of this monitoring process had 
been created on an ad hoc basis, the European semester is, for the first time, laid down 
in secondary Union law, added to the already existing Regulation 1466/97 signifying 
the so-called preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact298. 
 
The basis of this monitoring system was a new set of integrated guidelines, now a 
total of ten, with four pertaining specifically to employment policy coordination, 
namely299 increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing 
structural unemployment and promoting job quality; developing a skilled workforce 
responding to labour market needs and promoting lifelong learning; improving the 
quality and performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing 
participation in tertiary or equivalent education; promoting social inclusion and 
combating poverty. 
 
Simultaneous to the introduction of the Europe 2020 strategy and the European 
semester a wide process was initiated to further strengthen economic policy 
coordination. Two aspects of this process are of particular relevance for this study. 
The first one is the conclusion of the Euro Plus Pact. Originally a German idea, this 
pact which was concluded at the Spring European Council in 2010 was meant to 
increase political commitment for concrete economic reform in, e.g., the areas of 
                                                   
295 Elaborated in Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 amending Regulation 1466/97 of the Council on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, 
section 1-a. 
296 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306/01. 
297 The Treaty of Lisbon amended the EU's two core treaties, the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. The latter is renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
298 Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Regulation 1466/97 of the Council on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306. 
299 See Council Recommendation 2010/410/EU of 13 July 2010 on broad guidelines for the economic 
policies of the Member States and of the Union [2010] OJ L 191 and Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 
21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States [2010] OJ L 205.  
 
employment and competitiveness300. The 23 countries participating301 would commit 
themselves to specific reform efforts on a year-by-year basis, the progress of which 
would be reviewed annually by Heads of State or Government. The second aspect was 
the increased attention for the concept of macroeconomic surveillance in the area of 
macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness, with a particular emphasis on euro 
area Member States302. Two guidelines on this subject were included in the integrated 
guidelines. Furthermore, the European Commission proposed, as part of a broader 
legislative package to strengthen economic governance303 referred to as the Six Pack, 
two Regulations setting up a separate monitoring system in this area in September 
2010, which after some alterations after debate with Council and European 
Parliament, entered into force in December 2011304. The new surveillance mechanism 
is largely set up along the lines of the Stability and Growth Pact, with a preventive 
and a corrective arm, the latter including the possibility of financial sanctions for euro 
area Member States. In its application it relies on an alert mechanism that uses a 
scoreboard of indicators and in-depth country studies and better enforcement in the 
form of financial sanctions for euro area Member States whose economies are 
characterised by severe macroeconomic imbalances and that do not follow up on 
recommendations.  
The scope of the new procedure is defined by the concept of “macroeconomic 
imbalances”, which in article 2(1) of the Regulation on the prevention and correction 
of macroeconomic imbalances is defined as “any trend giving rise to macroeconomic 
developments which are adversely affecting, or have the potential adversely to affect, 
the proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, or of the Union as a whole”. Further clarification of this definition 
can be found in the alert mechanism that is used, or the so called scoreboard. The 
scoreboard, which is drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with the 
European Parliament and the Council305, includes a number of indicators linked to the 
labour market, most importantly an indicator of unit labour costs and an indicator of 
unemployment306. Constant and excessive rising of unit labour costs as well as 
                                                   
300 The other two areas included are the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial 
stability, see European Council conclusions, Brussels, 11 March 2011. 
301 The 27 EU Member States except for the UK, Hungary, Czech Republic and Sweden 
302 See also Council Recommendation 2010/410/EU of 13 July 2010 on broad guidelines for the 
economic policies of the Member States and of the Union [2010] OJ L 191, guidelines 2 and 3. 
303 Economic governance is used in this study as comprising the rules, processes and behavior that 
determine the way economic policy is exercised at the national and European level in the European 
Union (EU), a definition based on Commission, ‘European Governance. A White Paper’ COM(2001) 
428. 
304 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306 and Regulation 1174/2011 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to 
correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 306. 
305 See Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, recital 12.  
306 Envisaged design of the scoreboard (November 2011) 
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been created on an ad hoc basis, the European semester is, for the first time, laid down 
in secondary Union law, added to the already existing Regulation 1466/97 signifying 
the so-called preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact298. 
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total of ten, with four pertaining specifically to employment policy coordination, 
namely299 increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing 
structural unemployment and promoting job quality; developing a skilled workforce 
responding to labour market needs and promoting lifelong learning; improving the 
quality and performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing 
participation in tertiary or equivalent education; promoting social inclusion and 
combating poverty. 
 
Simultaneous to the introduction of the Europe 2020 strategy and the European 
semester a wide process was initiated to further strengthen economic policy 
coordination. Two aspects of this process are of particular relevance for this study. 
The first one is the conclusion of the Euro Plus Pact. Originally a German idea, this 
pact which was concluded at the Spring European Council in 2010 was meant to 
increase political commitment for concrete economic reform in, e.g., the areas of 
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the European Union. 
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guidelines. Furthermore, the European Commission proposed, as part of a broader 
legislative package to strengthen economic governance303 referred to as the Six Pack, 
two Regulations setting up a separate monitoring system in this area in September 
2010, which after some alterations after debate with Council and European 
Parliament, entered into force in December 2011304. The new surveillance mechanism 
is largely set up along the lines of the Stability and Growth Pact, with a preventive 
and a corrective arm, the latter including the possibility of financial sanctions for euro 
area Member States. In its application it relies on an alert mechanism that uses a 
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form of financial sanctions for euro area Member States whose economies are 
characterised by severe macroeconomic imbalances and that do not follow up on 
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The scope of the new procedure is defined by the concept of “macroeconomic 
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can be found in the alert mechanism that is used, or the so called scoreboard. The 
scoreboard, which is drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with the 
European Parliament and the Council305, includes a number of indicators linked to the 
labour market, most importantly an indicator of unit labour costs and an indicator of 
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excessive levels of unemployment are the main employment related indicators of 
potential harmful imbalances.   
The position of the other instruments of EU employment policy has already been 
briefly mentioned in the beginning of this section. Internal market policy was deemed 
one of the central EU instruments for the obtainment of the Europe 2020 objectives. 
Furthermore, internal market policy in the area of employment was also an important 
part of several of the flagships initiatives, most notably “an agenda for new skills and 
jobs” and “youth on the move”. The European Commission in April 2011 published a 
Communication, setting out “twelve levers to boost growth and increase 
confidence”307. Three of those relate to the subject here, namely “mobility for 
citizens”, “services” and “social cohesion”. Under the first heading the Commission 
announces legislation modernising the system for recognising professional 
qualifications, for which the Commission presented a proposal in December 2011308. 
The aim is to simplify procedures for the mutual recognition of mobile workers, 
modernise the legislative framework, review the scope of regulated professions and 
strengthen trust and cooperation between Member States. Under the heading of 
services, the Commission emphasises the need for full implementation and 
application of the services Directive, something which was not fully yet the case even 
though the implementation deadline had expired for more than a year. Under social 
cohesion, the Commission announced legislation aimed at improving and reinforcing 
the transposition, implementation and enforcement in practice of the Posting of 
workers Directive, which was presented in March 2012309. Furthermore, Regulation 
                                                                                                                                                 
-  3 year backward moving average of the current account balance as a percent of GDP, with the a 
threshold of +6% of GDP and - 4% of GDP; 
- net international investment position as a percent of GDP, with a threshold of -35% of GDP; 
- 5 years percentage change of export market shares measured in values, with a threshold of -6%; 
- 3 years percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9% for euro-area 
countries and +12% for non euro-area countries. 
- 3 years percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on HICP/CPI deflators, 
relative to 35 other industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5% for euro-area countries and -
/+11% for non-euro-area countries; 
- private sector debt in % of GDP with a threshold of 160%; 
- private sector credit flow in % of GDP with a threshold of 15%; 
- year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, with a threshold 
of 6%; 
- general government sector debt in % of GDP with a threshold of 60%; 
- 3 year backward moving average of unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10%. 
See Commission, ‘Scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances, envisaged design of 
the scoreboard’ SEC(2011)1361. 
307 Commission, ‘Single Market act, twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence, 
“working together to create new growth”’ COM(2011)206.  
308 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of 
professional qualifications and Regulation [...] on administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System’ COM(2011)883. 
309 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services’ COM(2012)131 final and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services’ COM(2012)130 final. 
 
492/2011310 came into force, updating the existing general rules under Regulation 
1612/68 on employment and equal treatment for workers from other Member States. 
  
In the area of social policy the Treaty of Lisbon had incorporated a number of 
changes. First of all, the Treaty incorporates in the new article 153(2) TFEU the 
possibility for the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, 
after consulting the European Parliament, to decide to change the legislative 
procedure in the areas of protection of workers where their employment contract is 
terminated, representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers and conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing 
in Union territory, most notably, foregoing the unanimity requirement in the Council 
in favour of Qualified Majority Voting. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon had given 
full legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Even 
though the Charter does not extend the competences of the EU beyond the 
competences given to it in the treaties, it does guarantee basic rights in areas such as 
equality, working conditions and social security for Member States to be taken into 
account when they are implementing EU law. 
 
With this framework in mind, the flagship initiative “an agenda for new skills and 
jobs”311 incorporates a number of plans for alteration of various aspects of EU social 
policy. The communication emphasises the role of the flexicurity concept as a guiding 
principle for legislation at both the EU and national level. Amongst other things, the 
Commission considers this principle to be one of the causes for reviewing the EU 
definition and common indicators of quality of work, and make them more 
operational for the evaluation and benchmarking of Member States’ policies in this 
area. In the same spirit of revision, under the heading “improving the quality of work 
and working conditions” the communication states that the Union has a solid 
legislative ‘acquis’ in e.g. ensuring minimum standards across the EU on working 
conditions, health and safety at work and gender equality. The ‘acquis’ according to 
the Commission, however, must nevertheless be adapted: The legislative ‘acquis’ 
must be kept in tune with new working patterns and technologies, so that it helps 
rather than hinders workplace adaptation. The Commission therefore announces a 
large scale evaluation in the coming years of the whole of the ‘acquis’, with work 
already started in the areas of the working time Directive and health and safety of 
workers312.  
                                                   
310 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141.  
311 Commission, ‘An agenda for new skills and jobs; a European contribution towards full 
employment’ COM(2010)682. 
312 The area of gender equality had already undergone a large scale modernization exercise in Directive 
2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation [2006] OJ L 204, added to later on by Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 7 July 2010  on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men 
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procedure in the areas of protection of workers where their employment contract is 
terminated, representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers and conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing 
in Union territory, most notably, foregoing the unanimity requirement in the Council 
in favour of Qualified Majority Voting. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon had given 
full legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Even 
though the Charter does not extend the competences of the EU beyond the 
competences given to it in the treaties, it does guarantee basic rights in areas such as 
equality, working conditions and social security for Member States to be taken into 
account when they are implementing EU law. 
 
With this framework in mind, the flagship initiative “an agenda for new skills and 
jobs”311 incorporates a number of plans for alteration of various aspects of EU social 
policy. The communication emphasises the role of the flexicurity concept as a guiding 
principle for legislation at both the EU and national level. Amongst other things, the 
Commission considers this principle to be one of the causes for reviewing the EU 
definition and common indicators of quality of work, and make them more 
operational for the evaluation and benchmarking of Member States’ policies in this 
area. In the same spirit of revision, under the heading “improving the quality of work 
and working conditions” the communication states that the Union has a solid 
legislative ‘acquis’ in e.g. ensuring minimum standards across the EU on working 
conditions, health and safety at work and gender equality. The ‘acquis’ according to 
the Commission, however, must nevertheless be adapted: The legislative ‘acquis’ 
must be kept in tune with new working patterns and technologies, so that it helps 
rather than hinders workplace adaptation. The Commission therefore announces a 
large scale evaluation in the coming years of the whole of the ‘acquis’, with work 
already started in the areas of the working time Directive and health and safety of 
workers312.  
                                                   
310 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141.  
311 Commission, ‘An agenda for new skills and jobs; a European contribution towards full 
employment’ COM(2010)682. 
312 The area of gender equality had already undergone a large scale modernization exercise in Directive 
2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation [2006] OJ L 204, added to later on by Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 7 July 2010  on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men 
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The role of the various OMC processes in the area of social employment policy is 
mostly dealt with in the flagship initiative “European platform against poverty”313. 
With the inclusion of a headline target on poverty and social inclusion in the Europe 
2020 strategy and guideline 10 on this issue in the employment guidelines, the OMC 
processes, which under the Lisbon strategy had a separate and distinct position, are 
largely integrated in the core of the Europe 2020 strategy. At the same time, however, 
the Commission is still hesitant to draw concrete conclusions on what this would 
mean for the processes themselves. The Commission emphasises that "it is important 
that the instruments and tools that have been developed under the Social OMC cross-
fertilise with the governance architecture of Europe 2020, to best serve the purposes 
of the new strategy. The detailed arrangements must ensure the right balance between 
integration and focus, continuity and innovation, simplification and accountability, 
coordination and subsidiarity. Based on the experience of the first European Semester 
of Europe 2020, the Commission will discuss with Member States and other 
institutional and non-institutional actors, how to best adapt the working methods of 
the Social Open Method of Coordination to the new governance of Europe 2020”. The 
Social Protection Committee in this regard presented a report in 2011, which was 
endorsed by the EPSCO Council of 17 June 2011 stating that the Social OMC 
contributes to the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy while still maintaining its 
specificity314. 
 
Finally, as to the role of the EU Structural Funds, the current period for the EU 
Structural Fund Regulation ends in 2013, so any fundamental changes to these funds 
will have to wait up till then. However, there are already a number of recent 
developments which have had short-term effects in this area. Furthermore, the 
Commission proposals for the period 2014-2020 have been published, already 
starting discussion on revision. Both elements will be discussed here. Concerning 
short-term changes, the Europe 2020 strategy claimed the EU Structural Funds as one 
of the main instruments at the EU level to achieve its objectives. Furthermore, in all 
of the relevant flagships there is extensive coverage of the role EU funding can play 
in taking the necessary action. Actual changes in the EU Structural Funds did also 
occur in response to the crisis. Part of the European Economic Recovery Program 
was rapid additional action, simplification of procedures and faster implementation of 
both the European Social Fund and Structural Funds. EU funding was therefore 
integral part of the short-term stabilisation policy propagated. This was even further 
developed for specific countries under a financial assistance program 315 when the 
Commission in August 2011 proposed to decrease the necessary co-financing rates 
                                                                                                                                                 
and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 
86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1. 
313 Commission, ‘European Platform against Poverty and social exclusion, a European framework for 
social and territorial cohesion’ COM(2010)758. 
314 Social Protection Committee, ‘Opinion on the Future of the Social Open Method of Coordination’ 
(2011). 
315 Then Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Latvia and Hungary. 
 
under a number of EU funds specifically for these countries to stimulate 
investment316, which was subsequently agreed by the Council and the European 
Parliament in December 2011. 
 
In October 2011 the Commission published its proposals for the Structural Funds in 
the programming period 2014-2020. In these proposals the link between the Structural 
Funds and the Europe 2020 strategy is strengthened. The Commission proposes that 
the funds will be fully aimed at achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. In 
this regard, the Commission proposes a menu with eleven themes from which the 
Member States can choose to invest the funds. Most relevant here are the themes 
“promoting employment and supporting labour mobility”, “investing in education, 
skills and lifelong learning” and “promoting social inclusion and combating 
poverty”317. Furthermore, macroeconomic conditionalities are installed, which means 
that the Commission can propose amendments to Structural Fund programmes to 
support the implementation of country specific recommendations. Also, when 
Member States have failed to correct an excessive imbalance according to the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure explained above, the Commission shall 
suspend payments and commitments under the various programs318.   
 
Taking all these developments together gives the following table. A red X again 
marks changing or emerging EU employment policy instruments, with a red arrow 
marking a change the strictness of coordination arrangements. 
 
 
                                                   
316 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 as regards certain provisions relating to financial management 
for certain Members States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability’, COM(2011)482.  
317 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common 
Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615. Other themes are:  
 1 strengthening research, technological development and innovation; 
2. enhancing accessibility to and use and quality of information and communication technologies; 
3. enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises; 
4. supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; 
5. promoting climate change adaptation and risk prevention; 
6. protecting the environment and promoting the sustainable use of resources; 
7. promoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key network infrastructures 
8. enhancing institutional capacity and an efficient public administration. 
318 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common 
Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615, art 21. 
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The role of the various OMC processes in the area of social employment policy is 
mostly dealt with in the flagship initiative “European platform against poverty”313. 
With the inclusion of a headline target on poverty and social inclusion in the Europe 
2020 strategy and guideline 10 on this issue in the employment guidelines, the OMC 
processes, which under the Lisbon strategy had a separate and distinct position, are 
largely integrated in the core of the Europe 2020 strategy. At the same time, however, 
the Commission is still hesitant to draw concrete conclusions on what this would 
mean for the processes themselves. The Commission emphasises that "it is important 
that the instruments and tools that have been developed under the Social OMC cross-
fertilise with the governance architecture of Europe 2020, to best serve the purposes 
of the new strategy. The detailed arrangements must ensure the right balance between 
integration and focus, continuity and innovation, simplification and accountability, 
coordination and subsidiarity. Based on the experience of the first European Semester 
of Europe 2020, the Commission will discuss with Member States and other 
institutional and non-institutional actors, how to best adapt the working methods of 
the Social Open Method of Coordination to the new governance of Europe 2020”. The 
Social Protection Committee in this regard presented a report in 2011, which was 
endorsed by the EPSCO Council of 17 June 2011 stating that the Social OMC 
contributes to the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy while still maintaining its 
specificity314. 
 
Finally, as to the role of the EU Structural Funds, the current period for the EU 
Structural Fund Regulation ends in 2013, so any fundamental changes to these funds 
will have to wait up till then. However, there are already a number of recent 
developments which have had short-term effects in this area. Furthermore, the 
Commission proposals for the period 2014-2020 have been published, already 
starting discussion on revision. Both elements will be discussed here. Concerning 
short-term changes, the Europe 2020 strategy claimed the EU Structural Funds as one 
of the main instruments at the EU level to achieve its objectives. Furthermore, in all 
of the relevant flagships there is extensive coverage of the role EU funding can play 
in taking the necessary action. Actual changes in the EU Structural Funds did also 
occur in response to the crisis. Part of the European Economic Recovery Program 
was rapid additional action, simplification of procedures and faster implementation of 
both the European Social Fund and Structural Funds. EU funding was therefore 
integral part of the short-term stabilisation policy propagated. This was even further 
developed for specific countries under a financial assistance program 315 when the 
Commission in August 2011 proposed to decrease the necessary co-financing rates 
                                                                                                                                                 
and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 
86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1. 
313 Commission, ‘European Platform against Poverty and social exclusion, a European framework for 
social and territorial cohesion’ COM(2010)758. 
314 Social Protection Committee, ‘Opinion on the Future of the Social Open Method of Coordination’ 
(2011). 
315 Then Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Latvia and Hungary. 
 
under a number of EU funds specifically for these countries to stimulate 
investment316, which was subsequently agreed by the Council and the European 
Parliament in December 2011. 
 
In October 2011 the Commission published its proposals for the Structural Funds in 
the programming period 2014-2020. In these proposals the link between the Structural 
Funds and the Europe 2020 strategy is strengthened. The Commission proposes that 
the funds will be fully aimed at achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. In 
this regard, the Commission proposes a menu with eleven themes from which the 
Member States can choose to invest the funds. Most relevant here are the themes 
“promoting employment and supporting labour mobility”, “investing in education, 
skills and lifelong learning” and “promoting social inclusion and combating 
poverty”317. Furthermore, macroeconomic conditionalities are installed, which means 
that the Commission can propose amendments to Structural Fund programmes to 
support the implementation of country specific recommendations. Also, when 
Member States have failed to correct an excessive imbalance according to the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure explained above, the Commission shall 
suspend payments and commitments under the various programs318.   
 
Taking all these developments together gives the following table. A red X again 
marks changing or emerging EU employment policy instruments, with a red arrow 
marking a change the strictness of coordination arrangements. 
 
 
                                                   
316 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 as regards certain provisions relating to financial management 
for certain Members States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability’, COM(2011)482.  
317 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common 
Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615. Other themes are:  
 1 strengthening research, technological development and innovation; 
2. enhancing accessibility to and use and quality of information and communication technologies; 
3. enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises; 
4. supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; 
5. promoting climate change adaptation and risk prevention; 
6. protecting the environment and promoting the sustainable use of resources; 
7. promoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key network infrastructures 
8. enhancing institutional capacity and an efficient public administration. 
318 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common 
Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615, art 21. 
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Table 7 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
(more binding) 
 
Internal market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
X 
   
  X 
 
X 
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
X 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
X 
   
  X 
 
X 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
   
  X 
 
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
X 
    
X 
 
Main changes in this period can again be observed in the area of employment policy 
coordination. With the start of the Europe 2020 strategy and more notably with the 
installation of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, the policy coordination 
processes became more binding for the Member States. This time both from a 
procedural and political perspective, in e.g. the laying down of the European Semester 
and national quantitative targets, and by the inclusion of financial sanctions in the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure.  Short-term stabilisation policy furthermore 
resurfaced in the light of the crisis, both concerning coordination and in the 
application of the EU funds instruments.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters developed the economic theory underlying employment 
policy, distilling the various economic objectives government can pursue and saw the 
development of employment policy instruments in the European Communities and, 
thereafter, the European Union. The current chapter will further examine the link 
between the EU’s policy instruments and how these relate to the developments of the 
economic objectives. The aim is to assess how the various EU instruments assist in 
achieving the objectives, a question which is addressed hereafter for each of the four 
different employment policy instruments.  
 
4.2 Employment policy coordination 
 
As has been highlighted in chapter 3, employment policy coordination within Europe 
only really took shape in the beginning of the 1990s with the European Employment 
Strategy. This coordination developed from an informal setup at the Essen summit in 
1994 to formalisation with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and inclusion in the 
Lisbon strategy since the year 2000 and the Europe 2020 strategy, Euro Plus Pact and 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure in more recent years.  Furthermore, it has 
become clear that this coordination in the current set up can be linked to the following 
economic objectives:  
 
Table 8 
Objective 
 
 
 
Instrument 
Increasing 
incentives 
for work  
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
Improving 
the human 
capital stock 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
Looking more closely at the exact contents of the instrument at hand one can see that 
even though the content of the broad policy directions in the process of employment 
policy coordination has varied, from the beginning a large overlap can be identified 
between the directions prescribed and the economic policy objectives distilled in 
chapter 2. Following this relationship throughout the years, there are a couple of 
interesting developments.  
 
In the area of increasing incentives for work, focus in the early years was on 
decreasing unemployment. With the start of the Lisbon strategy, this focus shifted to 
stimulating employment in general by decreasing unemployment but also by 
 
increasing labour market participation319. From an economic point of view, this 
broadening of focus is to be welcomed. It widens the scope of the exercise to include 
the participation element of the growth accounting equation. This having been said, 
the number of hours worked by each person, which forms another important element 
of the growth accounting equation, has remained largely absent from the process 
throughout the years. Illustrative for this fact is that both the original Lisbon target in 
the area of participation of 70% and the Europe 2020 target of 75% include employed 
persons independent of the hours worked.  
 
Improving the functioning and flexibility of markets and improving the human capital 
stock are issues that from the beginning figured prominently in the economic and 
employment guidelines in various terms, the former under a number of different 
headings. Regarding flexibility of markets we have seen the concepts of flexibility, 
adaptability and since 2006/2007 flexicurity320. The aspect of wage developments in 
line with productivity growth has come back as wage moderation321, employment 
friendly wage setting322 and wage setting that contributes to growth323. The recent 
increased attention for wage development in the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure therefore is not new, but constitutes an increased focus and stricter 
surveillance in this area. The position of human capital and education has further been 
strengthened in the new Europe 2020 strategy, with explicit mentioning of the subject 
and the incorporation of quantitative targets in the area of education in the 
guidelines324. 
 
Improving framework conditions is an aspect that finds its way into the guidelines 
mainly via the concept of “quality of work”. This aspect of the guidelines has become 
more of an issue since the start of the Lisbon strategy in 2000 and the formulation of 
the goal of creating more and better jobs. How quality of work relates to economic 
theory is very much dependent on its definition. On the one hand, the definition of 
work quality as used by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) for instance, takes the productivity of workers as starting 
                                                   
319 This despite the introduction in 2000 of the somewhat confusing term full employment as a Lisbon 
objective, which in economic terms would only imply a move to the steady state level of employment 
given the current labour supply. For a display of the economic inadequacy of the political concept of 
full employment see the Speech of Alexander Rinnooy Kan (chairman of the Dutch Social Economic 
Council) at the Europaïsches Forum Alpbach, on 31 August 2008, 
http://www.ser.nl/sitecore/content/Internet/en/Publications/Speeches%20chairman/2007/20070831.asp
x , last accessed 3 January 2013. 
320 See chapter 3. 
321 See e.g. Council Recommendation 2001/483/EC of 15 June 2001 on the broad guidelines of the 
economic policies of the Member States and the Community [2001] OJ L 179, par 2.2. 
322 See e.g. Council Decision 2005/600/EC on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member 
States [2005] OJ L 205, guideline 22. 
323 See e.g. Council recommendation 2008/390/EC of 14 may 2008 for the broad economic policy 
guidelines for the Member States and the Community [2008] OJ L 137, guideline 4. 
324 See Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies 
of the Member States [2010] OJ L 308, guideline 9. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters developed the economic theory underlying employment 
policy, distilling the various economic objectives government can pursue and saw the 
development of employment policy instruments in the European Communities and, 
thereafter, the European Union. The current chapter will further examine the link 
between the EU’s policy instruments and how these relate to the developments of the 
economic objectives. The aim is to assess how the various EU instruments assist in 
achieving the objectives, a question which is addressed hereafter for each of the four 
different employment policy instruments.  
 
4.2 Employment policy coordination 
 
As has been highlighted in chapter 3, employment policy coordination within Europe 
only really took shape in the beginning of the 1990s with the European Employment 
Strategy. This coordination developed from an informal setup at the Essen summit in 
1994 to formalisation with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and inclusion in the 
Lisbon strategy since the year 2000 and the Europe 2020 strategy, Euro Plus Pact and 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure in more recent years.  Furthermore, it has 
become clear that this coordination in the current set up can be linked to the following 
economic objectives:  
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Looking more closely at the exact contents of the instrument at hand one can see that 
even though the content of the broad policy directions in the process of employment 
policy coordination has varied, from the beginning a large overlap can be identified 
between the directions prescribed and the economic policy objectives distilled in 
chapter 2. Following this relationship throughout the years, there are a couple of 
interesting developments.  
 
In the area of increasing incentives for work, focus in the early years was on 
decreasing unemployment. With the start of the Lisbon strategy, this focus shifted to 
stimulating employment in general by decreasing unemployment but also by 
 
increasing labour market participation319. From an economic point of view, this 
broadening of focus is to be welcomed. It widens the scope of the exercise to include 
the participation element of the growth accounting equation. This having been said, 
the number of hours worked by each person, which forms another important element 
of the growth accounting equation, has remained largely absent from the process 
throughout the years. Illustrative for this fact is that both the original Lisbon target in 
the area of participation of 70% and the Europe 2020 target of 75% include employed 
persons independent of the hours worked.  
 
Improving the functioning and flexibility of markets and improving the human capital 
stock are issues that from the beginning figured prominently in the economic and 
employment guidelines in various terms, the former under a number of different 
headings. Regarding flexibility of markets we have seen the concepts of flexibility, 
adaptability and since 2006/2007 flexicurity320. The aspect of wage developments in 
line with productivity growth has come back as wage moderation321, employment 
friendly wage setting322 and wage setting that contributes to growth323. The recent 
increased attention for wage development in the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure therefore is not new, but constitutes an increased focus and stricter 
surveillance in this area. The position of human capital and education has further been 
strengthened in the new Europe 2020 strategy, with explicit mentioning of the subject 
and the incorporation of quantitative targets in the area of education in the 
guidelines324. 
 
Improving framework conditions is an aspect that finds its way into the guidelines 
mainly via the concept of “quality of work”. This aspect of the guidelines has become 
more of an issue since the start of the Lisbon strategy in 2000 and the formulation of 
the goal of creating more and better jobs. How quality of work relates to economic 
theory is very much dependent on its definition. On the one hand, the definition of 
work quality as used by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) for instance, takes the productivity of workers as starting 
                                                   
319 This despite the introduction in 2000 of the somewhat confusing term full employment as a Lisbon 
objective, which in economic terms would only imply a move to the steady state level of employment 
given the current labour supply. For a display of the economic inadequacy of the political concept of 
full employment see the Speech of Alexander Rinnooy Kan (chairman of the Dutch Social Economic 
Council) at the Europaïsches Forum Alpbach, on 31 August 2008, 
http://www.ser.nl/sitecore/content/Internet/en/Publications/Speeches%20chairman/2007/20070831.asp
x , last accessed 3 January 2013. 
320 See chapter 3. 
321 See e.g. Council Recommendation 2001/483/EC of 15 June 2001 on the broad guidelines of the 
economic policies of the Member States and the Community [2001] OJ L 179, par 2.2. 
322 See e.g. Council Decision 2005/600/EC on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member 
States [2005] OJ L 205, guideline 22. 
323 See e.g. Council recommendation 2008/390/EC of 14 may 2008 for the broad economic policy 
guidelines for the Member States and the Community [2008] OJ L 137, guideline 4. 
324 See Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies 
of the Member States [2010] OJ L 308, guideline 9. 
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point325. In this sense, there is by definition a positive link between aspects of quality 
of work and productivity development, mainly through the concept of human capital. 
The line gets blurred when the definition is broadened and also includes areas of 
worker security possibly linked to policy that has ambiguous economic effects or 
actually decreases economic effectiveness. A good example are job security issues 
that could lead to economically unbeneficial decreases in the flexibility of labour 
markets by, e.g., increasing the level of employment protection regulation326.  
 
The start of the Lisbon strategy left the concept of “better” jobs practically undefined, 
while in the 2001 employment guidelines it is only briefly mentioned327. In 
subsequent years attention for the concept did increase, however, and its definition 
was further developed. The 2002 employment guidelines introduced “improving 
quality of work” as a new horizontal objective across all the pillars, with a definition 
including both job characteristics (such as intrinsic job quality, skills, lifelong 
learning and career development) and the wider labour market context encompassing 
gender equality, health and safety at work, flexibility and security, inclusion and 
access to the labour market, work organisation and work-life balance, social dialogue 
and worker involvement, diversity and non-discrimination and overall work 
performance and productivity328. This clearly constitutes a very wide definition. The 
2005 Lisbon relaunch kept the promotion of quality of work with this broad definition 
as one of three overarching themes. The difference, however, was that actual policy 
measures had to be focussed on the economic concepts of human capital, increasing 
adaptability and creating jobs329. The new Europe 2020 guidelines follow up on this 
trend, paying significantly less attention to the concept of quality per se. Instead they 
focus on flexicurity and human capital330. Given the already existing focus as far as 
policy options are concerned, however, the decreased attention for the term 
presumably will not make a big difference as far as prescribed policy is concerned.  
 
More generally speaking, however, an aspect of the guidelines that stands out is the 
degree of socialisation throughout the years, or in other words, the incorporation of 
”social” elements which either partially fall under the economic rationale, or are not 
purely economic in their goals but may have beneficial economic effects. An 
important element worth highlighting in this regard is the issue of social inclusion. 
                                                   
325 See section 2.3.1. 
326 See e.g. section 2.3.2 
327 See e.g. Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment 
policies for the year 2001 [2001] OJ L 60, horizontal objective A. 
328 Council Decision of 18 February 2002 on guidelines for Member States' employment policies for 
the year 2002 [2002] OJ L 60, further elaborated upon by Commission, ‘A framework for investing in 
quality’ COM(2001)313.  
329 Council Decision 2005/600/EC on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States 
[2005] OJ L 205, guideline 17. 
330 Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of 
the Member States [2010] OJ L 308. 
 
Under various names (e.g. combating social exclusion331 or strengthening social 
cohesion332) this has been part of the guidelines in one manner or another throughout 
the period, often lacking a clear definition. In general it is safe to say that this concept 
again does not directly fit into the economic theory developed in chapter 2, since it is 
more based on equality and redistribution than on increasing economic effectiveness. 
However, there are significant links to be made here in the sense that beneficial 
economic policy decisions can also have a beneficial effect on social inclusion. More 
specifically, looking at the appearance of social inclusion in the guidelines throughout 
the years one can see a wave-like pattern of economisation and socialisation. In the 
1990s, there is a clear focus on economics with hardly any reference to social 
inclusion, except when referring to getting jobs for the long-term unemployed. This 
changes with the Lisbon strategy in 2000, where combating social exclusion becomes 
a separate part of the focus areas of the new strategy. This is reflected in the 
employment guidelines in these early years of Lisbon, which also more explicitly and 
elaborately mention combating social exclusion. In this, however, the employment 
guidelines stick to the promotion of more and better jobs as overarching goal and 
central manner to fight social exclusion333. The issue of social inclusion as a goal per 
se is placed outside the guidelines with a referral to the new open method of 
coordination process in this area. The 2005 relaunch of the Lisbon strategy and 
simplification of the guidelines further increased the instrumental focus in the 
employment guidelines on job and skill creation. The Europe 2020 strategy, however, 
has seen a remarkable change of direction on the issue, with the employment 
guidelines containing a guideline solely on social inclusion as a direct objective, even 
linking this to a target of 20 million people less in social exclusion. The indicators 
linked to this target also clearly widen the scope beyond the economic rationale, 
including, next to the number of jobless households, relative poverty334 and the 
material deprivation rate335. This change of position and formulation arguably 
integrates the entire scope of the open method of coordination on social inclusion in 
the employment guidelines, even possibly introducing an internal inconsistency 
between policy prescriptions. The effects of this change of scope will have to work 
themselves out in the coming years, but it can already be said that this leaves more 
                                                   
331 See e.g. Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment 
policies for the year 2001 [2001] OJ L 60. 
332 See e.g. Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment 
policies of the Member States [2010] OJ L 308, guideline 10. 
333 See Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment policies 
for the year 2001 [2001] OJ L 60, 11 (with the title “promoting social inclusion by access to 
employment”). 
334 Eurostat definition: ”the persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social 
transfers)”. 
335 Eurostat definition: “Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely 
constrained by a lack of resources, they experience at least 4 out of 9 following deprivations items: 
cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected 
expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week holiday away from 
home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or ix) a telephone. 
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point325. In this sense, there is by definition a positive link between aspects of quality 
of work and productivity development, mainly through the concept of human capital. 
The line gets blurred when the definition is broadened and also includes areas of 
worker security possibly linked to policy that has ambiguous economic effects or 
actually decreases economic effectiveness. A good example are job security issues 
that could lead to economically unbeneficial decreases in the flexibility of labour 
markets by, e.g., increasing the level of employment protection regulation326.  
 
The start of the Lisbon strategy left the concept of “better” jobs practically undefined, 
while in the 2001 employment guidelines it is only briefly mentioned327. In 
subsequent years attention for the concept did increase, however, and its definition 
was further developed. The 2002 employment guidelines introduced “improving 
quality of work” as a new horizontal objective across all the pillars, with a definition 
including both job characteristics (such as intrinsic job quality, skills, lifelong 
learning and career development) and the wider labour market context encompassing 
gender equality, health and safety at work, flexibility and security, inclusion and 
access to the labour market, work organisation and work-life balance, social dialogue 
and worker involvement, diversity and non-discrimination and overall work 
performance and productivity328. This clearly constitutes a very wide definition. The 
2005 Lisbon relaunch kept the promotion of quality of work with this broad definition 
as one of three overarching themes. The difference, however, was that actual policy 
measures had to be focussed on the economic concepts of human capital, increasing 
adaptability and creating jobs329. The new Europe 2020 guidelines follow up on this 
trend, paying significantly less attention to the concept of quality per se. Instead they 
focus on flexicurity and human capital330. Given the already existing focus as far as 
policy options are concerned, however, the decreased attention for the term 
presumably will not make a big difference as far as prescribed policy is concerned.  
 
More generally speaking, however, an aspect of the guidelines that stands out is the 
degree of socialisation throughout the years, or in other words, the incorporation of 
”social” elements which either partially fall under the economic rationale, or are not 
purely economic in their goals but may have beneficial economic effects. An 
important element worth highlighting in this regard is the issue of social inclusion. 
                                                   
325 See section 2.3.1. 
326 See e.g. section 2.3.2 
327 See e.g. Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment 
policies for the year 2001 [2001] OJ L 60, horizontal objective A. 
328 Council Decision of 18 February 2002 on guidelines for Member States' employment policies for 
the year 2002 [2002] OJ L 60, further elaborated upon by Commission, ‘A framework for investing in 
quality’ COM(2001)313.  
329 Council Decision 2005/600/EC on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States 
[2005] OJ L 205, guideline 17. 
330 Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of 
the Member States [2010] OJ L 308. 
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331 See e.g. Council Decision of 19 January 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment 
policies for the year 2001 [2001] OJ L 60. 
332 See e.g. Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment 
policies of the Member States [2010] OJ L 308, guideline 10. 
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employment”). 
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room for policy decisions which are not in line with the economic framework.   
Finally, the attention for short-term stabilisation policy has varied with the economic 
cycle, with short-term stabilisation policy coming to the forefront most pronouncedly 
during the crises in the mid 1990s and in 2008/2009. The years in between, especially 
during the Lisbon strategy, were characterised by an increased focus on medium-term 
challenges and policy directions. In comparing the approach on short- term 
stabilisation policy from the mid 1990s and recent years a large overlap can be seen as 
regards the broad directions given. A combination of short-term (budgetary) stimulus 
with more medium-term structural reform measures is propagated during both 
periods, which fits well with the theoretical framework. As far as short-term measures 
are concerned there is, however, a difference in the level of activism on the part of the 
Commission as well as the detail of its policy advise. Where the 1990s were 
characterised by general calls for national level budgetary stimulus and increased 
investment in e.g. infrastructure336, during the recent crisis the Commission, within 
the framework of “temporary, targeted, timely and coordinated” took the level of 
detail up a bit, prescribing a specific percentage of budgetary stimulus, as well as 
focussing on more specific policy measures which countries could take, such as 
increased incentives for labour hoarding.  Furthermore, during the recent crisis greater 
use is made of EU instruments like the EU Structural Funds.337 
 
4.2.1 Employment policy coordination and economic developments 
 
The further elaboration of the manner in which the instrument of employment policy 
coordination is linked to economic objectives still does not provide any insight on its 
actual functioning in practice. For this, insight is required into the manner in which 
this instrument has been translated into actual developments in policy objectives and, 
a step further, in actual economic developments within the Union and its Member 
States. Theoretically, the link would run from the employment guidelines through 
policy decisions at the Member State level to changes in the underlying economic 
variables in the Member States. In assessing actual effects, however, there are a 
number of difficulties stemming from the nature of the coordination process. First, 
there are some fundamental methodological problems in assessing the causal impact 
of such an iterative process based on collaboration between EU institutions and 
Member States, especially in the absence of legally binding sanctions. Furthermore, 
the potential causal impact of the process on Member State policy can be blurred by 
ongoing trends and the simultaneous influence of other EU-level processes, such as 
decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union or the Structural Funds, other 
international organisations, such as the OECD, the World Bank, or the IMF, and 
domestic political changes, such as shifts in government.  Finally, Member State 
representatives continuously participate in the definition of EU objectives, guidelines, 
                                                   
336 See section 3.4. 
337 See section 3.6. 
 
targets, and indicators, which allows for ‘uploading’ of domestic concepts and 
preferences and further blurs the causal relationship between the national and 
European levels338.  
Given these limitations, the following approach will be taken in appraising 
employment policy coordination’s actual effectiveness. First, several indicators 
covering economic output will be analysed for the EU 15 Member States339, as well as 
policy indicators for Member States linked to the various policy objectives stipulated 
in the employment policy coordination process. The next section will then take a more 
qualitative approach in analysing the actual impact of the employment coordination 
process on policy decisions in various Member States and policy areas.    
Following the growth accounting approach, the analysis will be divided into an 
employment and productivity pillar, starting with the objective of higher employment. 
As shown in chapter 2, stimulating employment boils down to increasing the number 
of people working and the hours that they actually work. Graph 25 shows the 
development of the employment rate340: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
338 Zeitlin,’Is the OMC an alternative to the community method’ in Dehousse, The ‘Community 
method’ obstinate or obsolete (Palgrave McMillan, 2011).  
339 The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Finland, Austria. Next to data availability issues, the 
selection of these Member States is justified by the fact that they were EU members from the beginning 
of the period under consideration, and have therefore gone through the development of employment 
policy coordination more or less in full. 
340 Eurostat definition; Persons stating they are 'currently' working for pay or profit in a job or business 
for at least one hour, or not currently working but with a job or business from which they are 
temporarily absent. Persons 'at work' comprise therefore 'paid employees', 'self-employed (together 
with employers)', persons in 'training under special scheme related to employment' or in 'paid 
apprenticeship'. Persons 'working unpaid in family enterprise' are also included. 
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targets, and indicators, which allows for ‘uploading’ of domestic concepts and 
preferences and further blurs the causal relationship between the national and 
European levels338.  
Given these limitations, the following approach will be taken in appraising 
employment policy coordination’s actual effectiveness. First, several indicators 
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policy indicators for Member States linked to the various policy objectives stipulated 
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338 Zeitlin,’Is the OMC an alternative to the community method’ in Dehousse, The ‘Community 
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Graph 25 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
From 1995 up until 2008 there has been a general upward trend in the employment 
rate, as well as some degree of convergence among Member States. A closer look 
reveals significant differences between Member States in both starting position and 
rate of growth. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Belgium started out with a relatively 
low employment rate (below 55%), while Denmark and the United Kingdom at the 
time already had an employment rate of over 70%. As to the growth rate, two of the 
low starters (Ireland and Spain) in 2008 had caught up in a rather spectacular manner, 
achieving employment rates of 68 and 65 percent, respectively. The recent economic 
crisis, however, has had a relatively large negative impact in these countries, leading 
to a much stronger decrease in the employment rate in 2009 compared to the other 
countries. Two countries which did manage to significantly increase the employment 
rate on a seemingly more sustainable basis are the Netherlands and Finland. Starting 
with an employment rate of 64% and 60%, respectively, they managed to increase to 
77% and 71% in 2008, respectively, (with the Netherlands overtaking frontrunner 
Denmark in 2009) and not be overly affected by the economic crisis in 2009. 
There are two distinct ways in which one can improve the employment rate in a 
country, either by increasing the participation/activity rate341, or by decreasing the 
unemployment rate342. Looking at both variables for the EU 15 gives the following 
pictures. 
                                                   
341 The activity rate is the sum of the employment rate and the unemployment rate. 
342 Eurostat definition: Persons that are currently not working (i.e. 0 hours) and are available to start 
work within the next two weeks AND  
(a) that have already found a job to start in the future or are awaiting the outcome of an application or 
 
 
Graph 26 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
Graph 27343 
 
Data source:  Eurostat 
                                                                                                                                                 
interview, or  
(b) that are actively seeking a job (i.e. contacted a public employment office for finding work, applied 
directly to an employer, studied or replied to advertisements, contacted a private employment or 
vocational guidance agency, asked friends or contacts or have taken steps to start an own business), or  
(c) that are seeking a job and have received a job offer during the past 4 weeks. 
343 Due to data availability issues Unemployment rate is defined for the age group 15-74 in stead of 15-
64. The relationship employment = participation – unemployment therefore does not completely apply 
here.  
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As graph 26 shows, there has been some convergence in activity rates among Member 
States. The EU 15 can be roughly divided into three different groups of countries. The 
first group contains Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom. These countries had 
a high activity rate in the beginning of the 1990s and have maintained this high 
activity rate throughout the period under review. The second group, consisting of 
Finland, Germany, Austria, Portugal, France and the Netherlands, started with an 
average activity rate gradually increasing and partly catching up with the first group 
(with the Netherlands already catching up in 2000). The final group is made up of 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Greece, Spain and Italy. This group started with a 
relatively low activity rate, with some countries growing rapidly and catching up with 
the second group (Spain and Ireland) and the rest growing more gradually. 
 
Graph 27 shows the development of the unemployment rate in the various Member 
States. While general trends are less easy to identify here, a number of countries do 
stand out. Until 2009, Spain and Finland showed a large drop in unemployment 
followed at a more moderate pace by Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. The unemployment rate in Portugal, Austria, Greece and 
Germany remained relatively stable, with unemployment in Luxembourg actually 
rising slightly (be it from a very low level). From 2009 onwards, however, there is a 
turnaround in this trend, with unemployment increasing extremely rapidly in Spain 
and Ireland.  
 
The development of the employment level is only half the picture as far as 
employment is concerned. The other half is the average number of hours worked per 
employed person344. The development of this variable is shown in the following 
graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
344 OECD definition: “the total number of hours worked over the year divided by the average number 
of people in employment”. 
 
Graph 28 
 
Data source: OECD 
 
There still is a large disparity in annual hours worked per worker between Member 
States, with Greece and the Netherlands as outliers. There is a general tendency for 
hours worked to decline, except in Denmark where the average number of hours 
worked has grown slightly. The observed decline is largest in Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Germany and Finland. On the other hand, in countries such as Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden, hours worked declined very little, 
remaining roughly the same.  
 
Finally, the development of the productivity side of the growth accounting equation, 
or the level of GDP per hour worked gives the following picture: 
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Graph 29 
 
  Data source: Total Economy Database, Groningen Development Centre 
Similar to employment, a large divergence between Member States appears in the 
level of productivity. Luxembourg is an obvious outlier on the upside, while Portugal 
and Greece on the other hand have a relatively low labour productivity. When looking 
at the developments in the period under consideration it becomes apparent that Ireland 
has had by far the highest average growth rate, increasing labour productivity by more 
than 50%. Productivity in countries like Italy, Portugal, Spain and Denmark either 
remained at the same level or increased only slightly.  
 
Tables 9 and 10 take all of these stylised facts together. The tables give both the 
starting position and the change in the period 1995 until 2009 that is before the crisis 
really affected the economies of the Member States. The colours are based on relative 
performance of the countries, with green meaning that a country had (in absolute 
terms) a high starting position or a high growth relative to the other EU 15 countries, 
yellow meaning that a country had (in absolute terms) a medium starting position or a 
medium growth relative to the other EU 15 and red meaning that a country had (in 
absolute terms) a low starting position of a low growth relative to the other EU 15345.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
345 In analysing the results this should be taken into account. For instance, the fact that a country has a 
relatively high starting position or absolute growth does not mean that there is no further room for 
improvement or that performance of these countries is also relatively high in relationship to other 
countries that are not in the sample. 
 
Table 9: Initial level in 1995 
 Employment 
rate 
 
Activity rate Unemployment rate Hours 
worked 
Productivity per 
hour worked 
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Greece 
 
     
 
Belgium 
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France 
  
     
 
Portugal 
 
     
 
Luxembourg 
 
     
 
Netherlands 
 
     
 
Finland 
 
     
 
Denmark 
 
     
 
Austria 
 
     
 
Sweden 
 
     
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
     
 
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
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absolute terms) a low starting position of a low growth relative to the other EU 15345.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
345 In analysing the results this should be taken into account. For instance, the fact that a country has a 
relatively high starting position or absolute growth does not mean that there is no further room for 
improvement or that performance of these countries is also relatively high in relationship to other 
countries that are not in the sample. 
 
Table 9: Initial level in 1995 
 Employment 
rate 
 
Activity rate Unemployment rate Hours 
worked 
Productivity per 
hour worked 
 
Ireland 
 
     
 
Spain 
 
     
 
Italy 
 
     
 
Greece 
 
     
 
Belgium 
 
     
 
Germany 
 
     
 
France 
  
     
 
Portugal 
 
     
 
Luxembourg 
 
     
 
Netherlands 
 
     
 
Finland 
 
     
 
Denmark 
 
     
 
Austria 
 
     
 
Sweden 
 
     
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
     
 
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
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Table 10: Change 1995-2009 
 Employment 
rate 
 
Activity rate Unemployment rate Hours 
worked 
Productivity per 
hour worked 
 
Ireland 
 
     
 
Spain 
 
     
 
Italy 
 
     
 
Greece 
 
     
 
Belgium 
 
     
 
Germany 
 
     
 
France  
 
     
 
Portugal 
 
     
 
Luxembourg 
 
     
 
Netherlands 
 
     
 
Finland 
 
     
 
Denmark 
 
     
 
Austria 
 
     
 
Sweden 
 
     
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
     
 
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
 
 
First of all, even though there is a general trend towards increasing employment, 
decreasing hours worked and increasing productivity, developments have varied 
widely among Member States. Both in starting position and growth developments of 
the different variables there is a large disparity between the EU 15. Five different 
groups of countries can be identified.  
 
1. Good starters: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria and Denmark 
These countries already in the beginning of the 1990s had a relatively high 
employment rate, and performed medium to well in all the other areas under 
consideration346. Given this good starting position the subsequent changes in variables 
were low to medium.  
 
2. High growers: Finland and the Netherlands  
These countries started out as medium to well performing overall while having a 
specific problem area, the Netherlands with hours worked and Finland with 
unemployment. These countries subsequently made significant progress, the 
Netherlands in particular in the area of activity rate and Finland in the area of 
unemployment, which caused them to catch up with the group of good starters. 
 
3. Medium performers: Luxembourg, France, Germany and Portugal.   
Starting out as medium to well performing Member States with specific problems       
(activity rate in Luxembourg, unemployment in France, hours worked in Germany and 
productivity in Portugal), they subsequently made low to medium progress in the 
various fields.  
 
4. Low performers: Italy, Greece and Belgium 
Even though these countries had their good points in the beginning of the 1990s, Italy 
and Greece starting out with a high level of hours worked and Belgium with a high 
productivity level, these countries were low performing in various aspects which they 
did not manage to correct, achieving only low to medium progress in all fields in the 
period under consideration. 
 
5. Bubble growers: Spain and Ireland 
Starting out as low performing Member States these countries made (very) high 
progress in various fields up until the year 2009. The global economic crisis however 
has had a relatively large negative impact in these countries, causing strong declines 
of several indicators in both countries 
 
 
 
                                                   
346 With the exception of the hours worked in Denmark. 
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346 With the exception of the hours worked in Denmark. 
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The analysis on the previous pages provide a general impression of the developments 
of the output indicators of employment and productivity in the various Member States 
and the manner and extent to which convergence between Member States has taken 
place. Taking one step further towards the functioning of the instrument of 
employment policy coordination, some more distinct policy elements of the labour 
market have to be examined, which are part of the process of employment policy 
coordination and that the economic theory in chapter 2 identified as influencing the 
variables analysed above. Subsequently, developments in the area of tax incentives, 
benefit incentives, “active labour market policies”, the functioning and flexibility of 
markets and human capital are subject of analysis.  
 
Starting with the point of tax incentives for work: as shown in chapter 2, theory 
predicts that the demand for labour, given its productivity, depends on the wage an 
employer has to pay. Policy elements include mainly the taxation of labour either 
through income tax or through social security contributions. Since these effectively 
increase the cost of labour they decrease incentives for employers to hire additional 
personnel. A relevant indicator is the so called “tax wedge on labour costs”, defined 
as income tax on gross wage earnings plus the employee’s and the employer’s social 
security contributions, expressed as a percentage of the total labour costs of the 
earner. This indicator varies widely according to the position of the person under 
consideration. The tax wedge on a person earning a minimum wage, for instance, 
differs significantly from a person earning once or twice the average wage. Likewise, 
the tax wedge varies with the family situation of the person under consideration 
(single, married, children etc.)347. Therefore, graph 30, showing the development of 
the average tax wedge for a person earning 67% of the average wage, can only serve 
as an illustration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
347 These disparities are not the only caveats to be taken into account when looking at this indicator. 
The OECD in its publication Taxing wages 2009-2010 devotes three pages to the limitations of this 
indicator. The indicator, for example, does not cover the impact of indirect taxes, the treatment of non-
wage labour income and other income components under personal income taxes and the effect of other 
tax allowances and cash benefits. Given data availability however, this is the best we can do at this 
time.  
 
Graph 30348 
 
Data Source: Eurostat  
 
There is a large disparity in initial levels across Member States, with low performing 
countries, such as Italy and Belgium, but also good starters, such as Sweden with a tax 
wedge of around 50% and the United Kingdom, and bubble grower Ireland having tax 
rates below 30%. There is no convergence between Member States. The tax wedge in 
some countries has decreased, most notably in Ireland (even more remarkable in view 
of its low initial level) but also in Sweden, high grower Finland and low performer 
Italy. Mostly, however, a constant tax wedge can be observed. 
 
The OECD in its yearly publication “Taxing wages” gives a more comprehensive 
overview of various tax wedges. In its 2011 edition349 the OECD analyses the 
developments of tax wedges in the period 2000-2010 for 8 different types of families 
and earning levels. It shows that the average EU 15 tax wedge has dropped 
significantly. Finland, Ireland, Sweden, but also Belgium, Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg managed to decrease the tax wedge across the board combined with 
relatively large decreases for a number of family types. Greece and Spain are the only 
countries which increased the tax wedge for all groups. 
 
The second policy element to be analysed is benefit incentives for work. As has been 
highlighted in chapter 2, a person will be less inclined to take up a job when the extra 
amount of money earned decreases350. An important variable here is the benefit a 
                                                   
348 The starting year is 1996 due to data availability. 
349 OECD, Taxing wages 2009-2010 (2011). 
350 See e.g. section 2.2.2. 
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developments of tax wedges in the period 2000-2010 for 8 different types of families 
and earning levels. It shows that the average EU 15 tax wedge has dropped 
significantly. Finland, Ireland, Sweden, but also Belgium, Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg managed to decrease the tax wedge across the board combined with 
relatively large decreases for a number of family types. Greece and Spain are the only 
countries which increased the tax wedge for all groups. 
 
The second policy element to be analysed is benefit incentives for work. As has been 
highlighted in chapter 2, a person will be less inclined to take up a job when the extra 
amount of money earned decreases350. An important variable here is the benefit a 
                                                   
348 The starting year is 1996 due to data availability. 
349 OECD, Taxing wages 2009-2010 (2011). 
350 See e.g. section 2.2.2. 
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person receives that he will have to give up when he gets the job. Developments in 
this area can be analysed by observing the OECD’s summary measure for “gross 
benefit replacement rate”351, defined as the average of the gross unemployment 
benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three 
durations of unemployment. 
 
Graph 31352 
 
Data Source: OECD 
Graph 31 shows that there is no general trend and no convergence between Member 
States. Initial levels vary greatly, with Denmark and the Netherlands having a 
replacement rate of over 50% and Greece just over 10%. Developments also vary 
greatly, with the Netherlands and Denmark decreasing, the replacement rate in 
Sweden, Portugal Italy and Ireland are actually increasing, whereas other countries 
have a more or less constant rate. 
The third policy element is Member States’ expenditure on so called active labour 
market policy measures (ALMP). ALMP measures in the Eurostat definition cover 
interventions that provide temporary support for groups that are disadvantaged in the 
labour market and which aims at activating the unemployed, helping people move 
from involuntary inactivity into employment, or maintaining the jobs of persons 
                                                   
351 Even though incentive wise it would be better to analyse the net replacement rate, data availability 
forces to use the gross benefit replacement ratio. Furthermore, the concept of taxation is already 
covered in the tax wedge discussed earlier, which also incorporates important elements of the 
difference between both rates. 
352 The end year is 2007 due to data availability. 
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threatened by unemployment. Categories of action include training, job rotation and 
job sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct 
job creation and start-up incentives. Through creating incentives for work, improving 
the functioning of markets and improving human capital this type of expenditure 
contributes to increasing participation and productivity. This indicator has developed 
as follows. 
 
Graph 32353 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
There is some convergence between Member States. However, contrary to what might 
have been expected, the graph shows a general decline in spending on active labour 
market policies in the Member States. All Member States that spent a relatively high 
amount of money in the 1990s have cut their spending considerably, notably good 
starters Sweden and Denmark. In fact, there are only four countries in which this 
indicator has increased in the period under consideration, namely good starter Austria, 
bubble grower Spain, and medium performers Luxembourg and Portugal, all of whom 
started out at a very low position.   
As fourth policy indicator, graph 33 gives an overview of the level of employment 
protection legislation in the different countries. As argued in chapter 2, this is an 
important element of (in-)flexibility of the labour market354. The OECD indicator of 
employment protection measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing 
individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers both 
                                                   
353 Period selected due to data availability. 
354 See e.g. section 2.3.2. 
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fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts355. 
 
Graph 33356 
 
Data source: OECD 
 
The EU 15357 had very different positions at the beginning of the 1990s. Good starter 
United Kingdom and bubble grower Ireland already had a very high level of 
flexibility, where countries, such as medium performer Portugal and low performers 
Italy and Greece, started out with a high level of employment protection. From the 
mid 1990s, there is some convergence although disparities between Member States 
remain high. The already flexible countries United Kingdom and Ireland slightly 
increased, medium performer France and bubble grower Spain stayed at roughly the 
same level, and the other countries increased their flexibility. Countries with the 
highest increases in flexibility are low performers Italy and Belgium (be it from a very 
high level), medium performer Germany, good starter Denmark and high grower the 
Netherlands. 
 
Another important feature of the functioning of markets and the fifth policy element is 
                                                   
355 In interpreting the results of this indicator one should realise that there are some limitations as to the 
extent in which this indicator forms an adequate measure of the law in the Member State concerned. As 
already acknowledged e.g. by Venn, 'Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement: Updating the 
OECD employment protection indicators' (OECD social, employment and migration working papers 
89, 2009) the construction of composite indicators designed to measure qualitative features of the legal 
system inevitably involves some degree of subjectivity. Furthermore, the indicator only partly 
integrates issues related to the enforcement of the law and only refers to formal-sector employment.  
356 Period due to data availability. 
357 Except for Luxembourg, that due to data availability issues is not included here. 
 
wage costs. As argued in chapter 2, wage setting in line with productivity can increase 
employment performance, where wage setting above productivity performance can 
increase unemployment and decrease participation358. Since it is therefore not so 
much the initial level but the development over time of this indicator that is of 
interest, graph 34 shows the development of unit labour costs359 (ULC) as an index, 
with 2005 as the base year (=100). ULC measures the labour costs incurred in 
producing an additional unit of output, and therefore covers both productivity 
developments and labour costs per se.    
 
Graph 34 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
As shown by the graph, there is no convergence of ULC, with a wide variety in the 
development of this indicator across Member States. On the positive side are 
Germany and Austria, with unit labour costs only rising slightly during the period 
under consideration. On the other side of the spectrum are Denmark, Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Greece and Italy with large increases in 
unit labour costs360. 
 
The final variable to be considered is human capital. As stated in chapter 2, the 
                                                   
358 See section 2.4.1. 
359 Data portrayed concerns nominal unit labour costs, chosen because this also is an indicator in the 
macroeconomic imbalances scoreboard. 
360 Since the focus rests on  nominal unit labour costs the position of non-euro states, especially the UK 
and Denmark, should be judged somewhat differently than the rest. Not being part of the Euro area 
means that they are prone to different inflation and exchange rate developments and have additional 
instruments at their disposal to influence developments in this area.  
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accumulation of human capital increases employment and is an important determinant 
of labour productivity. Education in this regard was found to be the central element in 
determining the level of human capital361. There are a number of different elements 
worth examining. A first indicator is government expenditure on education, shown in 
graph 35.  
 
Graph 35362 
  
Data source: Eurostat 
 
There is no convergence between Member States, with a large disparity among 
Member States. Sweden, Denmark and Finland spend between 6 and 8% of GDP, 
while Greece and Spain but also medium performers Luxembourg and Germany 
spend far less. Concerning the development, if there is any general picture to be 
distilled it is that spending on education as a percentage of GDP has more or less 
remained the same in most EU Member States.  
 
The amount of spending, however, does not tell the whole story. Looking at the 
education level in Member States, for instance, gives a different impression. One 
important aspect in this regard is the number of people having completed at least 
upper secondary education.  
 
 
                                                   
361 See section 2.3.1. 
362 The end year is 2008 due to data availability issues. 
 
Graph 36363  
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
There are large differences between Member States as regards starting position. 
Whereas Denmark, Sweden and Austria had a very high level of graduates, similar to 
high growers Finland and the Netherlands and medium performer Germany, low 
performers Italy and Greece, medium performer Portugal and high grower Spain do 
not even achieve 40% in the beginning of the 1990s. There is a general upward trend 
visible for all countries in the period under consideration, with some convergence 
between Member States. Portugal, however, is clearly lagging behind.  
 
The level of education in general still lacks important elements of the level of human 
capital in the Member States. There is also an important quality element here that 
should not be overlooked. To add to the general picture, the following graph presents 
data from the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)364.   
 
 
 
 
                                                   
363 The end year is 2008 due to data availability issues. 
364 PISA is an internationally standardized assessment administered to 15 year olds in school. PISA 
assesses whether students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge 
and skills that are essential for full participation in society. In all cycles, the domains of e.g. reading 
and science are covered not merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, but in terms of 
important knowledge and skills needed in adult life; see also www.oecd.org/pisa last accessed 2 
January 2013. 
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Graph 37 
 
Data source: own calculations based on OECD data on PISA scores 
 
Taking into account that due to data availability this graph only refers to the period 
2000-2006, as well as the fact that it gives scores relative to the OECD average there 
is some confirmation of earlier findings. For instance, Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece, which have a very low upper secondary education attainment level, also have 
low PISA scores, while Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland combine high education 
levels with high PISA scores. The EU 15 largest countries (Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom) only get an average score in these areas in 2006 with the actual 
level in France and the United Kingdom dropping from their 2000 values.  
 
Taking the development of all these policy elements together provides the following 
tables, which give both starting position and change in the period until 2009. The 
black lines between rows indicate the five different country groups identified in the 
previous section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Initial level365 
 Tax  
wedge 
Benefit 
replacement 
rate 
Spending on 
active labour 
market 
policies 
Strictness of 
employment 
protection 
legislation 
Public 
spending 
on 
education  
Education  
attainment 
level 
PISA 
score 
 
Ireland 
       
 
Spain 
       
 
Italy 
       
 
Greece 
       
 
Belgium 
       
 
Germany 
       
 
France  
       
 
Portugal 
       
 
Luxembourg
366 
       
 
Netherlands 
       
 
Finland 
       
 
Denmark 
       
 
Austria 
       
 
Sweden 
       
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
       
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
                                                   
365 Year varies according to data availability of the specific indicators. 
366 Employment protection legislation and benefit replacement rate are insufficiently available for 
Luxembourg. 
27022 Duin.indd   144 12-10-13   17:43
4Focus and impact of EU employment policy
145 
Graph 37 
 
Data source: own calculations based on OECD data on PISA scores 
 
Taking into account that due to data availability this graph only refers to the period 
2000-2006, as well as the fact that it gives scores relative to the OECD average there 
is some confirmation of earlier findings. For instance, Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece, which have a very low upper secondary education attainment level, also have 
low PISA scores, while Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland combine high education 
levels with high PISA scores. The EU 15 largest countries (Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom) only get an average score in these areas in 2006 with the actual 
level in France and the United Kingdom dropping from their 2000 values.  
 
Taking the development of all these policy elements together provides the following 
tables, which give both starting position and change in the period until 2009. The 
black lines between rows indicate the five different country groups identified in the 
previous section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Initial level365 
 Tax  
wedge 
Benefit 
replacement 
rate 
Spending on 
active labour 
market 
policies 
Strictness of 
employment 
protection 
legislation 
Public 
spending 
on 
education  
Education  
attainment 
level 
PISA 
score 
 
Ireland 
       
 
Spain 
       
 
Italy 
       
 
Greece 
       
 
Belgium 
       
 
Germany 
       
 
France  
       
 
Portugal 
       
 
Luxembourg
366 
       
 
Netherlands 
       
 
Finland 
       
 
Denmark 
       
 
Austria 
       
 
Sweden 
       
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
       
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
                                                   
365 Year varies according to data availability of the specific indicators. 
366 Employment protection legislation and benefit replacement rate are insufficiently available for 
Luxembourg. 
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Table 12: Change367 
 Tax  
wedge 
Benefit 
replacement 
rate 
Spending 
on active 
labour 
market 
policies 
Strictness of 
employment 
protection 
legislation 
Unit 
labour 
cost 
develop-
ment 
Public 
spending 
on 
education  
Educa- 
tion  
attain-
ment 
level 
PISA 
score 
 
Ireland 
        
 
Spain 
        
 
Italy 
        
 
Greece 
        
 
Belgium 
        
 
Germany 
        
 
France  
        
 
Portugal 
        
 
Luxembourg
368 
        
 
Netherlands 
        
 
Finland 
        
 
Denmark 
        
 
Austria 
        
 
Sweden 
        
 
United 
Kingdom 
    
 
    
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
                                                   
367 Period varies according to data availability of the specific indicators. Change in tax wedge is based 
on the general OECD findings for the period 2000-2010.  
368 Employment protection legislation and benefit replacement rate are insufficiently available for 
Luxembourg. 
The two tables do not provide a coherent picture. Especially table 12 shows no 
general convergence in policies among Member States. Despite the fact that 
membership of the euro area should have further increased incentives for reform, only 
taking into account the euro area Member States (leaving out the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Sweden) does not change this picture. From the perspective of the five 
different country groups identified on the basis of the economic output indicators in 
the previous section, the following picture emerges: 
 
Good starters Denmark, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom: started out with a 
good track record on the majority of the policy variables. The countries did, however, 
have some initial different approaches to the labour market. This becomes especially 
apparent in comparing Denmark and Sweden’s high spending and the United 
Kingdom and Austria’s low spending on active labour market policy. There are also 
significant initial differences in the tax wedge, especially between the United 
Kingdom (very low) and Sweden (high) and in generosity of benefits (which is low in 
the United Kingdom and Austria and high in Denmark). Looking at the changes in 
variables, the large decline in active labour market policy spending in Sweden and 
Denmark and a decrease in generosity of benefits in especially Denmark stand out. On 
the other side of the spectrum there is the United Kingdom, with constantly low 
spending in the area of ALMP and a constantly low benefit replacement rate. Austria 
is the only good starter country that actually raised spending in the area of ALMP, 
albeit from a very low level. Also, all countries had relatively high results in the area 
of education, with the United Kingdom significantly increasing its education level as 
well, be it combined with a drop in quality. Lastly, Denmark managed to significantly 
increase its market flexibility, almost catching up with the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in this area.  
 
High growers Finland and the Netherlands: started out with medium scores on the 
majority of policy variables, with Finland achieving high scores in the areas of labour 
market flexibility and education. Both countries subsequently had medium to high 
changes in all policy variables (except for Finland’s education spending, which 
already was very high).  
 
Medium performers: Luxembourg, Portugal, France and Germany. No general trend 
is visible here. France started out with medium scores on all policy indicators except 
for a relatively high spending on education and continued with medium progress in all 
areas except for a low score on labour market flexibility. Germany started out with 
medium scores on ALMP, benefit replacement rate and labour market flexibility, had 
a relatively high tax wedge and combined low spending with medium to high 
outcome variables in the area of education. Portugal and Luxembourg started out in a 
far worse position, both scoring poorly in all areas except for their relatively low tax 
wedge. Given this bad starting position both countries made medium to high progress 
in all fields, except for Portugal’s poor progress in the areas of education. Portugal 
and Luxembourg furthermore performed poorly on unit labour costs development.    
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Table 12: Change367 
 Tax  
wedge 
Benefit 
replacement 
rate 
Spending 
on active 
labour 
market 
policies 
Strictness of 
employment 
protection 
legislation 
Unit 
labour 
cost 
develop-
ment 
Public 
spending 
on 
education  
Educa- 
tion  
attain-
ment 
level 
PISA 
score 
 
Ireland 
        
 
Spain 
        
 
Italy 
        
 
Greece 
        
 
Belgium 
        
 
Germany 
        
 
France  
        
 
Portugal 
        
 
Luxembourg
368 
        
 
Netherlands 
        
 
Finland 
        
 
Denmark 
        
 
Austria 
        
 
Sweden 
        
 
United 
Kingdom 
    
 
    
Green = high 
Yellow  = medium 
Red = low 
                                                   
367 Period varies according to data availability of the specific indicators. Change in tax wedge is based 
on the general OECD findings for the period 2000-2010.  
368 Employment protection legislation and benefit replacement rate are insufficiently available for 
Luxembourg. 
The two tables do not provide a coherent picture. Especially table 12 shows no 
general convergence in policies among Member States. Despite the fact that 
membership of the euro area should have further increased incentives for reform, only 
taking into account the euro area Member States (leaving out the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Sweden) does not change this picture. From the perspective of the five 
different country groups identified on the basis of the economic output indicators in 
the previous section, the following picture emerges: 
 
Good starters Denmark, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom: started out with a 
good track record on the majority of the policy variables. The countries did, however, 
have some initial different approaches to the labour market. This becomes especially 
apparent in comparing Denmark and Sweden’s high spending and the United 
Kingdom and Austria’s low spending on active labour market policy. There are also 
significant initial differences in the tax wedge, especially between the United 
Kingdom (very low) and Sweden (high) and in generosity of benefits (which is low in 
the United Kingdom and Austria and high in Denmark). Looking at the changes in 
variables, the large decline in active labour market policy spending in Sweden and 
Denmark and a decrease in generosity of benefits in especially Denmark stand out. On 
the other side of the spectrum there is the United Kingdom, with constantly low 
spending in the area of ALMP and a constantly low benefit replacement rate. Austria 
is the only good starter country that actually raised spending in the area of ALMP, 
albeit from a very low level. Also, all countries had relatively high results in the area 
of education, with the United Kingdom significantly increasing its education level as 
well, be it combined with a drop in quality. Lastly, Denmark managed to significantly 
increase its market flexibility, almost catching up with the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in this area.  
 
High growers Finland and the Netherlands: started out with medium scores on the 
majority of policy variables, with Finland achieving high scores in the areas of labour 
market flexibility and education. Both countries subsequently had medium to high 
changes in all policy variables (except for Finland’s education spending, which 
already was very high).  
 
Medium performers: Luxembourg, Portugal, France and Germany. No general trend 
is visible here. France started out with medium scores on all policy indicators except 
for a relatively high spending on education and continued with medium progress in all 
areas except for a low score on labour market flexibility. Germany started out with 
medium scores on ALMP, benefit replacement rate and labour market flexibility, had 
a relatively high tax wedge and combined low spending with medium to high 
outcome variables in the area of education. Portugal and Luxembourg started out in a 
far worse position, both scoring poorly in all areas except for their relatively low tax 
wedge. Given this bad starting position both countries made medium to high progress 
in all fields, except for Portugal’s poor progress in the areas of education. Portugal 
and Luxembourg furthermore performed poorly on unit labour costs development.    
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Low performers: Italy, Greece and Belgium: had a poor starting position for most 
policy indicators. The most notable exception is Belgium’s high to medium 
performance in the area of education. Developments of indicators in the period under 
consideration were mainly medium in nature. Italy and Belgium, however, increased 
market flexibility considerably, though from a very high level, and both Greece (from 
a low level) and Belgium (from a high level) had high increases in education 
spending. Italy and Greece furthermore were characterised by high increases in unit 
labour costs. 
 
Bubble growers: Spain and Ireland had a significantly different starting position as 
far as policy indicators are concerned. On the one hand, Spain had a low to medium 
score in all areas, scoring especially poorly in the area of education. Ireland on the 
other hand had a much better starting position, scoring medium to high in all areas, 
with high scores in the areas of taxation, labour market flexibility and education 
outcome. Spain and Ireland had medium to high scores in the area of taxation, benefit 
replacement rate and active labour market policy. Especially the decrease in tax 
wedge in Ireland can be considered quite remarkable given its low initial level. 
Increase in market flexibility was low in both countries, which can be understood for 
already flexible Ireland, but less so for Spain. Spain furthermore managed to increase 
education attainment considerably (albeit from a very low level) with low change in 
education spending and decrease in education outcome. Ireland’s education outcomes 
are even better, with high attainment level changes through less funding and medium 
progress in quality. Lastly, both countries experienced high increases in unit labour 
costs.   
 
Comparing the results for policy indicators in tables 11 and 12 with those for 
economic output indicators in tables 9 and 10, economic indicators and policy 
indicators roughly fit the picture which theory predicts. This is seen most clearly 
when comparing initial starting positions from the group of good starters, with mostly 
medium to high scores, with the group of low performers, with mostly low to medium 
scores. At the same time, however, important limitations to the straightforward use of 
the policy indicators emerge. For instance, there are significant differences between 
Member States, indicating that economic outcomes have been achieved with various 
combinations of policy indicators. This is illustrated by comparing the ALMP, benefit 
replacement rate and tax wedge of the United Kingdom and Sweden, showing 
significantly different labour market policies. A more straightforward picture emerges 
in the area of education, where good performance goes together with mainly high 
performance in this area and low performers have low initial positions369.  
 
Taking a look at changes in variables, the most clear-cut case can be found in 
                                                   
369 Except for Belgium, which has medium to high scores in the area of education. It is good to note 
here the fact that Belgium gets its low performer status mainly from its participation performance, and 
has, as theory would predict, a correspondingly high productivity level. 
 
comparing the two high-growth countries (Netherlands and Finland) with low-growth 
countries Italy, Greece and Belgium. Here too roughly the picture one would expect 
emerges, with high-growth countries experiencing medium to high changes in all 
policy variables, except for Finland that already had a high level of education 
spending. The low performers have mostly medium to low scores. Furthermore, there 
are a few noteworthy exceptions. Italy’s relatively high increase in labour market 
flexibility can at least partially be explained by its very high initial rigidity. The same 
reasoning applies for Belgium’s performance. In the area of education spending for 
Greece the same reasoning applies. Belgium’s high growth rate in this area is quite 
remarkable, given its already high level. It is good to recall here, however, that its low 
performer status was not based on its productivity performance (arguably most 
affected by the education indicator), but on participation.  
 
Interesting to note is also the development of bubble growers Spain and Ireland. 
Observing the development of policy indicators and initial position, the change in 
variables in general gives no clear indication or prediction of the large negative 
developments in recent years. A poor development of unit labour cost, however, does 
fit this picture, with such a performance next to the bubble growing countries being 
mainly linked to poor performing countries370. 
 
Examining more deeply the correlation between specific variables reveals some 
interesting developments371. Concerning the education spending variable, for instance, 
in general countries with high (growth in) education spending not necessarily get the 
best results in terms of (changes in) human capital output and productivity 
performance. This is illustrated by the simple scatter plots shown in graphs 38 and 
39.372   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
370 With the exception of Luxembourg and the UK and Denmark. The latter two should be judged 
differently since they are non-euro area Member States. 
371 On methodology it should be noted that the following discussion has a limited scope, merely aiming 
at providing some insights into correlations between variables. The approach taken does not include 
regression analysis and is not aimed at sorting out causality.  
372 Own analysis based on previous tables. 
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Low performers: Italy, Greece and Belgium: had a poor starting position for most 
policy indicators. The most notable exception is Belgium’s high to medium 
performance in the area of education. Developments of indicators in the period under 
consideration were mainly medium in nature. Italy and Belgium, however, increased 
market flexibility considerably, though from a very high level, and both Greece (from 
a low level) and Belgium (from a high level) had high increases in education 
spending. Italy and Greece furthermore were characterised by high increases in unit 
labour costs. 
 
Bubble growers: Spain and Ireland had a significantly different starting position as 
far as policy indicators are concerned. On the one hand, Spain had a low to medium 
score in all areas, scoring especially poorly in the area of education. Ireland on the 
other hand had a much better starting position, scoring medium to high in all areas, 
with high scores in the areas of taxation, labour market flexibility and education 
outcome. Spain and Ireland had medium to high scores in the area of taxation, benefit 
replacement rate and active labour market policy. Especially the decrease in tax 
wedge in Ireland can be considered quite remarkable given its low initial level. 
Increase in market flexibility was low in both countries, which can be understood for 
already flexible Ireland, but less so for Spain. Spain furthermore managed to increase 
education attainment considerably (albeit from a very low level) with low change in 
education spending and decrease in education outcome. Ireland’s education outcomes 
are even better, with high attainment level changes through less funding and medium 
progress in quality. Lastly, both countries experienced high increases in unit labour 
costs.   
 
Comparing the results for policy indicators in tables 11 and 12 with those for 
economic output indicators in tables 9 and 10, economic indicators and policy 
indicators roughly fit the picture which theory predicts. This is seen most clearly 
when comparing initial starting positions from the group of good starters, with mostly 
medium to high scores, with the group of low performers, with mostly low to medium 
scores. At the same time, however, important limitations to the straightforward use of 
the policy indicators emerge. For instance, there are significant differences between 
Member States, indicating that economic outcomes have been achieved with various 
combinations of policy indicators. This is illustrated by comparing the ALMP, benefit 
replacement rate and tax wedge of the United Kingdom and Sweden, showing 
significantly different labour market policies. A more straightforward picture emerges 
in the area of education, where good performance goes together with mainly high 
performance in this area and low performers have low initial positions369.  
 
Taking a look at changes in variables, the most clear-cut case can be found in 
                                                   
369 Except for Belgium, which has medium to high scores in the area of education. It is good to note 
here the fact that Belgium gets its low performer status mainly from its participation performance, and 
has, as theory would predict, a correspondingly high productivity level. 
 
comparing the two high-growth countries (Netherlands and Finland) with low-growth 
countries Italy, Greece and Belgium. Here too roughly the picture one would expect 
emerges, with high-growth countries experiencing medium to high changes in all 
policy variables, except for Finland that already had a high level of education 
spending. The low performers have mostly medium to low scores. Furthermore, there 
are a few noteworthy exceptions. Italy’s relatively high increase in labour market 
flexibility can at least partially be explained by its very high initial rigidity. The same 
reasoning applies for Belgium’s performance. In the area of education spending for 
Greece the same reasoning applies. Belgium’s high growth rate in this area is quite 
remarkable, given its already high level. It is good to recall here, however, that its low 
performer status was not based on its productivity performance (arguably most 
affected by the education indicator), but on participation.  
 
Interesting to note is also the development of bubble growers Spain and Ireland. 
Observing the development of policy indicators and initial position, the change in 
variables in general gives no clear indication or prediction of the large negative 
developments in recent years. A poor development of unit labour cost, however, does 
fit this picture, with such a performance next to the bubble growing countries being 
mainly linked to poor performing countries370. 
 
Examining more deeply the correlation between specific variables reveals some 
interesting developments371. Concerning the education spending variable, for instance, 
in general countries with high (growth in) education spending not necessarily get the 
best results in terms of (changes in) human capital output and productivity 
performance. This is illustrated by the simple scatter plots shown in graphs 38 and 
39.372   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
370 With the exception of Luxembourg and the UK and Denmark. The latter two should be judged 
differently since they are non-euro area Member States. 
371 On methodology it should be noted that the following discussion has a limited scope, merely aiming 
at providing some insights into correlations between variables. The approach taken does not include 
regression analysis and is not aimed at sorting out causality.  
372 Own analysis based on previous tables. 
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Graph 38 
Education vs. productivity; initial level 
 
 
Graph 39 
Education vs. productivity; change 
 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness apparently have an important role to play in this area as 
well. The same inconclusive results show up for the ALMP indicator. There seems to 
be a positive relationship with the employment rate as far as initial starting positions 
is concerned373,  but this relationship is absent as far as developments in the period 
under consideration are concerned374.  
 
                                                   
373 See graph 40. 
374 See graph 41. 
 
Graph 40 
ALMP spending vs. employment rate; initial level 
 
 
Graph 41 
ALMP spending vs. employment rate; change 
 
 
An increased focus on specific groups instead of general measures as well as 
increased efficiency of the measures could be important explanatory developments for 
this less than straightforward relation375. Looking at actual reform measures in high-
spending countries, the counterintuitive results in this area, especially in Denmark and 
Sweden, can be explained by an increased emphasis on cost effective, more targeted 
                                                   
375 For some evidence on this see de la Porte, ‘The European level development and national level 
influence of the open method of coordination: the cases of employment and social inclusion’ (PhD 
study, Department of Social and Political Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2008).  
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Graph 38 
Education vs. productivity; initial level 
 
 
Graph 39 
Education vs. productivity; change 
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measures. The same goes for high-grower Finland, where significant cost reform 
efforts in the area of ALMP took place during the period under consideration, though 
not related to increased spending.  
 
The point that broad policy indicators can hide specific reform efforts in Member 
States also applies to other indicators used in this section. The tax wedge is a good 
example here. Even though the general picture concerning the tax wedge roughly 
follows the theoretical predictions376 there are exceptions. For instance, the tax wedge 
for the Netherlands only shows medium growth rates. Further analysis of measures, 
however, highlights that reform efforts in this area have in fact been high, but for 
specific target groups377. This fits the theoretical and empirical picture painted in 
chapter 2, where it was emphasised that labour elasticities of wage and tax incentives 
differ between different labour groups.  
 
Graph 42 
Tax wedge vs. employment rate; initial level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
376 See graphs 42 and 43 
377 OECD, Taxing wages 2009-2010 (2011). 
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Graph 43 
Tax wedge vs. employment rate; change 
 
 
A similar argument can be made for the Benefit Replacement Rate as shown in graphs 
44 and 45.  
 
Graph 44 
Benefit replacement rate vs. employment rate; initial level 
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measures. The same goes for high-grower Finland, where significant cost reform 
efforts in the area of ALMP took place during the period under consideration, though 
not related to increased spending.  
 
The point that broad policy indicators can hide specific reform efforts in Member 
States also applies to other indicators used in this section. The tax wedge is a good 
example here. Even though the general picture concerning the tax wedge roughly 
follows the theoretical predictions376 there are exceptions. For instance, the tax wedge 
for the Netherlands only shows medium growth rates. Further analysis of measures, 
however, highlights that reform efforts in this area have in fact been high, but for 
specific target groups377. This fits the theoretical and empirical picture painted in 
chapter 2, where it was emphasised that labour elasticities of wage and tax incentives 
differ between different labour groups.  
 
Graph 42 
Tax wedge vs. employment rate; initial level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
376 See graphs 42 and 43 
377 OECD, Taxing wages 2009-2010 (2011). 
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Tax wedge vs. employment rate; change 
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Graph 45 
Benefit replacement rate vs. employment rate; change 
 
 
There is no clear relationship between the policy indicators and the output indicator, 
with even a slightly positive relationship between level of benefit replacement ratio 
and employment. This fits the nuanced picture drawn in chapter 2 concerning the 
effects of the level of benefits, where other aspects of benefits systems, such as 
duration and complementary obligations, should be taken into account as well. 
  
Finally, the relationship between Employment Protection Legislation and the various 
economic output variables can be observed. Examining the relationship between EPL 
and the unemployment rate, graphs 46 and 47 do not provide a conclusive picture. 
Developments here seem to match the complicated relationship as discussed in 
chapter 2, with EPL rather influencing the nature and duration of unemployment.  
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Graph 46 
EPL vs. unemployment rate; initial level 
 
 
Graph 47 
EPL vs. unemployment rate; change 
 
 
First, the top performers with regard to decreasing the unemployment rate (Ireland, 
Finland, Spain) only have a low to medium performance in this strictness of 
employment protection legislation in the same period. Both Italy and the Netherlands, 
who come shortly after these high performers, however, do combine a fall in 
unemployment rate with a significant drop in strictness of employment protection 
legislation.  
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Graph 45 
Benefit replacement rate vs. employment rate; change 
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Graph 46 
EPL vs. unemployment rate; initial level 
 
 
Graph 47 
EPL vs. unemployment rate; change 
 
 
First, the top performers with regard to decreasing the unemployment rate (Ireland, 
Finland, Spain) only have a low to medium performance in this strictness of 
employment protection legislation in the same period. Both Italy and the Netherlands, 
who come shortly after these high performers, however, do combine a fall in 
unemployment rate with a significant drop in strictness of employment protection 
legislation.  
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As far as the link between EPL and productivity is concerned chapter 2 has 
highlighted that one would expect a negative relationship between the two. However, 
graphs 48 and 49 do not confirm this, with graph 49 actually depicting a positive 
relationship between an increase in EPL and productivity. It should be mentioned, 
however, that this negative relationship is solely based on outliers Italy and Ireland. 
Furthermore, there are numerous other elements influencing productivity growth378 in 
a country, which this simple scatter plot cannot take into account. 
 
Graph 48 
EPL vs. productivity; initial level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
378 Just a couple examples include innovation performance and product market functioning. 
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Graph 49 
EPL vs. productivity; change 
 
 
4.2.2 Employment policy coordination; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
The analysis in the previous section of economic output variables and the different 
policy elements in the EU 15 has given some insights on the actual developments of 
these policy and economic indicators during the period in which the instrument of 
employment policy coordination was active. The all-important question is then how 
the EU process of employment policy coordination has actually influenced the actions 
of national governments. Did the EU processes have a defining impact or were 
developments in Member States autonomous?  
 
Providing a definite answer to this question is anything but straightforward. As has 
been observed before, there are several reasons why the impact of employment 
coordination is difficult to distinguish from other factors. In fact, in its evaluations the 
European Commission chooses to remain rather vague and anecdotal in its analysis of 
concrete effects of the strategy, while at the same time being very positive on its 
overall impact. In the Commission report on ten years of the European Employment 
Strategy in 2007, for instance, Employment Commissioner Spidla, after listing the 
stylised facts of employment creation in the preceding year, states:  
 
“This success cannot all be attributed to the EES, but a substantial part can: 
employment performance is better because Member States can better enact 
their employment policies and learn from each other how to achieve common 
targets.” 379 
 
                                                   
379 Commission, ‘Ten years of the European Employment Strategy’ (2007), 3. 
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As far as the link between EPL and productivity is concerned chapter 2 has 
highlighted that one would expect a negative relationship between the two. However, 
graphs 48 and 49 do not confirm this, with graph 49 actually depicting a positive 
relationship between an increase in EPL and productivity. It should be mentioned, 
however, that this negative relationship is solely based on outliers Italy and Ireland. 
Furthermore, there are numerous other elements influencing productivity growth378 in 
a country, which this simple scatter plot cannot take into account. 
 
Graph 48 
EPL vs. productivity; initial level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
378 Just a couple examples include innovation performance and product market functioning. 
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Graph 49 
EPL vs. productivity; change 
 
 
4.2.2 Employment policy coordination; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
The analysis in the previous section of economic output variables and the different 
policy elements in the EU 15 has given some insights on the actual developments of 
these policy and economic indicators during the period in which the instrument of 
employment policy coordination was active. The all-important question is then how 
the EU process of employment policy coordination has actually influenced the actions 
of national governments. Did the EU processes have a defining impact or were 
developments in Member States autonomous?  
 
Providing a definite answer to this question is anything but straightforward. As has 
been observed before, there are several reasons why the impact of employment 
coordination is difficult to distinguish from other factors. In fact, in its evaluations the 
European Commission chooses to remain rather vague and anecdotal in its analysis of 
concrete effects of the strategy, while at the same time being very positive on its 
overall impact. In the Commission report on ten years of the European Employment 
Strategy in 2007, for instance, Employment Commissioner Spidla, after listing the 
stylised facts of employment creation in the preceding year, states:  
 
“This success cannot all be attributed to the EES, but a substantial part can: 
employment performance is better because Member States can better enact 
their employment policies and learn from each other how to achieve common 
targets.” 379 
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There are a number of reasons that prima facie make such an appraisal seem valid. A 
good example of the fit between the employment coordination process and outcome 
and policy developments in Member States can be found in the area of stimulating 
employment. The largest gains in employment on average occurred in the 1990s and 
were mainly due to decreasing unemployment rates (the then centre of focus in this 
part of the coordination process). Since 2000 gains in employment are more evenly 
shared between participation and unemployment, also in accordance with the 
widening of scope of the coordination process. Finally, hours worked, which has been 
absent from the guidelines, has generally declined instead of the increase that would 
fit the economic objectives of chapter 2. The only actual conclusion that can be drawn 
in this regard is that the coordination process has been rather good in following or 
predicting current trends and developments in labour market policy in the Member 
States. This coincidence of developments should not be confused with actual impact 
of the process.380  
 
The fact that clear causal effects are difficult to distil has not prevented the emergence 
of a large number of papers evaluating the actual effectiveness of the strategy in a 
more qualitative manner381. Often on the basis of extensive case studies in Member 
States, authors have drawn conclusions on the manner in which the process influences 
national decision making. Results of these studies vary in their optimism, but the 
conclusion is mostly the same: the effect of the strategy differs between Member 
States and policy areas. What does appear to emerge as consensus is that there is 
limited evidence of direct policy transfer in case of mutual learning382 or of direct 
instigation of reform through recommendations383. Ioannou and Stracca384 in this 
context find that the Lisbon Strategy at best has had no impact on the behaviour of 
real per capita GDP growth, employment growth and labour productivity growth. On 
the basis of qualitative research of policy developments in 14 Member States (EU 15 
minus Luxembourg) De La Porte385 concluded that the EES has been used more as a 
                                                   
380 See also e.g. van Rie and Marx, ‘The European Union at work? The European employment strategy 
from crisis to crisis’, (Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 50, no 2, 2012). 
381 Just a couple of examples include Heidenreich and Zeitlin, Changing european employment and 
welfare regimes, the influence of the open method of coordination on national reforms (Routledge/EUI 
studies in the Political Economy of Welfare, 2009), Ashiagbor, The European Employment Strategy, 
labour market regulation and new governance  (Oxford monographs on labour law, 2006), Begg, Erhal 
and Mortensen, Medium term employment challenges (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010), de la 
Porte, ‘The European level development and national level influence of the open method of 
coordination: the cases of employment and social inclusion’ (PhD study, Department of Social and 
Political Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2008).  
382 See e.g. Zeitlin, ‘The Open Method of coordination in action: theoretical promise, empirical 
realities, reform strategy’, in Zeitlin and Pochet, The open method of coordination in action the 
European employment and social inclusion strategies (P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A., 2005).  
383 See e.g. Toulemonde, ‘Evaluation of the integrated guideline package for growth and jobs’ 
(Eureval/Rambol management, evaluation for the European Commission, 2008). 
384 Ioannou and Stracca, ‘Have Euro area and EU economic governance worked? Just the facts’ (ECB 
working paper no 1344, 2011). 
385 de la Porte, ‘The European level development and national level influence of the open method of 
coordination: the cases of employment and social inclusion’ (PhD study, Department of Social and 
 
 
reporting device on what was already happening in Member States than as an input 
for actual policy development. She finds that the European Employment Strategy does 
not embody sufficient “European pressure” to engender change, no matter what the 
domestic landscape looks like. When used in domestic policy making it was often as a 
justification of the national reform agenda. De la Porte identifies Germany in this 
regard as a country where the EES has been used in such a manner, specifically in the 
so called Hartz reforms in the beginning/mid 2000s. Mailand386 takes a somewhat 
more optimistic view, stating on the basis of a comparative qualitative study of policy 
developments in four countries that “the EES has only to a limited extent had a direct 
impact on the employment policies of the Member States, but the impact varies 
between these Member States”. He finds a number of plausible variables explaining 
the difference in impact between countries, entailing level of compliance before entry 
into force of the EES, e.g. high in Denmark, which leads to low impact, level of 
agreement on policy, e.g. low in Spain, which leads to use of the EES as ammunition 
in policy dialogue, and level of economic dependence on EU, e.g. high in Spain which 
leads to higher impact. In this line of reasoning Graziano concludes from an in depth 
study of the French and Italian experiences with the European Employment Strategy 
that it did have an impact in both countries, but to a varying extent, with the Italian 
government being more willing to incorporate EES guidance into its policy domain 
partly due to the wish to present itself as a trustworthy European partner. Begg, Erhal 
and Mortensen387 conclude on the basis of surveys sent to Member States’ officials 
and stakeholders that the direct effect on national employment policies is somewhat 
limited, and that the EES is largely the preserve of a limited number of members of 
national policy “elites”. At the same time, they emphasise that there are different 
ways in which the EES exerts influence by widening horizons and increasing 
receptiveness of Member States to new policy ideas. The concept of flexicurity, now 
actively pursued in various Member States, is mentioned as an example here. 
Nedergaard388 also finds evidence for policy learning between Member States, as do 
Heidenreich and Zeitlin, who point to these types of indirect or second order learning 
as real and significant. On the basis of a number of different qualitative country 
studies they conclude that the OMC has “systematically (though neither 
deterministically nor uniformly) stimulated substantial changes in national policy 
agenda’s, cognitive paradigms, and (in some cases) programmes, as well as 
procedural shifts in governance and policy making processes, through a series of 
direct and indirect mechanisms, including but not confined to transnational learning 
and creative appropriation by domestic actors.” 389 
                                                                                                                                                 
Political Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2008). 
386 Mailand, ‘The uneven impact of the European Employment Strategy on Member States employment 
policies: a comparative analysis’ (Journal of European Social Policy, vol 18, no 4, 2008). 
387 Begg, Erhal and Mortensen, Medium term employment challenges (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2010). 
388 Nedergaard, ‘Policy learning in the European Union; the case of the European Employment 
Strategy’ (Policy Studies, vol 27, no 4, 2006). 
389 Heidenreich and Zeitlin, Changing european employment and welfare regimes, the influence of the 
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387 Begg, Erhal and Mortensen, Medium term employment challenges (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2010). 
388 Nedergaard, ‘Policy learning in the European Union; the case of the European Employment 
Strategy’ (Policy Studies, vol 27, no 4, 2006). 
389 Heidenreich and Zeitlin, Changing european employment and welfare regimes, the influence of the 
 
27022 Duin.indd   159 12-10-13   17:43
Chapter 4
160 
The last elaborate appraisal probably comes closest to an adequate summary of the 
actual influence of the employment coordination process on national employment 
policy. The fact that the direct effect has been limited can be attributed to the nature 
of the system, which at least until recently in essence has remained a broad and soft 
process without a real sanction mechanism. This makes its functioning dependent on 
the (political) will of Member States’ participants in the process. Consequently, 
Member States will interpret, use and learn from the system to their benefit, and will 
take advantage of it when needed and dependent on their policy views. When they do 
not need it (think of the good starter countries) its impact will be very limited, and the 
actual will of a country can then depend on a range of sometimes surprising 
arguments390. Furthermore, the possibilities for a pick-and-choose approach in using 
the employment policy coordination process are increased by the fact that actual peer 
and public pressure as well as more general knowledge of the process amongst a 
broader civil society has been largely absent391, also causing the role of the process in 
national policy debates in e.g. national parliaments to remain limited392. 
 
Some confirmation of this can also be seen in the stylised fact analysis of economic 
and policy variables, best illustrated by comparing two different aspects, namely the 
aspect of human capital and that of the functioning and flexibility of markets. 
Increasing human capital has been one of the main issues in the guidelines since the 
beginning of the process. This is reflected in the policy variables, where the education 
level (if not expenditure) has risen constantly over the period under consideration. 
This can be compared with the development in the area of Employment Protection 
Legislation. The largest positive developments in this area took place in the 1990s 
when the coordination process was at its softest and most unsophisticated and 
therefore should arguably have had the weakest impact. The attention for improving 
the functioning and flexibility of markets in the coordination process remained high in 
the years after 2000, but reform efforts diminished. This in turn was noted and 
lamented in the mid-term review of the Luxembourg process, the Kok report and the 
relaunch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005393. Only recently did this change the trend, 
when in some Member States the reform process in this area has picked up again, 
arguably due to the economic crisis, which put extra pressure on pursuing structural 
reform measures improving the functioning and flexibility of markets394.  
 
Since reform efforts are based on national political preference and countries will pick 
                                                                                                                                                 
open method of coordination on national reforms (Routledge/EUI studies in the Political Economy of 
Welfare, 2009) 3. 
390 Such as  the “good European” rationale seen in Italy. 
391 See e.g. Begg, Erhal and Mortensen, Medium term employment challenges (Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2010). iii. 
392 Except when countries have explicitly used the process as extra ammunition for discussion, for 
instance in the case of the Hartz reforms in Germany mentioned earlier. 
393 See chapter 3. 
394 See also Hoj et al., ‘The political economy of structural reform; empirical evidence from OECD 
countries’ (OECD economics department working papers, no 501, 2006), par 4.2. 
 
and choose from the coordination process accordingly. Improving the education level 
in this context is politically a rather safe and therefore popular area of reform, which 
results in constant improvement. Increasing market flexibility by decreasing 
employment protection on the other hand arguably is one of the most difficult areas 
for labour market reform, since this will likely result in strong opposition from 
various groups of “insiders” in society, who see their own position weakened. Reform 
efforts in this area therefore pick up when real pressure arises: the reason for large 
reform efforts in the 1990s was the unprecedented large number of unemployed in the 
EU15. In the years after 2000 unemployment as a direct problem decreased 
significantly and was replaced by far less tangible problems such as ageing, which led 
to decreased domestic pressure and subsequently decreased reform efforts in this area. 
Finally, the current economic crisis, with its rising unemployment rates and debt 
levels, seem to have kick started the reform process once again, most notably in 
Greece and Portugal as part of their macroeconomic adjustment programme, but also 
in other countries, where e.g. in Spain and Italy significant labour market reform 
efforts have been implemented in recent years395. 
 
4.3 Social employment policy 
 
As has been highlighted in chapter 3, social employment policy as a separate 
instrument has started to develop since the Single European Act and the Treaty on 
European Union that gave legislative competence to the Union in a number of areas. 
In the last decade, this scope of legislative competence was added to by the instalment 
of the Open Method of Coordination process in the area of social protection and social 
inclusion. EU’s social employment policy as it stands today can be linked to the 
following policy objectives: 
 
Table 13 
Objective 
 
 
 
Instrument 
Increasing 
incentives 
for work  
Improving 
the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
Improving 
the human 
capital 
stock 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
Short- 
term 
stabili-
zation 
policy 
 
 
Social 
employment 
policy 
 
legislation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
coordi-
nation 
 
X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
 
Examining more closely the exact contents of the instrument at hand it can be 
observed that the full width of EU social employment policy goes beyond the 
economic objectives outlined above as EU social policy also encompasses broader 
                                                   
395 See e.g. OECD, Going for Growth (2012), box 1.2 and part I chapter 2. 
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issues than those relating to employment. EU social employment policy roughly 
consists of the following aspects396: 
 
1. Vocational training  
2. Equality between men and women  
3. Improvement in the working environment and working conditions  
4. Promotion of employment 
5. Social protection and social inclusion  
 
This section will discuss issues 2, 3 and 5, delving deeper into the relationship 
between policy instruments and policy objectives397.  
The Commission in its “Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-
2015”398, differentiates the actions to be taken under this subject into five different 
headings, which provides some foothold for further differentiating the subject as dealt 
with in EU policy making today. These five headings are “Equality in decision 
making”, “dignity, integrity and end to gender based violence”, “gender equality in 
external actions”, “equal pay for equal work of equal value” and “equal economic 
independence”. The first three aspects are topics that do not fit directly into the 
framework, since they do not concern the direct economic use of labour as a 
production factor in the EU. The last two do. Simple economic reasoning would make 
equal pay for equal work of equal value to be the natural and efficient outcome of the 
economic process. Removing obstacles that keep this from happening increases 
efficiency and therefore can be considered beneficial. Search theory, however, 
showed that even for workers with similar productivity differentiating wages could be 
the natural outcome of the economic process. This stemmed from the matching 
process and the nature of the search frictions involved. The crux of the matter 
therefore lies in the combination with the concept of discrimination on the basis of 
gender, which also in search theory is not an efficient reason for differentiation. EU 
policy fits this prescription, since this combination has been present in the EU 
approach to this subject from the start399, and therewith nicely fits under the heading 
                                                   
396 The aspects mentioned relate to EU social employment policy as laid down in or directly linked to 
the social chapter of the Treaty. Broader issues which could have a link with employment, like the 
general anti discrimination article present since the Treaty of Amsterdam (then art 13 TEC) will not be 
analysed.  
397 Those aspects of social policy that go beyond the framework of employment will not be dealt with 
in this section. Furthermore, social employment policy in its focus has a large overlap with the process 
of employment policy coordination as discussed in the previous section. This section will therefore not 
go into the broad subject of stimulating employment, nor will it deal with the aspect of vocational 
training, which to a large extent overlaps with issue of education already discussed in the previous 
section.   
398 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’ COM(2010)491.  
399 Note that this approach to gender equality is one that is based on equality of opportunities rather 
than equality of outcome. This therefore does not necessarily leads to e.g. an equal employment rate. 
An equality of outcome approach to gender equality could in fact lead to inefficient policies, forcing 
the underrepresented groups into positions where they would not have been if the decision would have 
been based solely on economic motives. Further on this distinction see also Chalmers et al., European 
 
 
of improving framework conditions. The second aspect that fits into the economic 
framework, “equal economic independence”, is translated as far as EU social 
employment policy making is concerned in promoting labour market participation of 
women, something which has received special attention ever since the Lisbon strategy 
in 2000 and the specific goal to increase female employment rate to 60% in 2010. 
Being aimed at increasing incentives for work as well as by improving the human 
capital stock, this fits very neatly into the framework.  
 
The second issue of social employment policy, the concept of improving the working 
environment and working conditions, breaks down in two distinct EU policy issues: 
health and safety of workers and organisation of working time. The general 1989 
health and safety at work Directive400 set out a number of specific provisions 
improving safety on the work place, the working time Directive401 gives minimum 
standards for maximum working hours and the fixed term402, part time403 and 
temporary work404 Directives introduce minimum requirements and equal treatment 
provisions for employees in these specific situations. Relating both to economic 
theory, both can be linked to the heading of improving framework conditions. chapter 
2 has shown that on the one hand this kind of legislation could enhance worker 
productivity as well as labour supply by improving framework conditions, e.g. by 
reducing the risk of injury of workers. Furthermore, the extra costs an employer has to 
make in case of an injury are reduced, improving competitiveness. On the other hand, 
employers have to make additional costs in meeting these conditions and see their 
administrative burdens increased and flexibility as far as possible business models are 
concerned reduced. Both aspects could decrease competitiveness and GDP per capita 
growth. The exact sign of these effects have been shown to depend on the specific 
situation and the level of protection implemented.  
The last issue, social protection and social inclusion, was already discussed in the 
previous section for as far as it appeared in the employment guidelines. The concept 
of social protection and social inclusion, however, was also and in a broader manner 
operationalised in 2000 in a separate Open Method of Coordination for social 
protection and social inclusion405. The goal of this OMC process was to set a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
400 Directive 89/391/EEC of the Council of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183.  
401 Directive 93/104/EC of the Council of 8 February 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
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European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the 
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part-time working concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L 14. 
404 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on 
temporary agency work [2008] OJ L 327. 
405 The issue of social protection could also be argued to include some EU legislative measures in the 
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issues than those relating to employment. EU social employment policy roughly 
consists of the following aspects396: 
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3. Improvement in the working environment and working conditions  
4. Promotion of employment 
5. Social protection and social inclusion  
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396 The aspects mentioned relate to EU social employment policy as laid down in or directly linked to 
the social chapter of the Treaty. Broader issues which could have a link with employment, like the 
general anti discrimination article present since the Treaty of Amsterdam (then art 13 TEC) will not be 
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398 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’ COM(2010)491.  
399 Note that this approach to gender equality is one that is based on equality of opportunities rather 
than equality of outcome. This therefore does not necessarily leads to e.g. an equal employment rate. 
An equality of outcome approach to gender equality could in fact lead to inefficient policies, forcing 
the underrepresented groups into positions where they would not have been if the decision would have 
been based solely on economic motives. Further on this distinction see also Chalmers et al., European 
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framework for national strategy development as well as for policy coordination on 
issues relating to poverty and social exclusion, health care and long-term care as well 
as pensions406. There are a number of aspects of this strategy which do not directly fit 
into economic theory. Both health care/long term care and the reduction of poverty do 
not fall under the scope of the framework. Neither do social exclusion aspects related 
to the guaranteed access to certain goods and services and pension aspects related to 
an equitable sharing of pension burden between generations. However, the active 
inclusion of people to the labour market, especially vulnerable groups, increases 
incentives for work and therewith fits in nicely into the economic framework, as does 
the sustainability of pension systems, which relates to the fact that as the number of 
pensioners in Europe rises, and the relative number of people of working age declines, 
further reforms are needed, including creating incentives for people to work longer.  
Having established the link between the instrument of EU social employment policy 
and the economic objectives the follow up question then is how this instrument relates 
to actual outcome and policy developments in the Member States. In distilling 
possible impact, however, the same difficulties are encountered as in the previous 
sections, specifically regarding the impact of the OMC social protection and social 
inclusion. When examining this OMC process therefore a similar method of analysis 
as used in the previous section is applied. The legislative aspects of gender equality 
and improving the working environment and working conditions, do not face the 
same problems since these more or less automatically lead to policy changes through 
shifts in legislation.    
 
4.3.1 Equality between men and women; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
Relevant aspects of gender equality for further analysis are the concept of equal pay 
for work of equal value and the concept of equal economic independence. Starting 
with the first one, the development of equal pay for work of equal value can be 
approximated by examining the development of the so called gender wage gap. The 
gender wage gap is shown in graph 50, which gives the development of the 
percentage difference in median earnings of full time male and full time female 
employees for the period starting in 1980, a rough approximation of the coming into 
force of the two gender equality Directives407 from the mid 1970s408.   
                                                                                                                                                 
area of, for instance, worker protection in the case of insolvency, see Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 
20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [1980] OJ L 283. Since this only has an 
indirect link with the economic framework of chapter 2 it will not be dealt with.  
406 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=753&langId=en last accessed 3 January 2013. 
407 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L 
045 and Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39. 
408 This is also the central indicator used in the OMC process on this issue. Data availability is also an 
 
 
Graph 50 
 
Data source: OECD 
 
The graph clearly shows a serious lack of data availability, with data available for 
several countries only after 1980 and large data gaps throughout the years. This 
having been said, however, large differences in starting position can be discerned, 
with the United Kingdom starting out with almost twice the gender pay gap of France. 
Furthermore, even though there is a general trend discernible towards a decrease in 
the gender pay gap, there are also large differences in development here. Sweden, for 
instance, remains fairly constant, though this is arguably due to the already small 
gender wage gap at the beginning of the period under consideration.   
 
The lack of data is not the only reason why it is difficult to draw any conclusions from 
this graph as far as actual development of “equal pay for equal work of equal value” is 
concerned, which are presented by the Commission in its Strategy for equality 
between women and men 2010-2015409. First of all, even though educational 
attainment levels of men and women have converged, there still is a gap between men 
and women’s educational attainment and professional development (mostly reflecting 
family responsibilities). The causes of the pay gap also derive from segregation in the 
labour market as women and men tend to work in different sectors/jobs. Women and 
men are often over-represented in certain sectors, with ‘female’ jobs (mostly in health 
care, education and public administration) being in general less valued than typically 
male private sector professions like engineers, plant and machine operators and 
assemblers. Furthermore, even within the same sector or company the jobs done by 
women tend to be of lower value and less well paid. These are all factors negatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
issue in choosing 1980 as the starting year. 
409 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’ COM(2010)491.  
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27022 Duin.indd   165 12-10-13   17:43
Chapter 4
166 
influencing the gender pay gap without necessarily being inefficient and without 
having a direct relationship with the hard law measures on gender equality under 
evaluation here.  
 
To gauge the effect of these hard law measures a more qualitative approach therefore 
needs to be taken. A number of studies have evaluated the implementation of the 
gender equality Directives in the Member States. Generally speaking, there seems to 
be a consensus that the Directives have had an impact on the reduction of gender 
inequality in the Member States, even though there are considerable differences 
between them. These include national differences in a variety of institutions, 
including legal machinery, political will and differences in the transposition of EU 
law410. Caporaso and Jupille (2001411), for instance, analyse the domestic structural 
change in legislation, individual rights and institutional balance incurred as a response 
to the two gender equality Directives from the mid 1970s in the United Kingdom and 
France. They conclude that the effect of EU legislation in France was limited, mainly 
due to the fact that France already had similar legal provisions in place. In the United 
Kingdom, however, there was a larger misfit between the domestic system and the EU 
legislation imposed. So EU legislation led to significant domestic changes. 
 
The second aspect of equality between men and women, the concept of “equal 
economic independence”, translated in specifically promoting labour market 
participation of women. Arguably, EU policy making in this area only really started 
with its mentioning in the first employment guidelines in 1997, as well as the start of 
the Lisbon strategy in 2000 with its target of 60% female employment412. Two output 
indicators are relevant in this regard. The first one is the female employment rate as a 
percentage of the male employment rate. The second is the number of hours worked 
by women, also as a percentage of the male hours worked. These two indicators are 
depicted in graphs 51 and 52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
410 See Walby, ‘The European Union and gender equality; emerging varieties of gender regime’ (Social 
Politics, vol 11, no 1, 2004) for an overview.  
411 Caporaso and Jupille, ‘The Europeanisation of gender equality policy and domestic structural 
change’ in Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, Transforming Europe (Cornell University Press, 2001). 
412 This is illustrated by the fact that the previously mentioned Delors white paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment makes no reference to gender issues, see Commission, ‘White paper 
on Growth, competitiveness, employment the challenges and ways forward into the 21st century’, 
COM 93/700. 
 
 
Graph 51 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data on male and female employment rate 
 
Graph 52 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data on female and male hours worked 
 
There is a large difference in starting position between the Member States. In general, 
there is a south, centre, north divide here, with southern EU 15 countries having 
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There is a large difference in starting position between the Member States. In general, 
there is a south, centre, north divide here, with southern EU 15 countries having 
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relatively unequal female/male employment rate with a percentage of around 55% 
(with the exception of Portugal), northern countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
having a highly equal employment rate of 85-95% and the other countries faring 
somewhere in the middle. As far as development is concerned a general upward 
tendency can be discerned, with convergence taking place and low- starting countries, 
especially Spain, as well as the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland, growing more 
rapidly than the others.  
 
As far as increasing labour participation is concerned, however, this picture gets more 
nuanced when looking at the average number of hours worked by females relative to 
males, as shown in graph 52. Sweden and Finland, countries with a highly equal 
employment rate, also have a highly equal number of hours worked. Southern 
countries Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy combine a very unequal employment rate 
with a highly equal number of hours worked, meaning that if women work, they work 
a high number of hours. The Netherlands combines a high level of equality as far as 
employment is concerned with a high inequality in hours worked, which reflects the 
large number of part time jobs held by women in the Netherlands. There is no general 
trend visible as far as development over time is concerned, with the hours worked by 
women as a percentage of hours worked by men remaining roughly equal.  
 
Moving closer towards the actual impact of the process, there are two central policy 
indicators mentioned in the employment guidelines whose developments warrant 
further analysis. These are the provision of affordable and high-quality child-care as 
well as the elimination of tax and benefit disincentives for female employment. The 
existence of affordable and high-quality child-care reduces the costs a person with 
children has when participating in the labour market, therewith increasing labour 
supply. Since 1998, the policy direction of Member States to ensure affordable and 
high-quality child-care has been part of the employment guidelines, with the 
Barcelona European Spring Council in 2002 even setting targets for the EU to child-
care for at least 90% of children between 3 years and the mandatory school age and at 
least 33% of children under 3 years by 2010413. These targets are set independent of 
the number of hours of child-care requested. Matching quantitative indicators for this 
target are, however, only available from 2005 onward. Since as far as a time series is 
concerned this is insufficient to say anything about the trend since the start of the 
OMC process in this area, the following table only gives an overview of the current 
differences between countries based on 2009 data414 for both age groups.  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
413 Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council of 15/16 March 2002. 
414 Data for Denmark are for 2008. 
 
Table 14  
Percentage of children in childcare, 2009 
  
Children                                   
age 0-2 years 
 
 
 
 
 
Children 
age 3 to min. compulsory 
school age 
 percentage of 
children in 
formal 
childcare 
average 
number of 
hours in 
formal health 
care 
  percentage of 
children in 
formal 
childcare 
average 
number of 
hours in formal 
health care 
Denmark 73 34.00 Belgium  99.0 32.1 
Sweden 63 29.2 Denmark  97.0 33.9 
Netherlands 49 16.1 France  95.0 29.4 
France 41 30.4 Sweden  94.0 32.9 
Spain 36 27.4 Spain  94.0 29.5 
Portugal 36 41.9 Italy  92.0 32.3 
United Kingdom 35 12.4 United Kingdom 91.0 17.9 
Luxembourg 34 25.3 Germany  89.0 26.9 
Belgium 33 27.9 Netherlands  87.0 19.8 
Finland 27 33.8 Ireland  87.0 21.7 
Italy 25 30.4 Portugal  81 39.5 
Ireland 20 19.1 Austria  80.0 24.4 
Germany  19 29.7 Finland  78.0 33.4 
Greece 11 31.0 Luxembourg  71 23.9 
Austria 10 20.5 Greece  58.0 27.5 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
There is a very large degree of heterogeneity between the Member States as far as 
policy outcomes in the area of childcare is concerned. This especially applies to the 
age group of 0-2 year olds. Countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, which have a 
coverage of formal childcare in this area of around 70%, stand against countries, such 
as Greece and Austria with a coverage of only 10%. As far as the question of whether 
or not countries are using the policy variable of childcare in an effective manner, 
however, the policy indicator used as benchmark is insufficient. There is, for instance, 
the same lack of regard for number of hours of childcare seen with the number of 
hours of employment. Table 14 also includes number of hours of childcare, which is 
not incorporated in the target. Adding the number of hours significantly nuances the 
performance picture. Specifically, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which 
perform relatively well on the targets, combine high enrolment rates with a low 
number of average hours of childcare. Another critique of this target is that this does 
not include non-formal childcare, such as grandparents taking care of the children for 
a couple of days a week. As far as labour market outcomes is concerned this is 
relevant, because the manner of childcare does not make a difference for the 
economic model as far as labour market participation is concerned. Because policies 
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Finland 27 33.8 Ireland  87.0 21.7 
Italy 25 30.4 Portugal  81 39.5 
Ireland 20 19.1 Austria  80.0 24.4 
Germany  19 29.7 Finland  78.0 33.4 
Greece 11 31.0 Luxembourg  71 23.9 
Austria 10 20.5 Greece  58.0 27.5 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
There is a very large degree of heterogeneity between the Member States as far as 
policy outcomes in the area of childcare is concerned. This especially applies to the 
age group of 0-2 year olds. Countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, which have a 
coverage of formal childcare in this area of around 70%, stand against countries, such 
as Greece and Austria with a coverage of only 10%. As far as the question of whether 
or not countries are using the policy variable of childcare in an effective manner, 
however, the policy indicator used as benchmark is insufficient. There is, for instance, 
the same lack of regard for number of hours of childcare seen with the number of 
hours of employment. Table 14 also includes number of hours of childcare, which is 
not incorporated in the target. Adding the number of hours significantly nuances the 
performance picture. Specifically, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which 
perform relatively well on the targets, combine high enrolment rates with a low 
number of average hours of childcare. Another critique of this target is that this does 
not include non-formal childcare, such as grandparents taking care of the children for 
a couple of days a week. As far as labour market outcomes is concerned this is 
relevant, because the manner of childcare does not make a difference for the 
economic model as far as labour market participation is concerned. Because policies 
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to stimulate formal childcare, for instance through subsidies, may meet  the EU 
targets but at the same time they may cause a shift from non-formal to formal child-
care and therewith have only limited effects on female labour market participation415.   
 
The second policy indicator concerns the elimination of tax and benefit disincentives 
for female employment. One of the conclusions of the analysis so far is that the 
elasticities differ between target groups. Women, especially second earners, were 
identified as having a high responsiveness to tax and benefit incentives. Any specific 
disincentives for second earners entering the labour market or increasing hours 
worked would therefore have a relatively large negative effect. Data availability 
unfortunately limits possibilities for analysing these incentives over time. However, 
for an indication of the existence of such disincentives graph 53 compares the average 
tax wedge faced by a single individual earning 67% of average earnings with the 
average tax wedge faced by a second earner also earning 67% of average earnings, 
whose partner earns 100% of average earnings. This indicator measures how much 
extra income tax, employer social security contributions and employee social security 
contribution the family will have to pay as a result of the second earner entering 
employment, as a proportion of the second earner’s total income plus the employer 
social security contributions due on the second earner’s income. As emphasised by 
OECD416, this is the appropriate tax rate to measure the disincentive facing a second 
earner to participate in employment. 
 
Graph 53 
 
Data source: OECD  
 
                                                   
415 For some evidence on this effect specifically for the case of the Netherlands see Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis, Macro Economische Verkenningen (2008).  
416 OECD, ‘Taxation and employment’ (OECD tax policy studies no 21, 2011). 
 
In all countries except Greece a second earner faces a higher average tax wedge than a 
single individual earning the same income. In most cases, the increase is caused by 
the loss of either family-based benefits/tax credits or a dependent spouse allowance as 
a result of the second earner entering employment. In a smaller number of countries, 
such as France, Germany, and Luxembourg, it is due to family-based taxation more 
generally. The presence of children further lowers the average tax wedge faced by 
single individuals in most countries as a result of substantial child-dependent benefits 
and/or tax credits, while tending to increase the average tax rate faced by second 
earners due to the income-based withdrawal of the same benefits and/or tax credits417.  
 
Considering these characteristics of the various Member States the question arises 
what the actual effect of EU policy making in the area of promoting female labour 
participation on Member States’ policy actions has been. First of all, a large part of 
the general appraisal of the impact of the Open Method of Coordination in the area of 
employment on Member States’ policies, discussed in the previous section, applies to 
the specific subject of female labour participation as well. Here too, outcome and 
policy indicators have largely moved in the appropriate directions, while the impact of 
the process is limited, and varies between Member States and policy areas. There 
have been some more specific studies on the impact of the Open Method of 
Coordination on gender equality issues which give some further insight into this 
relationship. Beveridge and Velluti (2008)418, for instance, argue that there is a more 
than average difference in approach between Member States on the issue of gender 
equality in general, which leads to diminished possibilities for policy learning. These 
also make progress in policy making more dependent on national history and cultural 
development419. Furthermore, the facts that the issue of gender equality is dealt with 
both in the OMC social inclusion as in the OMC employment and that there is a 
general lack of definition of gender equality leads to uncertainty and overlap, which 
means that Member States remain largely autonomous in the aspects they choose to 
incorporate. The authors also observe that the attention for gender equality has 
lessened since the start of the OMC, with gender equality taking a less central role in 
the process, a view which is substantiated by the position of gender equality in the 
employment guidelines. Combined with the before-mentioned uncertainty and overlap 
this was followed by decreased attention for these issues in Member States’ national 
implementation reports420.  
 
                                                   
417 OECD, ‘Taxation and employment’ (OECD tax policy studies no 21, 2011). 
418 Beveridge and Velluti, Gender and the Open method of coordination, perspectives on law, 
governance and equality in the EU (Ashgate Publishing, 2008). 
419 See for a comprehensive overview of developments in the specific area of childcare report from the 
European Commission’s expert Group on gender and employment issues, ‘The provision of childcare 
services, a comparative review of 30 European countries’ (2009). 
420 See e.g. O’Connor, ‘The OMC and the European Employment Strategy: Broadening the possibilities 
for gender equality?’ (Paper for presentation at ESPANET Conference, Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration, 2007) and Rubery et al., ‘The ups and downs of European 
gender equality policy’ (Industrial Relations Journal, vol 35, no 6, 2004).  
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4.3.2 Improvement in working environment and working conditions; impact on 
Member States’ policies 
 
The second aspect of EU social employment policy is the concept of improving the 
working environment and working conditions. This can be divided in a number of 
different aspects concerning health and safety of workers, the organisation of working 
time and equal treatment of employees in specific situations. The general health and 
safety Directive in 1989 and the following more specific health and safety Directives 
in this regard are expected to lead to a decrease in accident rates in the Member 
States. Graph 54 shows the development of this accident rate421.  
 
Graph 54 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
Except for Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland, in the Member 
States the number of serious accidents at work have decreased. Germany, Austria, 
Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom in particular managed to significantly decrease 
their rates of serious accidents at work in the period under consideration. Ireland is the 
most obvious exception here, nearly doubling its relative accident rate between 1994 
and 2006. 
 
                                                   
421 The index shows the evolution of the incidence rate of serious accidents at work in comparison to 
1998 (= 100). The incidence rate = (number of accidents at work with more than 3 days' absence that 
occurred during the year/number of persons in employment in the reference population) x 100 000. An 
accident at work is a discrete occurrence in the course of work that leads to physical or mental harm. 
This includes accidents in the course of work outside the premises of his/her business, even if caused 
by a third party, and cases of acute poisoning. It excludes accidents on the way to or from work, 
occurrences having only a medical origin, and occupational diseases. 
 
To make sense of the divergent developments in this field as well as the actual impact 
of the European health and safety Directives the differences between Member States 
as far as starting position and implementation record is concerned have to be observed 
more closely. In 2004, the European Commission published an extensive report on the 
practical implementation of the general health and safety Directive and the first five 
following more specific Directives based on this general Directive422. It first analyses 
the legal impact of the Directives and large differences between countries. Remarks 
here concern the general tardiness of Member States in implementation, significant 
problems in all Member States in conformity of implementation, as well as practical 
implementation423. Denmark and Sweden are identified as countries where there was 
either no need for changes, or very limited ones, in the national framework, since 
these countries already had rules in this area in line which the requirements, which 
could explain the limited changes in the accident rate in these countries. On the 
contrary, Italy and Greece had to make very large adaptations to their national health 
and safety regulations, possibly offering an explanation for the large decrease in 
accidents in these countries. The results for the general impact of these Directives on 
employment, growth and competitiveness of companies are inconclusive, mostly due 
to lack of appropriate data. The Commission, thereafter, on the basis of several 
country and subject specific studies, as well as more qualitative approach from both 
Member States and companies, concludes that the general sentiment is that the 
Directives have had a positive effect in this regard424. 
 
The other aspects of the improvement of the working environment and working 
conditions are that of the organisation of working time in the working time Directive 
and the equal treatment requirements in fixed term, part time and temporary work 
Directives. As far as output and economic impact is concerned, it has been 
highlighted that employment and productivity in the period under consideration have 
increased while hours worked decreased. This section will analyse the specific 
predicted effects of these Directives, namely the changes in percentage of workers 
with average long hours of work and the developments in the incidence of part time 
and fixed term work arrangements. Temporary work will be left out of the analysis, 
since the legislation in this area is too recent to have been able to generate any 
discernible effects. Starting with the incidence of long hours worked, and therewith 
the effect of the working time Directive, graph 55 shows the development of the 
percentage of workers who usually work more than 40 hours a week in their main job. 
 
                                                   
422 Commission, ‘On the practical implementation of the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work 
Directives 89/391 (Framework), 89/654 (Workplaces), 89/655 (Work Equipment), 89/656 (Personal 
Protective Equipment), 90/269 (Manual Handling of Loads) and 90/270 
(Display Screen Equipment)’ COM(2004)62. 
423 This led the Commission to open infringement procedings against all Member States at some point 
in time. 
424 Ignoring the views of Austria and Belgium, who state that costs just might have outweighed the 
benefits, because “no data is provided” backing up this position. 
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422 Commission, ‘On the practical implementation of the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work 
Directives 89/391 (Framework), 89/654 (Workplaces), 89/655 (Work Equipment), 89/656 (Personal 
Protective Equipment), 90/269 (Manual Handling of Loads) and 90/270 
(Display Screen Equipment)’ COM(2004)62. 
423 This led the Commission to open infringement procedings against all Member States at some point 
in time. 
424 Ignoring the views of Austria and Belgium, who state that costs just might have outweighed the 
benefits, because “no data is provided” backing up this position. 
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Graph 55425   
 
Data source: EWCO working condition survey 2010. 
 
There was a large divergence between countries in 1995 as regards the percentage of 
workers with long working hours. Especially Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain had a 
relatively large number of workers making long weekly hours. In contrast, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands had a low percentage of workers falling under 
this definition. As far as development is concerned, there is a general trend towards 
decreasing the number of workers with long working hours, albeit to a varying extent. 
The coincidence of these developments with the introduction of the working time 
Directive, however, does not necessarily imply that the Directive had this result. The 
effect of the Directive is analysed in a study from Deloitte (2010)426, which at the 
request of the Commission, carried out a detailed analysis of the impact of the 
Directive in Member States and industries. On a macro level, by means of regression 
analysis the effects of the working time Directive on productivity developments are 
approximated. The problem with this analysis, which Deloitte confesses to straight 
away, is, however, the absence of a good proxy for the working time Directive. As 
best option, the reduction of average hours worked is used, therewith assuming the 
influence of the Directive on hours worked. Results come out inconclusive, with 
                                                   
425 Due to data availibility issues the quantitative indicator does not completely fit the requirements as 
set in the Directive, which sets a general maximum for workers of 48 hours per working week. For an 
accurate appraisal of the impact of the Directive we would have therefore had to check the percentage 
of people usually working over 48 hours a week and fall under the (stricter) definition of worker used 
in the Directive (the indicator shown also covers self employed). Although there is some data available 
on this issue at the International Labour Organisation it only covers 8 out of the 15 countries with 
varying definitions and age groups and was therefore deemed less appropriate for analysis.   
426 Deloitte, ‘Study to support an Impact Assessment on further action at European level regarding 
Directive 2003/88/EC and the evolution of working time organisation’ (report at the request of the 
European Commission, 2010). 
 
effects on productivity varying between sectors and countries under consideration. 
Neither is there any conclusive micro level evidence on costs and benefits of the 
Directive to employers and employees. The European foundation for the improvement 
of living and working conditions in a recent publication, on the basis of qualitative 
research in Member States, concludes that “The EU Working Time Directive 
93/104/EC that came into effect in 1993 (…) is judged to have raised the level of 
awareness and debate about working time issues in some countries, notably in Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. However, it is widely reported by other national 
correspondents as having had little or no effect in reducing working hours in practice. 
This view is held not only by those countries that had, or considered that they had, 
equivalent or superior legislation – the Benelux countries and Norway, in 
particular.”427 
 
Examining the developments of non-standard forms of employment, graph 56 gives 
an overview of the incidence of temporary employment as percentage of total 
employment.  
 
Graph 56 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
There is no general trend in this area, though Spain is a notable exception, with the 
percentage of fixed term contracts being almost twice the EU average. In this specific 
                                                   
427 Morley and Sanoussi, ‘Comparative analysis of working time in the European Union’ (Eurofound 
paper, 2009), 12.  
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case this is arguably a demonstration of a highly segmented labour market, where 
since an important set of labour market reforms in the 1980s, permanent contracts 
offering a high degree of on-the-job protection have co-existed with temporary 
contracts with almost no restrictions on hiring and firing428.  
 
Graph 57 shows the development of part time work as a share of total dependent 
employment. 
 
Graph 57 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
The incidence of part time work in the different countries remains stable or increases. 
This fits with the picture of the general decrease in hours worked shown in the 
previous section. The actual impact of the part time work Directive on this 
development, however, remains unclear. What can be stated on the basis of general 
OECD macro data is that the increase in incidence of part time work was a trend in 
the years before the coming into force of the Directive, suggesting a limited additional 
effect. There is some confirmation of this in analyses focusing on the adaptation of 
national systems in response to the Directive. The general conclusion deriving from 
this type of analysis is that the Directive had very limited impact on the actual 
legislative systems in the Member States. Davies and Freedland (2004429), for 
                                                   
428 For more information see Ayuso i Casals, ‘Fixed term contracts in Spain, a mixed blessing’ (ECFIN 
country focus, vol 1, issue 1, 2004). 
429 Davies and Freedland, ‘The role of EU employment law and policy in the de-marginalisation of 
 
 
instance, on the basis of country specific analysis in France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, conclude that the Directive was 
more reflexive in nature than standard setting, reflecting an already existing consensus 
present in Member States and not having a significant impact on already existing 
policy trajectories in Member States. Jeffery (1998430) points to a survey on national 
regulations on ‘atypical work’ present at the time of the creation of the Directive, in 
which it is concluded that the Directive is “unlikely to have a great impact in most 
countries”431. 
 
4.3.3 Social protection and social inclusion; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
The last aspect of EU social employment policy the effects of which will have to be 
examined is social inclusion, as operationalised since the year 2000 in the Open 
Method of Coordination for social protection and social inclusion. There are two 
aspects which fit in the economic framework, namely the active inclusion of people to 
the labour market, especially vulnerable groups, and the issue of pensions reform and 
creating incentives for people to work longer. Since there is no general and constant 
definition given as to the concept of vulnerable groups, as far as economic output is 
concerned the general participation graphs and policy indicators in the previous 
section will serve as measures for active inclusion. As seen, there has been a general 
increase in labour force participation, with the increase varying between Member 
States. 
 
The concept of pension reform is visualised as far as output is concerned by the 
employment rate of older workers in graph 58432. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
part-time work; a study in the interaction between EU regulation and Member State regulation’ in 
Sciarra, Davies and Freedland, Employment policy and the regulation of part-time work in the 
European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
430 Jeffery, ‘Not Really Going to Work? Of the Directive on Part-Time Work, 'Atypical Work' and 
Attempts to Regulate It’ (Industrial Law Journal, vol 27, no 3, 1998).  
431 Not in the least because of an existing 1994 ILO convention no 175 which already had layed down 
similar and often stricter minimum requirements on part time work. 
432 Since this was also the main goal of the Lisbon strategy in this area this indicator seems most 
appropriate. An alternative output indicator is the average exit age from the labour force, which leads 
to similar results. 
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employment. 
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Data source: Eurostat 
 
The incidence of part time work in the different countries remains stable or increases. 
This fits with the picture of the general decrease in hours worked shown in the 
previous section. The actual impact of the part time work Directive on this 
development, however, remains unclear. What can be stated on the basis of general 
OECD macro data is that the increase in incidence of part time work was a trend in 
the years before the coming into force of the Directive, suggesting a limited additional 
effect. There is some confirmation of this in analyses focusing on the adaptation of 
national systems in response to the Directive. The general conclusion deriving from 
this type of analysis is that the Directive had very limited impact on the actual 
legislative systems in the Member States. Davies and Freedland (2004429), for 
                                                   
428 For more information see Ayuso i Casals, ‘Fixed term contracts in Spain, a mixed blessing’ (ECFIN 
country focus, vol 1, issue 1, 2004). 
429 Davies and Freedland, ‘The role of EU employment law and policy in the de-marginalisation of 
 
 
instance, on the basis of country specific analysis in France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, conclude that the Directive was 
more reflexive in nature than standard setting, reflecting an already existing consensus 
present in Member States and not having a significant impact on already existing 
policy trajectories in Member States. Jeffery (1998430) points to a survey on national 
regulations on ‘atypical work’ present at the time of the creation of the Directive, in 
which it is concluded that the Directive is “unlikely to have a great impact in most 
countries”431. 
 
4.3.3 Social protection and social inclusion; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
The last aspect of EU social employment policy the effects of which will have to be 
examined is social inclusion, as operationalised since the year 2000 in the Open 
Method of Coordination for social protection and social inclusion. There are two 
aspects which fit in the economic framework, namely the active inclusion of people to 
the labour market, especially vulnerable groups, and the issue of pensions reform and 
creating incentives for people to work longer. Since there is no general and constant 
definition given as to the concept of vulnerable groups, as far as economic output is 
concerned the general participation graphs and policy indicators in the previous 
section will serve as measures for active inclusion. As seen, there has been a general 
increase in labour force participation, with the increase varying between Member 
States. 
 
The concept of pension reform is visualised as far as output is concerned by the 
employment rate of older workers in graph 58432. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
part-time work; a study in the interaction between EU regulation and Member State regulation’ in 
Sciarra, Davies and Freedland, Employment policy and the regulation of part-time work in the 
European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
430 Jeffery, ‘Not Really Going to Work? Of the Directive on Part-Time Work, 'Atypical Work' and 
Attempts to Regulate It’ (Industrial Law Journal, vol 27, no 3, 1998).  
431 Not in the least because of an existing 1994 ILO convention no 175 which already had layed down 
similar and often stricter minimum requirements on part time work. 
432 Since this was also the main goal of the Lisbon strategy in this area this indicator seems most 
appropriate. An alternative output indicator is the average exit age from the labour force, which leads 
to similar results. 
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Graph 58 
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There are very large differences in initial starting positions between Member States: 
Sweden, Denmark the United Kingdom and Portugal had an employment rate of over 
50%, while Luxembourg, France, Austria, Italy and Belgium had employment rates of 
under 30%. There is a general increase in the employment rate of older workers. This 
can at least partly be attributed to a significant set of pension reforms in Member 
States in the past decade, for instance, in the area of abolishing or lessening early 
retirement schemes and increasing statutory pension ages, which is shown in an 
interim joint report on pensions of the Economic Policy Committee and the Social 
Protection committee. This report gives a comprehensive overview of pension 
reforms and their effects on labour force participation of older workers433. This does 
not necessarily imply, however, that this spur of reforms was initiated or stimulated 
by the OMC social protection and social inclusion. There are a number of qualitative 
studies on the impact of this OMC process, which come up with a rather negative 
assessment. De la Porte (2008434), for instance, on the basis of in depth country 
specific research, finds no significant impact on Member States’ policy making in this 
area. She finds that the OMC due its soft character does not embody sufficient 
‘European pressure’ to engender change, no matter what the domestic landscape looks 
like and no matter where the respective policies are located among governmental 
                                                   
433 Economic Policy Committee and Social Protection Committee, ‘Interim joint report on pensions’ 
(2010). 
434 De la Porte, ‘The European level development and national level influence of the open method of 
coordination: the cases of employment and social inclusion’ (PhD study, Department of Social and 
Political Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2008). 
 
priorities. Natali (2007435) emphasises the path dependence of pension reforms and 
the large differences in approach between Member States, using the developments in 
France and the Netherlands as an illustration. He finds little or no impact from the 
OMC process. The shared challenge of ageing has led to some convergence in 
national approaches, but the complexity and national rootedness of pension reforms 
both in structure and key actors in his view leaves little room for EU influence. 
 
4.4 Internal market legislation 
 
As seen in chapter 3, the internal market has been at the centre of EU policy making 
in the area of employment ever since the 1950s, when the establishment and 
functioning of the Common market was laid down in the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community as one of two main instruments in “improving the 
living and working conditions of its people”436. As has been highlighted in chapter 3, 
this policy instrument is linked to the following objectives: 
 
Table 15 
Objective 
 
 
 
Instrument 
Increasing 
incentives 
for work  
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
Improving 
the human 
capital stock 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
Short-term 
stabilisation 
policy 
Internal 
market 
legislation 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
A gradual operationalising of the internal market in the area of employment in 
secondary legislation, with land mark developments in the 1970s in the area of 
coordination of social security systems, the 1970s and 1980s in the area of the 
recognition of professional qualifications, the 1990s in the area of posting of workers, 
and in recent years the elaboration and the implementation of the services Directive. 
These developments have left a system for free movement in the area of employment 
which core arguably consists of the often updated Directives in these four areas437 
within the more general principles laid down in Regulations 2004/38/EC on European 
citizenship and 492/2011 on free movement of workers.  
                                                   
435 Natali, ‘Pensions OMC’s Influence on National Reforms’ (NEWGOV paper, 2007). 
436 TEEC, recitals 2 and 3. 
437 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255, Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems [2004] OJ L 166 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L 284, Directive 96/71 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L 18, Directive 2006/123/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376.  
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Unlike the previous sections on employment coordination and social employment 
policy, relating the further development in the employment related areas of the 
internal market to policy objectives is rather straightforward. All actions taken in this 
area can be interpreted as an elimination of search costs and frictions in the job search 
proves. Economic theory has shown that on a macro level this will lead to more and 
better employment matches and therewith higher employment and productivity.  
An exception is the posting of workers Directive, which introduces a common floor of 
rights for workers posted to another EU Member State. This can have both positive 
effects by increasing productivity and negative effects by decreasing flexibility 438. 
 
4.4.1 Internal market legislation; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
To unravel the economic impact of internal market policy there are a number of steps 
needed. Like in previous sections, the output side is examined first. Output in this 
context consists of transnational flows within the EU of workers and the services they 
provide. Labour mobility would be stimulated by increases in market flexibility, 
which in turn would be induced by the hard law measures mentioned earlier.  
 
In the first step already, however, data availability is problematic. There are no 
updated and consistently gathered data to examine labour migration in Europe439. 
Available data is scarce and measures stocks and flows of foreign population instead 
of (flows of) foreign labour440. Table 16 gives an overview of the number of 
foreigners in a selection of EU countries, with ‘foreign’ being defined as coming from 
another EU 15 country.  
  
 
                                                   
438 Generally, studies on migration focus at the national level analysing the economic effects of an 
influx of migration on the national labour market and often more specifically on native workers and 
sectors. From this perspective, labour migration can have a number of different effects than the one 
described above. However, these aspects will not be discussed here, since it does not fit the general set 
up of this study, which is focused on the maximisation of European GDP per capita from a macro 
perspective. National and sectoral effects are distributional effects and are therefore excluded. 
Furthermore, this study looks at the EU internal market, migration issues concerning migration from 
third countries are also excluded. For the interested reader; there are numerous, mostly country specific 
studies on the effects of labour migration in Europe. For a useful overview, see OECD, ‘Migration in 
OECD countries; labour market impact and integration issues’ (Economics department working papers 
no 562, 2007). 
439 There are more reasons why it is difficult to study mobility in Europe. First, geographic mobility is 
low and difficult to observe. Second, international migration cannot be measured by country surveys 
which only capture individuals before or after migration. Transnational surveys are missing. Third, 
migrants are not followed across countries, so that repeat, circular and chain migration cannot be 
studied. Fourth, the definition of a migrant is not always clear. Official statistics may treat foreign 
nationals as migrants, ignoring naturalized individuals but including second generation immigrants 
who kept the citizenship of the country of origin. See Zaiceva and Zimmerman, ‘Scale, diversity and 
determinants of labour migration in Europe’ (IZA discussion paper 3595, 2008). 
440 In general, population migration can be used as a proxy for labour migration but the difference 
should be kept in mind, see also Belot and Ederveen, ‘Cultural and institutional barriers in migration 
between OECD countries’ (Journal of Population economics, vol 25, no 3, 2012).  
 
Table 16 
 
Inhabitants in EU-15 countries from another EU-15 
Member State, thousands441 
   Year   
   1990 1999 2002 2006 
 Austria     115 154 
 Belgium 551 534 567 585 
 Denmark 38 53 55 63 
 Finland   16 18 21 
 France 1312 1161   1187 
 Germany 1633 1856 1860 2183 
Country Ireland     131 153 
 Italy 149 146 151   
 Netherlands 174 196 211 211 
 Portugal 29 52 66 80 
 Spain   337 739 1538 
 
United 
Kingdom 731 886 840 937 
Data source: OECD 
 
Graph 59 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
There is a general rise in the number of EU 15 nationals living in one of the other EU 
15 countries. At the same time, however, as a percentage of the total population, the 
                                                   
441 Blank cells due to unavailability of data. 
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441 Blank cells due to unavailability of data. 
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total stock of people from EU 15 countries living in one of the EU 15 countries 
remains small. The same holds for the EU as a whole as show in graph 59 for 2009. 
With the exception of Luxembourg, the number of citizens coming from other EU 
Member States as a percentage of the total population is limited, with an average of 
2.4% in the EU. This is confirmed by the European Commission’s Employment in 
Europe report in 2006442 which concludes that intra EU labour mobility has always 
been and remains low. That intra EU mobility is low gives a first indication of the 
effects of the EU measures taken in this area. To further elaborate on this, however, 
this analysis has to be expanded in two ways. First, an analysis of the factors 
influencing EU mobility and the size of the effect is needed. Second, these figures say 
nothing on the cross border provision of services and temporary migration, which will 
have to be considered separately. 
 
Several studies have examined variables influencing intra EU mobility. One recent 
and comprehensive study is Bonin et al. (2008). They recall that in general the 
economic migration decision comes down to a comparison of the utility gained in 
moving minus the utility lost in moving plus the costs of moving. On the positive side 
they identify two main drivers of intra EU migration, namely wage differentials and 
unemployment differentials. Increased wages and a higher opportunity to find a job 
increase a person’s propensity to enter the labour market of another country443. Both 
of these aspects are relatively high in Europe. As far as barriers are concerned, these 
authors identify eight possible ‘key hurdles’:444 
 
1. Lack of language skills 
2. Finding a job for oneself or for the partner 
3. Access to child care, education, health care or other social benefits  
4. Problems of having educational and professional skills recognised  
5. Problems of transferring pension rights  
6. Problems of finding suitable housing  
7. Problems of obtaining a residence or work permit 
8. Problems of adapting to a different culture  
 
Hurdles 3, 4, 5 and 7 would be the hurdles that EU policy analysed in this section 
might alleviate. These hurdles, however, are exactly the one that in the regression 
analysis of Bonin et al. come out as not having a significant effect. Only language, job 
hurdles and culture come out significantly. The regression analysis, however, is based 
                                                   
442 Commission, Employment in Europe (2006). 
443 There is an important micro economic element here, which we will not go into that deeply. Simply 
put, both gains and costs of moving differ greatly between workers, depending on personal 
characteristics. This makes it possible to identify the workers most likely to migrate. High-skilled 
young people, not married, without children and without links to the home country, like home 
ownership and a permanent employment relationship are the most likely to move.  
444 Bonin et al., ‘Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Economic and Social 
Benefits’ (IZA working paper no 19, 2008), par 3.4. 
 
on a person’s intention to migrate as dependent variable, and ‘perceived hurdles’, 
which can only serve as a proxy of actual migration hurdles. Observing the 
determinants of actual migration flows between 22 OECD countries over the period 
1990-2003, Belot and Ederveen445, however, confirm the results of Bonin et al., 
finding evidence of the importance of economic variables and the importance of 
cultural links between countries, including the presence of social networks in the 
country of destination446. They conclude that migration flows between countries with 
closely related languages are likely to be much larger than between countries with 
unrelated languages. Similarly, the proximity in religions and culture also stimulates 
migration. In earlier work, Belot and Ederveen447 do find some evidence of the 
importance of institutional barriers for migration. For instance, the portability of 
(supplementary) pension rights has a positive effect on migration. However, most of 
their results on institutional barriers are ambiguous.  
 
Several studies have examined the effects of the various pieces of legislation. As has 
been highlighted in chapter 2, before being replaced by the 2005 professional 
qualifications Directive the general system for recognition of professional 
qualifications consisted of three Directives from the late 1980s and the 1990s448. In a 
report on the practical application of the 1992 Directive, the Commission gives an 
overview of the total of qualifications recognised by EU Member States under the 
Directives. In the period 1993-1998 the total number of recognition requests for the 
purpose of establishment in another Member State granted was 23,224, with 12,595 
requests granted in the period 1993-1996 which indicates a significant rise in the last 
years. The Commission, however, is quick to emphasise that even though “this is the 
most complete figure available” it is not necessarily possible or appropriate to try to 
draw specific conclusions from the statistical information, partly because the 
Directives have been in application for a shorter period and so understanding of the 
                                                   
445 Belot and Ederveen, ‘Cultural and institutional barriers in migration between OECD countries’ 
(Journal of Population economics, vol 25, no 3, 2012). 
446 The importance of this network effect is also shown in Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith, ‘Selection or 
Network Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990-2000’ (IZA discussion paper no 
1104, 2004).   
447 Belot and Ederveen, ‘Cultural and institutional barriers in migration between OECD countries’ 
(Journal of Population economics, vol 25, no 3, 2012). 
448 Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of 
higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least 
three years' duration [1988] OJ L 19, Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second 
general system for the recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 
89/48/EEC [1992] OJ L 209 and European Parliament and Council Directive 99/42/EEC of 7 June 
1999 establishing a mechanism for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional 
activities covered by the Directives on liberalisation and transitional measures and supplementing the 
General Systems for the recognition of qualifications [1999] OJ L 201.  The 2005 Directive also 
simplifies and consolidates a large number of more specific Directives for the nineteen sixties, 
seventies and eighties on professional qualifications in the areas of craft commerce and industry, health 
professionals and architects.   
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draw specific conclusions from the statistical information, partly because the 
Directives have been in application for a shorter period and so understanding of the 
                                                   
445 Belot and Ederveen, ‘Cultural and institutional barriers in migration between OECD countries’ 
(Journal of Population economics, vol 25, no 3, 2012). 
446 The importance of this network effect is also shown in Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith, ‘Selection or 
Network Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990-2000’ (IZA discussion paper no 
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higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least 
three years' duration [1988] OJ L 19, Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second 
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89/48/EEC [1992] OJ L 209 and European Parliament and Council Directive 99/42/EEC of 7 June 
1999 establishing a mechanism for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional 
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availability and application of the rules and rights may still be growing449. This 
statement is given further body by the fact that a large number of Member States did 
not adhere to the implementation deadline of June 1994450. Experience with the new 
2005 Directive has been limited due to similar implementation delays. Even though 
the Directive was to be transposed by October 2007 it was only in September 2010 
that all Member States had fulfilled this obligation451. However, in the meantime the 
number of qualifications granted under the system had increased further, from 24,966 
in 2007 to 35,550 in 2008, quadrupling between 1997 and 2008452. The recent 
economic crisis has diminished the number of qualifications, with 28,391 granted 
requests in 2009 and 16,867 in 2010453.  
 
Concerning the issue of cross border application of social security schemes, as has 
been highlighted in chapter 2, the basic Regulations stem from the beginning of the 
1970s454. Unfortunately, there is a lack of studies on the impact of this Regulation on 
the free movement of workers. The 2004 Regulation only entered into force in 2010, 
which means there is no data available yet. The economic effects of the services 
Directive and to a lesser extent, the posting of workers Directive, have been 
researched. The studies available concern ex ante impact assessments of the 
Directive455, most notable the studies of Copenhagen Economics in 2005456, and 
studies by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in 2004457 and 
2006458. While the European Commission’s original impact assessment459 due to 
methodological and data issues only gives a qualitative appraisal of effects on growth 
and employment (being positive), these studies point towards significant gains in 
                                                   
449 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
application of Directive 92/51/EEC in accordance with art 18 of Directive 92/51/EEC’ COM 2000/17, 
14. 
450 Spain was approximately one year late, Ireland two years, Portugal and the United Kingdom two 
and a half years, Belgium three years and Greece four years late. 
451 Commission, ‘Staff working document on the transposition and implementation of the professional 
qualifications Directive’ SEC 2010/1292. 
452 Commission, ‘Evaluation of the professional qualifications Directive’ (2011). 
453 Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive amending Directive 
2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation on administrative 
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System’ SEC(2011)1558. 
454 Notably Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 
149 and its Regulation (EEC) 574/72 of the Council of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedure for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons and their families moving within the Community [1972] OJ L 74.  
455 Because the Directive has only entered into force at the end of 2009 it is too early for ex post 
impacts to be calculated. 
456 Jensen et al., ‘Economic assessment of the barriers to the Internal Market for services’ (Copenhagen 
economics, 2005). 
457 Kox, Lejour and Montizaan, ‘The free movement of services within the EU’ (CPB document 69, 
2004). 
458 De Bruijn, Kox and Lejour, ‘The trade induced effects of the services Directive and the country of 
origin principle’ (CPB document 108, 2006). 
459 Commission, ‘Extended impact assessment of proposal for a Directive on services in the Internal 
market’ SEC(2004)21. 
 
terms of foreign direct investment, growth and job creation on a more quantitative 
basis. Both studies calculate indicators for barriers in services provision and/or 
heterogeneity in product market regulation between Member States, estimate the 
reduction in these indicators expected to occur by implementation of the services 
Directive and its effect on trade and FDI flows in services and/or price and 
competitiveness. Copenhagen Economics found that the Commission’s proposal for 
the services Directive would lead to an expected increase of EU GDP, at a 
conservative estimate, by 0.8%-point, with positive growth rates in all Member States. 
Employment is expected to increase in the long term by 0.3%-point (up to 600,000 
jobs). The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its most recent study 
found that EU wide economic gains of the Services Directive as agreed by the 
Council and European Parliament in the long term could range between 60-140 billion 
euros, representing a growth potential of 0.6-1.5% of GDP. Interestingly, in the 
analysis they also calculated the difference in effect between the original services 
Directive proposal from the Commission, including the country of origin principle, 
and the Directive agreed upon by Council and European Parliament. They find that 
the effect on services trade is diminished by 1/3 (from +30-60% to +20-40%) due to 
the exclusion of the country of origin principle.460  
 
Finally, the posting of workers Directive entered into force in December 1999 and in 
essence defines the basic conditions of employment that must be guaranteed to EU 
workers posted in the territory of another EU member state. The economic effects of 
posting of workers have been extensively examined by IDEA and Ecorys in a 2011 
study on behalf of the European Commission461. Using a proxy for the number of 
posted workers462 in the period 2005-2007, the study reports a little over a million 
postings in 2007 in the EU 27, or 18.5% as a percentage of total non-national EU 27 
citizens in the labour force. The posting of workers is considered an important 
phenomenon in intra EU labour mobility flows, even more so since the number of 
postings seems to be growing rapidly463. This finding, however, has to be put in the 
context of the overall low mobility in the EU. According to the study, compared to the 
total active population in the EU, posted workers represent a relatively small group: 
0.37% in EU 15 and 0.74% in EU 12464. Furthermore, the phenomenon seems limited 
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workers Directive) and that the number of forms concern the number of postings rather than the 
number of persons posted. However, data availability issues limit alternatives at this point.   
463 At least it did in the period 2005-2007. Due to the economic crisis the number of postings dropped 
in 2008-2009.  
464 Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, 
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statement is given further body by the fact that a large number of Member States did 
not adhere to the implementation deadline of June 1994450. Experience with the new 
2005 Directive has been limited due to similar implementation delays. Even though 
the Directive was to be transposed by October 2007 it was only in September 2010 
that all Member States had fulfilled this obligation451. However, in the meantime the 
number of qualifications granted under the system had increased further, from 24,966 
in 2007 to 35,550 in 2008, quadrupling between 1997 and 2008452. The recent 
economic crisis has diminished the number of qualifications, with 28,391 granted 
requests in 2009 and 16,867 in 2010453.  
 
Concerning the issue of cross border application of social security schemes, as has 
been highlighted in chapter 2, the basic Regulations stem from the beginning of the 
1970s454. Unfortunately, there is a lack of studies on the impact of this Regulation on 
the free movement of workers. The 2004 Regulation only entered into force in 2010, 
which means there is no data available yet. The economic effects of the services 
Directive and to a lesser extent, the posting of workers Directive, have been 
researched. The studies available concern ex ante impact assessments of the 
Directive455, most notable the studies of Copenhagen Economics in 2005456, and 
studies by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in 2004457 and 
2006458. While the European Commission’s original impact assessment459 due to 
methodological and data issues only gives a qualitative appraisal of effects on growth 
and employment (being positive), these studies point towards significant gains in 
                                                   
449 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
application of Directive 92/51/EEC in accordance with art 18 of Directive 92/51/EEC’ COM 2000/17, 
14. 
450 Spain was approximately one year late, Ireland two years, Portugal and the United Kingdom two 
and a half years, Belgium three years and Greece four years late. 
451 Commission, ‘Staff working document on the transposition and implementation of the professional 
qualifications Directive’ SEC 2010/1292. 
452 Commission, ‘Evaluation of the professional qualifications Directive’ (2011). 
453 Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive amending Directive 
2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation on administrative 
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System’ SEC(2011)1558. 
454 Notably Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 
149 and its Regulation (EEC) 574/72 of the Council of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedure for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons and their families moving within the Community [1972] OJ L 74.  
455 Because the Directive has only entered into force at the end of 2009 it is too early for ex post 
impacts to be calculated. 
456 Jensen et al., ‘Economic assessment of the barriers to the Internal Market for services’ (Copenhagen 
economics, 2005). 
457 Kox, Lejour and Montizaan, ‘The free movement of services within the EU’ (CPB document 69, 
2004). 
458 De Bruijn, Kox and Lejour, ‘The trade induced effects of the services Directive and the country of 
origin principle’ (CPB document 108, 2006). 
459 Commission, ‘Extended impact assessment of proposal for a Directive on services in the Internal 
market’ SEC(2004)21. 
 
terms of foreign direct investment, growth and job creation on a more quantitative 
basis. Both studies calculate indicators for barriers in services provision and/or 
heterogeneity in product market regulation between Member States, estimate the 
reduction in these indicators expected to occur by implementation of the services 
Directive and its effect on trade and FDI flows in services and/or price and 
competitiveness. Copenhagen Economics found that the Commission’s proposal for 
the services Directive would lead to an expected increase of EU GDP, at a 
conservative estimate, by 0.8%-point, with positive growth rates in all Member States. 
Employment is expected to increase in the long term by 0.3%-point (up to 600,000 
jobs). The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its most recent study 
found that EU wide economic gains of the Services Directive as agreed by the 
Council and European Parliament in the long term could range between 60-140 billion 
euros, representing a growth potential of 0.6-1.5% of GDP. Interestingly, in the 
analysis they also calculated the difference in effect between the original services 
Directive proposal from the Commission, including the country of origin principle, 
and the Directive agreed upon by Council and European Parliament. They find that 
the effect on services trade is diminished by 1/3 (from +30-60% to +20-40%) due to 
the exclusion of the country of origin principle.460  
 
Finally, the posting of workers Directive entered into force in December 1999 and in 
essence defines the basic conditions of employment that must be guaranteed to EU 
workers posted in the territory of another EU member state. The economic effects of 
posting of workers have been extensively examined by IDEA and Ecorys in a 2011 
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phenomenon in intra EU labour mobility flows, even more so since the number of 
postings seems to be growing rapidly463. This finding, however, has to be put in the 
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to certain Member States and sectors. Poland, France and Germany as sending 
countries together account for almost two thirds of total postings, and most postings 
seem concentrated in the construction and services sectors, in particularly financial 
intermediation, business activities and transport activities. On the actual effect of the 
posting of workers Directive on these flows, however, there is no information 
given465.  
 
4.5  EU funds spending 
 
As has been observed in chapter 3, there has been a role for EU funding in European 
employment policy since the beginning of the European integration process in the 
1950s in the form of the European Social fund. Both the targets and size of this fund 
have increased and developed throughout the years, resulting in the following 
objectives: 
 
Table 17 
Objective 
 
 
 
Instrument 
Increasing 
incentives 
for work  
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
Improving 
the human 
capital stock 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
Short term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
EU funds 
spending 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
There are a number of direct links between EU fund spending and policy objectives. 
In the 1950s the activities of the ESF inter alia were to “render the employment of 
workers easier and to increase their geographical and occupational mobility”466. 
Although broad in scope, this in principle fits nicely with the different channels of 
employment policy identified in economic theory, even more so since in practice in 
the early years the European Social Fund was mainly used to help workers in sectors 
that had to be restructured by providing them with retraining allowances. It also made 
available resettlement help for those out of work who left their region to seek jobs 
elsewhere. In its further development there are three interesting notions that will be 
further discussed. First, the scope of operation of the fund has been widened, 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s and thereafter its link with the Lisbon and European 
                                                                                                                                                 
Romania, Bulgaria. 
465 See also Commission, ‘Staff working document executive summary of the impact assessment 
accompanying the document proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services and proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services’ SWD(2012)64 final.  
466 Art 123 TEEC. 
 
Employment Strategies. Second, there is increased attention for the issue of cohesion 
and the development of lesser-developed regions since the 1970s and especially the 
1980s, including the set-up of the ERDF. The final one concerns the introduction of 
short-term stabilisation policy in the funds. 
 
The number of activities and objectives eligible for EU funding from the European 
Social Fund was substantially extended with the Single European Act and the Treaty 
of Maastricht and translated in the Fund’s objectives, among others by adding the 
issue of helping “the socially excluded”. Furthermore, in the periods 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013 explicit reference was made to the objectives of respectively the European 
Employment Strategy and the Lisbon strategy, with the Commission proposing even 
further linking of the funds with the Europe 2020 strategy for the period 2014-2020. 
The analysis of whether the goals of EU fund spending are in line with the economic 
rationale presented throughout this study therefore largely follows the analysis of the 
process of employment policy coordination. As has been highlighted before, for 
instance, the issue of social inclusion is not necessarily in line with the economic 
rationale developed in the previous chapter. However, as far as policy measures are 
concerned, the focus in both the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon 
strategy, by keeping the promotion of more and better jobs as an overall objective, 
was largely in line with economic theory. This demarcation as far as the ESF is 
concerned is further enhanced by the fact that the legal basis of the European Social 
Fund largely prevents it from including these types of issues. Under article 162 TEU 
the overriding goal has been to improve employment opportunities for workers. The 
measures under the issue of helping the socially excluded therefore in theory at least 
fit into economic theory.  
 
Concerning the second issue of cohesion and the development of lesser developed 
regions, since its start there has always been a de facto redistributive element to the 
functioning of the ESF, simply because in the early years there was a relatively large 
demand for ESF money in the then poor regions of the EU (Italy)467. Since the 
beginning of the 1970s, however, this redistributive element or cohesion element was 
institutionalised by the inclusion of a focus on structural unemployment in less 
developed regions as a goal in the ESF Regulation and an increased aid percentage 
allowed in these regions as well as the set up of the ERDF. Ever since, EU fund 
spending has always had a cohesion element. The prioritisation of spending of EU 
money on certain regions does not directly fit into the economic framework developed 
in chapter 2. From an economic point of view, spending should be aimed at those 
areas where its impact is greatest, meaning where there is the largest benefit for 
                                                   
467 There was also a redistribute aspect to the funds stemming from the revenue side. Contributions of 
Member States were adjusted for redistributive purposes. In particular, a lower Italian and Dutch 
contribution to the European Social Fund was counterbalanced by larger shares for the other big 
Member States, see Neheider and Santos, ‘Reframing the EU budget decision making process’ (Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol 49. No 3, 2011).  
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increased employment and productivity. Theoretically, however, there is a case to be 
made for focus of EU spending to stimulate employment in the least developed 
regions, since these are usually the ones with the largest potential for improvement. 
When overlying objectives are in line with economic theory, which they are, this is 
mostly a question of effectiveness of spending, a point that will be dealt with more 
extensively in the next section. A similar effectiveness of spending argument can be 
followed for as far as the third issue of short term-stabilisation policy is concerned, 
something which has developed since the 1990s in various instances in the form of 
either easier access to EU funds and/or the availability of extra funding in a given 
period.  
  
4.5.1 EU funds spending; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
Graph 60 provides an overview of the development of total EU Structural Fund 
expenditure (now mainly ESF and ERDF) in millions of UA/ECU/Euro468 since the 
1960s, as well as the development of expenditure under the European Social Fund.  
 
Graph 60 
 
Data source: European Commission469 
 
The total amount of EU structural spending has increased significantly throughout the 
years, especially since the mid 1970s470. As a percentage of EU GDP, spending is 
limited and relatively constant since the beginning of the 1990s at 0.3/0.4% or about 
                                                   
468 UA stands for Unit of Account, also known as European Unit of Account (EUA), a book-keeping 
device for recording the relative value of payments into and from EC accounts, replaced by the 
European currency unit (ECU), which has been replaced by the euro. 
469 Commission, ‘EU budget 2007 Financial Report’ (2007). 
470 The higher growth of total structural funds related to the ESF is mainly caused by the European 
Regional Development Fund. In 2006, for instance, the ERDF accounted for 14825 million Euro of 
spending. 
 
0.7% of public national spending. In the period 2007-2013 the ESF makes up 8% of 
the total EU budget spending, or about 75 billion Euro. Furthermore, given the fact 
that projects under the ESF are co-financed by EU Member States, adding another 37 
billion in this period471, there is room for a significant impact on GDP per capita 
growth, the more so in specific (poorer) regions which receive relatively large shares 
of total funding.  
 
There are numerous studies on the effects of EU funds spending on convergence and 
growth creation. Ederveen et al. (2003)472 and Hagen and Moll473 give useful surveys 
of the results. Ederveen et al. (2003) give an extensive history of evaluation of 
cohesion policy. Their conclusion is that evaluation of effectiveness only really got 
started in the 1980s. Since then there has been a wide variety of research techniques 
(case studies, model simulations and econometric analysis) used with mixed results. 
In the words of Ederveen et al. (2003) “Researchers draw different conclusions from 
different studies, ranging from a dismal negative impact of cohesion policy on 
economic growth of lagging regions to wildly positive assessments of projects, 
yielding rates of return that are unheard of in the private sector”474. Hagen and Moll 
present an overview of 22 more recent econometric evaluations of the impact of 
European cohesion policy on economic growth and convergence. Their conclusion is 
that studies have provided mixed if not contradictory results. At the country level, the 
most that can be concluded from the empirical studies is that cohesion policy seems to 
be only conditionally effective. Referring to Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2006475) 
and Bahr476 they conclude that given a good quality institutional set up or 
decentralised government structures cohesion policy has a positive impact on growth. 
There are a number of possible explanations why the impact of Cohesion expenditure 
on growth might be ambivalent. The first one concerns effectiveness. As has been 
highlighted in the previous section on employment policy coordination, the amount of 
money a country spends on employment related policy is not always a good indicator 
of ultimate outcomes, as becomes clear e.g. from the money spent on active labour 
market policies. Hagen and Moll in this context also point to the fact that the 
allocation of funds is at least partly determined by political-economic factors. Hence, 
                                                   
471 European Commission website on the European Social Fund http://ec.europa.eu/esf/ last accessed 3 
January 2013. 
472 Ederveen et al, ‘Funds and games, the economics of European cohesion policy’ (ENEPRI 
occasional paper, no 3, 2003). 
473 Hagen and Moll, ‘Econometric evaluation of EU cohesion policy, a survey – a survey’ (ZEW 
discussion paper no 09-052, 2009). 
474 Ederveen et al., ‘Funds and games, the economics of European cohesion policy’ (ENEPRI 
occasional paper, no 3, 2003), 48. 
475 Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis, ‘Fertile soil for structural funds? A panel data analysis of the 
conditional effectiveness of European cohesion policy’ (Kyklos, vol 59, 2006). 
476 Bahr, ‘How does sub-national autonomy affect the effectiveness of structural funds?’ (Kyklos, vol 
61,  2008). 
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increased employment and productivity. Theoretically, however, there is a case to be 
made for focus of EU spending to stimulate employment in the least developed 
regions, since these are usually the ones with the largest potential for improvement. 
When overlying objectives are in line with economic theory, which they are, this is 
mostly a question of effectiveness of spending, a point that will be dealt with more 
extensively in the next section. A similar effectiveness of spending argument can be 
followed for as far as the third issue of short term-stabilisation policy is concerned, 
something which has developed since the 1990s in various instances in the form of 
either easier access to EU funds and/or the availability of extra funding in a given 
period.  
  
4.5.1 EU funds spending; impact on Member States’ policies 
 
Graph 60 provides an overview of the development of total EU Structural Fund 
expenditure (now mainly ESF and ERDF) in millions of UA/ECU/Euro468 since the 
1960s, as well as the development of expenditure under the European Social Fund.  
 
Graph 60 
 
Data source: European Commission469 
 
The total amount of EU structural spending has increased significantly throughout the 
years, especially since the mid 1970s470. As a percentage of EU GDP, spending is 
limited and relatively constant since the beginning of the 1990s at 0.3/0.4% or about 
                                                   
468 UA stands for Unit of Account, also known as European Unit of Account (EUA), a book-keeping 
device for recording the relative value of payments into and from EC accounts, replaced by the 
European currency unit (ECU), which has been replaced by the euro. 
469 Commission, ‘EU budget 2007 Financial Report’ (2007). 
470 The higher growth of total structural funds related to the ESF is mainly caused by the European 
Regional Development Fund. In 2006, for instance, the ERDF accounted for 14825 million Euro of 
spending. 
 
0.7% of public national spending. In the period 2007-2013 the ESF makes up 8% of 
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that projects under the ESF are co-financed by EU Member States, adding another 37 
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yielding rates of return that are unheard of in the private sector”474. Hagen and Moll 
present an overview of 22 more recent econometric evaluations of the impact of 
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that studies have provided mixed if not contradictory results. At the country level, the 
most that can be concluded from the empirical studies is that cohesion policy seems to 
be only conditionally effective. Referring to Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2006475) 
and Bahr476 they conclude that given a good quality institutional set up or 
decentralised government structures cohesion policy has a positive impact on growth. 
There are a number of possible explanations why the impact of Cohesion expenditure 
on growth might be ambivalent. The first one concerns effectiveness. As has been 
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471 European Commission website on the European Social Fund http://ec.europa.eu/esf/ last accessed 3 
January 2013. 
472 Ederveen et al, ‘Funds and games, the economics of European cohesion policy’ (ENEPRI 
occasional paper, no 3, 2003). 
473 Hagen and Moll, ‘Econometric evaluation of EU cohesion policy, a survey – a survey’ (ZEW 
discussion paper no 09-052, 2009). 
474 Ederveen et al., ‘Funds and games, the economics of European cohesion policy’ (ENEPRI 
occasional paper, no 3, 2003), 48. 
475 Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis, ‘Fertile soil for structural funds? A panel data analysis of the 
conditional effectiveness of European cohesion policy’ (Kyklos, vol 59, 2006). 
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“there is room for political bargaining and/or side payments which might result in the 
funding of politically feasible, and less economically efficient, projects”477.  
 
Related to this, is the concept of efficiency. There may be an efficiency argument in 
the distribution of EU money between countries and regions within the EU, with a 
euro spent in one region being less efficient in GDP per capita growth creation than 
the same EU money spent somewhere else. In a comprehensive study on EU spending 
on behalf of the European Commission, Ecorys, the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) and the Institute for Economic Research (IFO)478 
give some reasons for reconsideration of spending on employment and cohesion on 
the EU level. They are especially critical of the use of the EU budget for these types 
of projects in richer Member States. This entails both spending of convergence 
criteria money in poorer regions of richer Member States, as the full spending under 
the regional competitiveness and employment objective. The main reason is that these 
Member States have the financial capacity to finance these policies themselves, and 
they also have the institutional capacity to govern and monitor sponsored projects.  
 
A second issue is that EU spending may not be purely additional, meaning that EU 
spending may replace domestic spending that would otherwise be used for the same 
project. Ederveen et al. (2003479) determine what the effect is of being a so-called 
“Objective 1 region” (relatively poor regions that get the bulk of Cohesion money) on 
the amount of national regional aid. They find that, at the margin, a region typically 
forgoes 50% of national regional aid once it becomes eligible for Objective 1 support. 
This boils down to an average crowding out of 0.17 euro of cohesion support per 1 
euro of cohesion policy. Hagen and Moll (2009480) confirm the crowding out 
hypothesis. Using a 27 EU country dataset for the period 1982-2006, they show that 
EU Cohesion Policy payments do not seem to increase public investments in the EU 
countries. Given the obligatory co-financing that is involved in Cohesion policy, this 
indicates a crowding out process of national spending.  
 
                                                   
477 Hagen and Moll, ‘Econometric evaluation of EU cohesion policy, a survey – a survey’ (ZEW 
discussion paper no 09-052, 2009), 29. 
478 ECORYS, CPB and IFO, ‘A study on EU spending’ (Commissioned by the European Commission, 
2008). 
479 Ederveen et al., ‘Funds and games, the economics of European cohesion policy’ (ENEPRI 
occasional paper, no 3, 2003). 
480 Hagen and Moll, ‘How does EU Cohesion policy work? Evaluating its effects on fiscal outcome 
variables’ (ZEW discussion paper, no 09-051, 2009). 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focussed on the relationship between the four EU employment 
policy instruments and the economic objectives that were derived in chapters 2 and 3. 
What has become apparent from this analysis is that there is a good, though not 
perfect, fit between the economic objectives of chapter 2 and the content of the 
various EU employment policy instruments. However, it has also become apparent 
that the fact that EU employment policy instruments are aimed at certain economic 
objectives does not necessarily mean that the instruments actually contribute in an 
optimal manner to achieving these objectives. Analysis in the previous chapter 
showed large differences between the EU employment policy instruments in this 
regard. Possible underlying reasons for this, however, have so far only briefly been 
examined.  
 
This chapter will elaborate on these possible underlying reasons by focussing on a 
number of specific issues related to the institutional structure of EU employment 
policy that can have an impact on its effectiveness. From an institutional perspective, 
EU employment policy can be described as a complex multilevel model of 
governance, where decision-making competences are shared by actors at various 
levels of government, with mutually intertwined decision making processes481. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the nature of the vertical relationship between the 
Member States and the Union institutions as well as the nature of the horizontal inter-
institutional relationship between Union institutions and bodies have been the subject 
of constant evolution482. In general, arguments for assigning decision making powers 
in such a system with multi-level governments in a manner which leads to the greatest 
effectiveness in improving citizens' welfare are rooted in the theory of fiscal 
federalism. This theory, which finds its foundation in the work of Musgrave (1959)483, 
discusses the optimal level of centralisation of public economic functions. The theory 
identifies a trade-off between preference matching on the one hand, which would 
argue for decentralisation of power, and economies of scale and the internalisation of 
externalities on the other hand, which would argue for more centralisation484. 
Heterogeneity of preferences in different areas is a reason for decentralisation of 
policy making. This makes it possible to create a better fit between the preferences 
and policy implemented, which is welfare increasing. Economies of scale can be a 
                                                   
481 See chapter 3 and following also Hooghe and Marks, Multilevel Governance and European 
Integration (Rowman and Littlefield publishers, Oxford, 2001) and Blanpain et al., Employment 
policies and multilevel governance (Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
482 See chapter 3. See also Amtenbrink, ‘The multidimensional constitutional legal order of the 
European union – a successful case of cosmopolitan constitution building?’ (Netherlands yearbook of 
international law, vol XXXIX, 2008). 
483 Musgrave, The theory of public finance (McGraw-Hill, 1959). 
484 This simple set up necessitates a large number of assumptions on government behavior. For 
elaboration on this as well as a more elaborate overview see Ederveen, Gelauff and Pelkmans, 
‘Assessing subsidiarity’, in Gelauff, Grillo and Lejour, Subsidiarity and economic reform in Europe 
(Springer, 2008), section 2.2. 
 
reason to combine resources and act at a centralised level, for instance, when policies 
are costly because of high fixed costs, which again leads to increases in welfare. Cross 
border externalities finally are a reason for centralisation when decentralised 
governments take insufficient account of the consequences (positive or negative) of 
their own policies for other government constituencies. Centralisation then leads to 
these effects being taking into account in decision making, which, again, is welfare 
increasing.  
 
Placing these fiscal federalism considerations against the EU’s institutional 
framework, one can see that they find their way in the setting and implementation of 
EU employment policy via the concepts of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The limits of the Union’s competences are governed by the principle of conferral, 
under which Member States have delegated competences to the EU level in the 
founding Treaties, while the actual use of these competences, where they are shared 
between the EU and the Member States, is governed by the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality485. The manner in which the distribution of power between the EU 
and national level has taken place in the area of employment policy and how this 
influences its functioning is the subject of discussion in section 5.2.486  
 
Furthermore, the attribution and use of competences by actors in a multilevel 
environment calls for commensurate allocation of mechanism ensuring democratic 
legitimacy and accountability. Besides the relevance of such mechanisms from the 
point of view of fundamental democratic values487, the manner in which they are put 
in place influences the effectiveness of the instruments. That issues of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability can contribute to an effective functioning of 
employment policy instruments has been widely accepted, most so in the context of 
studies on the political economy of reform. First of all, effective democratic 
legitimacy and accountability can ensure that the setup of instruments takes place in a 
manner that is in line with citizen preference. Furthermore, a strong electoral mandate 
on the level where policy decisions are taken has been proven to be essential to ensure 
effective reform implementation488.  
 
Placing these considerations of democratic legitimacy and accountability against the 
EU’s institutional framework poses a number of difficulties. In fact, in ensuring 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, the EU has often been criticised as 
                                                   
485 Art 5 TFEU, in combination with the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
486 The approach will be limited to an analysis of the EU versus national level, which is readily 
acknowledged to be a large simplification of reality e.g. by not taking into account the regional 
dimension of this discussion.  
487 This angle will not be dealt with in this study. Interested readers are referred to Amtenbrink, The 
democratic accountability of Central Banks; a comparative study of the European Central Bank (Hart 
Publishing, 1999). 
488 See e.g. OECD, The Political Economy of Reform; lessons from pensions, product markets and 
labour markets in ten OECD countries (2009). 
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485 Art 5 TFEU, in combination with the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
486 The approach will be limited to an analysis of the EU versus national level, which is readily 
acknowledged to be a large simplification of reality e.g. by not taking into account the regional 
dimension of this discussion.  
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encompassing a general “democratic deficit”489. Difficulties stem from the fact that 
Europe does not constitute a state in the classic sense, but is rather a half-way house 
in which both the participating nation states as well as the supranational institutions 
function as sources for the democratic legitimation and the necessary mechanisms of 
democratic accountability490. Thus, the EU institutional framework rests on the 
twinfold legitimacy of the citizens, directly represented at the Union level in the 
European Parliament, and the Member States as represented in the Council, 
themselves democratically accountable either to their national parliaments or to their 
citizens491. Focussing on the role of the European Parliament and that of national 
parliaments, the extent to which the various instruments of EU employment policies 
are accompanied with effective mechanisms for democratic legitimacy and 
accountability is the subject of discussion in section 5.3492.  
 
Finally, given the complexity of the EU employment policy and the fact that various 
EU employment policy instruments are aimed at achieving the same economic 
objectives, the functioning of the instruments can be hindered by issues of coherence 
between the instruments as well as more practical problems in the application of the 
different instruments. The extent to which this is the case will be subject of discussion 
in section 5.4.  
 
5.2 Distribution of power in the supranational legal order 
 
5.2.1 Conferral 
 
In the EU context, any discussion on distribution of power in the supranational legal 
order and the trade-offs identified in fiscal federalism necessarily starts with the 
question of whether it is in fact legally possible for the European Union to act. Under 
the principle of conferral, “the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein”493. Furthermore, “competences not conferred upon the 
                                                   
489 There is a vast amount of literature on this issue. Examples include Scharpf, Governing in Europe: 
Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 1999) and Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the 
“Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing the Legitimacy of the European Union’ (Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2002). For an overview of relevant literature see Craig, The Lisbon 
Treaty, law, politics and Treaty reform (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
490 For an more detailed overview of this multilevel system, including explanation on the role played by 
the various institutional actors see Amtenbrink, ‘The multidimensional constitutional legal order of the 
European union – a successful case of cosmopolitan constitution building?’ (Netherlands yearbook of 
international law, vol XXXIX, 2008). 
491 Art 10 TFEU. 
492  It is readily acknowledged that this approach does not include all different manners in which 
democratic legitimacy and accountability can be ensured. The dialogue with representative associations 
and societies as well as the citizens initiative as laid down in art 11 TEU e.g. will not be dealt with, nor 
will the role played by the European Court of Justice and the national courts and tribunals in 
legitimizing the exercise of power at EU level.    
493 Art 5(2) TEU. 
 
Union by the Treaties remain with the Member States". . This setup can put some 
boundaries on the extent to which effectiveness of EU employment policy can be 
ensured, with e.g. the possibility that optimal policy making is hindered by a lack of 
EU competence. In any case, the principle of conferral acts as a framework, or first 
hurdle to take, before the more substantial subsidiarity and proportionality 
considerations handled in the next sections come into play.  
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU includes the substantive articles concerned 
with competence494, listing the various specific subject matter areas and 
differentiating between various types of competence. Principal categories are where 
the EU’s competence is exclusive495, where it is shared with the Member States496 and 
where the EU is limited to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
Member States497. Also, special categories of competences are created for the Union 
to coordinate economic, employment and social policies498. The extent to which the 
Union is allowed to lay down legally binding acts under these competences is laid 
down in article 2 TFEU. Here, it is stated that only the Union is allowed to legislate 
and lay down legally binding acts in the areas of exclusive competence, where both 
the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in areas 
falling under shared competence, though the Member States shall only exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. Breach of 
these rules can lead to legally binding acts, or parts thereof, being declared void 499. 
 
Article 2(6) TFEU states that the specific scope of and arrangements for exercising 
the Union's competences shall be determined by the provisions of the Treaties relating 
to each area. While keeping the general notions laid down in articles 2-6 TFEU in 
mind, it is therefore the specific legal bases under the different headings in the TFEU 
that this section will use to analyse the extent to which action is in line with the 
principle of conferral500. It should be noted that the scope of these legal bases can vary 
considerably. Furthermore, the existence in parallel of broad cross-sector legal bases, 
like article 114 TFEU for harmonisation in the internal market501, the residual legal 
basis of  article 352 TFEU, and the implied powers doctrine developed by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union502  give significant flexibility in this regard503.   
                                                   
494 Art 2-6 TFEU. 
495 Art 3 TFEU. 
496 Art 4 TFEU. 
497 Art 6 TFEU. 
498 Art 5 TFEU. 
499 Art 264 and 267 jo 263 TFEU. 
500 Amtenbrink and Vedder, Recht van de Europese Unie (4th edition, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 
2010). 
501 This development of the scope of this broad legal basis shows the large role the European Court of 
Justice has played in shaping EU competences, often ruling favorably in the identification of such 
competences. See e.g. Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council [1991] ECR I-2867. It is only in recent 
days the Court has been shown to take a bit more reluctant approach in its interpretation, see e.g. Case 
C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and the Council [2000] ECR I-8419. 
502 See e.g. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council  [1971] ECR 263 par 16, where the Court ruled that the 
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European union – a successful case of cosmopolitan constitution building?’ (Netherlands yearbook of 
international law, vol XXXIX, 2008). 
491 Art 10 TFEU. 
492  It is readily acknowledged that this approach does not include all different manners in which 
democratic legitimacy and accountability can be ensured. The dialogue with representative associations 
and societies as well as the citizens initiative as laid down in art 11 TEU e.g. will not be dealt with, nor 
will the role played by the European Court of Justice and the national courts and tribunals in 
legitimizing the exercise of power at EU level.    
493 Art 5(2) TEU. 
 
Union by the Treaties remain with the Member States". . This setup can put some 
boundaries on the extent to which effectiveness of EU employment policy can be 
ensured, with e.g. the possibility that optimal policy making is hindered by a lack of 
EU competence. In any case, the principle of conferral acts as a framework, or first 
hurdle to take, before the more substantial subsidiarity and proportionality 
considerations handled in the next sections come into play.  
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU includes the substantive articles concerned 
with competence494, listing the various specific subject matter areas and 
differentiating between various types of competence. Principal categories are where 
the EU’s competence is exclusive495, where it is shared with the Member States496 and 
where the EU is limited to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
Member States497. Also, special categories of competences are created for the Union 
to coordinate economic, employment and social policies498. The extent to which the 
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principle of conferral500. It should be noted that the scope of these legal bases can vary 
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of Justice of the European Union502  give significant flexibility in this regard503.   
                                                   
494 Art 2-6 TFEU. 
495 Art 3 TFEU. 
496 Art 4 TFEU. 
497 Art 6 TFEU. 
498 Art 5 TFEU. 
499 Art 264 and 267 jo 263 TFEU. 
500 Amtenbrink and Vedder, Recht van de Europese Unie (4th edition, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 
2010). 
501 This development of the scope of this broad legal basis shows the large role the European Court of 
Justice has played in shaping EU competences, often ruling favorably in the identification of such 
competences. See e.g. Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council [1991] ECR I-2867. It is only in recent 
days the Court has been shown to take a bit more reluctant approach in its interpretation, see e.g. Case 
C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and the Council [2000] ECR I-8419. 
502 See e.g. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council  [1971] ECR 263 par 16, where the Court ruled that the 
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The analysis of the principle of conferral as related to the employment policy 
instruments identified in the present study will be based on the following table that 
provides a more detailed overview of the various employment policy instruments 
currently in place.   
 
Table 18 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal market legislation 
 
Social employment policy 
 
 
EU funds spending 
legislation coordination 
 
Europa 2020 
strategy 
 
Euro Plus Pact 
 
Macroeconomic 
imbalances 
procedure 
 
Social security coordination  
 
Professional qualifications 
recognition 
 
Posting of workers  
 
Free movement of services 
 
European citizenship 
  
Freedom of movement of 
workers  
 
 
Gender 
equality  
 
Working 
environment 
and working 
conditions  
 
Social 
protection 
and social 
inclusion 
 
 
OMC social 
protection 
and 
inclusion 
 
 
European Social 
Fund  
 
European Regional 
Development Fund 
 
Considering employment policy coordination; the Europe 2020 strategy is based on 
article 121 and 148 TFEU and laid down in sections 1a and 1aa of Regulation 
1175/2011504. The Euro Plus Pact is an intergovernmental political process in which 
all EU Member States except the United Kingdom, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Sweden commit themselves to specific reform efforts on a year by year basis, with 
yearly review of progress by Heads of State or Government, and the Macroeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                 
right for the Community to enter international agreements exists not only when such a right is 
expressly provided for by a specific Treaty provision, but may also flow from other provisions of the 
Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community 
institutions. 
503 See e.g. Amtenbrink, ‘The multidimensional constitutional legal order of the European union – a 
successful case of cosmopolitan constitution building?’ (Netherlands yearbook of international law, vol 
XXXIX, 2008), ch 5, Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, law, politics and Treaty reform (Oxford University 
Press, 2010), ch 5 and  Chalmers et al, European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 
2010) ch 5 for further discussion on this issue. 
504 Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306. 
 
imbalances procedure is based on articles 121 and 136 TFEU and laid down in 
Regulation 1174/2011505 and Regulation 1176/2011506. 
 
This set up raises some questions. First, Regulation 1175/2011 is based on article 
121(6) TFEU, which is a legal basis for the Council and the European Parliament to 
adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure as far as it concerns 
articles 121(3) and 121(4) TFEU on economic policy. However, in its section 1a, 
Regulation 1175/2011 also includes procedural requirements as regards the 
formulation of employment guidelines and the issuing of country-specific 
recommendations under article 148 TFEU, something that does not fall under the 
relevant legal basis. Where from a fiscal federalism point of view it might be 
desirable for these additional rules to be laid down, it can therefore be doubted 
whether the principle of conferral in this specific setting actually allows for it.  
 
Second, the Euro Plus Pact is not officially based on any Treaty provisions. Instead it 
was included in the Conclusions of the Spring European Council 2011 which state 
that the Pact is to be integrated into the regular framework of surveillance in the 
European semester507. Both article 121 TFEU and article 148 TFEU arguably allow 
Member States to voluntarily commit themselves and make these commitments public 
so as to make peer and public pressure possible e.g. through their obligation to 
“forward information to the Commission about important measures taken by them in 
the field of their economic policy and such other information as they deem necessary” 
(article 121(3) TFEU) or in their “annual report on the principal measures taken to 
implement its employment policy in the light of the guidelines for employment” 
(article 148(3) TFEU). However, the formal relationship has (as of yet) not been 
incorporated, which leaves the Euro Plus Pact a purely political and 
intergovernmental process. 
 
Lastly, the macroeconomic imbalances procedure can indeed be considered a more 
detailed interpretation of the monitoring systematic under article 121 TFEU, in 
accordance with legal bases 136 and 121(6) TFEU. Although, as the analysis under 
subsidiarity and proportionality will show, from an effectiveness point of view, the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure incorporates desirable elements, it can be 
doubted whether the element of conferral actually allows such types of measures to be 
set up. Specifically, the two Regulations, and especially Regulation 1174/2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area, introduce two novelties which deserve further consideration, namely the 
possibility of financial sanctions and the change in voting arrangements in the Council 
                                                   
505 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306. 
506 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306. 
507 European Council conclusions, Brussels, 24/25 March 2011, annex 1. 
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articles 121(3) and 121(4) TFEU on economic policy. However, in its section 1a, 
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whether the principle of conferral in this specific setting actually allows for it.  
 
Second, the Euro Plus Pact is not officially based on any Treaty provisions. Instead it 
was included in the Conclusions of the Spring European Council 2011 which state 
that the Pact is to be integrated into the regular framework of surveillance in the 
European semester507. Both article 121 TFEU and article 148 TFEU arguably allow 
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so as to make peer and public pressure possible e.g. through their obligation to 
“forward information to the Commission about important measures taken by them in 
the field of their economic policy and such other information as they deem necessary” 
(article 121(3) TFEU) or in their “annual report on the principal measures taken to 
implement its employment policy in the light of the guidelines for employment” 
(article 148(3) TFEU). However, the formal relationship has (as of yet) not been 
incorporated, which leaves the Euro Plus Pact a purely political and 
intergovernmental process. 
 
Lastly, the macroeconomic imbalances procedure can indeed be considered a more 
detailed interpretation of the monitoring systematic under article 121 TFEU, in 
accordance with legal bases 136 and 121(6) TFEU. Although, as the analysis under 
subsidiarity and proportionality will show, from an effectiveness point of view, the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure incorporates desirable elements, it can be 
doubted whether the element of conferral actually allows such types of measures to be 
set up. Specifically, the two Regulations, and especially Regulation 1174/2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area, introduce two novelties which deserve further consideration, namely the 
possibility of financial sanctions and the change in voting arrangements in the Council 
                                                   
505 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306. 
506 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306. 
507 European Council conclusions, Brussels, 24/25 March 2011, annex 1. 
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in certain cases. The Lisbon Treaty, introduced a legal basis for this in article 136 
TFEU which is now used in combination with article 121(6) TFEU to form the legal 
basis for Regulation 1174/2011. Whether the legal basis of article 136508 is sufficient 
to actually cover the inclusion of sanctions in the procedure on macroeconomic 
imbalances can be doubted. Article 136(1) (a) TFEU in this regard would arguably be 
the most logical choice, but even then it can be questioned whether the concept of 
“coordination and surveillance of budgetary discipline” covers the measure in 
question. Firstly, whether the concept of “surveillance” is wide enough to cover the 
installation of sanctions can be questioned. Secondly, it is doubtful whether the full 
width of the imbalances procedure, which as has been observed in chapter 3 also 
relates to issues like unemployment and competitiveness, can in fact fall under the 
concept of “budgetary surveillance”. Furthermore, whether stricter surveillance in 
accordance with the procedure in article 121 can be interpreted as opening up the 
possibility to install financial sanctions in the multilaterals surveillance procedure is 
also open for debate. Similar questions can be raised as to the introduction of reversed 
qualified majority voting509. Also, whether the changes in institutional balance that 
this reversing of normal voting arrangements entails, increasing the power of the 
Commission to the detriment of the Council, can actually be said to be in accordance 
with the procedure in article 121 can again be questioned 510, since it expressly 
deviates from the voting procedures as laid down in the Treaty. However, since this is 
a new step in addition to the procedural steps and the corresponding regular QMV 
voting laid down in primary Union law, and therefore does not expressly go against 
primary Union law, there arguably is some freedom in defining these arrangements.  
 
Considering the instrument of internal market legislation, social security coordination 
is laid down in Regulation 883/2004511 and its implementing Regulation 987/2009512 
on the coordination of social security systems, which are based on articles 48 and 352 
TFEU513. The recognition of professional qualifications is laid down in Directive 
                                                   
508 Art 136 TFEU states 
1. In order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, and in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Treaties, the Council shall, in accordance with the relevant procedure 
from among those referred to in Articles 121 and 126, with the exception of the procedure set out in 
Article 126(14), adopt measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro: 
(a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline; 
(b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, while ensuring that they are compatible with those 
adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under surveillance. 
509 See e.g. Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 
on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306, art 3. 
510 See also Ruffert, ‘The European debt crisis and European Union law’ (Common Market Law 
Review 48, 2011). 
511 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166. 
512 Regulation 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying 
down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems [2009] OJ L 284. 
513 Art 352 TFEU is also quoted, since the scope of the Regulations also includes persons who are not 
 
 
2005/36/EC514 on the recognition of professional qualifications, based on article 46 
TFEU, covering workers, article 62 TFEU covering services and article 53(1) TFEU 
on establishment. The posting of workers is laid down in Directive 96/71/EC515 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provisioning of services,  
based on articles 53(1) and 62 TFEU. Free movement of services is laid down in 
Directive 2006/123/EC516 on services in the internal market, based on articles 53(1) 
and 62 TFEU. European citizenship is laid down in Regulation 2004/38/EC517 on 
European citizenship, based on articles 18 and 21 TFEU on respectively non 
discrimination based on nationality and the right for EU citizens to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, 46 TFEU on free movement of 
workers, 50 TFEU on freedom of establishment as regards a particular activity and 59 
TFEU on liberalisation of specific services. Finally, freedom of movement of 
workers, which is laid down in Regulation 492/2011518 on freedom of movement of 
workers within the Union, is based on article 46 TFEU. 
 
In general the above mentioned Treaty provisions can arguably be said to cover the 
substance of the various Directives. Free movement provisions in the area of workers, 
establishment and services are formulated to eliminate the type of barriers dealt with 
in most of the legislation under consideration. There are, however, some issues that 
deserve further consideration. Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 make 
arrangements to secure for workers in the area of social security aggregation of period 
under the laws of several countries and payment of benefits mentioned in article 48 
TFEU in general and in more detail for specific benefits. The addition of the 
flexibility article 352 TFEU is necessary since the Directive applies to all persons 
residing in a Member State who are or have been subject to the legislation of one or 
more Member States519, therewith encompassing more than just “employed 
persons”520. The fact that this “article of last resort” had to be used seems to have 
been remedied for future reference by the Treaty of Lisbon, which now includes 
                                                                                                                                                 
economically active and/or have not worked and therewith do not fall under art 48. 
514 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255. 
515 Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L 18. 
516 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376. 
517 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158. 
518 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141 
519 see Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166, art 2(1). 
520 See Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166, recital 2. 
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economically active and/or have not worked and therewith do not fall under art 48. 
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93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158. 
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520 See Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166, recital 2. 
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paragraph 3 of article 21 TFEU521. Article 21 TFEU clearly gives precedence to 
article 48 TFEU to be used first. To what extent this is possible however is somewhat 
unclear, as Article 48 TFEU includes the ambiguous term of “employed and self 
employed migrant workers”. This was probably meant to properly include self 
employed persons in the context of free movement of services and establishment in 
the legal basis next to persons in employment522, while at the same time the confines 
experienced due to the inclusion of the provision in the Treaty chapter on free 
movement of workers lead to the contradictory term “self employed worker”. 
Arguably, however, in the practical application in future changes to the Regulations 
this will not lead to that much difficulties, since already in the current Regulations the 
term worker as such is not used and preference is given to the terminology of 
employed and self employed person as defined in national legislation523.  
 
Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market has also been cause of some 
debate as far as the issue of conferral is concerned, especially during the negotiations 
leading up to the Directive524. Reason was mainly its scope as regards the economic 
activities covered and as well as the requirements that are considered obstacles to 
services provision. The agreed Directive is limited in scope to the provision of 
services as defined in article 57 TFEU525 through establishment of cross border 
service provision. Although there is still some uncertainty, for instance, with regard to 
the difference between the concept of services and that of goods526, this arguably does 
not stand in the way of articles 53 and 62 TFEU being the proper legal bases for the 
Directive. The argument whether the requirements could be considered obstacles to 
free movement revolved around the question of whether the formulation of the 
services Directive would regulate requirements that were never meant to fall under 
EU free movement law. In this regard, the final Directive in article 4(7) had a very 
broad definition of requirements527 which could cover a variety of measures528. 
                                                   
521 Which states: 
“3. For the same purposes as those referred to in paragraph 1 and if the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt 
measures concerning social security or social protection. The Council shall act unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament.” 
522 See Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 149, 
recital 2.  
523 See Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166, article 1(a) and 1(b). 
524 See e.g. Gekiere, ‘Towards a European Directive on services in the Internal Market; analysing the 
legal repercussions of the draft services Directive and its impact on national services regulations’ 
(Research report commissioned by the European Parliament, 2004). 
525 See Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 4(1) and Recital 33. 
526 See Barnard, ‘Unravelling the services Directive’ (Common Market Law Review 45, 2008). 
527 “any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in the laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions of the Member States or in consequence of case-law, administrative practice, 
the rules of professional bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or other professional 
organizations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy”  
528 Famous example here comes from the European Parliament, which questioned whether British 
 
 
Recital 9 of the Directive tries to frame this definition of requirements further by 
excluding requirements not specifically regulating or affecting the service activity but 
have to be respected in general. Although the Directive still leaves room for 
interpretation529, the text itself arguably does not go explicitly beyond the definition 
of requirements linked to the legal bases and therefore does not preclude these as legal 
bases. In fact, arguably, the argument rather goes the other way around; given the 
uncertainty, the interpretation of the Directive will be streamlined because of this 
choice of legal basis to cover just these requirements that fall under its scope.  
 
The last element that gives some cause for concern is the posting of workers 
Directive. The core of the Directive is the coordination of certain employment 
conditions between Member States by giving mandatory and permitted labour 
standards for a host Member State to apply to posted workers, mainly laid down in 
articles 3 of the Directive530. The difficulty here lies in the fact that to be in 
accordance with the legal basis, the coordination should be meant to make it easier to 
take up or pursue activities for the service provider. As far as the service provider is 
concerned, the Directive on the positive side increases legal certainty and facilitates 
                                                                                                                                                 
service providers could argue that the requirement to drive on the right side of the road restricted their 
freedom to provide services, see Barnard, ‘Unravelling the services Directive’ (Common Market Law 
Review 45, 2008). 
529 Also because of the somewhat contradictory recital 59 of the Directive.  
530 Which most relevantly states:  
“1. Member States shall ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the employment 
relationship, the undertakings referred to in art 1(1) guarantee workers posted to their territory 
the terms and conditions of employment covering the following matters which, in the Member 
State where the work is carried out, are laid down: 
- by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or 
- by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8, insofar as they concern the activities referred to 
in the Annex: 
(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
(b) minimum paid annual holidays; 
(c) the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; 
(d) the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by temporary 
employment undertakings; 
(e) health, safety and hygiene at work; 
(f) protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of pregnant 
women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of young people; 
(g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-discrimination. 
For the purposes of this Directive, the concept of minimum rates of pay referred to in 
paragraph 1 (c) is defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member State to whose 
territory the worker is posted. 
.................... 
7. paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment 
which are more favourable to workers 
...................... 
10.  This Directive shall not preclude the application by Member States, in compliance with the Treaty, 
to national undertakings and to the undertaking of other states, on a basis of equality of treatment of: 
- terms and conditions of employment on matters other than those referred to in the first subparagraphs 
of paragraph 1 in the case of public policy provisions”. 
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paragraph 3 of article 21 TFEU521. Article 21 TFEU clearly gives precedence to 
article 48 TFEU to be used first. To what extent this is possible however is somewhat 
unclear, as Article 48 TFEU includes the ambiguous term of “employed and self 
employed migrant workers”. This was probably meant to properly include self 
employed persons in the context of free movement of services and establishment in 
the legal basis next to persons in employment522, while at the same time the confines 
experienced due to the inclusion of the provision in the Treaty chapter on free 
movement of workers lead to the contradictory term “self employed worker”. 
Arguably, however, in the practical application in future changes to the Regulations 
this will not lead to that much difficulties, since already in the current Regulations the 
term worker as such is not used and preference is given to the terminology of 
employed and self employed person as defined in national legislation523.  
 
Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market has also been cause of some 
debate as far as the issue of conferral is concerned, especially during the negotiations 
leading up to the Directive524. Reason was mainly its scope as regards the economic 
activities covered and as well as the requirements that are considered obstacles to 
services provision. The agreed Directive is limited in scope to the provision of 
services as defined in article 57 TFEU525 through establishment of cross border 
service provision. Although there is still some uncertainty, for instance, with regard to 
the difference between the concept of services and that of goods526, this arguably does 
not stand in the way of articles 53 and 62 TFEU being the proper legal bases for the 
Directive. The argument whether the requirements could be considered obstacles to 
free movement revolved around the question of whether the formulation of the 
services Directive would regulate requirements that were never meant to fall under 
EU free movement law. In this regard, the final Directive in article 4(7) had a very 
broad definition of requirements527 which could cover a variety of measures528. 
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the identification of employment conditions applied to posted workers531. On the 
down side, however, it installs the obligation for service providers to comply with two 
different systems of law when providing a service in the home and host state. 
Contrary to promoting the free movement of services, this could actually hinder or 
render less attractive the cross border provision of services. Since the Directive does 
not harmonise but only coordinates relevant measures, the judgement of this will have 
to depend on the case-by-case application and interpretation of the Directive532. In any 
case, theoretically, the application of the Directive could actually be considered to be 
in breach of the freedom to provide services533. Should this be considered the case, the 
principle of conferral in this regard could actually have a positive impact as far as 
fiscal federalism considerations are concerned, with the principle acting as a deterrent 
for policy measures to be taken that are not in line with its considerations.   
 
Concerning social employment policy; gender equality has its legal basis in article 
157 TFEU with the main legislative instruments of Directive 2006/54/EC534 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation and Directive 2010/41/EU535 on the 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an 
activity in a self employed capacity. The improvement of the working environment 
and working conditions has its legal basis in article 153 TFEU and the main 
legislative instruments of Directive 89/391536 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work and Directive 
2003/88/EC537 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, as well 
as Directive 2008/104/EC538 on temporary agency work and the framework 
agreements on fixed term and part-time work based on article 155 TFEU of Directive 
99/70/EC539 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work and Directive 
97/81/EC540 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time working. Finally, the 
                                                   
531 See also Commission, ‘Posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services: 
maximising its benefits and potential while guaranteeing the protection of workers’ COM(2007)304. 
532 Section 5.4 will handle case law concerning the posting of workers Directive. 
533 See also Davies, ‘Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Systems?’ 
(Common Market Law Review 34, 1997). 
534 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation [2006] OJ L 204. 
535  Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010  on the 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a 
self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1. 
536 Directive 89/391/EEC of the Council of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183.  
537 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L 299. 
538 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on 
temporary agency work [2008] OJ L 327. 
539 Directive 99/70/EC of the Council of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L 175.  
540 Directive 97/81/EC of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
part-time working concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L 14. 
 
Open Method of Coordination social protection and social inclusion lacks an explicit 
legal basis.  
 
In general, the various legal bases can all be considered to cover the substance of the 
legal instruments under consideration. Although the OMC on social protection and 
social inclusion is not explicitly laid down in the Treaty, the monitoring process as 
developed can be based on articles 153(2), 156 and 160 TFEU and the competence 
these provisions vest upon the Council, European Parliament, Commission and Social 
Protection Committee to take measures inter alia to establish guidelines and 
indicators, the organisation of exchange of best practice, and the preparation of the 
necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, additional 
measures taken in the various areas, for instance, in the context of the Community 
strategy on health and safety at work541 and the strategy for equality between men and 
women542, including the PROGRESS program543 also find an appropriate legal basis 
in article 153(2)(a) TFEU. If anything, due to the evolving nature of the Treaty, some 
of the measures could in the current form just as well be based on another legal basis 
present in the Treaty. The gender equality Directives, for instance, could just as easily 
find a basis in article 153 TFEU, which in paragraph 1 (i) also mentions “equality 
between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at 
work”, and under the general non-discrimination article 19 TFEU, which incorporates 
a general non-discrimination clause, including specifically the aspect of 
discrimination based on gender. 
 
Lastly, concerning the instrument of EU funds spending, general provisions regarding 
the EU Structural Funds in the programme period 2007-2013 are laid down in 
Regulations 1083/2006544 and its implementing Regulation 1828/2006545, based on 
article 177 TFEU. The specific Regulation 1081/2006546 on the European Social 
Fund, based on articles 164 TFEU linked, which are also to the specific Regulation on 
the European Regional Development Fund 1080/2006547 based on article 178 TFEU. 
                                                   
541 Commission, ‘Improving quality and productivity at work: community strategy 2007-2012 on health 
and safety at work’ COM(2007)62.  
542 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between men and women 2010-2015’ COM(2010/491).  
543 Decision 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 2006 
establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity — Progress [2006] OJ L 
315. 
544 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210. 
545 Commission Regulation 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006 setting out rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and of Regulation1080/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional Development Fund [2006] OJ L 
371/1. 
546 Regulation 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 July 2006 on the European 
Social Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 [2006] OJ L 210. 
547 Regulation1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional 
Development Fund [2006] OJ L 371/1. 
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541 Commission, ‘Improving quality and productivity at work: community strategy 2007-2012 on health 
and safety at work’ COM(2007)62.  
542 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between men and women 2010-2015’ COM(2010/491).  
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establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity — Progress [2006] OJ L 
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544 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
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545 Commission Regulation 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006 setting out rules for the implementation of 
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Here too there is no question that appropriate legal bases exist for the Structural Funds 
Regulations in general, and specifically the ESF and ERDF. This is even more so 
since the legal bases in fact require the set up of Regulations to define the tasks, 
priority objectives and the organisation of the Structural Funds as well as specific 
implementing Regulations for the ESF and ERDF.  
 
5.2.2 Subsidiarity 
 
If it is established that the European Union has a competence to act in a certain area it 
does not necessarily mean that the EU should use this competence. This decision is 
governed by the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in article 5(3) TEU and the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 548. 
Article 5(3) TFEU states that the Union, where it does not have an exclusive 
competence, shall only act when the goals pursued cannot sufficiently be achieved by 
Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved at Union level. The subsidiarity principle therefore goes to when 
the Union should intervene, something which is also captured in the Preambule to the 
Treaty on European Union, which states that Member States are resolved to “continue 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in 
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen”. Breaching these rules 
can again lead to legally binding acts, or parts thereof, being declared void 549. 
Subsidiarity is linked to the effectiveness of implementation of policy in the sense that 
the principle of subsidiarity to a large extent embodies the trade-off identified in fiscal 
federalism theory for assigning the optimal level of centralisation of public economic 
functions, with both the preference matching argument and those on economies of 
scale and the internationalisation of externalities being part of the subsidiarity test. 
However, although similar in its considerations, the EU legal setup places important 
limitations as to the manner in which the subsidiarity test can fully include all of fiscal 
federalisms elements. These limitations relate both to the nature of EU competences 
and the role of the European Court of Justice.  
 
EU competences tend to be defined in terms of objectives to be achieved, rather than 
areas of activity to be regulated. This means that subsidiarity in these cases is largely 
                                                   
548 For an overview of the historical development of the principle of subsidiarity and its inclusion in the 
Maastricht Treaty see Estella, The EU principle of subsidiarity and its critique (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
549 Art 264 and 267 jo 263 TFEU. Furthermore, the protocol on the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality lays down a procedure in which national parliaments can give reasoned 
opinions on draft legislative proposals and their conformity with the subsidiarity principle. If more than 
a third is of the opinion that a proposal is not in line with subsidiarity principle the Commission is 
obligated to review the proposal after which it may be decided to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
draft. Furthermore, a proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure can be stopped by a simple 
majority of national parliaments when a minimum of 55% of the members of the Council or a majority 
in the European Parliament is also of the opinion that a proposal is not line with the subsidiarity 
principle. 
 
a test of the extent to which it achieves Community goals, something which from the 
perspective taken here can arguably render the subsidiarity principle largely 
useless550. A good example is the aim of harmonisation in the internal market of 
article 114 TFEU. For this functional competence it is very hard to argue that it could 
be better achieved at Member State level, since it is not the area of harmonisation that 
is put under scrutiny, but the actual function of harmonisation in the Internal Market 
in this area. This can be illustrated by the practice of the European Court of Justice, 
where the argument of the court in annulment cases seems to follow a repetitive 
pattern. First the complainant states that the act under review regulates an area of 
national competence (think of social security or health and safety), that Member 
States could just as well regulate this themselves and that therefore subsidiarity should 
prevent EU action. The measures, however, are pursuing one of the Community’s 
functional competences, for instance the removing of obstacles to free movement, and 
not the regulation of the area of national competence per se. The Court therefore is 
left no other option than to reject the claim because it asks the wrong question551.  In 
general, the Court of Justice has so far taken a critical stance against appeals based on 
reasoning of Union action not being in line with the principle of subsidiarity552. 
Annulment of a measure on the ground that it offends against subsidiarity is therefore 
generally considered to be likely to occur only in extreme circumstances553. Keeping 
these general limitations of the subsidiarity principle in mind, the remainder of this 
section will analyse the four instruments of EU employment policies. 
 
EU measures in the area of employment policy coordination (i.e. the Europe 2020 
strategy, the Euro Plus Pact and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure) are meant 
to set out arrangements for the coordination of economic and employment policies of 
Member States, in particular by defining (broad) guidelines for these policies554. 
Though these competences form a special category in the competence catalogue of the 
Treaty555, it is safe to argue that this was not meant to preclude any type of 
arrangement by the Member States themselves556. The competence therefore can be 
                                                   
550 See also in this regard Davies, ‘Subsidiarity, the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ 
(Common Market Law Review 43, 2006). 
551 See e.g. Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079. See 
also Davies, ‘Subsidiarity, the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (Common Market 
Law Review 43, 2006). 
552 Amtenbrink and Vedder, Recht van de Europese Unie (4th edition, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 
2010). 
553 Chalmers et al, European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010). The mainly 
political nature of the principle is further underlined by the the aforementioned procedure for national 
parliaments. 
554 Art 5(1) and 5(2) TFEU. 
555 This can lead to some discussion on the width of Union competences in this regard See Craig, The 
Lisbon Treaty, law, politics and Treaty reform (Oxford University Press, 2010), ch 7 for an overview 
and historical development of this special category of competence.  
556 See also Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, judgement of 27 November 2012, where 
the European Court of Justice makes a similar argument as regards the Member States' set up of the European 
Stability Mechanism. In any case, there are numerous other examples where two or more Member States 
have coordinated (parts of) their employment and economic policies, prominent case in point being the 
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Here too there is no question that appropriate legal bases exist for the Structural Funds 
Regulations in general, and specifically the ESF and ERDF. This is even more so 
since the legal bases in fact require the set up of Regulations to define the tasks, 
priority objectives and the organisation of the Structural Funds as well as specific 
implementing Regulations for the ESF and ERDF.  
 
5.2.2 Subsidiarity 
 
If it is established that the European Union has a competence to act in a certain area it 
does not necessarily mean that the EU should use this competence. This decision is 
governed by the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in article 5(3) TEU and the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 548. 
Article 5(3) TFEU states that the Union, where it does not have an exclusive 
competence, shall only act when the goals pursued cannot sufficiently be achieved by 
Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved at Union level. The subsidiarity principle therefore goes to when 
the Union should intervene, something which is also captured in the Preambule to the 
Treaty on European Union, which states that Member States are resolved to “continue 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in 
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen”. Breaching these rules 
can again lead to legally binding acts, or parts thereof, being declared void 549. 
Subsidiarity is linked to the effectiveness of implementation of policy in the sense that 
the principle of subsidiarity to a large extent embodies the trade-off identified in fiscal 
federalism theory for assigning the optimal level of centralisation of public economic 
functions, with both the preference matching argument and those on economies of 
scale and the internationalisation of externalities being part of the subsidiarity test. 
However, although similar in its considerations, the EU legal setup places important 
limitations as to the manner in which the subsidiarity test can fully include all of fiscal 
federalisms elements. These limitations relate both to the nature of EU competences 
and the role of the European Court of Justice.  
 
EU competences tend to be defined in terms of objectives to be achieved, rather than 
areas of activity to be regulated. This means that subsidiarity in these cases is largely 
                                                   
548 For an overview of the historical development of the principle of subsidiarity and its inclusion in the 
Maastricht Treaty see Estella, The EU principle of subsidiarity and its critique (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
549 Art 264 and 267 jo 263 TFEU. Furthermore, the protocol on the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality lays down a procedure in which national parliaments can give reasoned 
opinions on draft legislative proposals and their conformity with the subsidiarity principle. If more than 
a third is of the opinion that a proposal is not in line with subsidiarity principle the Commission is 
obligated to review the proposal after which it may be decided to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
draft. Furthermore, a proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure can be stopped by a simple 
majority of national parliaments when a minimum of 55% of the members of the Council or a majority 
in the European Parliament is also of the opinion that a proposal is not line with the subsidiarity 
principle. 
 
a test of the extent to which it achieves Community goals, something which from the 
perspective taken here can arguably render the subsidiarity principle largely 
useless550. A good example is the aim of harmonisation in the internal market of 
article 114 TFEU. For this functional competence it is very hard to argue that it could 
be better achieved at Member State level, since it is not the area of harmonisation that 
is put under scrutiny, but the actual function of harmonisation in the Internal Market 
in this area. This can be illustrated by the practice of the European Court of Justice, 
where the argument of the court in annulment cases seems to follow a repetitive 
pattern. First the complainant states that the act under review regulates an area of 
national competence (think of social security or health and safety), that Member 
States could just as well regulate this themselves and that therefore subsidiarity should 
prevent EU action. The measures, however, are pursuing one of the Community’s 
functional competences, for instance the removing of obstacles to free movement, and 
not the regulation of the area of national competence per se. The Court therefore is 
left no other option than to reject the claim because it asks the wrong question551.  In 
general, the Court of Justice has so far taken a critical stance against appeals based on 
reasoning of Union action not being in line with the principle of subsidiarity552. 
Annulment of a measure on the ground that it offends against subsidiarity is therefore 
generally considered to be likely to occur only in extreme circumstances553. Keeping 
these general limitations of the subsidiarity principle in mind, the remainder of this 
section will analyse the four instruments of EU employment policies. 
 
EU measures in the area of employment policy coordination (i.e. the Europe 2020 
strategy, the Euro Plus Pact and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure) are meant 
to set out arrangements for the coordination of economic and employment policies of 
Member States, in particular by defining (broad) guidelines for these policies554. 
Though these competences form a special category in the competence catalogue of the 
Treaty555, it is safe to argue that this was not meant to preclude any type of 
arrangement by the Member States themselves556. The competence therefore can be 
                                                   
550 See also in this regard Davies, ‘Subsidiarity, the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ 
(Common Market Law Review 43, 2006). 
551 See e.g. Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079. See 
also Davies, ‘Subsidiarity, the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (Common Market 
Law Review 43, 2006). 
552 Amtenbrink and Vedder, Recht van de Europese Unie (4th edition, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 
2010). 
553 Chalmers et al, European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010). The mainly 
political nature of the principle is further underlined by the the aforementioned procedure for national 
parliaments. 
554 Art 5(1) and 5(2) TFEU. 
555 This can lead to some discussion on the width of Union competences in this regard See Craig, The 
Lisbon Treaty, law, politics and Treaty reform (Oxford University Press, 2010), ch 7 for an overview 
and historical development of this special category of competence.  
556 See also Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, judgement of 27 November 2012, where 
the European Court of Justice makes a similar argument as regards the Member States' set up of the European 
Stability Mechanism. In any case, there are numerous other examples where two or more Member States 
have coordinated (parts of) their employment and economic policies, prominent case in point being the 
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deemed to not be of an exclusive nature, which makes subsidiarity apply. The 
coordination of economic and employment policies however, is a functional 
competence. Similar to the argument seen earlier with the harmonisation of the 
internal market, the coordination exercise per se is therefore something that can be 
quite easily justified as something better achieved at the Union level. The subsidiary 
principle in this sense therefore gives very little help in determining whether EU 
action in this area is set up in the most effective manner. To end discussion on 
subsidiarity on this note, however, would arguably be a too limited approach. The 
question that remains is what the scope of EU action should be. Because of the lack of 
definition in the Treaty of what economic and employment policies actually are there 
is room for debate; is there a necessity to create coordination mechanisms for the 
various employment related subjects under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
and the employment guidelines?557. This does give us the room to analyse the aspects 
of fiscal federalism, or the manner in which possible economies of scale or 
externalities present in the areas subject of coordination weigh up against the 
heterogeneity between Member States in the areas under consideration. This sort of 
application of the principle of subsidiarity when related to the Open Method of 
Coordination has been extensively debated, especially at the start of the Lisbon 
strategy in 2000558 and its relaunch in 2005559, and first necessitates a further 
differentiation in the concept of “externalities”. Externalities can be both positive and 
negative. Positive externalities would e.g. entail that when one country takes measures 
that increases its output in these areas, this would lead to positive side effects in other 
countries as well. Another option is that simultaneous action by several countries 
leads to larger gains. In these cases, from a welfare enhancing perspective, 
coordinated action would increase the overall effectiveness of policies. There is, in 
general, very little evidence for these types of externalities in the area of employment 
policies560, and where they are identified they are very small561. For instance, Lejour 
                                                                                                                                                 
recent Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.   
557 To recall, the most prominent output variables under the various policy coordination instruments are 
the headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy (employment rate, the two education rate targets and 
the social inclusion target) and the competitiveness goals of the Euro Plus Pact and the macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure. The current employment guidelines are 
- Increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing structural unemployment and 
promoting job quality 
- Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs and promoting lifelong learning 
- Improving the quality and performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing 
participation in tertiary or equivalent education 
- Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty 
Furthermore, the relevant Broad Economic Policy guidelines are 
- Addressing macroeconomic imbalances 
- Reducing imbalances within the Euro area. 
See Council Recommendation 2010/410/EU of 13 July 2010 on broad guidelines for the economic 
policies of the Member States and of the Union [2010] OJ L 191 and Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 
21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States [2010] OJ L 205 
558 See e.g. Syrpis, ‘Legitimising European Governance; Taking Subsidiarity Seriously within the Open 
Method of Coordination’ (EUI working paper LAW, no 2002/10, 2002). 
559 See e.g. Pisany-Ferry and Sapir, ‘Last exit to Lisbon’ (Bruegel policy contribution, 2006). 
560 See e.g. Gelauff, Grillo and Lejour, Subsidiarity and economic reform in Europe (Springer, 2008) 
 
 
and Rojas-Romagosa (2008)562, in analysing the effects of simultaneously achieving 
the earlier Lisbon Strategy’s 70% employment target and several targets in the area of 
skills, find that the externalities only accounts for around 6% of the total effect. 
Furthermore, there are large structural heterogeneities between Member States563, 
which would indicate that policy making is better left decentralised to cater for 
specific citizen preferences. This argument therewith leaves a weak case for EU 
action. However, again, to end discussion on subsidiarity on this note would arguably 
be a too limited approach. Positive externalities can also stem from the level of actual 
policy decisions rather than the level of policy outcome. Positive externalities in this 
regard could include better policy outcomes e.g. when coordination fosters learning 
from the experiences of others on what works and what does not work and therewith 
decreases the uncertainties on the effect of reforms564. From this point of view there is 
also a line of reasoning concerning some type of peer pressure in those cases where 
pressure from EU level “helps” Member States to improve and speed up national 
policy decisions. Although within the European Union there is a large level of policy 
heterogeneity in the areas under consideration565, externalities in this respect are more 
easily envisioned in the various areas mentioned above.  
 
Contrary to positive externalities, negative externalities would mean that action, or the 
lack thereof, in one Member State would lead to negative effects in another Member 
State. This line of reasoning is particularly relevant for the countries that share the 
euro as common currency. With a common monetary policy from the European 
Central Bank and without the possibility of exchange rate fluctuations, the policies 
governments of those countries can pursue to increase their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
other countries as well as the manner in which they can deal with (asymmetric) 
shocks is limited566. This puts extra pressure on countries to pursue structural reforms 
to improve the functioning and flexibility of markets567. Not taking these kind of 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Tabellini and Wyplosz, ‘Reformes structurelles et coordination en Europe’ (Report to the Prime 
Minister of France, 2004). More specifically in the area of education see e.g. Thissen and Ederveen, 
‘Higher education, time for coordination on a European level?’ (CPB discussion paper, no 68, 2006). 
The same goes for the existence of possible economies of scale.  
561 See Rosenbaum, ‘Lisbon, Europe 2020, and the Case for Soft Coordination in EU Policymaking’ 
(Intereconomics, vol 45, issue 5, 2010).  
562 Lejour and Rojas-Romagosa, ‘International spillovers of domestic reforms: The joint application of 
the Lisbon Strategy in the EU’ (CPB discussion paper, no 105, 2008). 
563 See section 4.2. See also Tabellini and Wyplosz, ‘Reformes structurelles et coordination en Europe’ 
(Report to the Prime Minister of France, 2004). 
564 Debrun and Pisany Ferry, ‘Economic reforms in the euro area; is there a common agenda’ (Bruegel 
Policy contribution, 2006). 
565 See section 4.2. 
566 These kind of issues relate to the Optimum Currency Area theory, as first set out by Mundell in 
1961, see Mundell, ‘A theory of Optimum Currency Areas’ (American Economic Review, vol 51, no 4, 
1961). 
567 See also Bednarek-Sekunda, Jong-A-Pin and de Haan, ‘The European Economic and Monetary 
Union and Labour Market Reform’ (European Union Politics 11:3, 2010) who make a distinction 
between policy measures aimed at reform that enhances the capacity of an economy to adjust to 
economic shocks and reform that aims to increase long-run output, with the former applying to 
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deemed to not be of an exclusive nature, which makes subsidiarity apply. The 
coordination of economic and employment policies however, is a functional 
competence. Similar to the argument seen earlier with the harmonisation of the 
internal market, the coordination exercise per se is therefore something that can be 
quite easily justified as something better achieved at the Union level. The subsidiary 
principle in this sense therefore gives very little help in determining whether EU 
action in this area is set up in the most effective manner. To end discussion on 
subsidiarity on this note, however, would arguably be a too limited approach. The 
question that remains is what the scope of EU action should be. Because of the lack of 
definition in the Treaty of what economic and employment policies actually are there 
is room for debate; is there a necessity to create coordination mechanisms for the 
various employment related subjects under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
and the employment guidelines?557. This does give us the room to analyse the aspects 
of fiscal federalism, or the manner in which possible economies of scale or 
externalities present in the areas subject of coordination weigh up against the 
heterogeneity between Member States in the areas under consideration. This sort of 
application of the principle of subsidiarity when related to the Open Method of 
Coordination has been extensively debated, especially at the start of the Lisbon 
strategy in 2000558 and its relaunch in 2005559, and first necessitates a further 
differentiation in the concept of “externalities”. Externalities can be both positive and 
negative. Positive externalities would e.g. entail that when one country takes measures 
that increases its output in these areas, this would lead to positive side effects in other 
countries as well. Another option is that simultaneous action by several countries 
leads to larger gains. In these cases, from a welfare enhancing perspective, 
coordinated action would increase the overall effectiveness of policies. There is, in 
general, very little evidence for these types of externalities in the area of employment 
policies560, and where they are identified they are very small561. For instance, Lejour 
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- Increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing structural unemployment and 
promoting job quality 
- Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs and promoting lifelong learning 
- Improving the quality and performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing 
participation in tertiary or equivalent education 
- Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty 
Furthermore, the relevant Broad Economic Policy guidelines are 
- Addressing macroeconomic imbalances 
- Reducing imbalances within the Euro area. 
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and Rojas-Romagosa (2008)562, in analysing the effects of simultaneously achieving 
the earlier Lisbon Strategy’s 70% employment target and several targets in the area of 
skills, find that the externalities only accounts for around 6% of the total effect. 
Furthermore, there are large structural heterogeneities between Member States563, 
which would indicate that policy making is better left decentralised to cater for 
specific citizen preferences. This argument therewith leaves a weak case for EU 
action. However, again, to end discussion on subsidiarity on this note would arguably 
be a too limited approach. Positive externalities can also stem from the level of actual 
policy decisions rather than the level of policy outcome. Positive externalities in this 
regard could include better policy outcomes e.g. when coordination fosters learning 
from the experiences of others on what works and what does not work and therewith 
decreases the uncertainties on the effect of reforms564. From this point of view there is 
also a line of reasoning concerning some type of peer pressure in those cases where 
pressure from EU level “helps” Member States to improve and speed up national 
policy decisions. Although within the European Union there is a large level of policy 
heterogeneity in the areas under consideration565, externalities in this respect are more 
easily envisioned in the various areas mentioned above.  
 
Contrary to positive externalities, negative externalities would mean that action, or the 
lack thereof, in one Member State would lead to negative effects in another Member 
State. This line of reasoning is particularly relevant for the countries that share the 
euro as common currency. With a common monetary policy from the European 
Central Bank and without the possibility of exchange rate fluctuations, the policies 
governments of those countries can pursue to increase their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
other countries as well as the manner in which they can deal with (asymmetric) 
shocks is limited566. This puts extra pressure on countries to pursue structural reforms 
to improve the functioning and flexibility of markets567. Not taking these kind of 
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562 Lejour and Rojas-Romagosa, ‘International spillovers of domestic reforms: The joint application of 
the Lisbon Strategy in the EU’ (CPB discussion paper, no 105, 2008). 
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(Report to the Prime Minister of France, 2004). 
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measures not only increases the economic and fiscal policy vulnerability of the 
countries in question; given the externalities within the closely integrated euro-area 
markets, they are also a hazard for other Member States and, consequently, for the 
single currency area as a whole. Furthermore, the ensuing divergence within the euro 
area can impede the implementation of a uniform monetary policy that is geared to 
price stability. All these externalities further legitimate EU action, since coordination 
between Member States would internalise these externalities and therewith increase 
the effectiveness of policies568.  
 
Taking the different aspects into account, some form of coordination of the various 
economic and employment policies mentioned in the Employment and Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines is arguably in line with the subsidiarity principle. The 
negative externalities argument is most relevant for the issues related to 
macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness, especially in the euro area. The 
positive political externalities argument can be relevant for all issues considered. 
Since the reasoning differs from subject to subject, this should also have effects on the 
specific kind of coordination that is installed, which will be dealt with under 
proportionality below. 
 
The second instrument of EU employment policy, the internal market is an area of 
shared competence between the EU and the Member States569. Subsidiarity therefore 
applies. However, here too the functional manner of the competence makes EU action 
in this area easily justifiable, and therewith gives us little room to analyse the fiscal 
federalism balance. Since the various Directives and Regulations have as policy 
objectives to improve the functioning of the internal market and facilitate the free 
movement of workers, services and establishment, the cross border element is per 
definition present and can therefore not be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States. Furthermore, specific provisions largely concern the objective of either 
“coordination”, “mutual recognition” or “aggregation” between Member States, again 
something that cannot be done sufficiently by Member States themselves570.  
 
The third instrument of EU employment policy, social employment policy falls under 
                                                                                                                                                 
measures in the area of employment protection legislation, working time/part time work and wage 
formation and industrial relations.  
568 Rosenbaum, ‘Lisbon, Europe 2020, and the Case for Soft Coordination in EU Policymaking’ 
(Intereconomics, vol 45, issue 5, 2010).  
569 Art 4(2)(a) TFEU. 
570 The fact that the subsidiarity test is quite easily passed in these kinds of measures is e.g. reflected in 
the Commission’s extended impact assessment on the proposal for the services Directive. In this it 
states “In accordance with the case law of the European Court of Justice, certain barriers may be 
justified in the absence of a Community instrument and therefore require co-ordination of national 
regimes, including through administrative cooperation, in order to remove them. In addition, Member 
States have failed to remove even those obstacles which have already been judged by the Court as 
incompatible with the Treaty. It is therefore clear that the policy objective cannot be met by unilateral 
action by Member States but requires action at Community level. The choice of a Directive therefore 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity.”  
 
two different kinds of competences. First, the area of social policy for the aspects 
defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is an area of shared competence 
between the EU and the Member States571. Second, the Union may take initiatives to 
ensure coordination of Member States’ social policies572. Since neither of these are 
exclusive competences, subsidiarity for the various aspects of social policy discussed 
here applies. The first competence concerns the areas of social policy that can be 
directly subject to the EU’s social policy measures, meant to contribute to the goals of 
the social chapter in article 151 TFEU. The second competence concerns again a 
functional competence of coordination of Member States’ policies, with conclusions 
largely coinciding with the analysis of the various employment policy coordination 
mechanisms. The coordination exercise per se is therewith quite easily justified as 
something better achieved at the Union level. However, and similar to the argument 
concerning economic and employment policy coordination, given the lack of a full 
definition of the social policies to be coordinated the question remains as to what the 
exact scope of EU action should be573. Keeping this distinction in mind, analysis of 
subsidiarity for all the measures calls for an analysis of the possible external and scale 
effects versus the heterogeneity between Member States on the various subjects. In 
general, this analysis makes it difficult to justify EU action in the various areas of EU 
social policy discussed here. As has been highlighted in chapter 4, there exists a large 
heterogeneity between Member States linked to e.g. cultural preferences and 
institutional set up. This would indicate that policy making is better left decentralised 
to cater for specific citizen preferences. Furthermore, as was already partly identified 
in the previous section, external, as well as scale effects are generally considered to be 
small574, even in those areas of labour market regulation were discussion in the 1980s 
and 1990s focussed on a possible “race to the bottom” due to increased openness to 
trade575. However, here too it has to be kept in mind that externalities can also be 
examined from the level of actual policy decisions rather than the level of policy 
outcome. Positive externalities in this regard could include better policy outcomes, 
e.g. when coordination fosters learning from the experiences of others, and therewith 
decreases the uncertainties on the effect of reforms576. Externalities in this respect are 
more easily envisioned in all the various areas mentioned above577. The political 
                                                   
571 Art 4(2)(b) TFEU. 
572 Art 5(3) TFEU. 
573 Gender equality based on art 157 TFEU is a bit of the odd one out in this division since it is not 
directly linked to art 151 TFEU and the measures taken concern measures that ensure the application of 
the principle of gender equality. However, subsidiarity can be applied in a similar manner.  
574 See also e.g. Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, ‘European outlook 1; social 
Europe’ (CPB bijzondere publicaties 48, 2003). 
575 See e.g. OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and 
International Trade (1996). For a survey of literature on this issue see Brown, ‘International Trade and 
Core Labor Standards A Survey of the Recent Literature’ (OECD Labour Market and Social Policy 
Occasional Papers, no 43, 2000). 
576 Debrun and Pisany Ferry, ‘Economic reforms in the euro area; is there a common agenda’ (Bruegel 
Policy contribution, 2006). 
577 Next to these positive externalities one could imagine a line of reasoning based on negative 
externalities in the area of pensions related to public finances and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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measures not only increases the economic and fiscal policy vulnerability of the 
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markets, they are also a hazard for other Member States and, consequently, for the 
single currency area as a whole. Furthermore, the ensuing divergence within the euro 
area can impede the implementation of a uniform monetary policy that is geared to 
price stability. All these externalities further legitimate EU action, since coordination 
between Member States would internalise these externalities and therewith increase 
the effectiveness of policies568.  
 
Taking the different aspects into account, some form of coordination of the various 
economic and employment policies mentioned in the Employment and Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines is arguably in line with the subsidiarity principle. The 
negative externalities argument is most relevant for the issues related to 
macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness, especially in the euro area. The 
positive political externalities argument can be relevant for all issues considered. 
Since the reasoning differs from subject to subject, this should also have effects on the 
specific kind of coordination that is installed, which will be dealt with under 
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The second instrument of EU employment policy, the internal market is an area of 
shared competence between the EU and the Member States569. Subsidiarity therefore 
applies. However, here too the functional manner of the competence makes EU action 
in this area easily justifiable, and therewith gives us little room to analyse the fiscal 
federalism balance. Since the various Directives and Regulations have as policy 
objectives to improve the functioning of the internal market and facilitate the free 
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definition present and can therefore not be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States. Furthermore, specific provisions largely concern the objective of either 
“coordination”, “mutual recognition” or “aggregation” between Member States, again 
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two different kinds of competences. First, the area of social policy for the aspects 
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largely coinciding with the analysis of the various employment policy coordination 
mechanisms. The coordination exercise per se is therewith quite easily justified as 
something better achieved at the Union level. However, and similar to the argument 
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571 Art 4(2)(b) TFEU. 
572 Art 5(3) TFEU. 
573 Gender equality based on art 157 TFEU is a bit of the odd one out in this division since it is not 
directly linked to art 151 TFEU and the measures taken concern measures that ensure the application of 
the principle of gender equality. However, subsidiarity can be applied in a similar manner.  
574 See also e.g. Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, ‘European outlook 1; social 
Europe’ (CPB bijzondere publicaties 48, 2003). 
575 See e.g. OECD, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and 
International Trade (1996). For a survey of literature on this issue see Brown, ‘International Trade and 
Core Labor Standards A Survey of the Recent Literature’ (OECD Labour Market and Social Policy 
Occasional Papers, no 43, 2000). 
576 Debrun and Pisany Ferry, ‘Economic reforms in the euro area; is there a common agenda’ (Bruegel 
Policy contribution, 2006). 
577 Next to these positive externalities one could imagine a line of reasoning based on negative 
externalities in the area of pensions related to public finances and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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externalities argument therefore arguably justifies some form of action on EU level in 
the various areas under consideration.  
 
Finally, concerning EU funds spending, both social policy, for the aspects defined in 
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competence between the Union and the Member States578. Subsidiarity in analysing 
the EU funds therefore applies579. At the outset of this analysis, it should be noted that 
there are some specificities that stem from the combination of the legal basis as 
regards the exact purpose of the funds. The European Social Fund’s goals are laid 
down in article 162 TFEU580, linking it to improving employment opportunities for 
workers in the internal market. The ESF as an instrument, however, is also placed 
under the umbrella of the EU Structural Funds, the goals of which are laid down in 
article 174 TFEU, which also covers the ERDF,581 and concern reducing disparities 
between the regions.  
 
In judging the subsidiarity aspects of the EU funds spending it should first be recalled 
that the various Regulations concern the elaboration and implementation of the 
Structural Funds. The actual existence of the funds has already been established in the 
Treaty. From this point of view it is rather obvious that this can only be achieved at 
EU level. However, to limit subsidiarity to this approach here too would arguably be a 
too limited point of view. The principle must be taken further to include the actual 
subjects covered by the various Regulations. In further analysing subsidiarity these 
subjects a distinction should be made between the different goals pursued. The 
overarching goal of cohesion, or reducing disparities between the different regions in 
Europe, can quite easily be justified from a subsidiarity point of view as something 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unsustainable pension systems in Member States could form a severe risk for Member States’ public 
finances, which through negative externalities could call for stricter coordination. However, since this 
falls outside the scope of this study it will not be discussed here.   
578 Art 4(2)(b) and 4(2)(c) TFEU 
579 The European Social Fund has its own Title (XI) in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which 
separates it from the other aspects of social policy in chapter X. It is therefore not completely clear 
whether the ESF can be considered as an aspect of social policy as defined in the Treaty under art 
4(2)(b) TFEU. Arguably however, this is the case, since up until the Treaty of Lisbon the ESF was 
actually part of the Title on social policy in the EC Treaty. However, given the fact that it specifically 
deals with employment issues related to the internal market one could argue otherwise. Even then, 
however, subsidiarity would apply.   
580 Art 162 TFEU states: 
“In order to improve employment opportunities for workers in the internal market and to contribute 
thereby to raising the standard of living, a European Social Fund is hereby established in accordance 
with the provisions set out below; it shall aim to render the employment of workers easier and to 
increase their geographical and occupational mobility within the Union, and to facilitate their 
adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in particular through vocational 
training and retraining.“ 
581 Art 174 TFEU states: 
“In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its 
actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.…..” 
 
that can be better achieved at the EU level. However, whether this cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by Member States is something that can be questioned. This 
depends on the manner in which the EU funds have an added value to national policy 
measures, which chapter 4 demonstrated to depend on the specific situation at hand. 
The second goal, pursued specifically by the ESF, deals with improving employment 
opportunities for workers in the internal market. Subsidiarity assessment here 
coincides with the earlier appraisals of the employment policy coordination 
instruments and the instruments related to the internal market. Where this concerns 
measures that actually affect cross border mobility the subsidiarity test is quite easily 
passed. When the internal market is not directly in question, the lack of externalitiess 
makes it hard to justify EU action in the area of employment. 
 
5.2.3 Proportionality 
 
Once it is established that under the subsidiarity principle it is in fact warranted that 
some form of action on the EU level takes place, the question arises what type of 
action this should be. This is where the proportionality principle comes in. The 
proportionality principle was first laid down as a general principle of EU law by the 
European Court of Justice in the 1970s582. In applying this principle, the European 
Court of Justice can be said to have taken two distinctly different approaches to the 
proportionality principle when, on the one hand, assessing Community measures (the 
so called horizontal dimension) and, on the other hand, national measures (the so 
called vertical dimension)583. Under the vertical dimension, the European Court of 
Justice takes a strict approach; the measures needs to be capable of achieving the 
envisaged aim and must not go further than what is strictly speaking necessary to 
achieve that legitimate aim584.  This stands in contrast to the approach taken in the 
horizontal dimension, which is the proportionality as discussed in this section. 
Proportionality in this sense finds its basis in article 5(4) TEU and the protocol on the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, and states that “the 
content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties”. This is added to by the specific provisions on the EU's 
legal acts and adoption procedures, notably articles 288 and 296 TFEU. Article 296 
TFEU states that where the Treaties do not specify the type of act to be adopted, the 
institutions shall select it on a case-by-case basis, in compliance with the applicable 
procedures and with the principle of proportionality. Article 288 in this regard gives 
an overview of measures available for exercising the Union’s competences; 
                                                   
582 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide and 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. The principle of proportionality finds its earlier origin in continental 
(particularly German) administrative law, see also Ellis, the Principle of proportionality in the laws of 
Europe (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
583 See e.g. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 
2006), ch 3 and 5. 
584 See e.g. Case 104/75 Officier van Justitie v De Peijper [1976] ECR 613. See also Harbo, ‘The 
functioning of the proportionality principle in EU Law’ (European Law Journal, vol 16, issue 2, 2010).  
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582 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide and 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. The principle of proportionality finds its earlier origin in continental 
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Europe (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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584 See e.g. Case 104/75 Officier van Justitie v De Peijper [1976] ECR 613. See also Harbo, ‘The 
functioning of the proportionality principle in EU Law’ (European Law Journal, vol 16, issue 2, 2010).  
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regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. A regulation e.g. 
can be generally considered to be the most onerous instrument, having general 
application, being binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
On the other hand, a directive e.g. shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.   
 
The Court of Justice in application of the proportionality principle has chosen a wide 
definition, which falls in three different parts. First, the measures are appropriate and 
necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in 
question. Second, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures 
recourse must be had to the least onerous, and third, the disadvantages caused must 
not be excessive to the aims pursued585. Before the European Court of Justice the 
proportionality test has proven to be a weak one, with illegality of a measure only to 
follow once a measure is deemed manifestly inappropriate586. The test can therefore 
be considered more of a “law making” test for the relevant institutions to consider 
during this process587. With these characteristics, the principle of proportionality in 
fact gives a powerful tool for the fiscal federalism to come into play. Where we saw 
e.g. that the usefulness of the subsidiarity principle for functional competences is 
severely limited, proportionality can step in to make sure that measures taken keep the 
right balance between taking into account scale and externalities and heterogeneity of 
preferences. Keeping these general considerations in mind the remainder of this 
section will analyse the four different instruments of EU employment policy. 
An analysis of the proportionality of measures taken in the areas of employment 
policy coordination has to start with an analysis of different possibilities for legal 
action that are possible under the legal bases. Article 121(6) TFEU lays down the 
possibility to adopt detailed rules for multilateral surveillance by means of 
Regulation, something that in fact has taken place. As was already briefly mentioned 
in the appraisal of the subsidiarity principle, within this framework the various 
reasons for coordination call for different forms of coordination measures. In 
improving the effectiveness of policy measures, those based on positive externalities 
would have to achieve the aim of facilitating policy learning and/or or helping 
Member States in national decision making while giving enough space for differing 
preferences in Member States and refraining from imposing unnecessary costs and 
administrative burden. In general, observing the formulation of the broad economic 
                                                   
585 Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa [1990] 
ECR 1-4023.  
586 See also Chalmers et al., European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010) and 
Graig, ‘Subsidiarity; a political and legal analysis’ (Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 50, no 51, 
2012). For an alternative more ambitious view on possible use of the proportionality principle see 
Davies, ‘Subsidiarity, the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (Common Market Law 
Review 43, 2006). 
587 For referral to the principle in this regards, see e.g. Commission, ‘Better Regulation for Growth and 
Jobs in the European Union’ COM(2005)97. 
 
policy and employment guidelines and main targets in the area of employment, they 
leave ample room for Member States to adapt these to national circumstances. Rather, 
they create a common framework to streamline discussions on various subjects. 
Whether the current coordination and monitoring system under the Europe 2020 
strategy, the European semester and the Euro Plus Pact, however, can be deemed to 
be “the least onerous” to achieve these objectives is questionable. Although only to a 
very limited extend laid down in a legally binding fashion588, the process developed in 
practice has an elaborate set up with yearly National Reform Programs that is difficult 
to justify. Furthermore, the issuing of country-specific recommendations would only 
seem justified as far as they are perceived as positive policy advice, assisting Member 
States in national reform efforts, something which is arguably not the current rationale 
in the choice and formulation of the recommendations589.   
 
The presence of the negative externalities argument justifies a more stringent 
approach in coordination, where countries will more or less have to be forced to take 
into account the negative externalities of their action, or lack thereof. The current 
Regulations on the macroeconomic imbalances procedure install such a procedure, 
including the possibility of financial sanctions for euro area Member States. 
Arguably, and given the possibly large negative externalities of non-action in these 
areas, this can be deemed both appropriate and necessary in the areas of the 
functioning and flexibility of markets590. Whether the manner in which Member 
States will be forced to take the necessary policy actions is in line with proportionality 
considerations, however, is questionable and will largely depend on the conduct of the 
European Commission in implementing this rather new procedure. What constitutes a 
macroeconomic imbalance is hardly defined in the Regulations, and in practice solely 
demarcated by the broad indicators that form the imbalances scoreboard591. As 
regards the labour market this means that imbalances are defined by, most relevantly, 
excessive unit labour costs development and high unemployment. Both indicators 
cover the relevant areas of labour market flexibility and competitiveness, but on their 
own are insufficient demarcations of the relevant policy areas592. It is therefore up to 
the Commission in its alert mechanism report593, its in-depth studies594, policy 
                                                   
588 See Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, sections 1a and 
1aa. 
589For an overview of country specific recommendations adopted see  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/convergence/programmes/2011_en.ht
m  
590 See section 5.2.2. 
591 See also section 3.6. 
592 For instance, unit labour cost as an indicator covers both productivity and wage costs elements, 
which means that in theory one could improve the score on this indicator without altering anything as 
regards labour market flexibility, for instance by taking a number of productivity enhancing measures.  
593 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 3. 
594 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
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585 Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa [1990] 
ECR 1-4023.  
586 See also Chalmers et al., European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010) and 
Graig, ‘Subsidiarity; a political and legal analysis’ (Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 50, no 51, 
2012). For an alternative more ambitious view on possible use of the proportionality principle see 
Davies, ‘Subsidiarity, the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (Common Market Law 
Review 43, 2006). 
587 For referral to the principle in this regards, see e.g. Commission, ‘Better Regulation for Growth and 
Jobs in the European Union’ COM(2005)97. 
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588 See Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, sections 1a and 
1aa. 
589For an overview of country specific recommendations adopted see  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/convergence/programmes/2011_en.ht
m  
590 See section 5.2.2. 
591 See also section 3.6. 
592 For instance, unit labour cost as an indicator covers both productivity and wage costs elements, 
which means that in theory one could improve the score on this indicator without altering anything as 
regards labour market flexibility, for instance by taking a number of productivity enhancing measures.  
593 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 3. 
594 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
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recommendations595 and especially in its proposals for the start of an excessive 
imbalances procedure596, to further define this and make sure that emphasis is placed 
on the right areas. This is necessary but not sufficient. It will then depend on the 
Council to approve these demarcations. With the general tendency of the Council to 
favour more national room for a country to pick and choose specific policy measures 
the success of this is anything but guaranteed. The installation of Reversed Qualified 
Majority voting in the procedure does help to limit the influence of the Council in this 
regard. However, for a real impact, the principle enters too late in the procedure, since 
it only kicks in after the corrective action plan has been submitted and approved and 
the demarcation has already taken place.  
 
Proportionality considerations as regards the choice of legal instruments in the case of 
internal market legislation are limited. As far as legal instruments are concerned for 
most of the measures there is no choice in the matter. Due to the legal bases Directive 
2005/36 on recognition of professional qualifications had to be laid down in a 
Directive. The same goes for the Services Directive 2006/123, Directive 96/71 on 
posting of workers and Directive 2004/38 on European citizenship. The only two 
measures where there was a choice in the matter were Regulation 492/2011 on 
freedom of movement of workers and Regulation 883/2004 and its implementing 
Regulation 987/2009 on social security coordination. In these cases there was a choice 
between a Regulation and a Directive. In general, since coordination between national 
social security systems requires uniform rules and there is no room for divergence in 
the rights both Regulations inter on EU citizens, the choice of a Regulation seems 
justifiable. The question remains whether the chosen subjects in the various legal 
instruments are appropriate in improving internal market functioning. With the 
exception of the European citizens Directive all measures contain provisions on 
administrative cooperation between Member States, arguably an indispensable part in 
accurately implementing the free movement provisions. These add to the core of the 
various Regulation and Directives, which lay down a number of rights for the worker, 
self-employed or service provider in question, elaborating on the rights of European 
citizenship and free movement as laid down in the Treaty. As mirror image to this, the 
legal instruments also define what amounts to a barrier to free movement. Finally, 
most of the measures contain obligations for general information provision and/or 
administrative simplification, assisting the worker or service provider in finding the 
relevant information for the provision of his or her services.  
 
Within this general set up there are some specific issues linked to the concept of 
proportionality that are worth highlighting. Concerning the services Directive, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 5. 
595 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 6. 
596 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 7. 
 
balance between effects on free movement and social protection has been heavily 
debated, as has been highlighted in the previous chapter. Furthermore, there can be no 
doubt that some of the measures installed in the services Directive are quite onerous 
in their content and have a profound impact on the Member States. Especially the fact 
that Member States were required by the Directive to identify specific types of 
requirements imposed on service providers, such as authorisation schemes, legal form 
requirements, tariffs, ownership restrictions, assess whether they are necessary, non-
discriminatory and proportionate and amend them (if necessary), put a large burden 
on Member States597. The mere fact that this was a large task for Member States, 
however, does not make this disproportionate. For this the impact of such measures 
and possible alternatives have to be studied. Considering that the internal market for 
services was very poorly developed at the time, the welfare improving impact of these 
measures was large598. Seeking possible alternatives, the most logical option would be 
either harmonisation or leaving the responsibility for pulling down barriers fully at the 
Member State level, with ex post control and infringement proceedings by the 
Commission. Harmonisation of such a broad range of requirements arguably would 
have put an equally heavy burden on Member States, while respecting less the 
heterogeneity in legal systems present, which would not be in line with the fiscal 
federalism framework. Ex post control by the Commission would not have been a 
feasible alternative either. Given the extremely large amount of legal requirements 
governed this probably would have meant an explosion of infringement proceedings 
coming forth from the Directive. Therefore, even though this has put significant 
strains on Member States, the requirement in the Directive arguably is 
proportionate599.  
The posting of workers Directive has also been heavily discussed under the third 
proportionality test, specifically the balance between the effects on free movement of 
workers and the effects on social protection. In the area of conferral, where it was 
already mentioned that it can be doubted whether the system of coordination installed 
(by identifying a set of fundamental rights applicable, varying dependent on the 
country where the service provider plans to post workers) is actually appropriate and 
necessary to achieve the objective of free movement pursued by the Directive. Since 
the stated objective is to “increase legal certainty and facilitate the identification of 
employment conditions applied to posted workers” one could argue that a less 
onerous system based on information provision, leaving more room for adaptation to 
country specific preferences, could be used as well.  
 
Examining proportionality of EU action undertaken in the area of social employment 
policy, what stands out is that in general there is a large degree of freedom in choice 
                                                   
597 See Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 39. 
598 See section 4.4. 
599 See also Commission, ‘Towards a better functioning Single Market for services – building on the 
results of the mutual evaluation process of the Services Directive’ COM(2011)20. 
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Within this general set up there are some specific issues linked to the concept of 
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prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 5. 
595 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 6. 
596 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 7. 
 
balance between effects on free movement and social protection has been heavily 
debated, as has been highlighted in the previous chapter. Furthermore, there can be no 
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The posting of workers Directive has also been heavily discussed under the third 
proportionality test, specifically the balance between the effects on free movement of 
workers and the effects on social protection. In the area of conferral, where it was 
already mentioned that it can be doubted whether the system of coordination installed 
(by identifying a set of fundamental rights applicable, varying dependent on the 
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Examining proportionality of EU action undertaken in the area of social employment 
policy, what stands out is that in general there is a large degree of freedom in choice 
                                                   
597 See Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 39. 
598 See section 4.4. 
599 See also Commission, ‘Towards a better functioning Single Market for services – building on the 
results of the mutual evaluation process of the Services Directive’ COM(2011)20. 
27022 Duin.indd   217 12-10-13   17:44
Chapter 5
218 
of instruments. The aspect of gender equality is most limited, with article 157 TFEU 
explicitly prescribing legislative instruments for laying down the application of 
gender equality principles. In analysing the proportionality of the actual content of the 
Directives it is essential to keep the nature of this instrument in mind. The concept of 
equal pay for equal work or work of equal value as laid down in article 157 of the 
Treaty already in the 1970s was judged by the European Court of Justice to have 
direct effect600. As stated earlier, the Directives therefore explicitly concern the 
application of the principle. This means that measures proposed should be judged in 
the manner in which they actually increase clarity and ease of application of this 
concept in national circumstances. The Directives in this regard for the most part meet 
these requirements, largely laying down rules as interpreted earlier by the Court of 
Justice601 and specifying specific legal rights and obligations602.  
 
The question that remains is whether it is also proportional for these Directives to be 
supplemented by other measures, which is optional, according to the various possible 
legal bases. The European Commission’s strategy for equality between men and 
women603 gives two different categories for action under the framework; “equal pay 
for equal work of equal value” and “equal economic independence”. Measures 
proposed mainly fall under the headings of coordination of female labour market 
participation measures in the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy and the OMC 
social inclusion (in various ways supported by the PROGRESS program). In general, 
this issue has been dealt with in the previous section, where it was concluded that 
despite absence of actual externalities there is still room for political externalities. 
This would call for a system aimed at stimulating best practices and assisting Member 
States in the national policy debate. The general appraisal of the system of 
employment policy coordination in the previous section is also valid for this specific 
subject.  
  
With legal bases in articles 153(2)(a), 153(2)(b), 155 and 156 TFEU, possible EU 
action in the area of improvement of working environment and working conditions 
can take a number of different forms. Furthermore, EU action is explicitly optional, 
                                                   
600 Case C-43/75 Defresne vs Sabena [1976] ECR 455. 
601 For instance, Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation [2006] OJ L 204, art 19 on burden of proof can be said to lay 
down rules as set out by the Court of justice in Case C-109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes 
Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, agissant pour Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199 and Case 
C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health [1992] ECR 1-5535. 
See also Chalmers et al, European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
602 Exception to this positive judgement can arguably be found in Directive 2006/54/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation [2006] 
OJ L 204, chapter III.2, obliging Member States to promote dialogue on equal treatment, something 
which from the point of view of the Directive’s objectives seems an unnecessarily onerous obligation 
for Member States.   
603 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between men and women 2010-2015’ COM(2010/491). 
 
and should in any case “support and complement the activities of the Member States 
in the following fields”604. If measures are taken they should be least onerous, or in 
other words, “light” and leave ample room for Member States to adapt the rules to 
their specific circumstances and citizen preferences. Given this set up it seems very 
hard to justify the legislative instruments that have developed in these areas. Since 
political externalities are the main issue here, a soft process, for instance in the form 
of an open method of coordination, where countries learn from each other on the basis 
of general principles and guidelines with common understandings on these issues 
could arguably achieve similar results in a less onerous manner. In fact, the 
Commission has been organising just these types of measures, but in addition to the 
legislative instruments, as can be seen in the Community strategy 2007-2012 on 
health and safety at work605. The same argument applies to the equal treatment and 
minimum requirement provisions for fixed term, part time and temporary agency 
workers, and the aspect of working time as part of health and safety of workers. If 
action is judged necessary at all, limited externalities and large heterogeneity between 
Member States would indicate that effectiveness of policy would be served by “light” 
EU action, with focus on political externalities and large room for manoeuvring for 
the Member States to adapt to national circumstances. Against the background of this 
assessment it is in particular very hard to justify the working time Directive, laying 
down detailed minimum requirements in the areas of rest period, maximum working 
time, reference periods as well as a whole list of possible derogations to the rules. A 
process based on common principles and exchange of best practices could arguably 
achieve similar results in a less onerous manner, leaving more room for to take 
heterogeneity of preferences into account. 
The issues of pensions and social inclusion of vulnerable groups and the Open 
Method of Coordination process associated with these subjects on the other hand can 
in general be said to fit the proportionality principle. The various possible legal bases 
in articles 153(2)(a), 156 and 160 TFEU leave ample room to choose the measures 
most appropriate to achieve the objectives. Policy measures would have to be 
effective in facilitating policy learning while giving enough space for differing 
preferences in Member States. In general, looking at the OMC system that is set up 
with broad common objectives and the common indicators used to measure 
developments they arguably leave ample room for Member States to adapt these to 
national circumstances. Rather, they create a common framework to streamline 
discussions on various subjects. Furthermore, the flexible and light reporting for 
                                                   
604 Art 153 TFEU. 
605 Commission, ‘Improving quality and productivity at work: community strategy 2007-2012 on health 
and safety at work’ COM(2007)62. Support for these types of measures is partly provided by the 
Progress program, see Decision 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
24 October 2006 establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity — 
Progress [2006] OJ L 315. 
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Member States under the social OMC since the start of the Europe 2020 strategy606, 
provides additional room for Member States to exemplify this in the manner that they 
seem most useful. 
 
Finally, considering proportionality for EU funds spending, the various legal bases 
explicitly require Regulations for implementing measures of the EU funds, therewith 
leaving no room for choice of legal instrument. Within these Regulations measures 
prescribed should, however, still be least onerous for Member States concerned. 
Furthermore, given the large heterogeneity between Member States in the areas under 
consideration, a welfare enhancing setup would call for large room for adapting to 
national circumstances. The current setting under the Structural Funds roughly fits 
this picture. The system allows for Community strategic guidelines on cohesion, 
which form a wide framework for intervention of the funds607. The adaptation to 
national circumstances takes place in the National Strategic Reference Frameworks608 
in which Member States set thematic and territorial priorities and list the operational 
programmes to be funded by the EU funds. Also, proportionality is an explicit aspect 
of the system of measuring effectiveness, monitoring and control and reporting under 
the various programmes609. There are, however, some aspects here that seem 
unnecessarily onerous for Member States, which are mainly concerned with the level 
of control and EU influence in national programmes. Notably, the Commission is 
given an approving role as far as the setting of certain elements of the National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks is concerned as well as on the specific operational 
programmes, which seems unnecessary to achieve the aim of the funds. Likewise, in 
deciding on the operational programmes the Commission is also to analyse whether 
this fits in the National Strategic Reference Framework610, something which could be 
just as well done by the Member States themselves. In the same vein, the extensive 
yearly reporting requirements for compliance and spending by the Member State to 
the Commission for each operational program appears disproportional to achieve the 
underlying policy objectives611.  
                                                   
606 See Social Protection Committee, ‘Opinion on reinvigorating the social OMC in the context of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy’ (2011) as endorsed by the Employment and Social Affairs Council of 17 June 
2011. 
607 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, Title II chapter I  
608 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, Title II chapter II. 
609 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210,  art 13, as well as e.g. 
Title IV ch 1 and art 74. 
610 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, art 30, art 32. 
611 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
 
 
 
Summarising the results of the analysis under the institutional aspect of distribution of 
power in the supranational legal, the following table can be drawn up. 
 
Table 19 
Instruments 
 
 
Institutional 
aspects 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal market 
legislation 
 
Social 
employment 
policy 
 
EU funds 
spending 
 
Distribution of 
power in the 
supranational 
legal order 
 
    
 
 
The colours represent the way the instruments perform. Green means that the analysis 
has not identified serious issues that can influence the manner in which the instrument 
performs in achieving its economic objectives. Red on the other hand means that 
serious issues can be observed. Yellow stands for a medium performance, where the 
analysis has shown some issues that can be improved upon. As far as conferral is 
concerned there are generally no large issues identified. However, the element of 
conferral can put into question some aspects of the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure, elements that, from the point of view of effectiveness of policy, are 
actually desirable. The opposite is the case with the posting of workers Directive, 
where conferral limits possibility for adverse policy action. Given the fact that a wide 
number of legal bases are available including the choice of legal instruments, the 
aspects of subsidiarity and proportionality become all the more relevant. From the 
point of view of effectiveness of policy, the analysis here revealed a number of issues, 
mainly related to proportionality of the measures taken. Main points here are the 
detailed legal instruments in the area of social employment policy, which do not seem 
justified. Neither do certain onerous aspects of employment policy coordination and 
EU fund spending, especially when not used for cohesion or internal market related 
issues. 
 
5.3 Democratic legitimacy and accountability 
 
This section analyses to what extent the various EU employment policy instruments 
are accompanied with effective mechanisms of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability. As stated before, effective mechanisms of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability can contribute to the effectiveness of policy by ensuring that the setup 
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of instruments takes place in a manner that is in line with citizen preference. 
Furthermore, a strong electoral mandate on the level where policy decisions are taken 
has been proven to be essential to ensure effective reform implementation612. In 
analysing democratic legitimacy and accountability, however, both aspects first need 
to be further defined. Discussion on democratic legitimacy is often divided into 
aspects regarding input and output legitimacy, a distinction originally set out by 
Scharpf (1999613). According to Scharpf, on the input side democratic legitimacy 
requires mechanisms or procedures to link political decisions with citizens’ 
preferences. In modern democracies these mechanisms are reflected in representative 
institutions in which political decision-makers can be held accountable by means of 
elections. At the same time Scharpf argues, democracy would be an ‘empty ritual’ if 
the democratic procedure was not able to produce effective outcomes, that is: 
‘achieving the goals that citizens collectively care about’. As to the extent to which 
the general setup of the EU calls for both input and output legitimacy Amtenbrink 
(2008614) and Craig (2011615) will be followed, who consider both to be of 
importance, while recognizing that especially on the input side there are structural 
reasons stemming from the nature of the EU that prevent it from being perfectly 
realised.  
 
Democratic legitimacy is inextricably linked to democratic accountability. It becomes 
readily apparent, however, that the definition of accountability is not an easy task. As 
Bovens (2007)616states, accountability is one of those golden concepts that no one can 
be against and is increasingly used in political discourse and policy documents, 
because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness. At the same time, it 
means different things to different people. Building on a long line of discussion on the 
subject617, Bovens presents a narrow definition of accountability618, entailing "a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
                                                   
612 See e.g. OECD, The Political Economy of Reform; lessons from pensions, product markets and 
labour markets in ten OECD countries (2009). 
613 Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
614 Amtenbrink, ‘The multidimensional constitutional legal order of the European union – a successful 
case of cosmopolitan constitution building?’ (Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol XXXIX, 
2008). 
615 Craig, ‘Integration, democracy and legitimacy’ in Craig and de Burca, The evolution of EU law 
(Oxford University Press, 2011). 
616 Bovens, ‘analyzing and assessing accountability: a conceptional framework’ (European Law 
Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007). 
617 See e.g. Vickers, 'Accountability' in Browder, Emerging patterns of administrative accountability 
(Mr Cutchan Publishing corp, 1971), Sartori The theory of democracy revisited (Chatham House 
Publishers, 1987) and Barnett, 'The creation of democracy' in Hirst and Khilnani Reinventing 
democracy (Blackwell Publishers, 1996). For an overview see also Amtenbrink, The democratic 
accountability of Central Banks; a comparative study of the European Central Bank (Hart Publishing, 
1999) and Bovens, ‘analyzing and assessing accountability: a conceptional framework’ (European Law 
Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007). 
618 See e.g. Day and Klein, Accountabilities; five public services (Tavistock publications, 1987),   
 
judgement and the actor may face consequences"619, which will be used in this 
section.  
 
Relating the issues of democratic legitimacy and accountability to the EU legal 
setting, Title II of the Treaty on European Union lays down a number of democratic 
principles for the functioning of the European Union. Specifically, article 10 TEU 
states that the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 
Most importantly, in this regard it is stated in article 10(2) TFEU that “citizens are 
directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament”, that “Member States 
are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in 
the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to 
their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.” Furthermore, in paragraph 3 of article 
10 TFEU it is stated that “Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as 
possible to the citizen”620.   
 
Before turning to the specific application of this system to the EU employment policy 
instruments, one should note a number of general difficulties stemming from this 
legal setting related to the various actors in the process. The indirect democratic 
legitimation of the Council by the national governments, which are accountable to 
their national parliaments, has severe limitations, notably in cases of qualified 
majority where the government has been outvoted. A collective accountability of the 
Council, beyond the judicial review of its acts by the European Court of Justice, does 
not exist. Also, the manner in which national parliaments are effectively able to fulfil 
their role in legitimising EU policy has its limitations in a generally strong position of 
national governments due to e.g. knowledge asymmetries between governments and 
national parliaments on EU negotiations, time and resource issues and limited 
possibilities for influencing the national government policy stance in EU policy621. 
Furthermore, the Commission has a large degree of independence in its day-to-day 
promotion of the general interests of the Union622, where the legitimation and 
accountability of the European Commission essentially rests on the European 
Parliament, which only has the right to adopt a motion of censure for the Commission 
as a whole623. Lastly, the statement that citizens are directly represented at the EU 
                                                   
619 Bovens, ‘Analyzing and assessing accountability: a conceptional framework’ (European Law 
Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007), 452. 
620 The Treaty does include other democratic principles, mainly in art 11 TEU e.g. on consultations 
with representative associations and on the citizens initiative. These aspects however will not be 
discussed here.   
621 See also e.g. Auel, ‘Democratic accountability and national parliaments; redefining the impact of 
parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs’ (European Law Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007) and Bellamy and 
Kruger, ‘Domesticating the democratic deficit? The role of national parliaments and parties in the EU’s 
system of governance’ (Parliamentary Affairs, 2012). 
622 Art 17(1) TEU. 
623According to art 17(8) TEU and art 234 TFEU, the European Parliament has the power to adopt a 
motion of censure against the Commission as a whole. The power of censure means Parliament can 
exert democratic control in the European Union. To be admissible, a motion of censure must be tabled 
by at least one tenth of the MEPs. It must state the reasons for the motion. During the Commission’s 
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of instruments takes place in a manner that is in line with citizen preference. 
Furthermore, a strong electoral mandate on the level where policy decisions are taken 
has been proven to be essential to ensure effective reform implementation612. In 
analysing democratic legitimacy and accountability, however, both aspects first need 
to be further defined. Discussion on democratic legitimacy is often divided into 
aspects regarding input and output legitimacy, a distinction originally set out by 
Scharpf (1999613). According to Scharpf, on the input side democratic legitimacy 
requires mechanisms or procedures to link political decisions with citizens’ 
preferences. In modern democracies these mechanisms are reflected in representative 
institutions in which political decision-makers can be held accountable by means of 
elections. At the same time Scharpf argues, democracy would be an ‘empty ritual’ if 
the democratic procedure was not able to produce effective outcomes, that is: 
‘achieving the goals that citizens collectively care about’. As to the extent to which 
the general setup of the EU calls for both input and output legitimacy Amtenbrink 
(2008614) and Craig (2011615) will be followed, who consider both to be of 
importance, while recognizing that especially on the input side there are structural 
reasons stemming from the nature of the EU that prevent it from being perfectly 
realised.  
 
Democratic legitimacy is inextricably linked to democratic accountability. It becomes 
readily apparent, however, that the definition of accountability is not an easy task. As 
Bovens (2007)616states, accountability is one of those golden concepts that no one can 
be against and is increasingly used in political discourse and policy documents, 
because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness. At the same time, it 
means different things to different people. Building on a long line of discussion on the 
subject617, Bovens presents a narrow definition of accountability618, entailing "a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
                                                   
612 See e.g. OECD, The Political Economy of Reform; lessons from pensions, product markets and 
labour markets in ten OECD countries (2009). 
613 Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
614 Amtenbrink, ‘The multidimensional constitutional legal order of the European union – a successful 
case of cosmopolitan constitution building?’ (Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol XXXIX, 
2008). 
615 Craig, ‘Integration, democracy and legitimacy’ in Craig and de Burca, The evolution of EU law 
(Oxford University Press, 2011). 
616 Bovens, ‘analyzing and assessing accountability: a conceptional framework’ (European Law 
Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007). 
617 See e.g. Vickers, 'Accountability' in Browder, Emerging patterns of administrative accountability 
(Mr Cutchan Publishing corp, 1971), Sartori The theory of democracy revisited (Chatham House 
Publishers, 1987) and Barnett, 'The creation of democracy' in Hirst and Khilnani Reinventing 
democracy (Blackwell Publishers, 1996). For an overview see also Amtenbrink, The democratic 
accountability of Central Banks; a comparative study of the European Central Bank (Hart Publishing, 
1999) and Bovens, ‘analyzing and assessing accountability: a conceptional framework’ (European Law 
Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007). 
618 See e.g. Day and Klein, Accountabilities; five public services (Tavistock publications, 1987),   
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states that the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 
Most importantly, in this regard it is stated in article 10(2) TFEU that “citizens are 
directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament”, that “Member States 
are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in 
the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to 
their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.” Furthermore, in paragraph 3 of article 
10 TFEU it is stated that “Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as 
possible to the citizen”620.   
 
Before turning to the specific application of this system to the EU employment policy 
instruments, one should note a number of general difficulties stemming from this 
legal setting related to the various actors in the process. The indirect democratic 
legitimation of the Council by the national governments, which are accountable to 
their national parliaments, has severe limitations, notably in cases of qualified 
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Council, beyond the judicial review of its acts by the European Court of Justice, does 
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their role in legitimising EU policy has its limitations in a generally strong position of 
national governments due to e.g. knowledge asymmetries between governments and 
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possibilities for influencing the national government policy stance in EU policy621. 
Furthermore, the Commission has a large degree of independence in its day-to-day 
promotion of the general interests of the Union622, where the legitimation and 
accountability of the European Commission essentially rests on the European 
Parliament, which only has the right to adopt a motion of censure for the Commission 
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621 See also e.g. Auel, ‘Democratic accountability and national parliaments; redefining the impact of 
parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs’ (European Law Journal, vol 13, no 4, 2007) and Bellamy and 
Kruger, ‘Domesticating the democratic deficit? The role of national parliaments and parties in the EU’s 
system of governance’ (Parliamentary Affairs, 2012). 
622 Art 17(1) TEU. 
623According to art 17(8) TEU and art 234 TFEU, the European Parliament has the power to adopt a 
motion of censure against the Commission as a whole. The power of censure means Parliament can 
exert democratic control in the European Union. To be admissible, a motion of censure must be tabled 
by at least one tenth of the MEPs. It must state the reasons for the motion. During the Commission’s 
 
27022 Duin.indd   223 12-10-13   17:44
Chapter 5
224 
level in the European Parliament, needs to be qualified given e.g. the lack of a 
European ballot and a degressively proportionate allocation of seats in the European 
Parliament, a mixture of proportionate representation of the citizens ànd of the 
Member States. The European Parliament is therefore arguably not as representative 
as it could be624. Keeping these general considerations in mind, the remainder of this 
section will analyse EU employment policy instruments from the perspective of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability as set out above. 
  
Concerning EU employment policy coordination, a logical starting point for 
discussion on democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU setting is the 
identification of what exactly is the appropriate forum in which these elements should 
be ensured. In this context it should be kept in mind that legitimation and 
accountability concerns arise at the level at which public power is exercised, since 
from the point of view of effectiveness of policy this is the level where citizen 
preference should be taken into account and where a strong electoral mandate is 
essential to ensure effective implementation. Employment policy coordination 
concerns in essence national policy decisions. Whether the European Parliament in 
this case should play a role as a forum for legitimacy and accountability is dependent 
on the existence of a power exercised at the EU level. Or in other words, if Member 
States remain fully autonomous in their decision-making, then there is little need for 
accountability at the EU level, and national parliaments should take full 
responsibility. Given the current division of power between the EU and national level 
in employment policy coordination625, arguably the main role in ensuring democratic 
legitimacy and accountability does indeed remain with national parliaments. 
However, there are some limitations for Member States encompassed in the current 
setup of the process that legitimate a forum at the EU level. As has been noted, the 
economic and employment guidelines are broad, but entail a framework for what is 
considered “good” policy. Non-compliance with the guidelines under the European 
semester can lead to policy recommendations and warnings, which, though soft, entail 
some form of political limitations to the actions a Member State can take. In the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure these limitations are more visible, with the 
possibility of sanctions when insufficient policy action is taken to mitigate or prevent 
macroeconomic imbalances. That this entails limits for Member States is also based 
on the voting arrangements in the Council, where a country cannot vote on 
recommendations which concern the country itself under article 121(4) TFEU, and 
that recommendations are decided upon by Qualified Majority.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
term of office, Parliament has the power to dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast, representing a majority of the component Members of Parliament 
624 See Amtenbrink, Continuation or reorientation? What future for European integration (Boom, 
2007). 
625 See section 5.2. 
 
With this power exercised at EU level in the current system, the European Parliament 
should have a role in ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability. As a matter 
of fact, the European Parliament has a number of different roles in the area of 
employment policy coordination that cover aspects of the framework set out in this 
section. In ensuring input legitimacy, the European Parliament has a limited role in 
the setting of the guidelines that form the basis of the whole economic and 
employment policy coordination process. Article 121(2) TFEU states that the 
European Parliament “shall be informed” of the setting of the guidelines. The 
employment guidelines of article 148 TFEU have a somewhat different process, with 
the European Parliament being “consulted” on draft guidelines. There is, however, no 
obligation for the Council to take the European Parliament’s views into account626. In 
ensuring democratic accountability and output legitimacy in the procedure that 
follows, including inter alia the yearly reporting and country specific 
recommendations, the Treaty gives the European Parliament no role to play, except in 
article 121(5) TFEU, where it is stated that “The President of the Council and the 
Commission shall report to the European Parliament on the results of multilateral 
surveillance. The President of the Council may be invited to appear before the 
competent committee of the European Parliament if the Council has made its 
recommendations public.” Concerning the setting of procedures, however, the EP, 
since the Treaty of Lisbon, has co-decision powers under article 121(6) TFEU, since 
the ordinary legislative procedure applies. This means that in the formulation of 
Regulation 1175/2011627 laying down the European semester and Regulations 
1174/2011628 and 1176/2011629 laying down the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure the European Parliament was a full negotiating partner. The European 
Parliament used this position to both increase possibilities for transparency in 
accountability and for input legitimacy. Examining the role of the European 
Parliament in the various Regulations, Regulation 1175/2011 lays down the obligation 
for the European Parliament to be duly involved in the European semester630 to 
“increase the transparency and ownership of, and accountability for decisions taken, 
in particular by means of the economic dialogue carried out pursuant to article 2-ab of 
                                                   
626 Although markedly different from the more mainstream method of Union method of policy making, 
which mostly takes place according to the normal legislative procedure of art. 294 TFEU with co-
decision powers for the European Parliament, this limited involvement of the European Parliament in 
the setting of guidelines for Member State policy is not unique for the area of employment policy. Art. 
173 and 181 TFEU for instance follow similar patterns for industry and research and technological 
development respectively.   
627Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306.  
628 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306. 
629 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306. 
630 Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, art 2a(4). 
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level in the European Parliament, needs to be qualified given e.g. the lack of a 
European ballot and a degressively proportionate allocation of seats in the European 
Parliament, a mixture of proportionate representation of the citizens ànd of the 
Member States. The European Parliament is therefore arguably not as representative 
as it could be624. Keeping these general considerations in mind, the remainder of this 
section will analyse EU employment policy instruments from the perspective of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability as set out above. 
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accountability concerns arise at the level at which public power is exercised, since 
from the point of view of effectiveness of policy this is the level where citizen 
preference should be taken into account and where a strong electoral mandate is 
essential to ensure effective implementation. Employment policy coordination 
concerns in essence national policy decisions. Whether the European Parliament in 
this case should play a role as a forum for legitimacy and accountability is dependent 
on the existence of a power exercised at the EU level. Or in other words, if Member 
States remain fully autonomous in their decision-making, then there is little need for 
accountability at the EU level, and national parliaments should take full 
responsibility. Given the current division of power between the EU and national level 
in employment policy coordination625, arguably the main role in ensuring democratic 
legitimacy and accountability does indeed remain with national parliaments. 
However, there are some limitations for Member States encompassed in the current 
setup of the process that legitimate a forum at the EU level. As has been noted, the 
economic and employment guidelines are broad, but entail a framework for what is 
considered “good” policy. Non-compliance with the guidelines under the European 
semester can lead to policy recommendations and warnings, which, though soft, entail 
some form of political limitations to the actions a Member State can take. In the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure these limitations are more visible, with the 
possibility of sanctions when insufficient policy action is taken to mitigate or prevent 
macroeconomic imbalances. That this entails limits for Member States is also based 
on the voting arrangements in the Council, where a country cannot vote on 
recommendations which concern the country itself under article 121(4) TFEU, and 
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624 See Amtenbrink, Continuation or reorientation? What future for European integration (Boom, 
2007). 
625 See section 5.2. 
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of fact, the European Parliament has a number of different roles in the area of 
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follows, including inter alia the yearly reporting and country specific 
recommendations, the Treaty gives the European Parliament no role to play, except in 
article 121(5) TFEU, where it is stated that “The President of the Council and the 
Commission shall report to the European Parliament on the results of multilateral 
surveillance. The President of the Council may be invited to appear before the 
competent committee of the European Parliament if the Council has made its 
recommendations public.” Concerning the setting of procedures, however, the EP, 
since the Treaty of Lisbon, has co-decision powers under article 121(6) TFEU, since 
the ordinary legislative procedure applies. This means that in the formulation of 
Regulation 1175/2011627 laying down the European semester and Regulations 
1174/2011628 and 1176/2011629 laying down the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure the European Parliament was a full negotiating partner. The European 
Parliament used this position to both increase possibilities for transparency in 
accountability and for input legitimacy. Examining the role of the European 
Parliament in the various Regulations, Regulation 1175/2011 lays down the obligation 
for the European Parliament to be duly involved in the European semester630 to 
“increase the transparency and ownership of, and accountability for decisions taken, 
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626 Although markedly different from the more mainstream method of Union method of policy making, 
which mostly takes place according to the normal legislative procedure of art. 294 TFEU with co-
decision powers for the European Parliament, this limited involvement of the European Parliament in 
the setting of guidelines for Member State policy is not unique for the area of employment policy. Art. 
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627Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306.  
628 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306. 
629 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306. 
630 Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, art 2a(4). 
27022 Duin.indd   225 12-10-13   17:44
Chapter 5
226 
this Regulation”. The economic dialogue described lays down the possibility for the 
European Parliament to invite the President of the Council, the Commission and 
where appropriate the President of the European Council or the President of the 
Eurogroup to discuss various aspects of the European semester. Regulation 1176/2011 
entails the obligation for the Commission and the Council to inform the European 
Parliament in a large number of stages during the procedure. Furthermore, both this 
Regulation and Regulation 1174/2011 lay down similar economic dialogue as to the 
one in Regulation 1175/2011631, also including the possibility for the European 
Parliament to offer a Member State the opportunity to engage in an exchange of views 
with the European Parliament when this Member State is in an excessive imbalances 
procedure. In addition to these requirements some aspects of input legitimacy as 
regards the setting of targets are created. Even though the European Parliament has no 
role to play in determining the overall targets set out in the economic and employment 
guidelines, it has influenced the goals of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure in 
the drafting of the Regulation. With the concept of imbalances being hardly defined, 
the content and the manner of setting of the scoreboard effectively delineates the 
scope for action in this area. Both Council and Commission strongly opposed the role 
the European Parliament claimed here, and after extensive discussions the 
compromise was that some general elements of the scoreboard were incorporated in 
the Regulation, but that the actual scoreboard would be set by the Commission “in 
close cooperation with the European Parliament and the Council”632.  
 
Assessing this system against the framework for democratic legitimacy and 
accountability as set out above it can be observed that the European Parliament is 
severely limited in its possibilities for ensuring input legitimacy, or playing its role in 
steering policy in line with citizen preference. Concerning elements for accountability 
there is a relationship between the actors (Commission and to some extent the 
Council) and the forum (EP), in which the actors are obliged to explain and justify 
their conduct, where the forum can pose questions and pass judgement. The various 
regulations for economic dialogue are numerous and open up a number of 
opportunities. There are, however, two issues here that severely limit effective 
accountability. The first one is the issue of complexity. Economic reform and analysis 
is a highly complex topic, which is even more so the case for the issue of 
macroeconomic imbalances. Given the large discretionary power of Commission and 
Council and, arguably, the knowledge asymmetry on this issue between especially the 
European Commission and the European Parliament a proper dialogue focussing on 
the ways to achieve the policy goals is not likely. Furthermore, the EP only has 
limited effective accountability mechanism or sanctions. The European Commission 
                                                   
631 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 14 and Regulation 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 306, art 6. 
632 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 4 and recital 12.   
 
is the only institution in the list of partners for economic dialogue directly accountable 
to the European Parliament, and even here in the day to day running of the procedure 
the European Parliament as seen only has the power to adopt a motion of censure 
against the Commission as a whole633, which, being an extremely harsh sanction, is 
arguably is not credible in this type of discussion. In general, in appraising the 
probable effectiveness of these accountability mechanism a parallel can be drawn 
with the monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the European 
Central Bank. Amtenbrink and van Duin (2009) found that in such a set up serious 
doubts can be raised as to the extent to which this dialogue actually amounts to an 
effective review of performance634.  This having been said, there is, however, an 
important difference with the system regarding ECB accountability in that the 
European Parliament in economic and employment policy coordination can change 
the various Regulations. All three Regulations carry similar review clauses635 that call 
for, where appropriate, changes to the legislation at the end of 2014 and every five 
years thereafter. The European Parliament could use its co-decision powers to alter 
the substance and process of the procedures. This is especially relevant for the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure since the actual content and focus of the 
procedure is delineated in the Regulations itself.  
 
As far as the role of national parliaments is concerned, their involvement mainly 
consists of controlling Member States in their actions in the Council and European 
Council at the first stages of the process, when the economic and employment 
guidelines are being set up, and in the last stages, in controlling the implementation of 
actual reform measures. In the stages in between there is virtually no role for national 
parliaments, even more so since in large parts of the process Member States 
themselves do not get to vote in the Council decision concerning their own country 
specific recommendations, implementation thereof and (possible) sanctions. As long 
as this concerns non-binding policy advice and possibilities for learning, this arguably 
only poses a problem to a limited extent, since governments remain free to choose 
their own behaviour. Moreover, parliament itself can use this to enrich national debate 
on reform measures (or ignore it at will). However, when EU decisions become 
                                                   
633 According to art 17(8) TEU and art 234 TFEU, the European Parliament has the power to adopt a 
motion of censure against the Commission as a whole. The power of censure means Parliament can 
exert democratic control in the European Union. To be admissible, a motion of censure must be tabled 
by at least one tenth of the MEPs. It must state the reasons for the motion. During the Commission’s 
term of office, Parliament has the power to dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast, representing a majority of the component Members of Parliament. 
634 Amtenbrink and van Duin, ‘The European Central Bank Before the European Parliament: Theory 
and Practice After Ten Years of Monetary Dialogue’ (European Law Review, No. 4, 2009). 
635 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306, art 7, Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, art 12a and 
Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 16. 
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this Regulation”. The economic dialogue described lays down the possibility for the 
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631 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 14 and Regulation 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 306, art 6. 
632 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 4 and recital 12.   
 
is the only institution in the list of partners for economic dialogue directly accountable 
to the European Parliament, and even here in the day to day running of the procedure 
the European Parliament as seen only has the power to adopt a motion of censure 
against the Commission as a whole633, which, being an extremely harsh sanction, is 
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As far as the role of national parliaments is concerned, their involvement mainly 
consists of controlling Member States in their actions in the Council and European 
Council at the first stages of the process, when the economic and employment 
guidelines are being set up, and in the last stages, in controlling the implementation of 
actual reform measures. In the stages in between there is virtually no role for national 
parliaments, even more so since in large parts of the process Member States 
themselves do not get to vote in the Council decision concerning their own country 
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633 According to art 17(8) TEU and art 234 TFEU, the European Parliament has the power to adopt a 
motion of censure against the Commission as a whole. The power of censure means Parliament can 
exert democratic control in the European Union. To be admissible, a motion of censure must be tabled 
by at least one tenth of the MEPs. It must state the reasons for the motion. During the Commission’s 
term of office, Parliament has the power to dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast, representing a majority of the component Members of Parliament. 
634 Amtenbrink and van Duin, ‘The European Central Bank Before the European Parliament: Theory 
and Practice After Ten Years of Monetary Dialogue’ (European Law Review, No. 4, 2009). 
635 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 
306, art 7, Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, art 12a and 
Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 16. 
27022 Duin.indd   227 12-10-13   17:44
Chapter 5
228 
binding, democratic legitimacy and accountability issues can come into play, since 
then there is effective power wielded at the EU level. This is most prominently the 
case in the imbalances procedure. The role of national parliaments in this procedure is 
mentioned in the Regulations, where it is noted that in “applying this Regulation, the 
Council and the Commission should fully respect the role of national parliaments and 
social partners, as well as differences in national systems, such as the systems for 
wage formation”636. This general reminder of the important role of national 
parliaments does indeed seem warranted. Since a Member State is not in charge of its 
own recommendations, and the European Parliament does not fully play the 
legitimacy and accountability role in these instances, there is a risk of a legitimacy 
and accountability gap that national parliaments will have to fill to the best extent of 
their possibilities. How this will work out in practice however remains to be seen, 
since up to now there has been no country that has advanced to such stages of the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure that severe limitations on national policy arise. 
In general the Commission and Council will have to place limitations on Member 
State reform measures that ensure that the imbalances procedure reaches it goals, 
namely the prevention and correction of harmful imbalances, while allowing national 
parliaments to ensure that national reform measures stay in line with national 
preferences. The current set up, with countries having to determine their own 
corrective action plans does seem to take these issues into account. How this will play 
out in practice, however, still remains to be seen. 
 
For the various pieces of legislation concerning the internal market, the EU level is 
quite easily justifiable as being the “natural” level for action637. As regards 
institutional set up this would therefore make the European Parliament the central 
actor to provide democratic legitimacy and accountability in this area. As far as input 
legitimacy is concerned, almost all of the legislative instruments have been 
established using an ordinary legislative procedure638, where the European Parliament 
has full co-decision powers on equal footing with the Council. An exception is social 
security coordination, where the current Treaty on the Functioning of the EU entails 
the special legal bases seen earlier639. In general, the preferred position of Member 
States in this area still remains obvious, stemming from the sensitivity of the subject, 
which reaches the core of the national welfare systems. Concretely, differing from the 
normal legal procedure, article 48(3) TFEU installs an exception clause giving 
Member States an edge over the European Parliament in negotiations. However, 
comparing this situation to the one before the amendments introduced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, this legal procedure in fact limits the ability of Member States to influence 
the situation, as decisions used to be taken in the Council by unanimity. This 
                                                   
636 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, recital 25. 
637 See section 5.2.2 
638 Art 294 TFEU. 
639 See section 5.2.1. 
 
unanimity in the Council is still present in article 21(3) TFEU introduced with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which uses a special legislative procedure, calling for consultation 
of the European Parliament.  
 
Actor in the present framework for democratic accountability is the Commission, 
which is responsible for suggesting improvements to the framework and for 
monitoring the Member States in proper implementation and application of the 
instruments. As for methods of accountability to the European Parliament, the various 
pieces of legislation mainly use the instrument of periodical reporting and review 
clauses. There is, however, a difference in the extent to which the European 
Parliament is actually involved. In the services Directive the role of the European 
Parliament is greatest, with reporting taking place both after the screening exercise 
mentioned earlier640 and regular comprehensive reporting on the application of the 
Directive on a three yearly basis 641. The European citizens Directive incorporates the 
obligation for the Commission to present a report to the European Parliament on the 
application of the Directive642. The Professional Qualifications Directive also contains 
the obligation for the Commission to prepare every five years an implementation 
report, although there is no explicit mentioning of the European Parliament as a 
recipient of this report643. The Regulation on freedom of movement of workers has no 
such transparency mechanisms, nor have the Regulations on coordination of social 
security systems. The posting of workers Directive, finally, contains an obligatory 
review of the Directive by the Commission in 2001, with the view of proposing 
necessary amendments to the Council where appropriate644. The European Parliament 
is not mentioned. Missing the concept of implementation reports is a gap in the 
possibilities for the European Parliament to effectively monitor the functioning of the 
various Regulations and Directives, since the necessary transparency is missing645. 
This gap is added to by the general lack of data availability and evidence on the 
impact of the various pieces of legislation identified in chapter 4. Combined, these 
two elements make the use of the various accountability instruments the European 
Parliament has as its disposal, such as requesting the Commission to submit a 
proposal for legislation on the basis of article 225 TFEU, difficult to implement646, 
                                                   
640 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376. art 39(4).  
641 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 41. 
642 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158, art 39. 
643 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255., art 60. 
644 Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L 18, art 8. 
645 An issue already encountered in the previous chapter.  
646 Other more soft instruments include, for instance, calling on the Commission to speed up 
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640 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376. art 39(4).  
641 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 41. 
642 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158, art 39. 
643 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255., art 60. 
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which puts questions on the European Parliament’s ability to ensure policy 
implementation in line with citizen preferences.  
 
Given the various instruments at play in the area of social employment policy there is 
no obvious single forum to ensure democratic legitimacy and accountability. In 
practice this has led to a system where for the same subject different level 
mechanisms are at play depending on the instrument used. Starting with the role of 
the European Parliament: it is the central forum for democratic legitimacy and 
accountability for as far as the various legal instruments are concerned. The European 
Parliament has a large role to play when it comes to the actions taken under articles 
153 and 157 TFEU. Under article 157 TFEU, which covers the Directives on gender 
equality, the European Parliament is given full co-legislative powers. The same co-
legislative powers are granted under article 153(2)TFEU, which covers the Directives 
in the area of working time and health and safety of workers, as well as the additional 
measures to encourage cooperation between the Member States, most prominently the 
PROGRESS programmes. Finally, concerning the agreements between management 
and labour on fixed term and part time work under article 155 TFEU the European 
Parliament plays only a limited role, with it being informed of the Council decision 
implementing the agreement.  
 
As far as instruments of accountability are concerned, periodical reporting and review 
clauses are most frequently used. In general, the European Parliament may at any time 
invite the Commission to draw up reports on any particular problems concerning 
social conditions647. More specifically, the PROGRESS programme provides e.g. for 
annual activity reports to be drawn up by the Commission and forwarded to the 
European Parliament648. The working time Directive provides for five yearly reports 
from the Commission to the European Parliament on the practical implementation of 
the provisions of the Directive, indicating the viewpoints of the two sides of 
industry649. A similar provision is found the health and safety of workers Directive650. 
Under the gender equality Directive, the Commission is obliged to provide a report on 
the application of the Directive to the European Parliament651. A similar obligation is 
also found in the gender equality for self-employed activity Directive652. Also, a five 
                                                                                                                                                 
infringement proceedings; see, for instance, Resolution of the European Parliament on the Internal 
Market Scoreboard (2011). 
647 Art 161 TFEU. 
648 Decision 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 2006 
establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity — Progress [2006] OJ L 
315, art 19. 
649 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L 299, art 24. 
650 Directive 89/391/EEC of the Council of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183, art 18. 
651 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation [2006] OJ L 204., art 31(1). 
652 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010  on the 
 
 
year review clause by the Commission is incorporated in the temporary agency 
Directive653. The Directives on fixed term and part time work finally are odd ones out 
here, since they concern the implementation of agreements by the social partners. 
There is in fact a five year review clause in both agreements, but this is to be done by 
the signatories of the agreement, without any mentioning of the European 
Parliament654. In general, in ensuring effective accountability and therewith policy 
implementation in line with citizen preferences, however, here too the European 
Parliament is limited by the lack of clarity on the impact of the various pieces of 
legislation identified in chapter 4 of this study.  
 
In the open method of coordination that is used for social inclusion, pensions and 
gender equality there is very limited involvement of the European Parliament. In fact, 
article 156 TFEU in this regard merely states that “The European Parliament shall be 
kept fully informed”. Since this process in no definitive way limits Member States, 
the fact that democratic accountability stays with the national parliaments is justified, 
although the general concerns as to the extent that national parliaments can ensure 
effective democratic legitimacy and accountability mentioned earlier in this section 
need to be kept in mind.  
 
Finally concerning the instrument of EU funds spending, given that the process on the 
Structural Fund spending entails both the setting of EU wide frameworks and national 
programs fit to specific circumstance, both the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments have a role in democratic legitimacy and accountability. Starting with the 
European Parliament, articles 164, 177 and 178 TFEU state that the Regulations on 
the Structural Funds are to be laid down using the normal legislative procedure. This 
gives the European Parliament full co-legislative powers. This role is further 
elaborated upon in article 177 TFEU, where it is stated that these Regulations “shall 
define the tasks, priority objectives and the organisation of the Structural Funds, 
which may involve grouping the Funds. The general rules applicable to them and the 
provisions necessary to ensure their effectiveness and the coordination of the Funds 
with one another and with the other existing Financial Instruments shall also be 
defined by the same procedure.” Furthermore, the setting of the Community Strategic 
Guidelines follows the same procedure655.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a 
self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1, Art 15. 
653 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on 
temporary agency work [2008] OJ L 327, art 12. 
654 Directive 99/70/EC of the Council of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L 175 and Directive 97/81/EC of the 
Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time working concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L 14. 
655 At the time of the setting of the Regulations for the period 2006-2013, the procedure in then article 
161 was a different one, with however similar influence by the EP since the Community strategic 
reference framework was dependent on “assent” from the European Parliament.  
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application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a 
self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1, Art 15. 
653 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on 
temporary agency work [2008] OJ L 327, art 12. 
654 Directive 99/70/EC of the Council of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
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The day to day running of the funds is left to the Commission. For the ESF this is 
made most apparent in article 163 TFEU, which states that the Fund shall be 
administered by the Commission, assisted by a Committee composed of 
representatives of governments, trade unions and employers’ organisations. 
Approving and control of national efforts is also in the hands of the Commission.  
Democratic accountability to the European Parliament in the implementation of the 
Structural Funds process is mainly focussed on transparency of the process, combined 
with the general power the European Parliament has to choose whether or not to grant 
the Commission formal release for the year’s budget on the basis of the European 
Court of Auditors annual statement of assurance on the reliability of the EU’s 
accounts, which includes a specific chapter on Cohesion Policy in its Annual 
Report656. In primary Union law itself there is already a reporting requirement laid 
down in article 175 TFEU, which states that every three years the Commission shall 
submit a report to the European Parliament (amongst others) on the progress made 
towards achieving economic, social and territorial cohesion, if necessary, 
accompanied by appropriate proposals. More specific reporting requirements are laid 
down in the Structural Fund Regulations, where in the Commission is obliged to 
submit a strategic report in 2010 and 2013 summarising Member States’ reports on 
progress657. The European Parliament is invited to hold a debate on this report. 
Furthermore, a general review clause is included in the various Regulations, obliging 
the European Parliament and the Council to review the obligations before the end of 
the programming period in 2013.  
 
Although limited in their national priority-setting and decision-making by the 
controlling role of the European Commission, both the Regulations themselves and 
the Community strategic guidelines are still very broad and therewith leave ample 
room for Member States to pick and choose their own priorities. How to ensure 
democratic accountability at the national level is completely left to Member States. 
Noteworthy in this regard is that in the obligatory partnership with relevant 
stakeholders laid down in article 11 of Regulation 1083/2006 and more specifically 
articles 28 and 32 concerning the National Strategic Reference Framework and 
operational programmes there is no explicit mentioning of national parliaments. 
However, the obligatory national co-financing that takes place and the budgetary 
rights generally reserved for national parliaments are important elements in ensuring 
democratic legitimacy and accountability on this level.  
 
Summarising the results of the analysis under the institutional aspect of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability is done in table 20.  
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657 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, art 30. 
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policy 
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Green again means that the analysis has not identified serious issues that can 
influence the manner in which the instrument performs in achieving its economic 
objectives, while yellow again stands for a medium performance, where the analysis 
has shown that some issues can be improved upon. In general, the combination of 
actors and measures taken on different levels has proven to make for a set up in which 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, and therewith the ability for European 
Parliament and national parliaments to ensure effective policy implementation in line 
with citizen preferences, is not always optimally ensured. Problems in this regard both 
stem from the general EU institutional set up, which poses sever limitation in this 
regard, as well as from the specific provisions governing the four different EU 
employment policy instruments. The process of employment policy coordination 
knows limitations of the roles of both the European Parliament and national 
parliaments in effectively performing their controlling function. In the areas of 
Internal Market legislation and social employment policy there is a large variety in the 
manner in which transparency of implementation and application of the various pieces 
of legislation is actually ensured, ranging from extensive reporting requirements 
under the services Directive to a full absence of a reporting obligation on the posting 
of workers Directive. This, combined with the general problems in assessing the 
effects of these pieces of legislation in achieving the desired outcomes, puts additional 
limitations on effective democratic legitimacy and accountability since Parliaments 
are unable to determine whether policy is actually implemented in line with citizen 
preferences. The same argument is valid for the EU social employment policy 
instruments.   
 
5.4 Coherence and practical application 
 
Analysis under this third and last institutional aspect related to the effectiveness of the 
EU employment policy instruments will focus on two different elements including 
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Parliament and national parliaments to ensure effective policy implementation in line 
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regard, as well as from the specific provisions governing the four different EU 
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manner in which transparency of implementation and application of the various pieces 
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of workers Directive. This, combined with the general problems in assessing the 
effects of these pieces of legislation in achieving the desired outcomes, puts additional 
limitations on effective democratic legitimacy and accountability since Parliaments 
are unable to determine whether policy is actually implemented in line with citizen 
preferences. The same argument is valid for the EU social employment policy 
instruments.   
 
5.4 Coherence and practical application 
 
Analysis under this third and last institutional aspect related to the effectiveness of the 
EU employment policy instruments will focus on two different elements including 
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coherence and practical application. That there is in fact an issue of coherence can be 
linked to the incremental building up of EU employment policy since the 1950s, 
which has resulted in a current setup of EU employment policy that consists of a wide 
variety of different instruments that influence and interrelate in different manners. 
This section examines how this interaction actually takes place and whether this leads 
to issues that can influence the manner in which EU employment policy instrument 
can contribute to achieving their economic objectives. The aspect of practical 
application refers to the manner in which the instruments have affected the real world, 
and examines whether there are, for instance, issues of complexity that hinder them 
from reaching the objectives.  
 
To start the discussion on coherence, recall the table on the relationship between EU 
employment policy instruments and the economic objectives, which was developed in 
chapter 3 and reproduced for convenience below in table 21.  
 
Table 21 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
(more binding) 
 
Internal market 
legislation 
Social employment policy  
 
EU funds 
spending Legislation  Coordination 
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
     X 
   
  X 
 
X 
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
     X 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
     X 
   
  X 
 
X 
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
     X 
 
X 
 
X 
   
  X 
 
Short term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
     X 
    
X 
 
Even though there are different instruments of EU employment policy, they partly 
share common economic objectives. In achieving these objectives the instruments 
overlap from time to time. Three main interlinkages can be identified658, which will 
                                                   
658 In general of course already on the basis of the Treaty there are certain cross-cutting 
objectives/principles that should be taken into account in all actions taken (e.g. art 8 and 9 TFEU which 
state this obligation for equality between men and women and e.g. the promotion of a high level of 
employment, as does, for the latter and quite superfluously, art 147(2) TFEU). In this section, however, 
we will take a bit more practical approach, analysing the actual legal instruments themselves and the 
interlinkages foreseen between them.  
 
be discussed subsequently, namely the link between employment policy coordination 
and internal market legislation and EU funds spending, the link between social 
employment policy and employment policy coordination, and the link between 
internal market legislation and social employment policy.   
 
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the employment guidelines form the 
basis of employment policy coordination. Even though these are explicitly linked to 
the coordination of policies of the Member States, the guidelines also contain several 
explicit references to the EU funds, in general calling on Member States to make 
optimal use of the various funds. This is also reflected in primary Union law, where 
strengthening cohesion in article 175 TFEU is linked to coordination of economic 
policies, and made explicit in the EU Fund Regulations where the obligation is 
installed for assistance from the Funds to target the European Union priorities of 
promoting competitiveness and creating jobs, including meeting the objectives of the 
Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. More specifically, that 60% of 
expenditure for the Convergence objective and 75% of expenditure for the Regional 
competitiveness and employment objective is set for the abovementioned priorities 659.  
 
Since the EU funds discussed here are already limited as to their objectives by their 
respective legal bases the broad categories available for funding arguably do not 
impose strict additional limitations. Even more so, given the broadness of the 
categories one can wonder why the link with expenditure was only made for 75% and 
60% of total expenditure. This combined with the large level of discretion for 
Member States to pick and choose the various categories arguably makes the practical 
link largely obsolete.  
 
In contrast to the frequent mentioning of the EU funds, the current integrated 
guidelines under the Europe 2020 strategy make no explicit mentioning of the internal 
market660. Given the mentioning of EU action this could be seen as rather odd, even 
more so since the practical implementation and application of the rules that constitute 
the internal market are in fact the responsibility of the Member States. Explicit legal 
links between employment policy coordination and the internal market, are limited to 
a mentioning in the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, it is stated that “Achieving 
and maintaining a dynamic internal market should be considered an element of the 
                                                   
659 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, art 9(3). The priorities 
are further defined in Annex IV, which refers to representing a wide area of possible expenditure 
categories, most relevantly in the area of the labour market concerning increasing adaptability of 
workers, improving access to employment, improving social inclusion of less-favoured persons and 
improving human capital.  
660 This is a change of approach as regards to the last years of the Lisbon strategy, where extending and 
deepening the internal market was explicitly included as one of the guidelines. 
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The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the employment guidelines form the 
basis of employment policy coordination. Even though these are explicitly linked to 
the coordination of policies of the Member States, the guidelines also contain several 
explicit references to the EU funds, in general calling on Member States to make 
optimal use of the various funds. This is also reflected in primary Union law, where 
strengthening cohesion in article 175 TFEU is linked to coordination of economic 
policies, and made explicit in the EU Fund Regulations where the obligation is 
installed for assistance from the Funds to target the European Union priorities of 
promoting competitiveness and creating jobs, including meeting the objectives of the 
Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. More specifically, that 60% of 
expenditure for the Convergence objective and 75% of expenditure for the Regional 
competitiveness and employment objective is set for the abovementioned priorities 659.  
 
Since the EU funds discussed here are already limited as to their objectives by their 
respective legal bases the broad categories available for funding arguably do not 
impose strict additional limitations. Even more so, given the broadness of the 
categories one can wonder why the link with expenditure was only made for 75% and 
60% of total expenditure. This combined with the large level of discretion for 
Member States to pick and choose the various categories arguably makes the practical 
link largely obsolete.  
 
In contrast to the frequent mentioning of the EU funds, the current integrated 
guidelines under the Europe 2020 strategy make no explicit mentioning of the internal 
market660. Given the mentioning of EU action this could be seen as rather odd, even 
more so since the practical implementation and application of the rules that constitute 
the internal market are in fact the responsibility of the Member States. Explicit legal 
links between employment policy coordination and the internal market, are limited to 
a mentioning in the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, it is stated that “Achieving 
and maintaining a dynamic internal market should be considered an element of the 
                                                   
659 Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210, art 9(3). The priorities 
are further defined in Annex IV, which refers to representing a wide area of possible expenditure 
categories, most relevantly in the area of the labour market concerning increasing adaptability of 
workers, improving access to employment, improving social inclusion of less-favoured persons and 
improving human capital.  
660 This is a change of approach as regards to the last years of the Lisbon strategy, where extending and 
deepening the internal market was explicitly included as one of the guidelines. 
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proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union”661. There are, 
however, no operational conclusions linked to this statement. Since there is no reason 
why flexibility of labour markets as a prescription to prevent and correct imbalances 
is something that is only relevant for national labour markets, this can be considered 
an omission.  
 
The processes of employment policy coordination and social employment policy have 
no formal legal links. Given the large overlap content wise, as well as the impact the 
two can have on one another this can be considered quite extraordinary. Though 
politically often combined, this lack of practical legal links poses a number of risks. A 
two-track approach between the two processes in general is one of them, as is lack of 
legal clarity. The former comes back in the non-inclusion of (aspects of) EU social 
legislation in the integrated guidelines. A similar reasoning for inclusion can be 
followed here as in the area of the internal market above, with concrete examples in 
the area of gender equality and health and safety of workers. The latter returns in the 
combination of the OMC process on social protection and social inclusion and the 
employment coordination processes. The integrated guidelines on promoting social 
inclusion and combating poverty de facto integrates the subjects from the OMC social 
inclusion in employment policy coordination. However, the possible legal bases of the 
OMC social inclusion propagate a system of best practices and do not foresee the 
issuing of country-specific recommendations. On which subject matters country-
specific recommendations can be issued therewith is not clear.  
    
Finally, the link between internal market legislation and social employment policy 
instruments. This link is already laid down in the Treaty itself, where article 151 
TFEU explicitly links the goals of the social chapter to the development of the 
internal market, and construes social policy as additional to the internal market. 
Where the social employment legislation lays down minimum requirements per 
Directive, which become part of the national legal systems, the relationship between 
most internal market legislation, which for the most part guarantee equal treatment in 
various manners, and the social employment legislation is quite clear. Following this 
relationship in the concrete legal instruments, the services Directive and the posting of 
workers Directive are the ones that from the internal market point of view attract most 
interest. The services Directive is very explicit in stating that labour law in any 
context is not affected by the Directive662. Since labour law in the context of provision 
of services is in fact covered by the posting of workers Directive, which is considered 
a lex specialis in article 3 of the Directive, and not the services Directive, from a legal 
point of view this statement is rather superfluous. The posting of workers Directive 
therefore is most relevant. The relationship between the posting of workers Directive 
                                                   
661 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, recital 3. 
662 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 1(6). 
 
and social employment legislation is made clear in article 3 of the Directive, more 
specifically articles 3(1)(a), 3(1)(e), 3(1)(g). These include the substance of working 
time, health and safety of workers and gender equality as terms and conditions of 
employment that should be guaranteed by the Member States to apply to posted 
workers663.  
 
Moving to a more specific examination of the various measures taken in the area of 
employment policy coordination, there are a number of issues related to coherence 
and practical application that deserve further discussion. First of all, as regards the 
Treaty the economic policy coordination of article 121 TFEU and the employment 
policy coordination of article 148 TFEU display a large overlap. The inclusion of 
article 148 TFEU in Regulation 1175/2011 on the European semester as well as large 
employment related areas in the imbalances procedure further emphasises the process 
of employment policy coordination as an integral part of the wider economic policy 
coordination under article 121 TFEU. The same overlap exists for the various 
procedures based on these provisions, the Europe 2020 strategy/European semester, 
the Euro Plus Pact and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure. A further explicit 
integration of the Euro Plus Pact into the regular process of the European semester 
and the imbalances procedure would both increase transparency and improve focus, 
leaving the Europe 2020 strategy and the imbalances procedure. Even between these 
two instruments there is a large potential overlap. With issues of competitiveness and 
unemployment falling under the macroeconomic imbalances procedure the largest 
share of employment, education and social inclusion can be incorporated as well into 
the imbalances procedure if so decided. This at first will depend on the interpretation 
of the Commission, which given its relatively independent role in the imbalances 
procedure, has strong incentives to widen the scope of the imbalances procedure to 
the largest extent possible. First signs of this can already be seen in the Commission’s 
first alert mechanism report published in February 2012664 in which the Commission 
identifies several countries possibly suffering from a wide range of imbalances. This 
would mean a diminishing of importance of the Europe 2020 strategy in general, and 
more specifically for the employment coordination process of article 148 TFEU, quite 
possibly making these processes largely obsolete. Whether from the point of view of 
the functioning of employment policy coordination instruments in practice this is a 
good or bad thing is open for discussion. On the one hand, this would increase 
possibilities for European pressure for reform efforts. On the other hand, this could 
decrease commitment within the Council for the imbalances procedure when issues 
                                                   
663 Conversely, the relationship between social employment legislation and the internal market is 
remarkably absent from the various pieces of social legislation, with only examples consisting of 
general negative sentiment in the recitals about e.g. workers health and safety “should not be 
subordinate to purely economic considerations” see e.g. Directive 2003/88/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time [2003] OJ L 299, recital 4.  
664 Commission, ‘Alert mechanism report’ COM(2012)68. 
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OMC social inclusion propagate a system of best practices and do not foresee the 
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TFEU explicitly links the goals of the social chapter to the development of the 
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Directive, which become part of the national legal systems, the relationship between 
most internal market legislation, which for the most part guarantee equal treatment in 
various manners, and the social employment legislation is quite clear. Following this 
relationship in the concrete legal instruments, the services Directive and the posting of 
workers Directive are the ones that from the internal market point of view attract most 
interest. The services Directive is very explicit in stating that labour law in any 
context is not affected by the Directive662. Since labour law in the context of provision 
of services is in fact covered by the posting of workers Directive, which is considered 
a lex specialis in article 3 of the Directive, and not the services Directive, from a legal 
point of view this statement is rather superfluous. The posting of workers Directive 
therefore is most relevant. The relationship between the posting of workers Directive 
                                                   
661 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, recital 3. 
662 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 1(6). 
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employment that should be guaranteed by the Member States to apply to posted 
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Moving to a more specific examination of the various measures taken in the area of 
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article 148 TFEU in Regulation 1175/2011 on the European semester as well as large 
employment related areas in the imbalances procedure further emphasises the process 
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coordination under article 121 TFEU. The same overlap exists for the various 
procedures based on these provisions, the Europe 2020 strategy/European semester, 
the Euro Plus Pact and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure. A further explicit 
integration of the Euro Plus Pact into the regular process of the European semester 
and the imbalances procedure would both increase transparency and improve focus, 
leaving the Europe 2020 strategy and the imbalances procedure. Even between these 
two instruments there is a large potential overlap. With issues of competitiveness and 
unemployment falling under the macroeconomic imbalances procedure the largest 
share of employment, education and social inclusion can be incorporated as well into 
the imbalances procedure if so decided. This at first will depend on the interpretation 
of the Commission, which given its relatively independent role in the imbalances 
procedure, has strong incentives to widen the scope of the imbalances procedure to 
the largest extent possible. First signs of this can already be seen in the Commission’s 
first alert mechanism report published in February 2012664 in which the Commission 
identifies several countries possibly suffering from a wide range of imbalances. This 
would mean a diminishing of importance of the Europe 2020 strategy in general, and 
more specifically for the employment coordination process of article 148 TFEU, quite 
possibly making these processes largely obsolete. Whether from the point of view of 
the functioning of employment policy coordination instruments in practice this is a 
good or bad thing is open for discussion. On the one hand, this would increase 
possibilities for European pressure for reform efforts. On the other hand, this could 
decrease commitment within the Council for the imbalances procedure when issues 
                                                   
663 Conversely, the relationship between social employment legislation and the internal market is 
remarkably absent from the various pieces of social legislation, with only examples consisting of 
general negative sentiment in the recitals about e.g. workers health and safety “should not be 
subordinate to purely economic considerations” see e.g. Directive 2003/88/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
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664 Commission, ‘Alert mechanism report’ COM(2012)68. 
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which are only very remotely linked to harmful imbalances are incorporated. Since 
the Council has the final say in this area effects therefore are uncertain. 
 
In the area of internal market legislation there are a number of issues concerning 
coherence and practical application which are relevant for discussion. In general, the 
various pieces of legislation in this area form a complex set up with various rights and 
requirements applying to various types of people. Chart 3 makes an attempt at 
mapping at the different interrelationships. 
 
Chart 3 665666 
 
 
 
That this multi-layered system can lead to some confusion for the individual to which 
these free movement rights apply becomes most apparent when examining the issue 
of social security rights for migrant workers. There are in fact three different sets of 
rules applicable here, stemming from the European citizens Directive, the free 
                                                   
665 For simplicity’s sake this table leaves non-active EU citizens out of the picture. 
666 The EU citizens Directive here poses a general framework on equal treatment in art 24 of the 
Directive, subject to specific provisions laid down in the Treaty and secondary law. The free movement 
of workers Regulation therefore e.g. can be seen for instance as a lex specialis to the equal treatment 
principle specifically for workers. In its relationship with the social security coordination Regulations 
however, the free movement of workers Regulation again functions as a lex generalis, giving 
precedence to these other Regulations (see art 36(2)). The services Directive is a lex specialis as 
regards the EU citizens Directive, while at the same time, within its scope fills a similar lex generalis 
role as the citizens Directive, with the posting of workers Directive e.g. functioning as a lex specialis 
for posted workers in the context of service provision (see art 3(1)(a) and, rather superfluously, also art 
17(2) of the services Directive). The services Directive also gives precedence over the social security 
coordination Regulations and the professional qualifications Directive (art 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(d) of the 
services Directive).  
 
movement of workers Regulation and the social security coordination Regulations667. 
In general, at least some of the complexity of the system as a whole can be said to 
stem from the Treaty-based separation between workers, self-employed persons and 
service providers. Examining the general system, however, it becomes clear that 
within an economic context and from the point of view of the migrating person in 
question especially the distinction between employed and self-employed is 
superfluous. The only relevant distinction here is between permanent and temporary 
residence in the host country. Permanent residence in this regard covers both 
employed and self-employed persons, and comes with a “full” extent of rights and 
requirements. Temporary residence on the other hand falls under services linked to 
where appropriate posting of workers entailing more limited rights, but also more 
limited requirements. Legally, there is indeed some evidence on “converging” or 
parallel development of the freedom of movement of the employed and self employed 
in recent decisions of the Court of Justice668, where, inspired by the concept of 
“European citizenship”, all market freedoms seem to form part of a general right for 
all Union citizens to pursue an economic activity in a cross border context669. In some 
of the legislation under consideration this approach can also already be seen. The EU 
citizens Directive provides the same rights to employed and self employed persons. 
Furthermore, the social security coordination Regulations and the professional 
qualifications Directive, for instance, pay little attention to their legal basis and simply 
separate their application along the permanent/temporary division outlined above.  
 
Complexity can also form a hurdle for effective application of European legislation by 
national administrations. In this regard, the various legislative instruments have 
significant overlap in the manner in which they provide for administrative cooperation 
between Member States. As stated, all instruments except for the European citizens 
Directive, contain provisions laying down processes for administrative cooperation, 
mainly aimed at information provision on migrating persons as well as national rights 
and requirements present in a Member State. Administrative cooperation, however, 
has developed independently within the context of each legal instrument, and 
therefore at the moment leads to parallel, different and therewith arguably inefficient 
systems. The European Commission’s recent Internal Market Information system 
initiative (IMI)) in this regard is a step in the right direction. IMI is intended to 
digitalise and streamline the various ways in which competent authorities exchange 
information on internal market related issues670. The system at this moment is 
available for (part of) the services Directive and the professional qualifications 
                                                   
667 See e.g. Verschueren, ‘Free movement of persons in the European Union and social rights: an area 
of conflicting secondary law instruments?’ (ERA Forum, vol 12, no 2, 2011). 
668 See e.g. Case C-464/02 Commission v Denmark [2005] ECR I- 7929.  
669 See also Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ 
(European Law Review, vol 35, no 1, 2010) and Chalmers et al., European Union law (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
670 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation for administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System’ COM(2011)522.  
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which are only very remotely linked to harmful imbalances are incorporated. Since 
the Council has the final say in this area effects therefore are uncertain. 
 
In the area of internal market legislation there are a number of issues concerning 
coherence and practical application which are relevant for discussion. In general, the 
various pieces of legislation in this area form a complex set up with various rights and 
requirements applying to various types of people. Chart 3 makes an attempt at 
mapping at the different interrelationships. 
 
Chart 3 665666 
 
 
 
That this multi-layered system can lead to some confusion for the individual to which 
these free movement rights apply becomes most apparent when examining the issue 
of social security rights for migrant workers. There are in fact three different sets of 
rules applicable here, stemming from the European citizens Directive, the free 
                                                   
665 For simplicity’s sake this table leaves non-active EU citizens out of the picture. 
666 The EU citizens Directive here poses a general framework on equal treatment in art 24 of the 
Directive, subject to specific provisions laid down in the Treaty and secondary law. The free movement 
of workers Regulation therefore e.g. can be seen for instance as a lex specialis to the equal treatment 
principle specifically for workers. In its relationship with the social security coordination Regulations 
however, the free movement of workers Regulation again functions as a lex generalis, giving 
precedence to these other Regulations (see art 36(2)). The services Directive is a lex specialis as 
regards the EU citizens Directive, while at the same time, within its scope fills a similar lex generalis 
role as the citizens Directive, with the posting of workers Directive e.g. functioning as a lex specialis 
for posted workers in the context of service provision (see art 3(1)(a) and, rather superfluously, also art 
17(2) of the services Directive). The services Directive also gives precedence over the social security 
coordination Regulations and the professional qualifications Directive (art 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(d) of the 
services Directive).  
 
movement of workers Regulation and the social security coordination Regulations667. 
In general, at least some of the complexity of the system as a whole can be said to 
stem from the Treaty-based separation between workers, self-employed persons and 
service providers. Examining the general system, however, it becomes clear that 
within an economic context and from the point of view of the migrating person in 
question especially the distinction between employed and self-employed is 
superfluous. The only relevant distinction here is between permanent and temporary 
residence in the host country. Permanent residence in this regard covers both 
employed and self-employed persons, and comes with a “full” extent of rights and 
requirements. Temporary residence on the other hand falls under services linked to 
where appropriate posting of workers entailing more limited rights, but also more 
limited requirements. Legally, there is indeed some evidence on “converging” or 
parallel development of the freedom of movement of the employed and self employed 
in recent decisions of the Court of Justice668, where, inspired by the concept of 
“European citizenship”, all market freedoms seem to form part of a general right for 
all Union citizens to pursue an economic activity in a cross border context669. In some 
of the legislation under consideration this approach can also already be seen. The EU 
citizens Directive provides the same rights to employed and self employed persons. 
Furthermore, the social security coordination Regulations and the professional 
qualifications Directive, for instance, pay little attention to their legal basis and simply 
separate their application along the permanent/temporary division outlined above.  
 
Complexity can also form a hurdle for effective application of European legislation by 
national administrations. In this regard, the various legislative instruments have 
significant overlap in the manner in which they provide for administrative cooperation 
between Member States. As stated, all instruments except for the European citizens 
Directive, contain provisions laying down processes for administrative cooperation, 
mainly aimed at information provision on migrating persons as well as national rights 
and requirements present in a Member State. Administrative cooperation, however, 
has developed independently within the context of each legal instrument, and 
therefore at the moment leads to parallel, different and therewith arguably inefficient 
systems. The European Commission’s recent Internal Market Information system 
initiative (IMI)) in this regard is a step in the right direction. IMI is intended to 
digitalise and streamline the various ways in which competent authorities exchange 
information on internal market related issues670. The system at this moment is 
available for (part of) the services Directive and the professional qualifications 
                                                   
667 See e.g. Verschueren, ‘Free movement of persons in the European Union and social rights: an area 
of conflicting secondary law instruments?’ (ERA Forum, vol 12, no 2, 2011). 
668 See e.g. Case C-464/02 Commission v Denmark [2005] ECR I- 7929.  
669 See also Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ 
(European Law Review, vol 35, no 1, 2010) and Chalmers et al., European Union law (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
670 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation for administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System’ COM(2011)522.  
27022 Duin.indd   239 12-10-13   17:44
Chapter 5
240 
Directive, with first results as far as effectiveness and ease of use promising. Plans are 
to increase the elements of the services Directive that fall under its scope and also 
include the posting of workers Directive under its scope. However, there is as of yet 
no mentioning of the free movement of workers Regulation and the social security 
coordination Regulations. Where the absence of the free movement of workers 
Regulation can be partly justified due to the different nature of administrative 
cooperation, cooperation under the social security coordination Regulations is so 
similar to especially the professional qualifications Directive that integration of these 
regulations in the IMI system could lead to significant benefits.  
 
Finally, there are some issues concerning the practical application of the various 
individual legal instruments in the area of the Internal Market. First and foremost, the 
way in which the posting of workers Directive should be actually applied has 
remained unclear for a long time. Especially the manner in which article 3(1), 3(7) 
and 3(10) of the Directive allow Member States to impose labour standards on posted 
workers has given room to extensive discussion, but uncertainties have been largely 
eliminated in a number of recent judgements from the European Court of Justice, 
especially in Laval671 and Ruffert672. The Court in these cases effectively interpreted 
the Posting of workers Directive to be one of maximum harmonisation, meaning that 
the labour standards laid down in article 3(1) are effectively the only ones that 
Member States can impose on posted workers in the context of the provision of 
services. Any other interpretation in the eyes of the Court would rob the Directive of 
its “effect utile”673. In this interpretation, the Court has taken away most doubts on the 
appropriateness of the legal basis and proportionality mentioned earlier since it in its 
vision effectively follows the reasoning of the legal basis on free movement of 
services. The free provision of services therefore takes precedence, with the 
transparency for the service provider being the main goal of the Directive. 
Furthermore, as far as practical application in concerned, the most recent impact 
assessment linked to the recent Commission proposals in this area identified a number 
of areas for improvement, including improving administrative cooperation between 
Member States, improving monitoring and enforcement of the Directive and 
improving clarity and information provision regarding the definition of posting and 
the interpretation of the terms and conditions of employment in the Directive674.  
                                                   
671 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-00000. 
672 Case C-346/06 Ruffert [2008] lRLR 467. 
673 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-00000, par 80 and Case C-346/06 Ruffert [2008] 
lRLR 467, par 33. These judgements have both been welcomed and criticized in public and academic 
debate. For an overview of academic literature see http://www.etui.org/Topics/Social-dialogue-
collective-bargaining/Social-legislation/The-interpretation-by-the-European-Court-of-Justice/Reaction-
to-the-judgements/Articles-in-academic-literature-on-the-judgements last accessed 10 January 2013. 
674 Commission, ‘staff working document executive summary of the impact assessment accompanying 
the document proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services and proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
 
 
On practical application, the services Directive also raises a large number of 
questions, mainly based on vague and even contradictory texts in the Directive itself. 
Barnard (2008) 675 extensively discusses the various inconsistencies and uncertainties 
of the Directive, which can largely be traced back to the extremely delicate political 
compromises and haste in (re-)drafting of the original text. Relevant issues here are 
e.g. the definition of the various exclusions, limitations and derogations as well as the 
exact interpretation of the various justifications for limitations to free movement. To 
overcome some of these issues the European Commission has provided extensive 
guidance in a “handbook” for Member States, providing for technical assistance  in 
the actual implementation of the Directive676 by clarifying and explaining the 
Commission position on a number of the unclear issues identified. First results here 
(as revealed by the mutual evaluation exercise) indicate positive effects of the 
Directive to actually lower barriers for provision of services in the internal market677 
by the identification and partial abolition of requirements for a wide range of services 
provided, although given the short period that has passed since the implementation of 
the Directive, its impact has yet to fully take shape, while it will eventually be the 
Court of Justice which will ultimately have to make sense of the Directive.   
 
Questions arising from complexity have also been abundant as regards the 
professional qualifications Directive and the social security coordination Regulations, 
both of which went through a large-scale consolidation exercise aimed at increasing 
transparency and ease of application678. That not all issues have been sufficiently dealt 
with, however, can be seen from the Commission’s own evaluation of the new 
professional qualifications Directive in 2011679 and the yearly report of the training 
and reporting on social security network (trESS) on behalf of the European 
Commission on the implementation of the social security coordination Regulations680. 
The evaluation of the professional qualifications Directive, although positive on 
general impact of the Directive, points to important weaknesses. Main results include 
that under the general system the case-by-case assessment of each request for 
recognition is considered a burdensome exercise both for competent authorities and 
professionals. Furthermore, the provisions on services provision appear underutilised, 
with frequent calls for further administrative simplification in this area. Also a general 
call for more flexibility in the rules for the recognition of qualifications as well as a 
required update as regards minimum training requirements and classification of 
economic activities is identified. Although the new social security coordination 
Regulations had only been in force for a year, the trESS report on the implementation 
                                                                                                                                                 
services’ SWD(2012)64 final. 
675 Barnard, ‘Unravelling the services Directive’ (Common Market Law Review 45, 2008). 
676 Commission, ‘Handbook on implementation of the services Directive’ (2010). 
677 For a full overview of the results of the mutual evaluation exercise see Commission, ‘The process of 
mutual evaluation of the services Directive’ SEC(2011)102.  
678 See chapter 3. 
679 Commission, ‘An evaluation of the professional qualifications Directive’ (2011). 
680 Training and reporting on European social security (trESS), European report 2011 (2011). 
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of these Regulations already gives important insights into their functioning in 
practice, and specifically the problems encountered. A couple of general cross cutting 
issues are identified concerning most prominently the changing national environment. 
This entails the changing national social security systems681 as well as the changes 
occurring in the typical migrant worker682, leading to problems in applying the 
Regulations and identifying responsible national authorities.  
 
Concerning the third instrument of EU employment policy, that of social employment 
policy, possible problems stemming from a lack of coherence can only come into play 
to a limited extent, since the various aspects largely stand alone, each covering 
distinct elements. Concerning the practical application there are two main problems 
that apply to the majority of the various legislative instruments, namely that of 
complexity and that of adaptation to changing composition of labour markets, 
especially with regard to the role of self-employed and those on part time and fixed 
term contracts. Concerning complexity; with twelve compulsory minimum standards 
and fourteen exemptions and derogation possibilities, the working time Directive can 
rightfully said to be a very complex piece of legislation, contributing to sometimes 
complicated implementation and a relatively high degree of non-compliance, 
especially in specific countries and sectors683. The same holds true for the general 
health and safety at work framework Directive and its specific follow ups, where the 
Commission itself identifies serious shortcomings in the application of Community 
legislation, leading it to announce further simplification of the legislative framework 
and the drawing up of practical guidelines684. The gender equality Directives finally 
underwent a major overhaul leading to the 2006 Directive largely aimed at 
simplification and clarification of the current legal system685.   
 
The adaptation of the various legislative instruments to changing composition of 
labour markets has taken place to a varying extent. The fixed term, part time and 
temporary agency work Directives incorporated equal treatment provisions for these 
types of workers. However, concerning e.g. gender equality, the issues of non-
transparency of equal pay provisions with regard to fixed term and part time contracts 
is something that is still highlighted by the European Commission as an area where 
further improvement is needed686. Furthermore, specific aspects of gender equality in 
a self-employed capacity were reinvigorated by Directive 2010/18/EU, where the 
                                                   
681 more decentralisation, different types of benefits, more use of additional activation measures linked 
to benefits 
682 mobile workers are highly fragmented and extremely mobile 
683 See also Falkner, Complying with Europe; harmonisation and soft law in the Member States 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) for a more comprehensive overview.  
684 Commission, ‘Improving quality and productivity at work: Community strategy 2007-2012 on 
health and safety at work’ COM(2007)62. 
685 Commission, ‘Extended impact assessment on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of 
men and women in matters of employment and occupation’ SEC(2004)482. 
686 Commission, ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’ SEC(2010)1079.  
 
original Directive 86/613 due to its very open formulation had proven to be 
insufficient687. As far as health and safety at work is concerned, self-employed 
persons in fact cannot fall under the scope of the general health and safety Directive 
and its specific follow up Directives, since the legal basis limits the scope to actual 
workers. Self-employed persons, however, have been an increasing part of the work 
place specifically also in “accident prone” sectors like construction. This has proven 
to be a significant gap in the Directive, with the Council having to resort to a 
recommendations on the basis of article 352 TFEU to encourage Member States to 
improve the health and safety at work of self-employed688. Furthermore, despite the 
existence of a separate Directive on measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health at work of workers with fixed term or temporary contracts689, these 
types of workers are comparatively more exposed to occupational health and safety 
risks than workers with other types of employment contracts690. 
 
The changing composition of labour markets has given room for an intensive debate 
of the working time Directive. The European Commission in its 2010 communication 
on reviewing the working time Directive691 spends ample time discussing the need to 
make working time rules more flexible in the light of changing labour market needs. 
Furthermore, the position of the self-employed in this regard also deserves special 
attention. Similar to the health and safety at work Directives, the working time 
Directive can not apply to self-employed persons due to its legal basis. However, 
looking at the incidence of long hours worked in the labour force it becomes clear that 
this is a group which is important. The European Working Conditions survey in this 
regard shows that about 15% of those in employment in the EU 27 work more than 48 
hours a week. Overall, in the EU, over 50% of those working 48 hours a week or 
more are self-employed, even though they only account for 16% of total 
employment692. 
 
Finally, when discussing coherence and practical application issues concerning EU 
funds spending the logical place to start are the dual objectives of cohesion and 
employment in the Single Market and the relationship between the ESF and ERDF 
                                                   
687 Commission, ‘Extended impact assessment on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
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688 Council Recommendation of 18 February 2003 concerning the improvement of the protection of the 
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690 See Commission, ‘Implementation by Member States of Council Directive 91/383/EC of 25 June 
1991 supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of 
workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a temporary 
employment relationship’ SEC(2011)982. 
691 Commission, ‘Reviewing the working time Directive’ COM(2010)106. 
692  European foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions, Comparative analysis 
of working time in the European Union (2010). 
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employment in the Single Market and the relationship between the ESF and ERDF 
                                                   
687 Commission, ‘Extended impact assessment on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of 
men and women in matters of employment and occupation’ SEC(2004)482. 
688 Council Recommendation of 18 February 2003 concerning the improvement of the protection of the 
health and safety at work of self-employed workers. 
689 Council Directive 91/383/EC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of workers with a fixed- duration employment 
relationship or a temporary employment relationship [1991] OJ L 206. 
690 See Commission, ‘Implementation by Member States of Council Directive 91/383/EC of 25 June 
1991 supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of 
workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a temporary 
employment relationship’ SEC(2011)982. 
691 Commission, ‘Reviewing the working time Directive’ COM(2010)106. 
692  European foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions, Comparative analysis 
of working time in the European Union (2010). 
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funding. In general, as to the exact nature of the various projects there are provisions 
that deal with overlap. Operational Programmes, for instance, are explicitly to be 
linked to one fund only693. Content wise, there is some overlap to be seen between the 
ESF and ERDF. Article 4 of Regulation 1080/2006 which limits content to be dealt 
with by the ERDF under the convergence objective also includes education issues and 
job creation, although in the latter it is explicitly mentioned that this only counts for as 
far as it does not fall under the ESF Regulation694. Furthermore, tertiary education is 
also something that falls under the scope of the ERDF in the regional competitiveness 
and employment objective695. The combination of this overlap combined with the 
explicit rule of one program one fund can pose some inconvenience, since the same 
project could fall under both funds, but is not allowed to benefit from both696.  
Concerning the practical application there are a number of issues that can be 
highlighted related to additionality, effectiveness and efficiency of spending. In 
general, the concepts of additionality, effectiveness and efficiency of spending are all 
part of the Structural Fund Regulations. However, in practice these provisions have 
proven to function imperfectly. As has been highlighted in the previous chapter, 
studies on the additionality of spending find a significant replacement of national 
spending by EU money697. Furthermore, the effectiveness and efficiency is already 
below standard as far as simply preventing or detecting and correcting the 
reimbursement of overstated or ineligible costs, as also becomes apparent by the 
refusal year after year of the EU Court of Auditors to sign the EU accounts, partly 
because of the high error rate in cohesion policy. As shown in the previous chapter, 
actual effectiveness in reaching the foreseen policy objectives is even more difficult to 
determine.  
 
Summarising the results of the analysis under the institutional aspect coherence and 
practical application, table 22 concludes this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
693 There are some exceptions to this, see Regulation 1083/2006 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] 
OJ L 210, art 34. 
694 Regulation1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional 
Development Fund [2006] OJ L 371/1, art 4(3). 
695 Regulation1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional 
Development Fund [2006] OJ L 371/1, art 5(1)(b). 
696 This inconvenience is of course even greater for the additionality between employment measures 
and other types of growth enhancing measures taken under the ERDF. However, since the focus of this 
study is employment policy this will not be discussed.  
697 See section 4.5. 
 
Table 22 
Instruments 
 
 
Institutional 
aspects 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Internal market 
legislation 
 
Social 
employment 
policy 
 
EU funds 
spending 
 
Distribution of 
power in the 
supranational 
legal order 
 
    
 
Democratic 
legitimacy and  
accountability 
 
    
 
Coherence and 
practical 
application 
 
    
 
 
Yellow again stands for a medium performance, where the analysis has shown that 
some issues can be improved upon. That the various instruments are connected in a 
number of ways has become clear in the discussion of coherence and practical 
application of the instruments. The relationship within the four instruments is 
especially tight when looking at the internal market, where different pieces of 
legislation cover the same substance and similar modus operandi are developed in e.g. 
cross border cooperation. Large uncertainties and overlap have been shown to exist in 
the area of employment policy coordination, even more so when expanded with the 
OMC social protection and social inclusion. Finally, concerning practical application 
issues that come back throughout the different instruments are the complexity of the 
instruments themselves and problems in adjusting to changing labour markets, the 
latter of which comes back most prominently in distinguishing between workers and 
self employed. 
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This study has discussed the economic objectives of employment policy, the 
development over time of the four different EU instruments of employment policy, 
the focus and impact of these instruments and a number of elements related to the 
EU's institutional structure that influence the manner in which the instruments 
contribute to the achievement of the economic objectives. This final chapter draws 
conclusions and looks ahead, proposing improvements. 
 
6.1 Main findings 
 
The economic framework developed in this study has led to five different objectives 
governments can pursue in setting employment policy, all of which are linked in a 
number of different ways to increasing GDP per capita growth;  
1. Increasing incentives for work  
2. Improving the functioning and flexibility of markets  
3. Improving the human capital stock 
4. Improving framework conditions and  
5  Short-term stabilisation policy698 
 
In examining how these economic objectives for government policy relate to 
developments in the EU, this study has shown that the development of EU 
employment policy from the 1950s led to four different instruments of policy-making; 
1. Employment policy coordination 
2. Internal market legislation 
3. Social employment policy and  
4. EU funds spending699 
 
The link between these EU instruments and the objectives stemming from the 
economic framework has been shown to be good, though far from perfect, something 
which became especially apparent when analysing social aspects of employment 
policy700. As to the manner in which EU employment policy instruments have 
contributed to achieving the economic objectives it was shown that this very much 
depends on the instrument in question, with especially questionable impact of the 
various open method of coordination processes. Furthermore, analysis of especially 
the legislative measures in the area of the internal market and social employment 
policy, was severely hampered by data availability issues, leading to largely 
inconclusive results701. The distribution of power in the supranational legal order, 
democratic legitimacy and accountability and issues of coherence and practical 
application were all shown to be relevant institutional elements in explaining the 
questionable impact of the EU's instruments. Issues concerning the distribution of 
                                                   
698 See chapter 2. 
699 See chapter 3. 
700 See chapter 4. 
701 See chapter 4. 
 
power in the supranational legal order were shown to mainly relate to the detailed 
legal instruments in the area of social employment policy, while also posing some 
problems in the areas of employment policy coordination and EU fund spending. 
Furthermore, effective democratic legitimacy and accountability has been shown to 
know significant limitations, notably in the areas of employment policy coordination, 
internal market legislation and social employment policies. Finally, coherence and 
practical application of the instruments has been shown to pose problems in all four of 
the instruments. Largest uncertainties and overlap have been shown to exist in the 
area of employment policy coordination, even more so when expanded with the OMC 
social protection and social inclusion, while concerns of practical application are 
notably related to the complexity of the instruments themselves and problems in 
adjusting to changing labour markets. 
 
In general, the conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the previous 
chapters is therewith both positive and negative. The positive part of the conclusion is 
that, as far as the aims of the various instruments are concerned, they are largely in 
line with the policy prescriptions from the economic framework. The negative part of 
the conclusion is that all in all, EU employment policy is a complex system with large 
overlaps and risks of adverse policy action, combined with uncertain actual impact in 
the real world.  
 
6.2 Rethinking EU employment policy 
 
The general appraisal outlined above combined with the more detailed analysis of the 
previous chapters provides a solid basis to shift focus to the future, or to “rethink” EU 
employment policy. The remainder of this final chapter will be dedicated to this 
exercise and the development of concrete proposals for changes in the current EU 
employment policy set up. Logical starting point for such an exercise is the basic 
issue of pursuing policies that contribute to achieving the envisaged economic 
objectives. Relating this to the current set up of EU employment policy, the analysis 
in this study in this regard immediately gives rise to two suggestions for 
improvement.  
 
1. Improve clarity and consistency of policy action   
2. Remove the risk of adverse policy action 
 
Both aspects for improvement ultimately stem from the current set up of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU, which in turn is a result of the stepwise development of 
EU employment policy and the political priorities that have shifted over the years702. 
This has led to a current set up of the TFEU with separate chapters on economic 
                                                   
702 See chapter 3. 
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699 See chapter 3. 
700 See chapter 4. 
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legal instruments in the area of social employment policy, while also posing some 
problems in the areas of employment policy coordination and EU fund spending. 
Furthermore, effective democratic legitimacy and accountability has been shown to 
know significant limitations, notably in the areas of employment policy coordination, 
internal market legislation and social employment policies. Finally, coherence and 
practical application of the instruments has been shown to pose problems in all four of 
the instruments. Largest uncertainties and overlap have been shown to exist in the 
area of employment policy coordination, even more so when expanded with the OMC 
social protection and social inclusion, while concerns of practical application are 
notably related to the complexity of the instruments themselves and problems in 
adjusting to changing labour markets. 
 
In general, the conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the previous 
chapters is therewith both positive and negative. The positive part of the conclusion is 
that, as far as the aims of the various instruments are concerned, they are largely in 
line with the policy prescriptions from the economic framework. The negative part of 
the conclusion is that all in all, EU employment policy is a complex system with large 
overlaps and risks of adverse policy action, combined with uncertain actual impact in 
the real world.  
 
6.2 Rethinking EU employment policy 
 
The general appraisal outlined above combined with the more detailed analysis of the 
previous chapters provides a solid basis to shift focus to the future, or to “rethink” EU 
employment policy. The remainder of this final chapter will be dedicated to this 
exercise and the development of concrete proposals for changes in the current EU 
employment policy set up. Logical starting point for such an exercise is the basic 
issue of pursuing policies that contribute to achieving the envisaged economic 
objectives. Relating this to the current set up of EU employment policy, the analysis 
in this study in this regard immediately gives rise to two suggestions for 
improvement.  
 
1. Improve clarity and consistency of policy action   
2. Remove the risk of adverse policy action 
 
Both aspects for improvement ultimately stem from the current set up of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU, which in turn is a result of the stepwise development of 
EU employment policy and the political priorities that have shifted over the years702. 
This has led to a current set up of the TFEU with separate chapters on economic 
                                                   
702 See chapter 3. 
27022 Duin.indd   249 18-10-13   09:44
Chapter 6
250 
policy703, employment policy704 and social policy705. In the framework of analysis 
used throughout this study, however, this does not make sense, since all three aspects 
for so far as they relate to employment policy are aimed at the same economic 
objectives. That this is recognised in practice is something that can be clearly seen 
especially since the Lisbon strategy, where the economic and employment policy 
coordination cycles have become ever more intertwined. These interlinkages have 
become even more pronounced in the recent set up of the European semester, so much 
in fact that it could be argued that were it not for the political motivation that separate 
entities such as a Council formation (Employment and Social Affairs Council) and 
working group (Employment Committee) base their role in the process on this 
separate title of the Treaty, the employment title of the Treaty would have lost its 
meaning altogether. The practical process has indeed evolved to such an extent that 
the separate title on employment policy in the Treaty is mostly obsolete706, and is in 
fact largely ignored707. Clarity and consistency of action would therefore be served by 
removing Title IX from the Treaty, although political considerations will probably 
prevent such an event from taking place, as it were political considerations that led to 
its inclusion in the first place.   
 
The relationship between the economic and employment titles of the Treaty and the 
social title of the Treaty is more complicated. Especially since the Europe 2020 
strategy the relationship between the OMC social protection and social inclusion and 
the Europe 2020 strategy is unclear708. The elements of the OMC social protection 
and social inclusion which have been discussed in this study709 have explicitly been 
incorporated in the integrated guidelines which find their legal basis in articles 121 
and 148 TFEU, which in fact make these elements part of employment and economic 
policy coordination. On the other hand, the OMC social protection and social 
inclusion still has its distinct process, something which has been emphasised time and 
time again710. As far as clarity and consistency of action is concerned this situation 
should be improved. The inclusion of the issue of social inclusion in the most recent 
set of integrated economic and employment guidelines711 under articles 121 and 148 
TFEU is a prima facie viable solution, but has been shown in this study to actually 
make things worse by blurring the lines of economic and employment guidelines to 
                                                   
703 Title VIII, chapter 1 TFEU. 
704 Title IX TFEU. 
705 Title X TFEU. 
706 Measures taken on the basis of the articles of the employment title not directly related to the OMC 
process (147 and 149 TFEU) do not justify its existence either, since these could arguably just as well 
be based on other articles like 153 and 156 TFEU of the Social title. 
707 See e.g. Regulation 1175/2011 based on art 121(6) TFEU which also “naturally” includes the art 
148 process 
708 See also Social Protection Committee, ‘Opinion on the Future of the Social Open Method of 
Coordination’ (2011). 
709 Specifically social inclusion in the labour market, gender equality and pension systems 
710 See chapter 3. 
711 See Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies 
of the Member States [2010] OJ L 308, guideline 10 and chapter 4. 
 
possibly include measures that do not fit the economic objectives pursued. Arguably, 
within the context of this study there is no need for a separate and distinct approach to 
social employment related measures, something which has in fact been recognised 
from the change of approach of the social agenda in the mid 1990s, to lately the 
flexicurity principle712. This does not mean that the conclusion that the OMC process 
on social protection and social inclusion is superfluous is politically easy, arguably 
since the OMC process on social protection and social inclusion is largely considered 
among policy makers to be a face of Social Europe713. However, streamlining could 
still be achieved by focussing the OMC social protection and social inclusion on those 
areas that do not fall directly under the economic objectives identified in this study 
(e.g. poverty and health care)714.  
 
The EU's social employment policy legislation has been identified in this study as the 
area where the risks of adverse policy action are greatest. In fact, it has been shown 
that from the point of view of achieving economic objectives it is questionable 
whether these types of arrangements should exist at all715. Within the economic 
framework these should only exist for as far as they either prevent negative 
developments, e.g. in the form of a “race to the bottom”, or when the measures 
improve productivity at work. There is no evidence for negative externalities, or a 
race to the bottom in the areas handled here716. This could of course be a result of the 
measures being in place actually preventing a race to the bottom from happening, but 
whether these measures have had such an effect can be highly questioned. In any case, 
there is a lack of data hindering effective analysis in this regard717. The same goes for 
the effect measures have had in improving framework conditions, which remains 
largely unclear. This is harmful, since in the economic framework effects could run 
both ways and could even be detrimental for GDP per capita growth. In the absence of 
a solid factual basis what to do here is uncertain. What is known is that it should be 
more substantiated. Furthermore, whether it is in fact the EU that should perform such 
a role in these areas, as opposed to the Member States can be very much questioned. 
 
In general, moving from the content of policy to the role of the EU gives rises to two 
additional suggestions for improvement. 
 
 
 
                                                   
712 See chapter 3. See in this regard also Barbier, 'Tracing the fate of EU "social policy": changes in 
political discourse from the "Lisbon Strategy" to "Europe 2020" (International Labour Review, vol 
151, no 4, 2012).  
713 Social Protection Committee, ‘Opinion on the Future of the Social Open Method of Coordination’ 
(2011). 
714 See chapter 4. 
715 See chapter 2. 
716 See chapter 5. 
717 See chapter 4.  
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704 Title IX TFEU. 
705 Title X TFEU. 
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710 See chapter 3. 
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712 See chapter 3. See in this regard also Barbier, 'Tracing the fate of EU "social policy": changes in 
political discourse from the "Lisbon Strategy" to "Europe 2020" (International Labour Review, vol 
151, no 4, 2012).  
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3. Streamline EU policy action  
4. Differentiate EU policy instruments according to the rationale for EU policy action 
 
Both questions relate to earlier discussion on the division of power in the 
supranational legal order, the concept of fiscal federalism and the EU's legal concepts 
of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality718. Given the fact that in virtually all of 
the aspects of employment policy heterogeneity between Member States is very 
large719 relevant issues here are external and scale effects and whether policy could be 
achieved sufficiently by Member States themselves. From this point of view there are 
three different rationales for EU action in the area of employment policy720, which can 
provide a filter to streamline and differentiate EU policy action, namely 1) Promoting 
positive policy developments in the Member States 2) Promoting EU and especially 
euro area convergence, and 3) Improving the functioning of the internal market. Any 
EU policy action undertaken should be effective in reaching these objectives, while 
proportionality considerations dictate that this should be done in a manner that does 
not exceed what is necessary.  
 
More specifically, the first rationale is linked to the argument of political 
externalities721. Any EU action under this rationale should be aimed at promoting 
policy learning and assisting Member States in the formulation and implementation of 
policy measures. The second rationale is based on two types of externalities, namely 
that of efficiency of spending and that of prevention of harmful macroeconomic 
imbalances. Any EU action under this rationale should therefore aim at making the 
most of the money at hand in stimulating GDP per capita growth, as well as 
preventing and mitigating the existence of harmful macroeconomic imbalances, with 
the latter being especially relevant for the Member States of the euro area. Finally, the 
rationale of improving the functioning of the internal market is applicable to all 
measures in the area of improving the functioning and flexibility of markets that 
facilitate cross border employment.  
 
Relating these three different rationales for EU employment policy to possible 
avenues for improvement of the current system one can envisage a streamlining and 
reshuffling of both the EU employment policy instruments themselves and the link 
between these instruments and the economic objectives, which can be portrayed in the 
following table. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
718 see chapter 5. 
719 See chapter 4.  
720 Building on section 5.2.2. 
721 See chapter 5. 
 
Table 23 
 
Rationale for 
EU action 
 
Promoting 
positive policy 
developments 
in the Member 
States 
 
Promoting EU and especially 
euro area convergence 
 
Improving the functioning of 
the internal market 
Instruments 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Employment 
policy 
coordination 
 
 
Macro 
economic 
imbalances 
Procedure 
 
 
EU funds 
spending 
 
Internal market 
legislation 
Convergence Internal 
market  
Increasing 
incentives for 
work 
 
X 
  
X 
  
Improving the 
functioning 
and flexibility 
of markets 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Improving the 
human capital 
stock 
 
X 
  
X 
  
Improving 
framework 
conditions  
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
  
Short term 
stabilisation 
policy 
 
X 
  
X 
  
 
As this table shows, in the new set up the rationale of promoting positive policy 
developments in the Member States is covered by the instrument of employment 
policy coordination. The instrument of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure is 
based on the rationale of promoting EU and especially euro area convergence, 
specifically on the aspect of preventing and mitigating the existence of harmful 
macroeconomic imbalances. The instrument of EU funds spending in turn is also 
partly aimed at promoting EU and especially euro area convergence, specifically on 
the aspect of increasing efficiency of spending. Furthermore, EU funds spending is 
partly aimed at improving the functioning of the internal market, as is the last 
instrument, that of internal market legislation.  
 
In comparing table 23 with the current situation of EU employment policy as 
portrayed in table 21, there are a number of changes that stand out. Firstly, the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure has been separated from the other elements of 
EU employment policy coordination and relabelled as a separate EU employment 
policy instrument. Although already partly the case in the current setting, here are two 
reasons why additional steps can be considered necessary. The first reason stems from 
the nature of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure itself and more specifically 
the lack of a strict definition on what harmful imbalances in the area of employment 
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3. Streamline EU policy action  
4. Differentiate EU policy instruments according to the rationale for EU policy action 
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proportionality considerations dictate that this should be done in a manner that does 
not exceed what is necessary.  
 
More specifically, the first rationale is linked to the argument of political 
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policy measures. The second rationale is based on two types of externalities, namely 
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most of the money at hand in stimulating GDP per capita growth, as well as 
preventing and mitigating the existence of harmful macroeconomic imbalances, with 
the latter being especially relevant for the Member States of the euro area. Finally, the 
rationale of improving the functioning of the internal market is applicable to all 
measures in the area of improving the functioning and flexibility of markets that 
facilitate cross border employment.  
 
Relating these three different rationales for EU employment policy to possible 
avenues for improvement of the current system one can envisage a streamlining and 
reshuffling of both the EU employment policy instruments themselves and the link 
between these instruments and the economic objectives, which can be portrayed in the 
following table. 
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As this table shows, in the new set up the rationale of promoting positive policy 
developments in the Member States is covered by the instrument of employment 
policy coordination. The instrument of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure is 
based on the rationale of promoting EU and especially euro area convergence, 
specifically on the aspect of preventing and mitigating the existence of harmful 
macroeconomic imbalances. The instrument of EU funds spending in turn is also 
partly aimed at promoting EU and especially euro area convergence, specifically on 
the aspect of increasing efficiency of spending. Furthermore, EU funds spending is 
partly aimed at improving the functioning of the internal market, as is the last 
instrument, that of internal market legislation.  
 
In comparing table 23 with the current situation of EU employment policy as 
portrayed in table 21, there are a number of changes that stand out. Firstly, the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure has been separated from the other elements of 
EU employment policy coordination and relabelled as a separate EU employment 
policy instrument. Although already partly the case in the current setting, here are two 
reasons why additional steps can be considered necessary. The first reason stems from 
the nature of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure itself and more specifically 
the lack of a strict definition on what harmful imbalances in the area of employment 
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actually are. To a certain extent this lack of a definition is unavoidable, since the large 
heterogeneity between EU Member States makes it very difficult to distil a one size 
fits all description in this area. Two issues should be central here, that of the 
development of competitiveness and that of the flexibility of markets, both elements 
that fall within the framework under the economic objective of “improving the 
functioning and flexibility of markets”722. In this regard, the current definition of an 
imbalance as portrayed in the imbalances scoreboard can be improved upon. The 
inclusion of the unemployment rate as an additional indicator has made the 
scoreboard ambiguous, since this covers various issues not directly related to 
imbalances723. Furthermore, the flexibility of markets is not covered, since this not 
directly influences the level, as much as the duration and nature of unemployment. A 
strict delineation would therefore be better served by inclusion of an indicator that 
covers flexibility of markets. The indicator on employment protection legislation that 
was used in chapter 3 could have served this role. This process of revision of the 
scoreboard would have very limited legal consequences, in the sense that there is no 
need for revision of secondary legislation and/or the Treaty, but can be done by the 
Commission in close cooperation with the Council and the European Parliament724. 
Given the fact that the imbalances scoreboard has just been agreed upon, however, it 
is doubtful that this type of change will occur in the near future. In the meantime, it is 
therefore up to the Commission, and thereafter the Council to make the right 
demarcation in the practical application of the procedure. Unfortunately, as can be 
observed from the first set of recommendations under the imbalances procedure725, 
both the Commission and the Council are still seeking, meaning that success in this 
regard is as of yet not guaranteed726.  
 
The second reason why the demarcation of the different rationales of employment 
policy coordination and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure has not fully taken 
place arguably lies in the political process of stimulating positive policy developments 
in Member States under the Europe 2020 strategy and the Euro Plus pact. As mirror 
image of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, these processes suffer from a 
                                                   
722 See chapter 2 and 4. 
723 See chapter 2. 
724 Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 4 and recital 12. 
725 Issued under Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L 306, art 6. 
726 Good examples in this regard are the country specific recommendations for Italy that were agreed in 
2012. Country specific recommendation number four, which is set out below is linked to the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure, but also includes measures that increase labour force 
participation by women, arguably as such not an aspect that should fall under the concept of 
macroeconomic imbalances.  
“4. Adopt the labour market reform as a priority to tackle the segmentation of the labour market and 
establish an integrated unemployment benefit scheme. Take further action to incentivize labour market 
participation of women, in particular through the provision of child and elderly care. Monitor and if 
needed reinforce the implementation of the new wage setting framework in order to contribute to the 
alignment of wage growth and productivity at sector and company level. (emphasis added)” 
 
perceived need for stronger intervention than can actually be justified on the basis of 
the political externalities argument that forms the basis for these procedures. 
Especially the Europe 2020 strategy with its elaborate system of National Reform 
Programmes and detailed country specific recommendations is overly burdensome for 
the Member States727. There is a large need for simplification and streamlining in this 
area. A process that includes more flexibility and opportunities for policy learning 
would fit the requirements better and would also make the distinction with the macro 
imbalances procedure easier to implement728. Also, there is no need for the Europe 
2020 strategy and the Euro Plus pact to remain as separate entities, so an integration 
of the two seems warranted. Some of these issues of simplification and streamlining, 
like the removal of the obligatory National Reform programmes, would call for 
changes in the relevant secondary legislation729. Mostly, however, this could be done 
through changes in practical working methods. However, current developments are 
moving in the opposite direction, towards even stricter and intricate monitoring and 
reporting systems. Good examples here are the obligatory National Job Plans Member 
States have to set up since 2012, with the European Council of June 2012 calling on 
Member States to develop more ambitious and precise National Job Plans for the next 
European Semester730.  
 
The second change in the set up of EU employment policy concerns the role of EU 
funds spending. EU funds spending in table 23 performs two distinct separate roles. 
The first one concerns promoting EU and especially euro area convergence, where the 
role of the EU funds is based on increasing effectiveness of spending. The second role 
that EU funds spending plays  concerns stimulating internal market related 
cooperation which is something that can apply to all countries. Comparing this new 
setup with the current situation there are three important differences, all related to the 
envisaged role of EU funds in promoting EU and especially euro area convergence. 
The first one is that there is an explicit link with all five economic objectives, since all 
categories can benefit from more efficient spending. The second one is that the money 
should go to those countries where the expected return is greatest. This means that 
there is no rationale for EU funds spending in relatively wealthier and better 
developed EU regions, since this does not increase effectiveness of spending and 
additionality can be highly questioned731. The third one is that EU funds spending 
under this heading should incorporate a general possibility for it to be used in the 
form of short term stabilisation policy to increase effectiveness of spending. This 
builds on the current system, where this possibility was incorporated for a number of 
                                                   
727 See chapter 5. 
728 This process should also, were warranted by the country in question, maintain room for some sort of 
peer pressure, where this helps countries in actually implementing structural reforms. 
729 See Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, section 1a. 
730 Conclusions of the European Council of 28/29 June 2012. 
731 See chapter 4. 
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strict delineation would therefore be better served by inclusion of an indicator that 
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was used in chapter 3 could have served this role. This process of revision of the 
scoreboard would have very limited legal consequences, in the sense that there is no 
need for revision of secondary legislation and/or the Treaty, but can be done by the 
Commission in close cooperation with the Council and the European Parliament724. 
Given the fact that the imbalances scoreboard has just been agreed upon, however, it 
is doubtful that this type of change will occur in the near future. In the meantime, it is 
therefore up to the Commission, and thereafter the Council to make the right 
demarcation in the practical application of the procedure. Unfortunately, as can be 
observed from the first set of recommendations under the imbalances procedure725, 
both the Commission and the Council are still seeking, meaning that success in this 
regard is as of yet not guaranteed726.  
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the political externalities argument that forms the basis for these procedures. 
Especially the Europe 2020 strategy with its elaborate system of National Reform 
Programmes and detailed country specific recommendations is overly burdensome for 
the Member States727. There is a large need for simplification and streamlining in this 
area. A process that includes more flexibility and opportunities for policy learning 
would fit the requirements better and would also make the distinction with the macro 
imbalances procedure easier to implement728. Also, there is no need for the Europe 
2020 strategy and the Euro Plus pact to remain as separate entities, so an integration 
of the two seems warranted. Some of these issues of simplification and streamlining, 
like the removal of the obligatory National Reform programmes, would call for 
changes in the relevant secondary legislation729. Mostly, however, this could be done 
through changes in practical working methods. However, current developments are 
moving in the opposite direction, towards even stricter and intricate monitoring and 
reporting systems. Good examples here are the obligatory National Job Plans Member 
States have to set up since 2012, with the European Council of June 2012 calling on 
Member States to develop more ambitious and precise National Job Plans for the next 
European Semester730.  
 
The second change in the set up of EU employment policy concerns the role of EU 
funds spending. EU funds spending in table 23 performs two distinct separate roles. 
The first one concerns promoting EU and especially euro area convergence, where the 
role of the EU funds is based on increasing effectiveness of spending. The second role 
that EU funds spending plays  concerns stimulating internal market related 
cooperation which is something that can apply to all countries. Comparing this new 
setup with the current situation there are three important differences, all related to the 
envisaged role of EU funds in promoting EU and especially euro area convergence. 
The first one is that there is an explicit link with all five economic objectives, since all 
categories can benefit from more efficient spending. The second one is that the money 
should go to those countries where the expected return is greatest. This means that 
there is no rationale for EU funds spending in relatively wealthier and better 
developed EU regions, since this does not increase effectiveness of spending and 
additionality can be highly questioned731. The third one is that EU funds spending 
under this heading should incorporate a general possibility for it to be used in the 
form of short term stabilisation policy to increase effectiveness of spending. This 
builds on the current system, where this possibility was incorporated for a number of 
                                                   
727 See chapter 5. 
728 This process should also, were warranted by the country in question, maintain room for some sort of 
peer pressure, where this helps countries in actually implementing structural reforms. 
729 See Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L 306, section 1a. 
730 Conclusions of the European Council of 28/29 June 2012. 
731 See chapter 4. 
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specific countries.  
 
A reshuffling of the tasks between the European Social Fund and the European 
Regional Development Fund could follow these lines of demarcation, changing the 
secondary legislation in place to link the ESF explicitly to the internal market and the 
ERDF to the issue of convergence. Because the ESF in this new setting would only be 
used for projects related to enhancing cross border mobility, clarity would be 
improved. Furthermore, this new setting would need to ensure additionality, 
effectiveness and efficiency of spending, while leaving sufficient room for Member 
States to choose their own policy priorities. This would call for EU Structural Funds 
based on increasing the efficiency of spending by transferring money between 
Member States, with an output based control system on EU level and project based 
control system on Member State level732. Relating these considerations to the recent 
Commission proposals for the Structural Funds733 one can indeed see an elaborate 
system of ex ante conditionalities and control is set in place for Member States to 
incorporate in its strategic partnership contract, including expected results, milestones 
and targets, which should allow for a thorough output based control on EU level by 
the European Commission. Furthermore, a general possibility for Member States to 
request an increase of co-financing rates when they are in financial difficulties, 
incorporates the short term stabilisation objective. Main problems, however, in this 
proposal are similar to those under the current setting. First of all, a clear demarcation 
between funds is not present. Furthermore, in the new proposals, all Member States 
still receive funding from the various EU funds, which is not in line with the 
efficiency of spending rationale. Further elements of critique relate to aspects that 
seem unnecessarily onerous for Member States and are therefore not in line with the 
proportionality considerations as discussed in this study. These are mainly concerned 
with the level of control and EU influence in national programmes, which in instances 
go further than the output based control propagated here. The various proposals for 
instance include very specific subjects which Member States are required to 
incorporate in their partnership contracts and programmes, including e.g. an 
earmarking of 20% of ESF funding to be spent on the goal of “promoting social 
inclusion and combating poverty”, which unnecessarily limits Member State 
flexibility734. Furthermore, the Commission is given an approving role as far as the 
                                                   
732 See chapter 5. 
733 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic 
Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615 final. 
734 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006’ COM(2011)607 final, art 
4(2). 
 
setting of the Partnership contacts and the specific programmes that fall under this 
partnership contract735, which again seems unnecessarily onerous.  
 
The third difference between table 23 and the current situation concerns internal 
market legislation. In the new framework, this is solely aimed at improving the 
functioning and flexibility of markets, removing the economic objective of improving 
framework conditions. That this rationale was incorporated in the current set up was 
due to the posting of workers Directive736, which lays down a basic floor of rights to 
be observed in cross border posting of workers. One could indeed argue that this 
limiting of scope of the posting of workers Directive has already taken place with the 
recent judgements by the Court of Justice, especially cases Laval737 and Ruffert738739. 
Furthermore, streamlining within the various pieces of internal market legislation can 
be along the lines of changing the directive and regulations to abolish the EU 
distinction between worker and self-employed, leaving this to the Member States. 
Notably, this would call for a removal of the free movement of workers Regulation740, 
or integrating this with e.g. the EU citizens Directive741. Indeed, the equal treatment 
and employment provisions of the free movement of workers Regulation can be said 
to carry very little added value to the EU citizens Directive. The removal of this 
Regulation would still leave a complex system. However, it should be realised that 
due to the specific nature of the various elements covered this to some extent cannot 
be avoided. This is especially relevant for the professional qualifications Directive742 
and the social security coordination Regulations743. For these issues focus should lie 
on changing the secondary legislation to adapt to changing labour market 
circumstances, while improving transparency and information provision and 
                                                   
735 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic 
Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615 final, art15 and 25. 
736 Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L 18. 
737 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-00000. 
738 Case C-346/06 Ruffert [2008] lRLR 467. 
739 See chapter 5. 
740 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141. 
741 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158. 
742 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255. 
743 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166 and Regulation 987/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L 284. 
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specific countries.  
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used for projects related to enhancing cross border mobility, clarity would be 
improved. Furthermore, this new setting would need to ensure additionality, 
effectiveness and efficiency of spending, while leaving sufficient room for Member 
States to choose their own policy priorities. This would call for EU Structural Funds 
based on increasing the efficiency of spending by transferring money between 
Member States, with an output based control system on EU level and project based 
control system on Member State level732. Relating these considerations to the recent 
Commission proposals for the Structural Funds733 one can indeed see an elaborate 
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incorporate in its strategic partnership contract, including expected results, milestones 
and targets, which should allow for a thorough output based control on EU level by 
the European Commission. Furthermore, a general possibility for Member States to 
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incorporates the short term stabilisation objective. Main problems, however, in this 
proposal are similar to those under the current setting. First of all, a clear demarcation 
between funds is not present. Furthermore, in the new proposals, all Member States 
still receive funding from the various EU funds, which is not in line with the 
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with the level of control and EU influence in national programmes, which in instances 
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incorporate in their partnership contracts and programmes, including e.g. an 
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Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158. 
742 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255. 
743 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166 and Regulation 987/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L 284. 
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facilitating application on the ground. The recent Commission proposal on the 
professional qualifications Directive presented December 2011744 in this regard can be 
positively appreciated, e.g. concerning its ideas for the installation of a (voluntary) 
European professional card, mandatory application of the Internal Market Information 
(IMI) system and the installation of a screening exercise concerning the requirements 
present in the Member States, something which can pose significant benefits745. A 
similar positive appraisal can be given to the recent proposals on the posting of 
workers Directive, which are exactly aimed at improving administrative cooperation 
between Member States, improving monitoring and enforcement of the Directive and 
improving clarity and information provision regarding the definition of posting and 
the interpretation of the terms and conditions of employment in the Directive746. 
 
Finally, the last and largest change to the current system is that the new set up 
removes social employment policy as a separate EU employment policy instrument. 
The framework of the division of power in the supranational legal order, fiscal 
federalism and the EU's legal considerations of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality make an insufficient case for inclusion of social employment policy as 
a separate EU instrument to achieve the various economic objectives. There is a case 
to be made for EU action in these areas on the basis of political externalities related to 
the rationale of improving positive policy developments in the Member States747, 
however, as argued above, issues of coherence and transparency would have this be 
included as part of the employment policy coordination process. The legislative 
measures in this area would therefore be removed entirely from the EU policy setting, 
leaving legislation in these areas up to Member States.  
 
Since under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in its various possible legal bases 
in title X748 secondary legislation is optional (with the exception of the issue of gender 
equality749), this can be to a great extent be achieved by removing the various 
Directives in this area.  Even so, however, this proposal will inevitably face very large 
political and practical implementation issues, where given the political setting and 
vested interest it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to scratch these aspects of 
EU policy750. It is therefore worthwhile to further develop an alternative way forward, 
                                                   
744 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of 
professional qualifications and Regulation [...] on administrative cooperation through the Internal 
Market Information System’ COM(2011)883. 
745 See chapter 5. 
746 Commission, ‘staff working document executive summary of the impact assessment accompanying 
the document proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services and proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services’ SWD(2012)64 final. 
747 See chapter 5. 
748 Notable articles 153, 155, 156 and 160 TFEU.  
749 Art 157 TFEU. 
750 Furthermore, even from the point of view of achieving GDP per capita growth this may not be 
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based on changing the rationale of the existing social employment policy instruments 
to better fit the EU's role in employment policy. Since there is a large scale review 
process of the EU's social employment policy legislation going on at this moment 
there is some reason to be optimistic on the possibilities for creating momentum 
towards such a goal.  
 
There are two non-mutually exclusive avenues for improvement that can be identified. 
The first one is to further align the pieces of legislation with the political externalities 
rationale of the employment policy coordination instrument. The second one is to 
improve the functioning and flexibility of markets objective in the various pieces of 
legislation. In taking such an approach one can build on the work of Scharpf 
(2002)751. Scharpf sets out an avenue for improvement of the European social model 
by combining framework Directives with the Open Method of Coordination. 
Applying this to the various legislative measures examined in this study one can see 
that the underlying rationale of the various pieces of legislation is based on either 
equality of treatment752 or minimum working conditions753. With the exception of 
equal treatment based on type of employment contracts, both these issues as far as 
fundamental rights are concerned are already laid down in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union754, which, since the Treaty of Lisbon, has the same 
legal status as the Treaty755. Combining these general principles with an OMC process 
built on political externalities would be a good way to improve the link with the 
political externalities rationale. However, the rights coming from the charter only 
apply to the Member States for as far as they are implementing EU law756. If it is 
therefore deemed necessary for these rights to be legally enforceable at the EU level, 
which arguably will be the case, either an integration in the Treaty or additional 
Directives remain necessary. One paragraph only pieces of secondary legislation seem 
a logical next step. However, such a system is only workable to a limited extent, as 
has been observed in the area of gender equality. Here the existence of a right 
enforceable on EU level enshrined in the Treaty led to interpretation of this right by 
the Commission and the Court of Justice, which built up until legal clarity, and a 
sense of ownership by the Council, called for additional legislation concerning the 
application of this right.  
 
Keeping these caveats in mind, concrete changes to legislative instruments in the area 
of social employment policy that would make it fit better in the framework developed 
                                                                                                                                                 
altogether beneficial, since companies have in fact installed measures that count on this legislation 
Consistency of policy as far as economic development in concerned is also of value in and of itself. 
751 Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the challenges of diversity’ (Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol 40, no 4, 2002) 
752 Either based on gender or type of employment contract. 
753 Either health and safety or working time. 
754 art 23 and 31 of the charter 
755 art 6 TFEU 
756 art 51(1) of the charter 
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in this study can be envisioned around a number of lines. First, the various Directives 
should arguably consist of a definition of what the right in question actually entails, 
when it applies and how it should be applied. Furthermore, they should also to the 
largest extent possible stay away from differentiating between self-employed and 
employed workers, and between employed workers under different contract757. Both 
should leave as much room as possible for the Member States to fit into their own 
national preferences. This could for instance mean an EU definition of maximum 
hours of working time that does not include a concrete number of hours, while 
Member States are obliged to install a concrete definition in their national legal 
systems. Furthermore, these issues can be more explicitly linked to the functioning 
and flexibility of markets, something which would be in line with the current 
discourse on flexicurity. An obligation for the Member States could e.g. be included 
to ensure that the necessary implementing measures do not hinder the functioning of 
the internal market, or even help in promoting its functioning. The same obligation 
could be installed stating that the legislation should not in any way contribute to 
sustaining or creating harmful macroeconomic imbalances758. A mutual screening 
exercise, like the one seen used in the implementation of the services Directive759, 
could then be used to provide additional clarity on the various national systems. 
Where needed this could identify areas for additional action and in any case this could 
be the starting point for an OMC process in this area, which could take these results 
and stimulate political debate and possibilities for policy learning on the various 
issues. 
 
Rebuilding EU employment policy along these lines would lead to a more streamlined 
and differentiated set of EU employment policy instruments. To then ensure that the 
EU instruments in practice also contribute to achieving the objectives there are two 
more suggestions for improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
757 Something which as we have seen will sometimes be made difficult due to wording of the legal 
bases, which can relate to workers and not the self-employed, see the Directive 89/391/EEC of the 
Council of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183  
758 Though for this a more concrete definition of a macroeconomic imbalance would arguably be 
necessary. 
759 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L 376, art 39. 
 
5. Ensure proper links between EU employment policy instruments  
6. Ensure effective democratic legitimacy and accountability at the level where power 
is exercised 
 
As can be seen in table 23, in the system of EU employment policy that is propagated 
here, there are two different links between the EU employment policy instruments. 
The first link is that between the instrument of employment policy coordination and 
the EU funds in helping to achieve all five different economic objectives. The second 
revolves around the economic objective of improving the functioning and flexibility 
of markets, something that all four different instruments contribute to.  
 
The link between EU employment policy coordination and EU funds spending will 
have to be incorporated in both instruments, more specifically in the integrated 
guidelines under article 121 and 148 TFEU and the Structural Funds Regulations. 
Looking ahead at the most recent Commission proposals for the Structural Funds 
Regulations for the period 2014-2020760, a number of different links are incorporated. 
First of all, the Commission proposes that the funds will be fully aimed at achieving 
the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. Furthermore, Member States “shall concentrate 
support, in accordance with the Fund-specific rules, on actions bringing the greatest 
added value in relation to the Union strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth”761. The required link between the two instruments in the Commission 
proposal is therewith largely satisfactory taken into account. If anything, one element 
that could cause concern is the possibility that is installed in article 21 of the proposal 
for the Commission to request a Member State to review and propose changes to the 
partnership contract in line with the country specific recommendations that are issued 
under articles 121 and 148 TFEU to which a country has to respond. There is a valid 
case to be made for such a possibility since the country specific recommendations are 
aimed at the weakest points in Member States economic and employment policies. 
However, improvement in various areas does not necessarily always mean spending 
more money. Efficiency of spending could e.g. be more of an issue, or changes in 
legislation for instance in the area of employment protection legislation.  
 
The second link between the EU employment policy instruments concerns the link 
                                                   
760 Most relevantly Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by 
the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006’ COM(2011)615 final. 
761 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic 
Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615 final, art 16. 
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760 Most relevantly Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by 
the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006’ COM(2011)615 final. 
761 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic 
Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006’ 
COM(2011)615 final, art 16. 
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between all the four EU employment policy instruments in the area of improving the 
functioning and flexibility of markets. The macroeconomic imbalances procedure 
would in this set up form a strict process for a limited number of countries, namely 
those were there is a (risk of) harmful economic imbalances occurring. This process is 
based on governing and stimulating efficient economic outcomes in the area of 
competitiveness and labour market flexibility, but would leave Member States free in 
choosing the exact manner of policy intervention. The instrument of employment 
policy coordination would add to this process by providing a forum for political 
externalities and policy learning to take place and would in fact be aimed at specific 
policy actions in all Member States. EU funds spending could then provide funds to 
implement policy measures in the area of improving the functioning and flexibility of 
markets when this is justified from an efficiency of spending rationale and when this 
concerns cross border projects. Internal market legislation could lastly provide for the 
implementation of policy measures in this area with a cross border element.  
 
To ensure such coherence between the four different instruments there are a number 
of additional aspects to the system as its stands today that should be improved upon. 
First of all, whether or not the macroeconomic imbalances procedure will in fact limit 
itself to an output oriented approach is still uncertain and will depend on its 
application by the Commission and the Council762. Also, that the internal market 
legislation has a function in improving the functioning and flexibility of markets and 
is therefore linked to both the macroeconomic imbalances procedure and the 
instrument of employment policy coordination is not incorporated in the current 
Regulations and integrated guidelines, an omission which should be remedied. 
Finally, EU funds spending should play a fully complementary role, a reasoning 
which goes partly against the current Commission proposals as far as the link with 
macroeconomic imbalances is concerned763. Specifically, these proposals incorporate 
two conditionality links764. First, the Commission can recommend Member States to 
review and propose changes to the Partnership contract and relevant programs 
provided that these amendments are deemed necessary to help correct the 
macroeconomic imbalances. This fits the role of EU funds spending, with especially 
the phrase “provided that these amendments are deemed necessary to help correct the 
                                                   
762 See chapter 5.  
763 Most relevantly Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by 
the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006’ COM(2011)615 final 
764 relevantly Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by 
the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006’ COM(2011)615 final, art 21. 
 
macroeconomic imbalances”, which provides for the necessary flexibility. However, 
in the same article it is also stated that the Commission shall suspend parts or all of 
the payments for the programs where the Member State does not act in accordance 
with some stages of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure. Though from an 
incentive point of view this possibility could be justified, such a method of 
sanctioning does not make sense. Even more so, the suspension of payments can lead 
to a further deterioration of the position of the Member State. Consideration should 
therefore be given to finding alternatives than suspending funding for projects which 
are in fact meant to assist in achieving the economic objective in question. 
 
The final avenue for improvement of the EU employment policy setting relates to 
ensuring effective democratic legitimacy and control at the level where power is 
exercised. Concerning the newly set up and delineated instrument of employment 
policy coordination the most important element for improvement arguably lies in 
clearly laying responsibility for ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability in 
the hands of national parliaments. In a process based on political externalities as 
propagated here, the limitations for Member States in implementing employment 
policy measures that fall under this heading are only present to a very limited extent. 
Therefore there is no justifiable role for a system of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability at EU level. Concretely, this would mean largely abolishing the role 
that the European Parliament has in the context of the European Semester, notably 
related to the scrutiny of the country specific recommendations, something which can 
be achieved by changing the relevant secondary legislation. This, however, runs 
contrary to the current developments, where the European Parliament in the European 
semester has been given an increasingly larger role765. Also, this would call for 
increased efforts in mitigating the general problems of legitimacy and accountability 
that national parliaments have in the EU multilevel setting766. Measures that could be 
envisaged include actively mitigating the knowledge asymmetries between 
governments and national parliaments on the EU process, increasing the possibilities 
for influencing the national government policy stance in this process EU policy 
combined with more mundane issues related to increasing time, interest and resources 
devoted to the subject in national parliaments. 
 
Contrary to this proposal for a smaller role of the European Parliament in the area of 
employment policy coordination an increased role of the European Parliament in the 
macroeconomic imbalances is warranted. There are two roles that the European 
Parliament has to fulfil here. The first is ensuring input legitimacy in setting the 
definition of macroeconomic imbalances. This has to some extent taken place, but 
                                                   
765 See also Hallerberg, Marzinotto and Wolff, ‘How effective and legitimate is the European 
Semester? Increasing the role of the European Parliament’ (Bruegel working paper 2011/09, 2011) that 
comes to exactly the opposite conclusion, though this is based on broader issues than employment, 
including fiscal policy, where there arguably is a greater rationale for a role of the European Parliament 
in ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability.  
766 See chapter 5. 
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European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by 
the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006’ COM(2011)615 final 
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Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
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765 See also Hallerberg, Marzinotto and Wolff, ‘How effective and legitimate is the European 
Semester? Increasing the role of the European Parliament’ (Bruegel working paper 2011/09, 2011) that 
comes to exactly the opposite conclusion, though this is based on broader issues than employment, 
including fiscal policy, where there arguably is a greater rationale for a role of the European Parliament 
in ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability.  
766 See chapter 5. 
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should be improved upon by changing the Regulation on the macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure to make the European Parliament a full partner in negotiating 
the scoreboard, instead of the current compromise where only part of the scoreboard 
is laid down in the Regulation itself. This arguably can even be done without 
removing the European Commission from the driver seat, for instance, by granting the 
Commission the power to lay down the macroeconomic imbalances scoreboard by 
delegated act767. The second role concerns ensuring democratic accountability of the 
European Commission in application of the procedure. Given a proper definition of a 
macroeconomic imbalance the establishment of whether a macroeconomic imbalance 
actually exist in a Member State and whether sufficient action is taken to mitigate or 
prevent this imbalance arguably becomes a technical exercise, best left in the hands of 
independent bureaucrats instead of politicians768. In the current setting, the entity 
closest to that of an independent bureaucrat is the European Commission, but as seen 
in the previous chapter an independent role for the Commission here is not present 
since it is still the Council that makes the ultimate decision, be it with reversed 
Qualified Majority Voting, while the reversed QMV only kicks in after the decision 
that establishes a possible excessive imbalance. In the framework a greater 
independent role of the Commission is therefore warranted769, which could be 
incorporated by changing the Regulations on the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure to extend the use of reversed QMV. A more ambitious step would be to 
change the process to be based on Commission decisions instead of recommendations, 
or, alternatively, to set up a process where the Commission puts forward a proposal to 
the Council, which it may amend only by acting unanimously770. The latter however,  
may necessitate a change in article 121 TFEU, which will not only affect employment 
policy coordination, but also issues related to broader economic and fiscal policy 
which are not covered by this study. The role of the European Parliament should then 
be focussed on ensuring that the Commission plays its role in identifying 
macroeconomic imbalances and in controlling whether Member States take sufficient 
action, while ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability concerning the 
concrete measures that are taken by the Member States remains the responsibility of 
national parliaments. The current requirements in the macro imbalances Regulations 
seem largely appropriate for this function, although several issues related to the 
general EU setting and position of the European Parliament therein as well as its 
specific role in this procedure can form a hurdle for an effective monitoring system in 
                                                   
767 Art 290 TFEU. 
768 For an entertaining and enlightening display of the trade-off between placing decision making in the 
hands of politicians vs. the hands of independent bureaucrats see Alesina and Tabellini, ‘Bureacrats or 
politicians? Part 1; a single policy task’ (American Economic Review, 2007) and Alesina and 
Tabellini, ‘Bureaucrats vs. politicians? Part 2; multiple policy tasks’(Journal of Public Economics 92, 
2008) 
769 Arguably however this would run into trouble with the Treaty, since such an independent role would 
no longer be in accordance with the procedure of art 121 TFEU, which is needed for such action to take 
place under art 136 TFEU. 
770 Art 293 TFEU.  
 
this regard771. Most notably, the complexity of the topic and knowledge asymmetry 
between the Commission and the European Parliament will arguably continue to hold 
back proper dialogue unless the European Parliament invests heavily in acquiring the 
necessary background knowledge and ensures proper focus in its inputs. Experiences 
in this regard in the area of monetary policy are not promising. Here attempts have 
been made to counter the existence of a knowledge asymmetry between the European 
Parliament and the ECB by the use of a Monetary Expert Panel, a group of monetary 
policy experts assisting the European Parliament in the preparation of the monetary 
dialogue. However, as Amtenbrink and van Duin (2009) show, input from this panel 
has only managed to deepen the debate to a very limited extent772.  
 
Concerning the instrument of the internal market in the current setting serious limits 
to effective democratic legitimacy and accountability have been shown to stem from 
the lack of data availability and limited possibilities in analysing the actual 
effectiveness of policy in influencing economic output variables773. Increasing 
transparency and, therewith, output legitimacy by improving evidence based policy 
making, with solid data on cross border flows and the effects of the measures in 
question should therefore be one of the first priorities. Next to Commission efforts in 
this regard, academia can play a large role here as well. Where such analysis is 
available, most notably for the services Directive, it was shown for instance that there 
are still significant gains to adjusting the Directive, for instance in the area of the 
country of origin principle. Furthermore, concerning reporting and review clauses, a 
large variety of different methods in the various pieces of internal market legislation 
were identified. The services Directive was considered best practice in this regard. 
Democratic legitimacy and accountability would therefore be served by implementing 
similar systems in the other pieces of legislation.  
 
 
  
                                                   
771 See chapter 5 . 
772 Amtenbrink and van Duin, ‘The European Central Bank Before the European Parliament: Theory 
and Practice After Ten Years of Monetary Dialogue’ (European Law Review, No. 4, 2009). 
773 See chapter 4. 
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Introductie 
In een wereld waar het merendeel van de mensen het grootste deel van hun leven 
werkend doorbrengt kan de arbeidsmarkt terecht worden beschouwd als een van de 
kernonderdelen van de hedendaagse samenleving. Het inkomen dat wordt verdiend en 
het nut dat wordt verworven door het uitoefenen van de arbeid in kwestie beïnvloeden 
het welvaartsniveau van de samenleving op een fundamentele manier. Gegeven deze 
centrale rol van de arbeidsmarkt in het bepalen van de welvaart van burgers is het 
geen wonder dat overheden over de hele wereld proberen om het arbeidsmarktproces 
te beïnvloeden. Overheidsingrijpen gericht op het beïnvloeden van de uitkomsten van 
het arbeidsmarkt proces bestaat al eeuwen, en is gedurende die tijd uitgevoerd door 
alle verschillende niveaus van overheid, variërend van lokale en regionale tot 
nationale overheden. Meer recentelijk overschrijdt overheidsingrijpen in de 
arbeidsmarkt zelfs de grenzen van de natiestaat. De Europese Unie heeft sinds zijn 
ontstaan in de jaren vijftig van de vorige eeuw op een aantal verschillende terreinen 
beleid gevoerd gericht op het sturen van het arbeidsmarktproces. Dit betreft beleid 
gericht op het faciliteren van het vrij verkeer van werknemers, het neerleggen van 
gemeenschappelijke sociale minimumstandaarden, het spenderen van EU fondsen en 
het coördineren van het door de lidstaten zelf gevoerde arbeidsmarktbeleid. Het zijn 
deze Europese beleidsinspanningen en hun functioneren die het onderwerp van 
beschouwing zijn in deze studie. Specifiek stelt deze studie de volgende 
onderzoeksvraag 
 
“Wat zijn de economische doelen van het werkgelegenheidsbeleid van de Europese 
Unie en hoe effectief is het beleid in het behalen van deze doelen?” 
 
De studie behandelt deze onderzoeksvraag door allereerst de economische doelen van 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid ten algemene onder de loep te nemen en te categoriseren. 
Vervolgens bespreekt deze studie de ontwikkeling van de verschillende instrumenten 
die door de EU worden ingezet op dit terrein, de focus en impact van deze 
instrumenten en een aantal institutionele aspecten die het functioneren van de 
Europese werkgelegenheidsinstrumenten in praktijk kunnen beïnvloeden. Ten slotte 
worden conclusies getrokken en voorstellen gedaan voor verbetering.  
 
Opzet van het boek 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt besproken welke doelen overheden vanuit economisch 
perspectief kunnen nastreven voor het voeren van werkgelegenheidsbeleid. Basis voor 
beschouwing is een zogenaamde "growth accounting" vergelijking, waarbij BBP per 
capita groei wordt bepaald als functie van de groei van hoeveelheid arbeid gebruikt en 
de arbeidsproductiviteit. Deze simpele vergelijking wordt in dit hoofdstuk verder 
uitgesplitst om de verschillende aspecten boven tafel te krijgen die bepalen hoe het 
BBP per capita zich ontwikkeld. Uiteindelijk leidt deze analyse tot vijf doelen die de 
overheid kan nastreven in het maken van werkgelegenheidsbeleid, namelijk het 
 
vergroten van prikkels voor werk, het verbeteren van het functioneren en de 
flexibiliteit van markten, het vergroten van de hoeveelheid menselijk kapitaal, het 
verbeteren van raamwerkvoorwaarden en korte termijn stabiliseringsbeleid.  
  
Hoofdstuk 3 zet uiteen welk type instrumenten op het gebied van het 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid zijn ontwikkeld op EU niveau sinds het ontstaan van de EU 
in de jaren vijftig. Naast een weergave van de ontwikkeling van deze instrumenten 
door de tijd relateert dit hoofdstuk deze instrumenten tevens tot de economische 
doelen zoals uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 2. De analyse maakt duidelijk dat de 
ontwikkeling van het EU werkgelegenheidsbeleid door de jaren heen heeft geleid tot 
vier verschillende beleidsinstrumenten, namelijk de coördinatie van nationaal 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid, wetgeving op het gebied van de Interne Markt, sociaal 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid en uitgaven uit EU fondsen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 vervolgt deze beschouwing door een nadere blik te werpen op de 
koppeling tussen de economische doelen en de instrumenten van het EU 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid en de rol die deze instrumenten daadwerkelijk spelen in het 
beïnvloeden van de uitkomsten van het arbeidsmarktproces. Er wordt aangetoond dat 
de koppeling tussen de economische doelen en de instrumenten ten algemene goed is 
vormgegeven. Echter, deze is verre van perfect, iets wat met name duidelijk wordt in 
beschouwing van de sociale aspecten van het EU werkgelegenheidsbeleid. De analyse 
van de wijze waarop de instrumenten van het EU werkgelegenheidsbeleid hebben 
bijgedragen aan het verwezenlijken van de economische doelen van dit beleid toont 
voorts aan dat hier sprake is van een grote heterogeniteit tussen lidstaten. Dit betreft 
zowel de oorspronkelijke uitgangsposities van de lidstaten als de ontwikkeling van de 
relevante arbeidsmarktvariabelen door de tijd heen. Tevens bestaan er grote 
verschillen in effecten tussen de verschillende EU instrumenten.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 neemt de analyse van het functioneren van de instrumenten van het EU 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid een stap verder door het analyseren van drie verschillende 
institutionele aspecten van het beleid die een effect kunnen hebben op de wijze 
waarop de instrumenten bij (kunnen) dragen aan het behalen van de economische 
doelen gesteld. Deze drie aspecten betreffen de verdeling van macht in de 
supranationale rechtsorde, democratische legitimiteit en verantwoording en coherentie 
en praktische toepassing. Hier wordt duidelijk dat al deze aspecten helpen bij het 
verklaren van het succes, of gebrek daaraan, van de verschillende instrumenten.  
 
Hoofdstuk 6 ten slotte geeft een aantal conclusies en doet aanbevelingen ter 
verbetering van het systeem. Ten algemene leidt de analyse in deze studie tot een 
gemengd beeld. Aan de ene kant zijn de doelen zoals nagestreefd door de 
instrumenten van het EU werkgelegenheidsbeleid grotendeels in lijn met de 
economische doelen zoals af te leiden uit de economische theorie. Aan de andere kant 
heeft het EU werkgelegenheidsbeleid zich door de jaren heen ontwikkeld tot een zeer 
complex systeem met grote overlap tussen instrumenten en vage terminologie met een 
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Introductie 
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onzekere invloed op de reëel economische ontwikkelingen. Er is dan ook ruimte voor 
verbetering, waarvoor dit hoofdstuk dan ook concrete aanbevelingen doet 
onderverdeeld in zes thema's; 
1. Verbeter de duidelijkheid en consistentie van gevoerd beleid. 
2. Verwijder het risico van beleid dat ingaat tegen de gestelde economische doelen.  
3. Stroomlijn het gevoerde beleid.  
4. Differentieer de instrumenten van het EU werkgelegenheidsbeleid naar gelang de 
rationale voor handelen. 
5. Verzeker afdoende verbindingen tussen de verschillende instrumenten. 
6. Verzeker effectieve mechanismen van democratische legitimiteit en 
verantwoording op het niveau waarop macht wordt uitgeoefend.  
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